— THE GLOBAL MIDDLE EAST —

Foreign Policy as Nation Making

Turkey and Egypt in the Cold War

— REEM ABOU-EL-FADL —

Foreign Policy as Nation Making

After the Second World War, Turkey and Egypt were among the most dynamic actors in the Middle East. Their 1950s foreign policies presented a puzzle, however: Turkey's Democrat Party pursued NATO membership and sponsored the pro-Western Baghdad Pact regionally, while Egypt's Free Officers promoted neutralism and pan-Arab alliances. This book asks why: what explains this divergence in a shared historical space? Rethinking foreign policy as an important site for the realisation of nationalist commitments, Abou-El-Fadl finds the answer in the contrasting nation making projects pursued by the two leaderships, each politicised differently through experiences of war, imperialism and underdevelopment. Drawing on untapped Turkish and Arabic sources, and critically engaging with theories of postcolonial nationalism, she emphasises local actors' agency in striving to secure national belonging, sovereignty and progress in the international field. Her analysis sheds light on the contemporary legacies of the decade which cemented Turkey's position in the Western bloc and Egypt's reputation as Arab leader.

REEM ABOU-EL-FADL is Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies at SOAS, University of London. Before moving to SOAS, she was Lecturer at Durham University and Jarvis Doctorow Junior Research Fellow in International Relations and the Middle East at the University of Oxford.

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REEM ABOU-EL-FADL
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

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Abbreviations

Turkey

TE	Turkish Embassy
TFM	Turkish Foreign Ministry
TRA	Turkish Republican Archives

Egypt

ECM	Egyptian Council of Ministers
EE	Egyptian Embassy
EFM	Egyptian Foreign Ministry, Cairo
ENA	Egyptian National Archives
ERA	Egyptian Radio Archives

United Kingdom

BE	British Embassy
BNA	British National Archives
FO	Foreign Office
SWM	Summary of World Broadcasts

United States

DOS	Department of State
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
NSC	National Security Council
USE US	Embassy

France

FDA	French Diplomatic Archives
FE	French Embassy
FFM	French Foreign Ministry

Introduction

On a hot and heady evening in June 2013, thousands of Egyptian Islamists packed Cairo International Stadium for a 'Support for Syria' rally organised by the Muslim Brotherhood. Senior Muslim Brother and then Egyptian president Muhammad Mursi entered the stadium to the chants of a charged crowd, who threw him the Syrian opposition and Egyptian flags to carry, and vowed to defeat Syrian president Bashar al-Asad. As the audience recited songs of religious victory, Salafi clerics took to the stage, calling on young Egyptians to travel to Syria and wage 'holy war' against the Syrian army. Mursi followed with the thrilling announcement that Egypt was to cut all ties with the Syrian regime, close Syria's embassy in Cairo, and withdraw the Egyptian envoy from Damascus. He pledged Egypt's 'material and moral support' to the opposition, and urged the imposition of a no-fly zone over Syria. In this, he intended to coordinate with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, he said, with whom he had worked in the past in pursuit of a resolution to the conflict.

Indeed Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had been the first to intervene in Syria: after the failure of early talks with al-Asad, he had cut ties with Damascus in September 2011, and imposed an arms embargo. His decision came after a high-profile 'Arab Spring tour' starting in Egypt, where he had denounced the Syrian leader and proposed that Turkey and Egypt form an 'axis of democracy' in the post-uprisings era. Already that summer, the Turkish government had quickly provided a political home to the Syrian opposition and quietly opened the border to aid its fighters, whose largest element came from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Even though their political projects hail from different traditions, Erdoğan's behaviour reflected the ideological affinity and flourishing business ties between the Brotherhood and the Turkish Milli Görüş ('National Outlook') movements. It also betrayed his intention to seize the role of regional leader, which had long eluded non-Arab powers in the Middle East. Erdoğan believed

that his devout Sunni credentials set him apart, and that he could recast the Ottoman imperial space as a kind of twenty-first-century Islamic commonwealth, with Turkey at the helm.

Both Mursi's and Erdoğan's actions had chimed with the United States' and European Union's moves to lobby for sanctions on Syria at the United Nations. By December 2012, Washington and Brussels had recognised a new outfit for the Syrian opposition, the Islamist-dominated Syrian National Coalition, based in Cairo, as well as its Supreme Military Council, launched in Antalya. This Turkish–Egyptian coordination over Syria lasted until June 2013, when the Egyptian military dramatically unseated Mursi, and moved to repair ties with Damascus.

Sixty years earlier, in a very different international scene, Syria was again the arena for Turkey and Egypt's regional activism, this time in a confrontation. After the Second World War, anticolonial movements were gaining momentum across Asia and Africa, while the two superpowers looked to spread their influence eastwards. Turkey's leadership, the Democrat Party government, was consumed by hostility to the Soviet Union. In the mid-1950s, it began accusing its Syrian counterpart of turning communist, and sought American assistance in thwarting this with a show of force. Meanwhile Egypt's Free Officers, having overthrown the monarchy, emphasised the sovereign choice of Arab states after liberation from colonialism. When Turkey mobilised troops to the Syrian border, Moscow and Washington signalled their support for each side, while Egypt sent troops to the port of Latakia in response. The standoff became known as the Syrian Crisis of 1957 and was one of the moments at which the superpowers nearly came to blows.

This tension had been brewing ever since Turkey had begun encouraging its neighbours to join pro-Western regional alliances. Indeed it had been the Turkish diplomats who first pursued the Western bloc, rather than the reverse. The Democrats tenaciously sought and secured membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1952, institutionalising Turkey's Western choice. The corollary of this orientation had long been a foreign policy distant from Turkey's Middle East neighbours. Yet the Democrats played an uncharacteristically activist role in promoting the ill-fated Baghdad Pact of 1955. Meanwhile, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser had been suspicious of such Western-sponsored defence pacts from the first, viewing them as attempts by former and emerging imperialist powers to secure their

bases in Egypt. He rebuffed Anglo-American overtures on regional defence, striving to remain independent of both superpower blocs. Consequently, when the Baghdad Pact was signed, Nasser rallied for its containment, and for an Arab alternative. Turkey and Egypt now stood on opposing sides of a regional and superpower struggle.

This book takes the puzzle of this divergence as its entry point into the political imaginaries and frays of the 1950s, the decade which cemented Turkey's enduring position in the Western bloc and Egypt's global reputation as an Arab leader. It asks the question why: given that modern Turkey and Egypt emerged from a shared geographical, historical and cultural space, why did their foreign policy stances diverge so much in the 1950s? As their engagement in the region continues, what can this tell us about trends in the foreign policy of each country since, and about the place of this historical legacy in contemporary foreign policy debates?

The foreign policy practices of Turkey and Egypt are often analysed within realist frameworks of international relations theory, either as responses to superpower rivalry and mutual insecurity in the Cold War, or else as adventurous pursuits of regional hegemony.[1] From this perspective, Turkey is presented as reactive, seeking to balance against threats in the international system, such as the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Egypt is cast as expansionist, even imperialist, in its policies towards the Arab world. In both readings, states are depicted as calculating their national interest based on material factors – military and economic capacity – and as acting rationally to maximise these. Given that Turkey and Egypt would not have looked dissimilar on a realist balance sheet in 1950 – the sizes of their militaries and rates of economic growth were close[2] – this leaves their different alliance choices unexplained. Meanwhile, foreign policy analyses that incorporate the role of identity and domestic politics tend to present them as instrumentalised. For example, pan-Arabism is routinely treated as a tool of

[1] Pınar Bilgin, 'Securing Turkey through Western Oriented Foreign Policy', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, pp. 107–8.

[2] See Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1998. Turkey and Egypt have been described as 'the two most populous, oil-poor, labour-surplus economies of the region, with roughly comparable levels of development': Çağlar Keyder and Ayşe Öncü, 'Introduction', in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Keyder and Öncü eds., *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1994, p. 1.

legitimation, employed strategically by Egyptian political elites. Such analysis does not bring us closer to understanding the drive behind the foreign policy itself.

This book presents a rereading of Turkey's and Egypt's foreign policies in the 1950s in light of each leadership's nation making project. The two countries' divergent international stances were accompanied by national programmes with substantially different priorities and methods. These programmes would involve a host of engagements with the international field, just as they demanded these in its domestic counterpart. On one hand, leaders formed their nationalist commitments in a context shaped by international affairs, and on the other, they could only pursue these commitments in a dynamic with international interlocutors. The latter could either agree or refuse to recognise their nation's sovereignty, to deem legitimate their narratives of national belonging, and to enable their pledges on national progress. Turkish and Egyptian leaderships thus sought to intervene in and instrumentalise the international field in the realisation of their nationalist commitments, on behalf of a constituency that they considered themselves to represent.

The clashes of the 1950s may therefore be read not as realpolitik, but as a series of manoeuvres in two larger quests to fashion a sovereign, united and modern nation, by leaders who were politicised in different ways against the backdrop of war, imperialism and underdevelopment. This effort would occur through the crafting of new political vocabularies, but crucially also through action and movement in resistance to these pressures in the international field. A central argument of this work is therefore that foreign policy is a site for political leaders' discursive creativity and activism in realising their nationalist commitments and aspirations.

These commitments cannot be reduced to a matter of identity. Instead, it is productive to mine the empirical record for the other values or symbols that might be articulated with identity, such as anticolonial solidarity, social justice or dignity, as well as the other ideologies that nationalism may 'inhabit', and that might 'fill out' the gaps in its broad framework, such as socialism or free market liberalism.[3] It then becomes possible to accept the constructivist argument

[3] Anthony Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge: Polity, 2001, p. 24.

that 'identity has a constitutive and not a causal standing in the positivist sense', but to add to it further concepts drawn from a historically informed study of the nationalist movements in question.[4] This fuller conceptualisation of identity and its agents offers a 'thicker' explanation of particular policy outcomes.

My focus throughout is on the creative agency of local actors, who sought to direct momentous social change, while confronting legacies of imperial decline and colonial encroachment, as well as the pressures of superpower politics and limited resources. I compare the ways in which they responded to these challenges – the histories that they selected or silenced, the narratives and practices that they modified or adopted – in order to construct their own national presents and futures. The aim here is to contribute to the erosion of the Cold War lens in scholarly literature, which has long privileged the superpowers' conflict and neglected other actors, and to point to the ways in which similarly reductionist tropes, from 'globalisation' to the 'War on Terror', have been foisted on to subsequent complex regional dynamics. In all these cases, much is revealed by beginning with local archives, and using them to disturb such conventions.

Theoretical Approaches: Foreign Policy Analysis and the Identity Debate

This study enters a debate that connects the fields of international relations theory, comparative politics and area studies, responding to developments as well as unexplored avenues in all three. In this section, I interrogate the ways in which questions of national identity and nationalist aspirations have been addressed in international relations theory, and develop the two principal arguments regarding foreign policy and nationalist commitments that guide the analysis of the Turkish and Egyptian cases.

Broadly speaking, the setting here is the complex and young debate on identity and foreign policy between the realist and constructivist schools. A recent essay evaluating the field of foreign policy analysis urged scholars to pursue two particular theoretical directions in the

[4] Cf. Telhami and Barnett, 'Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East', in S. Telhami and M. Barnett eds., *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 18. See also Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, *The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: a Cultural Genealogy*, London: Routledge, 2006, p. 7.

future: '(1) returning to being more comparative in nature, and (2) developing a connection between constructivist research on identity and ideas and previous work'.[5] Through an interdisciplinary approach, this study will follow both of these tracks. It offers a qualitative comparison using historical sources, and brings together constructivist research on identity with similar perspectives on nationalism.

Neorealist and Liberal Conventions

The foreign policies of Turkey and Egypt have often been analysed according to neorealist frameworks, which view identity as epiphenomenal. For example, in his examination of Middle East security dynamics, Stephen Walt accords priority to what he terms 'objective threats' confronting, and hence motivating, state actors.[6] In this type of account, a threatening Soviet bloc is presented as propelling Turkey into the Western bloc, in pursuit of urgent support and military aid. The narrative turns on the 1945–6 Soviet overtures to acquire a military presence in Turkey and to redraw their joint borders.[7] Foreign policy scholars read realist calculations into Turkey's drive for a close alignment with the United States against this backdrop of Soviet machinations.[8] Yet it could be countered that the change in Soviet posture

[5] Juliet Kaarbo, 'Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas', in 'Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2003, pp. 156–7.

[6] See discussion in Steve Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East', in J. Weldes, M. Laffey, H. Gusterson and R. Duvall eds., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 149.

[7] See Erel Tellal, '1945–1960: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc – Relations with the USSR', in B. Oran ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010, p. 300; Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* ('Turkey's System: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow'), Yenişehir, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1969, p. 262.

[8] See William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000*, London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 117–8; Malcolm Yapp, 'Soviet Relations with the Countries of the Northern Tier' in Adeed I. Dawisha and Karen Dawisha eds., *The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives*, London: Heinemann, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1981, p. 32; Alexei Vassiliev, *Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism*, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 17; Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945–1952: the First Enlargement of NATO*, London: Frank Cass, 1999, pp. 45–6; Tellal, '1945–1960: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', pp. 302–3.

following Premier Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 did not generate a shift in Turkey's alignment. Instead, Turkey's stance, including its resistance to new Premier Nikita Khrushchev's peace offensive, arose from the practice of a Turkish nationalism articulated with European self-identification.

Security calculations are also conventionally accorded primacy in understanding the positions adopted by Egypt's leaders. With this emphasis on materialist calculations of power, Egypt would be expected to have gone the way of Iraq in the 1950s, and chosen to tie its development prospects to British tutelage by welcoming a joint security pact. Neorealists fall short of offering a persuasive explanation of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to defy Britain and France instead, and to nationalise the Suez Canal Company in 1956. In analysing this event, several authors privilege economic and diplomatic considerations, and sidestep the nationalist frameworks that underpinned Nasser's foreign policy.[9]

Liberal institutionalists are similarly constrained in their ability to account for policy choices in Turkey and Egypt. They explain Turkey's pro-Western position and its drive for accession to NATO and later the European Union with reference to norms of interstate cooperation and political culture.[10] This neglects the fact

[9] See Malcolm Kerr, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy and the Revolution', in Panayotis Vatikiotis, *Egypt since the Revolution*, New York: Praeger, 1968, p. 128; Adeed Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, London: Macmillan, 1976; Avraham Sela, 'Nasser's Regional Politics: A Reassessment', in Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler eds., *Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Egypt*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004; Elie Podeh, *The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact*, Leiden: Brill, 1995; Kirk Beattie, *Egypt during the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics and Civil Society*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. See also Laurie Brand, 'Middle Eastern Alliances: From Neorealism to Political Economy' in Mark Tessler, Jodi Nachtwey and Anne Banda eds., *Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Middle Eastern Politics*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 135: 'it was less a theory of international politics than an intellectual framework that was an adjunct to maintaining US political domination'.

[10] See Ioannis Grigoriadis, *Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Ziya Öniş, 'Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey–EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2003, pp. 9–34; Mark D., Aspinwall and Gerald Schneider, 'Same Menu, Separate Tables: the Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration', *European Journal of Political Research*, No. 38, 2000, pp. 1–36;

that the national project required foreign aid and recognition, and that the ruling Democrat Party continued to lobby the United States for both well after Turkish accession. Meanwhile they do not explain why Nasser refused the terms of the 1955 Baghdad Pact, a regional security alliance that purported to defuse the threat of violence amongst regional rivals. In his view, its sponsorship by Britain made it a neocolonial creation, and accession was therefore at odds with national belonging and a sovereign national future. In both cases, the institutionalist approach is undermined by its flattening of international hierarchies, and its overlooking of imperial pasts.

By contrast, an approach addressing the nationalist political formation of leaders is attentive to their historical experience and the imperial legacies that informed each. Part of the reason that realist and liberal analyses fail to explain Middle East political dynamics is their uncritical use of categories drawn from European experience. References to 'incomplete state formation',[11] or 'quasi-states',[12] for example, suggest a linear path towards modernisation, with non-Western states lagging behind. Similarly, theories of 'subaltern realism' and 'peripheral realism' aim to take into account interactions between developing states' domestic politics and patterns of international conflict.[13] Yet as Braveboy-Wagner points out, 'the question remains as to whether any realist model can really accommodate the activity of global south states in arenas far removed from military security'.[14]

Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

11 Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

12 Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

13 See, respectively, Ayoob, 'Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World' in S. Neuman ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 31–54; Carlos Escudé, 'An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and its Implications for the Interstate System: Argentina and the Cóndor Missile Project' in Neuman ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, pp. 55–76.

14 Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, 'The Foreign Policies of the Global South: an Introduction', in Braveboy-Wagner ed., *The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Approaches*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 15.

Deconstructing Realism, Decolonising Constructivism

In recent years, scholars of the constructivist turn have critiqued conventional realist theories for their neglect of questions of identity and ideas.[15] Their work has highlighted the ways in which choices made to define certain threats are at once constitutive of certain identities.[16] For them, states do not have a fixed set of national interests: 'instead they define their interests in the process of defining situations'.[17] Wendt proposes a distinction between the one 'corporate' and multiple 'social' identities of states: the former comprises intrinsic characteristics that distinguish an actor, from which flows the process of interest formation. The latter are 'a set of meanings that an actor attributes to itself as a social object while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object'.[18] Wendt emphasises the latter over the former, as corporate identity is usually rooted in domestic politics, which does not play a part in his theory of identity formation through systemic interaction.[19] Thus while this brand of constructivism problematises the unit, limiting state identities to their origin in interstate interaction leaves the predispositions of policymakers unexplored.[20]

[15] Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, 'Neo-Modernization? IR and the Inner Life of Modernization Theory', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2002, p. 104. James Mayall's *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge University Press, 1993) comes from the International Society school, which imagines the international order as rooted in the 'moral constraints' and 'shared values' of 'European sovereigns' from the seventeenth century onwards (p. 1).

[16] Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; J. Weldes, M. Laffey, H. Gusterson and R. Duvall eds., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999; David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Manchester University Press, 1998, p. 61.

[17] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, p. 396.

[18] Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, 1994, p. 385.

[19] Ibid., p. 386.

[20] 'Wendt's belief in actors as cultural "blank slates" prior to contact, or as presocially acquisitive, suggests the influence of "state of nature" thinking in his work': N. Inayatullah and D. Blaney, 'Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory', in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 73.

Poststructuralist and critical constructivist[21] scholarship offers the important corrective that the collective meanings on which state behaviour is based are necessarily those meanings to which 'those individuals who act in the name of the state' relate. These are 'collective meanings already produced … in domestic political and cultural contexts'.[22] However, on the question of agency, poststructuralists explain that policymakers are 'already subject to the repertoire of meanings offered by the security imaginary that produces them'.[23] Subjects and signifiers are articulated in one particular way 'through social relations that embody an unequal distribution of power',[24] such that one discourse becomes hegemonic. However, poststructuralists do not often clearly theorise the seat of this power, making it at times difficult to pinpoint agency in turn.

Such critical international relations theory is arguably at its most compelling when used to produce genealogies of US foreign policy, demonstrating its authors' 'commitment to the marginal' by deconstructing the discourses of the 'core'.[25] However, this deconstruction of totalising narratives in the North does not travel as smoothly to the theatres of resistance to, or negotiation of, superpower pressures in the South, no matter what the emerging alignments.[26] Turkey and Egypt were often on the *receiving* end of the realist 'theory as practice' of great

[21] Ted Hopf distinguishes between 'conventional' and 'critical' constructivism, describing 'theoretical and epistemological distance' between the two. See Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1998, pp. 181–3.

[22] Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, 'Introduction: Constructing Insecurity', in Weldes et al., *Cultures of Insecurity*, p. 9.

[23] Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 12.

[24] Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 7.

[25] Philip Darby, 'Postcolonialism', in Darby ed., *At the Edge of International Relations: Postcolonialism, Gender, and Dependency*, London: Pinter, 1997, p. 14. Jim George argues that realist and modernisation theory-based analyses, presented as 'foreign policy "theory"', are 'better understood as power politics "practice"'. George, *Discourses of Global Politics: a Critical (Re)introduction to International Relations*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. 207.

[26] Randolph Persaud, having argued against the transposing of Western models to global South contexts, describes the transposing of Campbell's argument as 'very, if not more, appropriate for global south states'. See Persaud, 'Reconceptualizing the Global South's Perspective: the End of the Bandung Spirit', in Braveboy-Wagner, *The Foreign Policies of the Global South*, p. 52. I argue that this overlooks the implications of the very different positionality of global South states. For a different use of critical genealogies that engages with

powers: they had to refute its assertions of colonial difference. In an Ottoman Turkey losing its territories in the Balkans, and in the colonised Arab world, far from needing to conjure and shore up threats, the historical priority for aspiring political actors was arguably to assemble a narrative of unity, and to shore up sovereignty from imperial threats. As Sankaran Krishna has pointed out, in critiquing 'the unitary conception of sovereignty that characterizes international theory, critical theorists seem to underestimate the implications for people interested in retaining a notion of political subjectivity'.[27]

It is unsurprising that many of those who have called for renewed consideration of identity in international relations come from the newer literature focusing on the colonised world of the global South.[28] These scholars have drawn attention to a persistent lack of theory building through 'non-core' or non-Western empirical cases.[29]

this positionality through the concept of culture, see Adib-Moghaddam, *The International Politics of the Persian Gulf*.

[27] Sankaran Krishna, *Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 403.

[28] This book uses the term 'global South' to highlight the applicability of its arguments beyond the Cold War period; however, it also refers to the 'Third World' when discussing the national projects of newly independent states in the early to mid-twentieth century. For various usages, see B. Korany, 'The Take-off of Third World Studies? The Case of Foreign Policy', *World Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1983; Christopher Clapham ed., *Foreign Policy-Making in Developing States: a Comparative Approach*, London: Saxon House, 1977; Neuman, *International Relations Theory and the Third World*; Braveboy-Wagner, *The Foreign Policies of the Global South*. Some scholars refer instead to specific geographies. See Gerd Nonneman, 'Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa: a Conceptual Framework', in Nonneman ed., *Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, London: Routledge, 2005.

[29] Postcolonial and decolonial scholarship has examined international relations 'theory as practice' in the service of Cold War or counter-terror agendas. See Albert Paolini, *Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999, p. 5; Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw, *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001; Sankaran Krishna, 'Race, Amnesia and the Education of International Relations', *Alternatives*, Vol. 26, 2001, pp. 401–24; Geeta Chowdry and Sheila Nair eds., *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class*, London: Routledge, 2002; Arlene Tickner, 'Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World', *Millennium*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2003, pp. 297–301; Tickner, 'Hearing Latin American Voices in International Relations Studies', *International Studies Perspectives*, No. 4, 2003, pp. 325–50; Zachary Lockman, *Field Notes: the Making of Middle East Studies in the United States*, Stanford University Press, 2016.

They have encouraged the 'unthinking' of the artificial separation between categories in theoretical scholarship,[30] and have brought to light the formation of the international order through empire, and the importance of identity and discourse. In the same spirit, I wish to 'think together' nationalism and foreign policy, in a revision of the constructivist argument regarding the mutual constitution of identity and foreign policy. Paying attention to the agency of political leaders outside the global North reveals the formative role of nationalist commitments in regional and international affairs.[31]

Towards a Framework: Rethinking Foreign Policy, Beyond 'Identity'

In engaging with the above literatures, an important conceptual shift is made in order to generate a framework for the comparison of Turkey and Egypt. In contrast to realist assumptions of objective national interests, it is clear that identity does matter, given the importance of policymakers' conceptions of those interests. That said, whilst the majority of constructivist and poststructuralist analyses of foreign policy focus on the concept of identity and its construction in international or domestic social interactions, this book avoids the term. Identity is analysed instead within the framework in which it is often brought to bear on foreign policymaking, namely state-directed nation making. The reasoning here is two-fold: one relates to conceptualisation and the other to agency.[32]

[30] Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: the Limits of Nineteenth Century Paradigms*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001; Siba Grovogui, 'Postcoloniality in Global South Foreign Policy', in Braveboy-Wagner, *The Foreign Policies of the Global South*, p. 38.

[31] Braveboy-Wagner, 'Introduction', *The Foreign Policies of the Global South*, p. 10. One example is this volume edited by Braveboy-Wagner. In most global South states, its contributors argue, 'foreign policy has long been closely tied to domestic concerns – economic, social, and societal (e.g., cultural-ethnic), as well as political (nation-building, regime survival) issues . . . In other words, the foreign policy of global south countries has long been both politicized and "sociologized"'.

[32] Cf. the very pertinent analysis in Felix Berenskoetter, 'Parameters of a Biographical Narrative', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2014, which offers a theoretical elaboration of the concept of 'biographical narrative' as connecting the historical and future Self of a political community in international relations. A more historical approach appears in Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright eds., *Mental Maps in the Era of Two World Wars*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

On the one hand, crossing disciplines to the scholarship on nationalism tells us that national identity narratives are not entertained in isolation from broader objectives such as decolonisation or development, which see the articulation of a sense of national belonging with the notion of sovereignty and progress for the national community. This is routinely analysed as economic or development policy in social science studies, but a historical perspective indicates other articulations. It is fruitful to consider the broader ontology that a trope such as identity might be used to point to, such as that of an emergent movement seeking liberation or pursuing modernisation. This interdisciplinary approach aims to be sensitive to the emphases of policy actors themselves, rather than taking a particular foreign policy of interest as its departure point.

On the other hand, identity alone is inadequate as the analytical counterpart of foreign policy for the purposes of determining agency too: without relating it to a particular context and set of actors, precise empirical analysis and comparison is difficult. Nationalist commitments and their pursuit through foreign policy are examined here through the role of a political leadership, which can at times act as guardian of the status quo, and at others as the initiator of change. This is crucial to an enquiry into the reproduction of national narratives and practices, which pays attention to contingency but seeks to explain particular events. Otherwise, discussions of identity, 'unmoored' to an agent, tend to range across different social actors, and span several decades, which does not allow examination of specific policy decisions.[33] While critical theorists study the effects of discourses, and 'how possible' questions, the focus here is on who can make these discourses hegemonic and why they can.[34] Equally, this approach avoids the tendency to refer to the state as agent – the United States, India, Turkey, the Philippines – as this

[33] See Hasan Kösebalaban, 'Torn Identities and Foreign Policy: the Case of Turkey and Japan', *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008 on Turkey, and Ibrahim Karawan, 'Identity and Foreign Policy: the Case of Egypt', in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett eds., *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002 on Egypt.

[34] Roxanne L., Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1993, pp. 297–320.

conflates government and state, and does not fully enable the analysis of change and continuity.[35]

In this sense it takes seriously the assertion that 'leadership matters' and disaggregates leadership units from the state.[36] Leaders play a crucial role in interpreting collective aspirations and innovating means for realising them, while communicating both to their wider base in persuasive ways. The particular ideological view of the leadership will inform this interpretation and the strategy it produces, hence the need for attention to different leaderships' political formation when comparing policies and outcomes: contrasting 'ways of seeing and interpreting the world' will promote different 'strategic impulses', self-conceptions, and 'relations to rank-and-file members'.[37] As scholars of social movements write, the most successful leaderships are at once purposive and dialogical. They can draw on tropes from valorised local contexts, subvert the language of opponents, and forge connections between norms and practices in order to persuade, mobilise, and create a sense of trust and unity. At the same time, their constituents are engaged and not passive:

> Movement leadership, as simultaneously purposive activity and relationship, involves persuading others of ways of understanding, but also yoking the wills of others to a common project. Leadership is an activity conducted upon, and in response to others: would-be leaders have to be aware of the ideas, assumptions and moods of those with whom they seek to share a collective purpose.[38]

[35] Carlos Escudé (in *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997, pp. 22–46) has written of this state-centricity as the 'anthropomorphic fallacy in international relations discourse', but offers different critiques and uses this to introduce his own 'peripheral' variant of realism. Examples on the Middle East include Mustafa Aydın, 'Europeanization through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2007 and Kösebalaban, 'Torn Identities and Foreign Policy', which are otherwise insightful works but discuss under the rubric 'Turkey' a range of different actors with various levels of foreign policy engagement.

[36] Colin Barker, Alan Johnson and Michael Lavalette, 'Leadership Matters: an Introduction', in Barker, Johnson and Lavalette eds., *Leadership and Social Movements*, Manchester University Press, 2001; Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany and Timothy M. Shaw, 'Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001, pp. 83–131.

[37] Barker et al., 'Leadership Matters: an Introduction', p. 7.

[38] Ibid., p. 10.

There are of course pitfalls to an approach that focuses on political elites: it risks exaggerating their agency and autonomy. Leaders face constant challenges and political competition. The successful leader is attuned to what engenders their mandate to lead, what motivates people to grant them authority, and their fallibility in this regard: 'New strategic and tactical choices are posed all the time, and leadership in movements has to be won, and won again … as leaders are regularly challenged from within and without.'[39] This was the case for both the Democrats in building a political party base, and the Free Officers in appealing to a military one, before both began to influence much larger audiences. For this reason, it is necessary to track political leaderships through the process of sociopolitical contestation from which they emerged, in pursuit of hegemony – in the Gramscian sense – and in collaboration with an allied class of intellectuals. The next three chapters analyse the Turkish and Egyptian leaderships in this context.

Leaders also operate within the constraints imposed by more enduring institutions, as well as more powerful actors in other fields. They require structural resources to implement their visions, including the power bases and networks upon which they rely, and access to influence within the political and social configurations of the state, which can change. Though this is most often understood in a domestic context, the need for such resources in non-national fields is the focus in this book. The keenest survivors are those able to pause and reassess their strategies and tactics in the face of dilemmas generated by a lack of such resources. The story of the ways in which Turkish and Egyptian leaders navigated precisely this problem begins in Chapter 4.

In successful experiences of nation making then, the interplay of discursive claims with structural conditions enabling material practice is crucial. Leaders' narratives on nationalist commitments are vulnerable when states lack the material resources with which to sustain and disseminate them, and when they are subject to the interference of external players with superior material power.[40] Following decolonial perspectives on international relations

[39] Ibid., p. 16.

[40] Raymond Hinnebusch, 'The Politics of Identity in Middle Eastern International Relations', in Louise Fawcett ed., *International Relations of the Middle East*, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 161.

then,[41] the argument regarding nation making here is combined with insights from studies in international political economy which emphasise the continuing structural effects of imperialism, whether that of global North or South states.[42] As Ella Shohat cautions,

> the concept of the 'post-colonial' must be interrogated and contextualized historically, geopolitically, and culturally . . . There is a need for more flexible relations among the various conceptual frameworks – a mobile set of grids, a diverse set of disciplinary as well as cultural-geopolitical lenses – adequate to these complexities.[43]

In states that have experienced structural dependency – 'subjection within a dominant pattern of social practices or institutional framework(s)' at the scale of global relations[44] – this shapes both the emergence of nationalist commitments and the ability of their carriers to realise them.

Accordingly, in this study, the insights of critical and decolonial international relations theory highlight the relevance of imperial hierarchies to leaders' narratives of self and other, theories of nationalism help to place their identity narratives in context, bringing in aspirations to modernity and development, and the literature on leadership helps pinpoint the agency in such processes. Such a perspective ultimately displaces the category of foreign policy as a reified set of policy inputs, decisions and outcomes designed to maximise power in global competition or to defend from external threats the security of a territorial nation-state and the regime administering it. It also, however, departs from its representation as purely a boundary-producing practice.

[41] Sanjay Seth, 'Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations', *Millennium*, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 167–83; Branwen Gruffyd Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.

[42] See Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, including Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in Method', *Millennium*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1983, pp. 162–75; Samir Amin, 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa – Origins and Contemporary Forms', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 19, 1972, pp. 503–24; Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System', *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990, pp. 31–55.

[43] Ella Shohat, 'Notes on the Post-Colonial', *Social Text*, Vols. 31–2, 1992, pp. 111–2.

[44] Paul James, 'Postdependency', in Philip Darby ed., *At the Edge of International Relations: Postcolonialism, Gender, and Dependency*, London: Pinter, 1997, p. 69.

Foreign policy may instead be fruitfully recast as a site for the making and projecting of the meaning of the 'nation'. Foreign policy discourses and practices are continually transformed through successive leaderships' projects to build and maintain national belonging, sovereignty and progress. This is itself the product of a contestation of political forces, and is pursued amidst the pressures of international imbalances of power. In global South states, the international field becomes a realm for the assertion and reconstitution of the self through every gesture or manoeuvre vis-à-vis the outside. In this sense, the book moves away from existing scholarship on the boundaries between 'nations' produced by foreign policy practices, towards a concern with the terrain that each nationalism claims, and how its peaks and troughs are drawn through international relations. Rather than a study of identity and foreign policy, this is a study of national self-realisation in the international field.

Making the Nation in the International: Belonging, Sovereignty, Progress

As Siba Grovogui writes, 'the study of the foreign policies of the global south requires novel analytical tools that must respond to the internal constitutional processes of the anticolonialist revolution and their identity producing experiences'.[45] These experiences may be grasped through an interdisciplinary approach that connects international relations theory with the study of nationalism within comparative politics, in order to grasp the situated national narratives mobilised by 'foreign policy actors' in Turkey and Egypt. Indeed there is limited engagement between the relatively young literature on identity and foreign policy, and the older and more diverse literature on nationalism: much may be gained from placing them in conversation. This section elaborates on the rethinking of terms and theoretical connections that have emerged from doing so in this study.

'Nation Building' and Nation Making

If constructivist accounts in international relations stress the importance of culture and norms, their content is not consistently

[45] Grovogui, 'Postcoloniality in Global South Foreign Policy', p. 47.

substantiated.[46] Insights from theorists of nationalism, and empirical sources from historical cases, are key in this regard. James McDougall observes that the problem of defining the 'nation' and 'nationhood' often runs up against 'the at once protean intangibility and dense affectivity of the object pursued'. It may be tackled by asking instead not what the nation is but how it works: 'how actual, specific socially and historically located people … conceive of themselves, and the society within which they live, think and act, as constituting a nation. In other (more concise) words, we should "abandon the nation as a category of analysis and treat it, instead, as a category of practice".'[47] In line with this approach, this study focuses on the discursive and material practices of nationalist leaders, in an agent-led process of nation making.

Nation making, or nation building, as it is most often termed, has conventionally been analysed as a domestically bounded phenomenon, directed by a state and targeting members of a particular national community. Indeed it was first theorised during the mid-twentieth century as an agentless process, driven by the exogenous forces of modernisation, which led to greater cohesion between state and society.[48] In this context, the term nation building was used to denote the development of loyalty to the state through industrialisation, the role of social communication and the expansion of citizenship rights.[49] Two classic works displayed this modernisation theory orthodoxy in a Middle Eastern context: Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society* and Bernard Lewis' *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*.[50] In each case, historical experiences of nation building were subjected to a success–failure dichotomy according to 'modern' criteria.

In response, and with the process of decolonisation followed by the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, attention has been paid to the diversity of

[46] Berenskoetter, 'Parameters of a Biographical Narrative', p. 267.

[47] James McDougall, 'Introduction: History/Culture/Politics of the Nation', in McDougall ed., *Nation, Society and Culture in North Africa*, London: Routledge, 2003.

[48] See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, New York: Free Press, 1958.

[49] Karl Deutsch and William Foltz eds., *Nation Building and National Formation*, New York: Atherton, 1963; Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order*, New York: Wiley, 1977.

[50] Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society;* Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, 1961.

temporal and spatial experiences of national formation, integration and indeed disintegration.[51] Scholars have examined the varied state policies which sought to forge and maintain nation formation, or as Timothy Mitchell put it, 'the variety of efforts, projects, encounters, and struggles in which the nation and its modern identity are staged and performed'.[52] Research has also been increasingly devoted to the fortunes of different constituencies, particularly outgroups such as minorities or immigrants.[53] Building on these works, nation making connotes here all efforts to foster loyalty to, and the legitimacy of, a cultural and political community, attached to a particular territory, and in whose interests sovereign state institutions are presented as operating. The term nation making is preferred, rather than nation building: this is partly to signify an ongoing (re)fashioning rather than one-off construction, and partly to keep a distance from its more recent uses.[54]

This being said, although recent scholarship on nationalism has been sensitive to the international developments conditioning the emergence of different nationalist strands, it has rarely investigated the implications of nationalism and nation building *in* the international field. Rather than examine all arenas in which nation making processes unfold, the focus has been on the domestic alone, whether on vehicles of dissemination, structures and programmes of integration and exclusion, or constituencies of influence.[55] Meanwhile, although 'most IR

[51] See Deniz Kandiyoti and Juan Cole, 'Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2002, pp. 189–203.

[52] Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, p. 183.

[53] See Walker Connor, 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?', *World Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3, April 1972, pp. 319–55; Şener Aktürk, *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia and Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, 2012. These usages are to be distinguished from the term's recent deployment in contexts such as the American occupation of Iraq to refer to the establishment of state structures by an invading third party. A RAND study described nation building as 'the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy': James Dobbins, 'Nation-Building: the Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower', *RAND Review*, Summer 2003.

[54] Dobbins (ibid.) is a prime example.

[55] Mylonas' study (Harris Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*, Cambridge University Press, 2012) is an

scholars recognize the need to open the black box of the state, few explore the configuration of the community under-pinning it'.[56]

Yet for any state, the project of nation making is never restricted to the national field. Certainly, self-declared nation builders themselves draw a distinction between the national and what lies beyond it, and this may be reflected in scholarship for heuristic purposes.[57] Nevertheless, the agents of any state nationalism will engage interlocutors who cross this imagined divide. The realisation of nationalist commitments has to occur through engagement with the international, and at the same time, the international is an arena for the contestation of nationalist discourses and projects, often by far more powerful and less than sympathetic interlocutors. Exploring nation making through the prism of foreign policy in this way generates insights not captured by investigating its conventional 'domestic' remit, such as areas of consistency as well as openness to change in the face of international challenges.

Belonging, Sovereignty, Progress

First, nation makers fashion and champion myths and symbols, articulating them to the central trope of the 'nation' in public narratives, in order to foster a unified sense of national belonging among their constituents. Cultural manifestations of enduring emotional attachment to the language, land and community of the nation are marshalled in this endeavour. Songs, poetry, customs and other artefacts of collective memory capture stories that direct the imagining of the national community to particular historical moments, and refashion the past to bolster the claims of the national state. Symbols of national virtue, such as solidarity and self-sacrifice in adversity, are particularly resonant in the case of anticolonial struggles, in which mobilisation at the level of the nation has been decisive.[58]

exception but one whose empiricist epistemology differs from the claim made here regarding nationalism's constitutive role for actors' behaviour.

56 Berenskoetter, 'Parameters of a Biographical Narrative', p. 263.

57 The majority of nation building literature focuses on processes unfolding among the proposed nationals of the nation(-state) in question.

58 Gopal Balakrishnan, 'The National Imagination', in Balakrishnan ed., *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, 1996, p. 210. In Laurie Brand's important new study of national narratives in Egypt and Algeria, the emphasis remains on state or regime legitimacy as their driver, rather than on such symbols and the notion

In order to maintain these narratives' hegemonic position, nation makers seek control over venues for the production of cultural and social authority. Often in collaboration with nationalist intelligentsia, they instrumentalise institutions such as the official media and education system, and initiate or modify such practices as commemoration or conscription. As Eley and Suny write, 'if politics is the ground upon which the category of the nation was first proposed, culture was the terrain where it was elaborated, and in this sense nationality is best conceived as the need to constitute nations discursively through processes of imaginative ideological labor'.[59]

Yet even such intimately national appeals encompass claims made about historical and present relations with the extra-national. If, as Raymond Williams wrote, culture is in one sense 'the signifying system through which necessarily ... a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced, and explored', it will often have an audience beyond its own members.[60] McCrone writes of 'the simple postage stamp which became an implicit yet powerful icon of the nation, most obviously in the issue of historic stamps to celebrate jubilees and national occasions'.[61] It may be added that its use and travel beyond the state's borders achieves the spatialisation of the nation beyond the national domain. Borrowing from Homi Bhabha's reference to the nation as performance, Timothy Mitchell emphasises that 'what is different about making the nation is that it always involves the question of otherness'.[62] This is not necessarily a simple dynamic of identity and difference, however, of distancing the nation from Others: claims may be made regarding a unity of purpose stretching beyond the nation to embrace others, where bonds of solidarity are forged through common values, struggles and horizons, rather than ethnicity. In order that such claims be affirmed and maintained, they require recognition and indeed reproduction by these non-nationals, and will be undermined if such appeals are rejected or contradicted.

of nationalist commitments: see Brand, *Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria*, Stanford University Press, 2014, pp. 11–7.

[59] Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, 'Introduction', in Eley and Suny eds., *Becoming National: a Reader*, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 8.

[60] Raymond Williams, *Culture*, Glasgow: Fontana, 1981, p. 13.

[61] David McCrone, *The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's Ancestors*, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 48.

[62] Mitchell, *Experts*, p. 183.

Second, and related, nationalists aim to secure and maintain national sovereignty. They make claims over a particular population and territory within political contestation amongst other social forces. It is as bound to this 'national' geography that the agents of nationalism emerge, successful contenders for the political power needed to launch a centrally directed project of nation making. Yet in the modern state system, as much as they require the recognition of other nationals in this endeavour, they require this beyond the national political field too, most notably in a forum such as the United Nations, or for Turkey in the 1950s, in NATO. By the same token, international opposition to a political leadership's claim to represent the nation can be profoundly destabilising, as in the case of the spontaneously formed Suez Canal Users Association of 1956, whose members deemed President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company illegitimate.

Recognition of this sovereignty in the national field is bound up with the political and economic positions of the nationalist leadership, and the constituencies to which they are tied. These allow them to construct their hegemony, as Gramsci theorised.[63] However, recognition is also bound up with the degree to which the leadership proposes to articulate with the hegemonic international order, or to resist it. Gramsci wrote of the interactions of national political order and foreign policy as follows:

> Any organic innovation in the social structure, through its technical-military expressions, modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the international field too. Even the geographical position of a national State does not precede but follows (logically) structural changes, although it also reacts back upon them to a certain extent (to the extent precisely to which superstructures react upon the structure, politics on economics, etc.).[64]

Gramsci arguably makes clear here the ways in which national struggles for power generate leaderships whose positions vis-à-vis the international order may or may not be reinforced by that order's strongest members.[65]

[63] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 12.

[64] Ibid.

[65] It should be said that these lines form a mere fragment, and the *Prison Notebooks* are notoriously difficult to interpret with certainty.

Third, particularly characteristic of nationalist visions is the dimension of progress for the nation, a narrative on modernity, on the future.[66] This invites participation in a forward-looking journey, mobilising citizens behind a voluntarist patriotism that involves some element of collective labour through which the nation is produced. In this case, the labour required is not only ideological, it is often material as well. Thus, to add to Eley and Suny's conceptualisation: cultivating national belonging becomes the effort to constitute nations materially through practices of collective material labour. Indeed Stuart Hall writes on identity as 'a matter of "becoming"', using resources such as history and language to go to the future.[67] Here nation makers add the dimension of resources for a material kind of construction that serves as a marker but also a vehicle for social change. Nationals' participation in such projects is an act represented and recognised as part of the nation's becoming. This is the kind of meaning encompassed by nationalism to which the term 'identity' in foreign policy analysis does not make any reference, and highlights the import of an interdisciplinary approach to a clearer understanding of 1950s foreign policies.

One of the emblems of such grounded futurity is the grand project of the developmental state, signalling the national mastery of technological advances that originate elsewhere. This is variously presented as reviving an illustrious past, or propelling the population into modernity. The realisation of a grand project will often see the articulation of a nationalist trope of progress with another ideological framework, such as socialism or economic liberalism. Benedict Anderson has discussed this in his study of anticolonial nationalism as follows:

> The Spanish American nationalist independence movements are inseparable from the universalist currents of liberalism and republicanism. In their turn Romanticism, democracy, Idealism, Marxism, anarchism, even, late in the day, fascism were variously understood as globe-stretching and nation-linking. Nationalism, that element with the highest valency of all, combined with all these others in different ways in different times.[68]

[66] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1991, pp. 11–2.

[67] Stuart Hall, 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora', in Jonathan Rutherford ed., *Identity, Community, Culture, Difference*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991, p. 225.

[68] Benedict Anderson, *The Age of Globalization: Anarchists and the Anticolonial Imagination*, London: Verso, 2013, p. 1.

This is in turn often combined with a narrative on the myth of an ancient origin for the nation, simultaneously signalling the grandeur of a rich civilisation and the legitimacy of the state as its heir and resuscitator. As Tom Nairn described, nationalism is the 'Modern Janus', like 'the two-headed Roman deity who couldn't help looking backwards into the past as well as forwards into the future'.[69]

Needless to say, the ability of a state to uphold such a nationalist claim is conditioned not only by the consent and participation of fellow nationals, but also by the vicissitudes of international market and political forces, and the interests and ideological positions of non-national actors in turn. Pledges of action and movement, made to usher forth the nation's future, require the cooperation of others. States that have been subject to imperialism need to secure resources for public projects, and can face dilemmas between these and their pursuit of sovereignty. In such cases, strategies for economic development or welfare spending can generate paths of alignment or clash, depending on the articulated ideologies that they choose. Understanding the orientation and constraints upon their foreign policies thus requires first an appreciation of how their national projects stand vis-à-vis the world order, and to what extent they are counterhegemonic or conformist.

Nation makers, then, meet some of their greatest tests in the international arena. The struggle for hegemony over national visions is waged by all those with investments in the contested 'nation-state', and by a variety of means. This begins at first during actors' political formation, and continues once they are in power, seeking to realise such visions. Insofar as they declare commitments to national culture and to the nation's sovereignty, or promise the realisation of a national grand project, these political actors must move in the realm of the international. Each of these claims is hence open to contestation, containment or indeed affirmation by interlocutors beyond the national field, and is liable to undergo transformation as a result.

To compare the ways in which the international shaped, and then enabled and limited, the Turkish and Egyptian national projects, it is necessary to further examine recurrent *dilemmas* that politicians faced between sovereignty on the one hand, and national belonging and

[69] Tom Nairn, *The Breakup of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism*, London: New Left Books, 1977, p. 67.

progress on the other. This is akin to the concept of 'identity conflict', which international relations scholars describe as occurring 'whenever competing definitions of the collective identity call for contradictory behaviors, or roles'.[70] However, in this case, the reconceptualising of a national project beyond mere identity, and with emphasis on the agency of one set of actors, allows for the analysis of external influences on behaviour, and the interactions of those with domestic influences, generating foreign policy relations and interventions. It is therefore possible to trace the efforts of Turkish and Egyptian leaderships to negotiate these dilemmas, while pursuing the realisation of their particular nationalist commitments. These efforts included an array of strategies and tactics, from identifying those great powers with which they shared particular interests, and playing them off against their rivals, to attempting to leverage external assistance from the pursuit of certain foreign policy stances.

Conversely, this approach is also revealing of the nature of the nationalist commitments in question themselves. Given that there were numerous overlapping commitments and considerations for each leadership, analysing the trends that proved consistent, or adaptable, in each case sheds light on the importance of each such commitment to the leadership in question. Contestation on the international stage served to reveal and engender the extents and limits of claims made upon the national stage in turn. Stressing their contingency does not prevent us from tracing these particular dynamics, and comparison throws these into particularly sharp relief.

The International for Turkey and Egypt: Comparative Nationalisms under Empire and Colonial Modernity

How, then, did the international field shape the formation and subsequent pursuit of normative commitments by would-be nation makers in the late Ottoman period? Many accounts have depicted a one-sided encounter: the arrival of Enlightenment ideas and Western technologies, in a westward flow through vehicles of trade, scholarship and war, to an ailing, decadent Ottoman Empire. Yet modernity has always been

[70] Telhami and Barnett, 'Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East', p. 15, fn 26–27; Sheldon Stryker and Anne Statham Macke, 'Status Inconsistency and Role Conflict', *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 4, 1978, pp. 57–90.

a global affair, connecting the fortunes of distant peoples through processes of exchange.[71] These were invariably unequal, generating an imperially founded modernity. As Stuart Hall put it, colonisation was 'the whole process of expansion, exploration, conquest, colonisation and imperial hegemonisation which constituted the "outer face", the constitutive outside, of European and then Western capitalist modernity after 1492'.[72]

These transimperial and translocal connections meant that ostensibly domestic relations were increasingly settled in the realm of the international, while the logics of global capital and imperial power could reconfigure social relations within local geographies. In this context, as the nation-state model spread within global politics, constructions of sovereignty were increasingly articulated to a national realm – to questions of national belonging and progress – in nationalist actors' political imaginations. With the continuing interconnectedness of global politics and trade, the realisation of their visions then depended on international structures and forces.

If the colonial constitution of such modern, global exchanges meant that they were productive of commitments to national sovereignty, articulated with commitments to national belonging and progress, what accounts for the divergence in these narratives? To understand this, I critically engage postcolonial theories of nationalism, and view the Turkish and Egyptian leaderships' divergent choices in the 1950s as partly a product of their differing experiences of imperial power.

This is a rather unorthodox endeavour as Turkey is commonly described as a Middle East state that 'escaped' colonialism, beating back the Greek advance in the 1919–23 War of Independence. The Ottoman Empire has been analysed most regularly in comparison with other empires – the Romanov and Habsburg, for example – in terms of the nature of its unravelling.[73] There is particular scholarly interest in the violent experiences of ethnic unmixing that usually accompanied

[71] T. Mitchell, 'The Stage of Modernity', in Mitchell ed., *Questions of Modernity*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000, pp. 1–34.

[72] Stuart Hall, 'When Was "The Post-Colonial": Thinking at the Limit', in *The Post-Colonial Question*, ed. I. Chambers and L. Curti, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 249.

[73] Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: the Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.

their transitions to nation-states.[74] This dimension is not neglected here – indeed I build on insights into these processes of internal othering – but an important premise in this work is that the Ottomans ruled an empire on the receiving end of imperial designs.

I am interested in Turkey's fraught relationship with the external Other constructed as 'the West', and in the fact that the generation that built the Turkish republic both wielded and experienced imperial power. The tensions at the heart of official Turkish national narratives – at once enamoured and suspicious of this West – can only be grasped by investigating the legacies of the colonial experience that confronted the Ottoman Empire and ushered forth the young Turkish republic. After all, by 1882 Britain and France had already taken formal control of such rich Ottoman territories as Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, while its ministers were in charge of the treasury in Istanbul. It was the fall of a great empire, but a fall nevertheless.

I compare this with the Egyptian case, where the colonial experience was not so much less protracted, as more profound and disruptive. It had begun with the structural violence of the Anglo-French 'dual control' and the military violence of Alexandria's bombardment in 1882, becoming formalised through protectorate status until the 1922 British declaration of Egypt's independence. It then continued through the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 'reserved points' that Britain dictated. Of course, Egypt had been in possession of Sudan since Muhammad Ali's conquest in 1821, before the British occupation imposed an Anglo-Egyptian condominium that took away Egypt's political control. As Beth Baron puts it, 'Egyptian nationalists fought European imperialism at the same time that they sought to regain control of the Sudan and to hold on to their own empire.'[75]

In this sense, then, it might be argued that Egypt resembled its Ottoman patron as an empire on the receiving end of imperial power. However, this would be a misleading comparison, since the colonisation of Egypt stripped it of political power over Sudan in 1882, and

[74] Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: the Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire*, Princeton University Press, 2012; Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*, Oxford University Press, 2005.

[75] Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005, p. 25.

mutual perceptions differed radically in each case. Most Egyptians saw Europe as effectively subjugating both Egypt and Sudan, and as different on cultural, moral and technological planes: while the Sudanese were infantilised and racialised in many fields, they were not externalised.[76] By contrast, the Ottoman Turkish elite recalled recent centuries of superiority over western Europe, and considered themselves members of one space, while they viewed the Arabs as a distinct, subject race. Compared with Turkey, then, Egyptians' engagement with European thought and practice, with this colonial modernity, generated a different range of creative accommodations. This unfolded at a time of great intellectual and cultural activity in Egypt, known as the *Nahda* or Renaissance Age, in which Arab and Muslim traditions were being rethought but also revalorised.

Cases from the Middle East have rarely been engaged in depth by broader theories of nationalism. The theoretical work often considered closest in focus is that of the Subaltern Studies Collective. Through their influential studies of British rule in India, these scholars have elaborated on the nationalist thought and praxis that emerges out of such colonial experience. In *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, Partha Chatterjee offered a simple paradox as his hypothesis on anticolonial nationalist thought: 'a different discourse, yet one that is dominated by another'. This is not, he says, a consistent relationship of derivation, but rather a selective one in which nationalist thought rejects the implications of colonial thought and points to possibilities that the latter refuses to admit.[77] In his subsequent work, *The Nation and its Fragments*, Chatterjee argues that 'Anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains – the material and the spiritual.' In the outside material domain, 'Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an "inner" domain bearing the "essential" marks of cultural identity.' He goes further to say that 'the greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore the greater

[76] See Eve Troutt Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.

[77] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse?*, London: Zed Books, 1986, p. 41.

the need to preserve the distinctness of one's spiritual culture. The formula is … a *fundamental feature* of anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa.'[78]

This bold claim is demonstrated by Chatterjee in the case of Bengal, and has provided a framework for scholars to analyse the nationalist politics and cultures of other colonised places. In Turkey and Egypt too, communities became conscious of their vulnerability amidst assertions of the colonial difference. Was the encounter with Europe their central organising principle, however, and did Europe provide the only anchor in the quest to spread modernity?

In both cases, there emerged nationalist thinkers and political organisers who sought to demarcate realms distinct from those that imperial narratives and practices appeared to dominate. In both cases too, however, these realms could not necessarily be labelled cultural, nor did their distinctions from a so-called material realm appear clear-cut. In problematising this distinction in the case of Egypt, this book builds on the important work of Omnia El Shakry and Laura Bier, and further brings Turkey into the same debate.[79] Its exploration of nation making in the 1950s finds that Chatterjee's claim regarding the inverse relationship between material mimicry and spiritual authenticity does not hold in either of the two cases.

In the case of the Ottoman reformers and Turkish protonationalists, the relationship with Europe was not one of the imitation of an Other in material spheres, and this is not simply because Europe here was no coloniser. Instead, and despite the mounting encroachment of Europe, the Ottomans saw themselves as part of Europe, and indeed part of imperial Europe. As Çağlar Keyder notes, this self-view was informed in great part by the traditions of Ottoman statecraft, which privileged interstate relations.[80] Over the nineteenth century, the Ottomans had willingly overhauled ever larger realms of both the material sphere and official culture in the image of western European states, whether in the

[78] Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 6.

[79] Omnia El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt*, Stanford University Press, 2007; Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt*, Stanford University Press, 2011.

[80] Çağlar Keyder, 'A History and Geography of Turkish Nationalism', in Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas eds., *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 13.

field of military organisation or in modes of education and dress. The ways in which these western European powers gradually undermined the empire, however, had all the trappings of their colonial economic encroachments elsewhere, and left the Ottoman elites to come to terms with a double rejection.

Nevertheless, they could not countenance separation from the epistemologies and structures of the imperial West, and preferred to assert the Ottoman Empire as another like unit within it. This generated reactions of a weakened peer amongst imperial states, overlaid by those of a colonised state: thus discourses among the political elite and intelligentsia indexed sensibilities of betrayal and rejection, alongside a proud emphasis on the superiority of Ottoman culture, while the practices of westernising defensive reform continued. Accompanying this were the practices of Ottoman Orientalism, which deflected the colonial difference asserted by the Europeans on to the empire's own 'orientals', in the Arab provinces. The Ottomans here asserted their own 'Turkish difference'.

Under Kemal Atatürk, Kemalist elites continued to equate modernity with the norms and practices prevailing in the advanced industrial societies of western Europe at the time. They sought a negotiation of these with what they considered suitable to Turkey's situation as guardian of a great and ancient heritage itself, but declared their aspiration to attain these 'standards of modern civilisation'. At the same time, they entrenched suspicion of Europe through the key trope dubbed the Sèvres Syndrome (after the 1920 treaty that would have dismembered Anatolia), and depicted the external world as poised to swallow Turkey. Nevertheless, Kemal's cultural reforms were often explicitly mimetic, as in the Hat Law of 1926 or the Language Reform of 1928. Meanwhile the spiritually authentic – predominantly Ottoman-Islamic traditions in the case of Turkey – was certainly not to be revered; on the contrary it was to be replaced wholesale. The sum of these different material and cultural interventions reflected alienation from Europe, but also asserted a common subjectivity with it. This elicited a mode of 'westernising despite the west' as Atatürk would put it, which can be traced through various formulations from the 1870s to the early republican period and into the 1950s.

Their Egyptian counterparts' project began similarly in the 1900s as the translation by Egyptian elites of knowledge produced in the West, and the adaptation of modes of rule and official culture now

understood as modern by association with it. Unlike their Ottoman counterparts, however, the Egyptians did not perceive Egypt as a part of Europe, and did not have the same anxiety to prove that they and the Europeans inhabited the same geopolitical unit. In their intellectual exchange, scholars of Al-Azhar from Upper Egypt and Cairo debated the ideas of European thinkers and kept the Arab philosophers of al-Andalus as a reference. As El Shakry's study details, intellectual elites were conscious throughout of their own roles in fashioning a modernity that is best understood as a 'historically specific and local category of thought and experience'.[81]

The arrival of colonial rule only sharpened the sense among many intellectuals that Egypt was a distinct entity with diverse influences from its religious and Arab contexts. They affirmed that it was their homeland, and deserving of freedom. However, this did not produce any kind of shrinking from cultural tropes recognised as both modern and originating in the West. This attitude is epitomised by the 'Islamic modernist' *salafiyya* movement of Grand Mufti Muhammad Abdu, who campaigned actively against British rule, but sought to reconcile Islamic practice with modern challenges and models. Indeed, a host of accommodations and negotiations continued in the arts, music and literature, in legal and educational systems, and in family modes and social codes on the place of women.[82] Thus the gradual adoption of the language of Western/Eastern, foreign/local, modern/traditional was only partially reflective of its users' conceptions of the modern. While the early twentieth century saw the rise of nationalist sentiments and commitments in multiple organisational forms, the break with Europe remained a political one above all. Egypt's elite continued to view it as a crucial interlocutor and source of models for reform, while the struggle to attain political sovereignty wore on.

For the Turkish elite then, the dynamics between the purportedly inner spiritual and outer material were marked always by an

[81] El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory*, p. 8.

[82] See Walter Armbrust, *Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt*, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998; El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory;* Paul Sedra, *From Mission to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth Century Egypt*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2011; Baron, *Egypt as a Woman*; Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Princeton University Press, 1995.

ambiguity about the place of Enlightenment Europe in the former domain. Meanwhile, in Egypt, the inner sphere was the subject of ongoing efforts to modernise and overhaul, though a merger of subjectivities was neither possible nor desirable under British rule. Rather than a non-colonised/colonised dichotomy, the historical record is one of differing configurations with and against imperialism, which was productive of changing approaches to modernity, hence changing conceptions of national belonging, sovereignty and progress in each case.

It was these political orders and social milieus that would shape the political formation of the Free Officers and Democrats, and which they would seek to reshape. Each leadership emerged out of a contestation within the national political field over the ways in which the first post-independence governments had responded to the legacies of imperialism and the challenges of nation making. Aspiring leaders at the end of the 1940s brought with them revisionist approaches to these efforts, and to the commitments to national belonging, sovereignty and progress discussed above. The means that they chose were dialectically linked with the incumbent orders that had been installed in the first decades of official independence. They went on to adjust and modify, in some cases overturn, the old order and sought to achieve some of its stated goals by different means. Representing different social projects, then, these leaderships' nation making found expression in divergent foreign policies.

In Turkey, the Democrat Party were freely elected to power in 1950, following three decades of centralised rule by the Republican People's Party. The Democrats upheld Kemal Atatürk's mission to catapult Turkey into the modern world's 'community of civilised nations'. However, they championed a different route for achieving this – conservative liberalism in economic and cultural policy, and a sharp turn towards the United States in foreign policy. Across the Mediterranean, the clandestine Free Officers organisation had toppled Egypt's King Faruq in a bloodless *coup d'état* in 1952. Its leadership then issued 'Six Principles' specifying the purge of Egypt's political system and the pursuit of social justice as prerequisites for national development. Their first condition for this, however, was the expulsion of British occupation forces, and Gamal Abdel Nasser went on to position Egypt as the ally to tens of Asian and African movements also pursuing

national liberation. These new state actors sought to overturn specific pasts, in order to announce radical futures, and an important arena for them was the international.

Methodological Rationales: Why Compare, and Why the 1950s? The Limits of Postcolonialism

Although their similarities hold much promise for comparative research, there is a lack of such scholarship on Turkey and Egypt. Turkey and its Arab neighbours' relations in the Cold War era have been considered together in only a handful of works,[83] particularly due to the attention paid to Turkey's behaviour within the European context, and less frequently to its role as a Middle Eastern state.[84] The few academic comparisons between Turkey and Egypt in existence have often fallen short of full monographs,[85] or approached the two states from the perspective of political sociology or economy.[86] Strikingly, Turkish nationalism and Egyptian Arabism in the era of independence have not been directly compared, in contrast to the rich literature on the origins of Arabism in the late Ottoman Empire.[87] Nevertheless, a latent comparison is usually made in

[83] A significant example is Ara Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours: Origins and Failure of the Baghdad Pact, 1953–58*, Slough: Archive Editions, 2001.

[84] Philip Robins, 'The Foreign Policy of Turkey', in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami eds., *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2014, p. 315.

[85] Ibrahim, Keyder and Öncü eds., *Developmentalism and Beyond*, 1994.

[86] See Bent Hansen, *The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: Egypt and Turkey*, Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1992; John Waterbury, *Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico and Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, 1993; Amr Adly, *State Reform and Development in the Middle East: Turkey and Egypt in the Post-Liberalization Era*, London: Routledge, 2012; Hazem Kandil, *The Power Triangle: Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change*, Oxford University Press, 2016.

[87] C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973; Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih and Reeva S. Simon eds., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991; Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

works preoccupied with other themes, often resulting in unhelpful judgements of success or abject failure.[88]

The comparison of Turkey and Egypt here was chosen with three objectives in mind: first, it highlights a trend in the political behaviour of states formerly subject to imperialism. Such states' leaderships share nationalist principles and preoccupations, as well as dilemmas in their realisation in the international field. In this sense, the book joins the voices calling for greater attention to the global South in international relations scholarship, and offers insights from two states that have historically been at the receiving end of colonial interest and intervention.

Second, the comparison also reveals divergences that are instructive for those seeking to decolonise and diversify international relations scholarship. The contrasting engagements with European imperialism on the part of Turkish and Egyptian actors help nuance the category of global South or postcolonial foreign policy.[89] In fact, the difficult positionality of Turkey as an empire colonised, with the conflicted nationalist discourses and practices of its leaderships that resulted, bears resemblance to other cases of fallen empire such as Meiji Japan and Safavid Iran. Egypt's case, as a colonised country with a national liberation movement, can be compared with states such as India, Ghana and Kenya, and later Cuba. The divergent inflections of this family of anti-imperial nationalisms, and their connected foreign policies, are worthy of further investigation.

Third, the choice of Ottoman Turkey shows the possibility of the argument's extension to states that have engaged in imperial expansion, beyond the global South, and the insights that might be gained from rethinking those states' foreign policies in light of their colonising experiences and the influences these have left on competing narratives of nationalism in their societies. Here the questions coming to the fore would concern state engagements with minorities who are migrants

[88] See Ergün Özbudun and Ali Kazancıgil eds., *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, Hamden: Archon Books, 1981; Keith Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt: a Critical Analysis*, London: Stevens and Sons, 1960; Fouad Ajami, 'The End of Pan-Arabism', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 1978/9. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori explain some of the reasons in *Muslim Politics*, Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 23.

[89] See Deniz Kandiyoti, 'Postcolonialism Compared: Potentials and Limitations in the Middle East and Central Asia', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34, 2002, pp. 279–97.

from the empire, for example, as well as questions of legitimacy in assembling discourses on a particular national past.[90]

Besides the matter of comparison, there is also the question of temporality and the period chosen for analysis. There are both empirical and conceptual advantages to the selection of case studies from the 1950s for this study. First, the 1950s ought to be recognised as a decade just as transformative as the inaugural 1920s of each republic. It was the first period in which Turkey and Egypt's nationalist actors made activist interventions in the regional and international fields, after the isolationist period of 'peace at home and abroad' advocated by Atatürk, and after colonial Britain's withdrawal from Egypt. It was also a period in which they undertook to reshape fundamental elements of official nationalism in each case. Examining this makes for a rethinking of the literature on Turkish nation making, which has been focused on the early Kemalist era and the post-1980 coup period, and which has not often incorporated issues of international politics.[91] The smaller literature on domestic politics under the Democrat Party is practically devoid of references to nation making, and rather directs its attention to the details of the multiparty experience.[92] In addressing these neglected areas, I understand nation making as an ongoing process, realisation of which is always dependent upon relations in the international field, and I present the 1950s as a particularly interesting period in this respect.

Analysing the 1950s also makes for a useful intervention into the existing theoretical literature on the colonial and postcolonial, and its utility. As discussed, employing the postcolonial frame helps reveal both the challenges and aspirations that leaders in Turkey and Egypt had in common in the 1950s. Yet doing so also reveals its limitations: much postcolonial scholarship has been preoccupied with the moment

[90] See Barkey and Von Hagen, *After Empire*, and Lisa Anderson, 'Legitimacy, Identity, and the Writing of History in Libya', in Eric Davis and Nicolas Gavrielides eds., *Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Historical Memory, and Popular Culture,* Miami: Florida University Press, 1991.

[91] See Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.

[92] Mogens Pelt, *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey: the Menderes Era and its Demise*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2014; Mustafa Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti,* Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2004; Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar,* Ankara: METU Press, 2001.

of colonial rupture, with formal independence and the legacies of the colonial experience in hybrid identities or cultural resistance. In these usages, it does not pay much attention to a colonial experience that persists, repoured into new moulds. It cannot in this case account for continuities in the experience of great power hegemony, and the pressures that this created, such as the implications of the Cold War during the mid-twentieth century. It cannot also fully account for the divergences resulting from contestation on the national level: this requires a more empirically specific historical analysis. Yet Turkish and Egyptian sources tell of precisely such complex historical developments.[93] It is therefore important to problematize the postcolonial framing, by highlighting the nature of decolonisation in turn as an ongoing process, with the Cold War as one in a series of its backdrops. Accordingly, this book asks: what continuities are seen in actors' nationalist commitments between the imperial-colonial experience and that of the Cold War? What can the comparison tell us about the nature of each nationalist project in turn? What can this tell us about our methodological approaches?

Sources

Underlining the perspectives and priorities of Turkish and Egyptian political actors, this book draws primarily on rarely cited official Turkish and Egyptian documents. In this way, it combines the methods of diplomatic history with those of comparative politics. Examining official documents affords insight into decision-making as well as public justifications, which are naturally hard to discern in accounts given by other players in English and French. In this sense, though with respect to different actors, it echoes Matthew Connelly's question: 'what can newly opened archives reveal about how the construction of "us–them" categories – long a concern of postcolonial theorists – actually affected high-level decisions on decolonization as it accelerated in the 1950s?'[94]

[93] Christopher Lee makes the same point with regard to cases from Southern Africa in 'Decolonization of a Special Type: Rethinking Cold War History in Southern Africa', *Kronos*, No. 37, November 2011, pp. 6–11.

[94] Matthew Connelly, 'Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North–South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence', *American Historical Review*, Vol. 105, No. 3, 2000, p. 741. See also Robert Vitalis, 'Archives: The Past is Another Country', in Ellen Perecman and Sara Curran eds., *A Handbook for Social Science Field Research: Essays and Bibliographic Sources on Research Design and Methods*, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2006.

These documents are housed in the Turkish Republican Archives in Ankara and Egypt's National Archives in Cairo, as well as Ankara's National Library and Egypt's National Library and State Information Service. They are read here alongside the British and American state documents most commonly used in other works, as well as French state documents, from the National Archives in London, the Foreign Relations of the United States series, and the Diplomatic Archives in Paris respectively.

To reconstruct the political formation of Turkish and Egyptian politicians, I have relied on their speeches and memoirs, as well as interviews with them at the time and contemporary political commentaries. Print media archives in Turkey and Egypt have also been illuminating, including both pro-government and oppositional publications. The aim here is to be just as sensitive to the way in which political decisions were debated in the public sphere, as to the way in which they were recorded in state discourse.

The analysis also draws on other rarer printed material, such as the Democrats' electoral campaign brochures, the Free Officers' clandestine pamphlets and – arguably the most important new source on 1950s Egyptian policy – Nasser's personal papers, released recently in a published series. Finally, this book also considers radio archives, drawing on rare, existing recordings from the Radio Archives at Cairo Radio in Maspero, Cairo, as well as transcripts of Turkish state radio broadcasts from secondary sources, and the Summaries of World Broadcasts held at the BBC Written Archives. They represent a rich and underused medium reflecting both state discourse and alternative critiques.

Outline

To explain the puzzle of Turkey and Egypt's divergence, three questions are addressed. First, what were these leaders' nationalist agendas and why did they differ? This requires an understanding of the process of political contestation from which leaders emerged, and the dynamic with the international field that shaped their nationalist commitments. In modern Turkey and Egypt, the meanings of nationalist commitments had been negotiated by generations of political actors from the late nineteenth century on, as the encounter with an advancing European West presented its harshest challenges to the Ottoman Empire. Chapter 1 looks comparatively at the international field during

the period of late Ottoman rule and imperial encroachment in Turkey and Egypt. It examines the evolution of the nationalist traditions and contestations in which the Democrats and Free Officers would later intervene.

The 1950s then brought new leaderships to power in each country, who had fresh and divergent ideas on these national imperatives. Chapters 2 and 3 elucidate the different conceptions of nationalism held by each leadership during their political formation in 1930s and 1940s Turkey and Egypt, respectively. The chapters aim to reconstruct each leadership's engagement with the socioeconomic, ideological and international trends of the moment.

Second, what can the nationalist frameworks promoted by each leadership tell us about the foreign policy episodes compared here in the 1950s? Third, to what extent were they able to realise these? The discussion moves to examine the ways in which these constructions drove state practice, once the two groups became political leaders. Three concurrent periods in the 1950s are examined, corresponding to foreign policy episodes in which both Turkey and Egypt played a role. These are presented alternately, however, to allow the comparison to unfold. Chapters 4, 6 and 8 cover Turkey's accession to NATO (1950–2); its role in promoting the Baghdad Pact (1954–6); and its role in the Syrian Crisis (1957–8). The first episode sees the Democrats fix Turkey's international alignment, the second tracks the unfolding of its activist regional policy, and the third describes the interplay of both. Chapters 5, 7 and 9 cover three, almost identical time periods from the Egyptian perspective: the period of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and early Egyptian pan-Arabist policy (1952–4); the campaign against the Baghdad Pact and the purchase of Czech arms after the Bandung Conference (1955); and finally the Suez War (1956) and the Syrian Crisis (1957–8). In contrast with Turkey, the first saw the leadership position Egypt as neutralist in the Cold War, and simultaneously launch its regional pan-Arabist policy; the second and third saw it develop both, including its Palestine policy, in confronting the twin challenges of invasion and economic sanctions.

A series of comparative conclusions will affirm the rethinking of foreign policy as a site for realising nationalist commitments, and that of nation making in turn as contingent on the international field for its realisation.

1 *Empire and Nationalism in Turkey and Egypt, 1839–1950*

Turkishness has engraved Istanbul and the Bosphorus into the imagination of humanity for five hundred years in this way . . . Moreover, Turkishness did not create this city on an empty region which had not seen construction until that day. It was founded upon the ruins of the Eastern Roman Empire which had been the single civilization of Europe for ages and had dazzled with its splendour. The Turkish Istanbul which was founded upon the ruins of old Byzantium had a different identity completely from its forerunner and was like the expression of the nation, and nationality of those who founded it.[1]

Yahya Kemal, *Aziz Istanbul* ('Glorious Istanbul')

And despite all this I used to feel something powerful inside me that would not melt easily in the current of Western civilisation, and I clarified this once in an article comparing the effect that Rome leaves on those visiting it from the North, and those emigrating from the South, as I noticed that the Northerners were awed by its sun and the civilisation of the Age of Enlightenment. As for me, I had arrived with a great deal of sun already . . . with civilisation . . . that may not exceed, but resembles Rome's civilisation, and with a religion that forms a complete and self-sufficient system.[2]

Yahya Haqqi, 'Autobiography'

The biographies of these two writers named Yahya, both ethnically Turkish but becoming celebrated men of letters in Turkey and Egypt respectively, offer a glimpse into the historical intertwining of the two countries with Europe since Ottoman times, and their productive encounters in the international field. By the early nineteenth century,

[1] Yahya Kemal, *Aziz Istanbul* ('Glorious Istanbul'), Istanbul: Yahya Kemal Institute, 1964, pp. 3–4.

[2] Yahya Haqqi, 'Ashjan 'Udw Muntasib: Sira Dhatiya, Mayu 1974' ('The Melancholies of an Associate: an Autobiography, May 1974'), in *Qandil Um Hashim* ('The Lantern of Um Hashim'), Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aamma li-l-Kitab, 2002, p. 43.

Turkey and Egypt had already moved towards competition as centre and contender of the Ottoman Empire, their rulers engaged in comparable projects of state expansion and modernising reform. They were each subject to pressures from other imperial great powers in the international field, and hosted a similar range of ideological and institutional responses. This chapter offers a comparative discussion of the evolution of nationalist discourses and practices in both countries, in light of the imperial hierarchies of the international.

Both Turkey's celebrated poet Yahya Kemal (1885–1958) and Egypt's beloved novelist Yahya Haqqi (1905–92) reflected these trends in their political, literary and career choices, the former joining the Young Turks in Paris, and the latter serving under the nationalist Wafd governments. Both men were engaged intellectuals who believed in the social and revolutionary role of literature, and both moved into politics and became career diplomats. Proud nationalists, they navigated transitions from dynasty to republic, and sought to endow contemporary modernisation processes with authenticity.

As the two men's careers show, the Turkish and Egyptian cases are particularly comparable because at the heart of both of their engagements with modernity lay a fraught encounter with western Europe, which left its mark on the particular narratives of self and Other and the modern subjectivities generated in each case. Both Kemal and Haqqi spent formative years in Europe, and grappled with this in their canon – they were both champions of a new 'scientific' writing style influenced by their European learning, but true to the spirit and parsimony of their own languages. Indeed Kemal studied classical divan poetry, as well as Arabic, while in France. The two even met when Haqqi was posted to Istanbul, and exchanged ideas on their states' modernisation projects.[3]

The conventional wisdom in comparisons of Turkey and Egypt is that Kemal Atatürk successfully resisted Allied efforts to capture Anatolia in 1922,[4] overturning the threat of dismemberment by Europe, whilst Egypt failed to mount similar resistance, succumbing to almost eighty years of foreign rule. Less obvious, however, is that the

[3] Haqqi, 'Ashjan 'Udw Muntasib', p. 41; see pp. 17–18 for Haqqi's observations on the Arabic language.

[4] Steven A. Cook, *Ruling but not Governing: the Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, pp. 9–10.

foundational experience with Europe for republican Turkey was the defeat of its Ottoman predecessor, after its erosion by its Western rivals. The profound wariness of Europe this generated, dubbed the Sèvres Syndrome after the infamous 1920 treaty, jostled with recognition of the advances made by Europe that had informed decades of Ottoman reformism. This tension is eminently comparable to the experience of successive traumas of foreign rule in Egypt, alongside the continuing translations and local adaptations of knowledge produced in imperial Europe. The modernist literary schools of Kemal and Haqqi are cases in point. In both countries, then, the departure point for state modernists was their perception of a degree of decline compared with Europe and of the need to catch up.

A useful framework for the comparison is to examine the engagements with a triad of questions that followed from this: what was the nature of this decline, what were the reasons, and what was the solution? This chapter examines answers to these questions, in debates around the precise way in which Ottoman Turks and Egyptians needed to think of themselves as modern subjects, and where the boundaries lay between the Ottoman Empire and its Western counterparts. These contestations began with conceptions of sovereignty – Ottoman in the first instance – and gradually generated layers of narrative on community, producing modern-national subjectivities in the process. Engagement with a thesis derived from comparison with Europe necessarily locked the actors into Orientalist frameworks, but their efforts to provide its antithesis would involve creative interpellations with indigenous as well as alternative traditions. Understanding these is crucial to an informed comparison of Turkish and Egyptian conduct in the 1950s, since these narratives were to recur and exercise their influence in the worldviews and proposals of the Democrats and the Free Officers.

Sovereignty before Nationalism

Saving the State: Ottoman Reform, Alliances and Orientalism

A formative experience for both Turkish and Egyptian political actors was the process of Ottoman integration into Europe, an increasingly unequal political and economic transformation. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at the height of Ottoman military power, it was

the Europeans who would send their delegations to Istanbul in an effort to forge alliances, and to learn of Ottoman culture.[5] By the nineteenth century, however, European powers had advanced technologically, and enjoyed greater regional cohesion after the Peace of Westphalia. They now threatened the Ottoman Empire militarily and financially, especially after 1820, when the Ottoman defeat by Russia led to its signing away significant commercial concessions. Meanwhile irredentist nationalist movements eroded it from within, often receiving support from its rivals. In 1821 and 1976 respectively, the independence movements of Greece and Serbia both received Russian support, a pattern that would recur and remain ingrained in the sultans' minds.[6]

Unusually, however, another major threat had come from Egypt, soon after its army had assisted the Ottoman sultan in the battles to retain Serbia and Greece. New governor Muhammad Ali had ambitions to transform Egypt into a regional power, and had occupied Syria by 1833. His expansionism was checked by Russia, and then Britain, however, which simultaneously exploited Ottoman vulnerability to extract favourable trade terms in the 1838 Balta Liman Treaty.[7] The experience only served to underline for both sides the critical edge possessed by the great powers to the west.

In this context, Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecit decreed the Tanzimat 'Reorderings' of 1839, which had their origins in the pioneering *nizam-i cedid* of Selim III. These defensive reforms were to play a dual role. First, they were to protect the empire through the adoption of ostensibly robust European modes of rule and legitimation. Second, they would signal to Europe the place of the Ottoman Empire in its ranks, often with the aim of joining a Western alliance.

[5] Fatma Müge Göcek, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century*, Oxford University Press, 1987; Gerald Maclean ed., *Re-Orienting the Renaissance: Cultural Exchanges with the East*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

[6] Göcek, 'The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab Nationalisms', in Göcek ed., *Social Construction of Nationalism in the Middle East*, New York: SUNY Press, 2002, pp. 20–3.

[7] Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 54; Virginia Aksan, 'War and Peace', in Suraiya Faroqhi ed., *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Vol. III: *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*, Cambridge University Press, 2006.

The Tanzimat statesmen were administrative elites who had been sent on educational missions to Britain and France, and had returned with a firmly 'European' vision of modernity. Men such as Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Mehmet Emin Ali Pasha, Mehmet Fuat Pasha and Ahmet Şefik Mithat Pasha, all Foreign Ministers and Grand Viziers until 1877, had founded the Translation Bureau in the 1820s, and bore a common conviction on the need to 'catch up' with Europe. Thus the 1839 Gülhane Edict launched lavish efforts to import symbolic practices as well as legal and political infrastructures from France in particular, beginning with the establishment of private property. The 1856 Hatt-ı Hümayun Reform Decree then overhauled taxation, conscription, education and public employment systems to declare all Ottoman subjects equal before the law.[8] The millet system of self-rule by religious community, and the mediation with the Porte of the ulema class, gave way to centralisation and the doctrine of Ottomanism for all subjects.

The Gülhane Decree was also 'undoubtedly . . . a diplomatic move, aimed at gaining the support of the European powers, and especially Britain, for the empire in its struggle with Mehmet Ali'.[9] Thus a practice of seeking formal alliances with the West, often through prior or conditional reforms, became part of the Ottoman repertoire of dynamics with European interlocutors. Earlier alliances had been facilitated by the empire's diplomatic engagement in western Europe.[10] However, as the empire suffered periodic setbacks, these alliances became increasingly performative. In the new climate after the Westphalian peace, Ottoman Turkey secured membership of the Concert of Europe through the promulgation of the Hatt-ı Hümayun Decree. It signalled total allegiance to the Westphalian order, and its content was determined by British and French ambassadors in Istanbul. As Eldem writes of the financial implications, 'Integration, if it ever happened, was to be realized on western terms, and would entail the right of the Great Powers to interfere in the internal matters of the Empire for the safeguard of the reforms, particularly the protection of non-Muslims.'[11] The Ottoman rulers' need for support

[8] Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 64–9; Aksan, 'War and Peace', p. 113.
[9] Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p. 53. [10] Göcek, *East*, pp. 7–23.
[11] Edhem Eldem, 'Ottoman Financial Integration with Europe: Foreign Loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman Public Debt', *European Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2005, p. 443.

from the former against the secessionism of the latter made it harder to achieve favourable terms.

These practices – at home and vis-à-vis the West – both presupposed and gradually concretised new ideas about Ottoman sovereignty and its associated community: the Ottoman *patrie*. In this period, Ottoman elites began to engage in mimicry and in a division of realms for its application that would endure into the twentieth century. This has become known as Ottoman Orientalism, the discourse and practices associated with Othering the non-Turkish Muslims, Arabs and Kurds of the empire. In theory, the doctrine of Ottomanism had come to dispel European Orientalist claims about the backwardness of the Muslim empire's modes of rule, and its consequent need for management. It had done so through an accommodation between Islamic-dynastic and secular-temporal grounds for legitimacy, presenting the sultan as preserver of rights equally for all his subjects. Yet admission of the accompanying need to overhaul the material realms of Ottoman governance contradicted this. It made manifest the acceptance of these claims. A further manoeuvre was necessary here, and it was this – Ottoman Orientalism – that would go on to inform official Turkish–Arab relations in the republic.

European Orientalists had long critiqued the Ottoman Empire as backward, attributing this to two aspects that they readily conflated, Turkishness and Islam. Beginning with the Tanzimat, the Ottoman response to this was to internalise their narrative of Turkish-Muslim identity, but to rebuff their judgements on tradition and modernity by applying these to the empire's non-Turkish subjects. As Deringil summarises, 'the Ottomans rejected the *subaltern role* that the West seemed intent on making them adopt, but they could only do this by inviting (to put it euphemistically) "their own" subalterns into history'.[12] These were the Arabs and Kurds of the peripheries of the empire. Thus when sectarian violence broke out in 1860 in Mount Lebanon, for example, 'this was relegated to the domain of tribal fanaticism by [Foreign Minister] Fuad Pasha and his European colleagues'. A crucial trend here was the incipient nationalisation of Islam, with its concomitant demotion of non-Turkish Muslims: 'As such, Ottoman modernization,

[12] Selim Deringil, '"They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery": the Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 45, No. 2, April 2003, p. 342.

from which emerged a discourse of Ottoman Orientalism, was as much a project of power within the empire as it was an act of resistance to Western imperialism.'[13]

As for the Christian minorities of the empire, these were alienated twice, both as non-Turks and as suspected agents of the Western empires, subjected to pathological distrust by the state. However, in this period at least, there remained an official position on their protection and importance to the integrity of the empire. By contrast Arab Muslims were cast as premodern, in need of civilisation, and situated outside the age of modernity that the Tanzimat had proclaimed. The displacement of the Turk into modernity and the installation of the Arab in his place were almost mathematical.

Building the State: Egyptian Sovereignty and 'Homeland'

While the Ottomans were concerned with saving the state, the Egyptian governor Muhammad Ali had been preoccupied with building it. His drive for power depended on fortifying Egypt against European imperial encroachment after Napoleon Bonaparte's 1798 occupation and the British effort to do the same in 1805. After vigorous popular resistance to both overtures, Muhammad Ali had manoeuvred himself into power, and set about the strengthening of his position and ultimately his dynasty. He began to launch far-reaching reforms, extending beyond those hitherto applied by Selim III. His aim was to build a modern, European-style army, raising the necessary taxation by expanding the state bureaucracy, and raising the standard of education in order to provide cadres for both. The Pasha's effort to motivate conscripts with religious appeals did not succeed in stopping desertions and evasions, however, and the notion of an emerging Egyptian community in this period is premature. However, Fahmy explains that the army 'did unwittingly contribute to the rise of Egyptian nationalism by homogenizing the experience of tens of thousands of Egyptians over a period that exceeded twenty years by instilling in them the feeling of hatred of the "Ottomans," and thus helped in their collective "imagination" of the nation'.[14] Moreover, as Zubaida points out,

[13] Ussama Makdisi, 'Ottoman Orientalism', *American Historical Review*, Vol. 107, No. 3, 2002, p. 772.

[14] Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2003, p. 268.

Muhammad Ali's state 'created a class of civil and military functionaries of the middle level, made aware of ideas of national identity by their education'.[15]

Some of these functionaries were sent on educational missions to France, as was also the case with Ottoman Turkish elites: the first group left Egypt for Paris in 1826. The religious scholar sent to accompany them, Rifa'ah Rifa'i al-Tahtawi, returned to play a pioneering role in the realms of culture and education for the Egyptian state. Tahtawi's writings elaborate the precepts of a reformism that was shared by Ottoman Tanzimat elites: civilisation resided currently in European states, and their progress – manifest in their superiority in the realms of war and governance – was underpinned by their mastery of rational sciences in turn, as well as governance which encouraged the welfare of all. This, he insisted, was not incompatible with Islam: indeed Muslims had studied and offered these rational sciences to the world first, and Islamic society could recover now by adopting them anew, starting in the field of education. He famously said that in Paris, he saw Muslims without Islam, while the opposite was true in Cairo.

These assumptions were shared by his Ottoman Turkish counterparts, but Tahtawi diverged from them in two crucial spheres: the explanation for the malaise they had diagnosed and the proposed solution. On the first count, Tahtawi insisted that it was the alien domination of Mamlukes and Circassians that had stunted progress in the Arab world. This can be read as a reversal of the manoeuvre of Ottoman Orientalism and its claims of Turkish superiority. Indeed this blaming of Turkish rule would persist in explanations for the Arab malaise well into the twentieth century. The fact that Egypt too was in imperial possession of non-Egyptian lands – Sudan since 1821 – provides an interesting parallel with the Ottoman attitudes to the Arab East, in the Egyptians' own 'civilising mission' in Africa.[16] This did not interfere with the developing stance vis-à-vis the Ottomans, however, who were perceived to threaten Egyptian sovereignty.

On the second count, Tahtawi prescribed an obligation for 'love of the homeland' on the part of both ruler and ruled: 'All the virtues which

[15] Sami Zubaida, *Beyond Islam: a New Understanding of the Middle East*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2010, p. 128.

[16] See Eve Troutt Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.

the faithful must manifest towards their brothers in faith are also incumbent between those who share a motherland, in terms of their reciprocal rights and the patriotic fraternity which unites them.'[17] Tahtawi's solution marked out Egypt from the Muslim Ottoman Empire and valorised its ancient civilisation as well as its army. He had become fascinated by pharaonic Egypt while in France, and now asserted the continuity of an Egyptian nation throughout time. This diverged from Islamic conventions of time that disregarded this period as one of barbarism or ignorance, *al-jahiliyya*.

Simultaneously, he engaged with a Muslim source such as Ibn Khaldun to contest European Orientalists' fatalistic assessments of Arab-Muslim decline. He adopted Ibn Khaldun's cyclical understanding of historical civilisation to present ancient Egypt as a peak to which Egypt could now return, given Muhammad Ali's reforms.[18] His thought reflected the ways in which the peripheralisation of Egypt sparked a search for its earlier greatness, and the identification with this ancient past became a pathway to salvation in the future. This protonationalist logic would recur among the Young Turks a generation later.

There was significant receptivity to Tahtawi's ideas in Muhammad Ali's court, though this did not stretch to his ideas on the duties of the ruler and rights of the ruled. He was charged with editing the official newspaper, *Al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyya*, and directing the new School of Languages and its crucial Translation Bureau, which prepared the new generations of professionally trained officials. After a brief exile, Tahtawi was invited back by Khedive Ismail, to form part of the commissions charged with translating French legal codes into Arabic and redesigning the schooling system. Ismail restarted the educational missions abroad, and founded Dar al-'Ulum and Dar al-Kutub. The Ministry of Education commissioned Tahtawi to write a textbook suitable for boys and girls, which underlined the principle of free primary education for both, equally. It encouraged *ijtihad*, and taught that 'there was a need to depart from the teachings of the Hanafi school . . . if modern practices required it'.[19]

[17] Rifa'ah Rifa'i Al-Tahtawi, cited in Anouar Abdel Malek ed., *Contemporary Arab Political Thought*, trans. Michael Pallis, London: Zed Books, 1983, p. 29.

[18] See Elliott Colla, *Conflicted Antiquities: Egyptology, Egyptomania, Egyptian Modernity*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007, pp. 129–36.

[19] Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 14.

Ismail also wished to enact Egyptian modernity in visible, spectacular ways. Thus he commissioned a series of showcase projects inspired by European precedents, ranging from sponsorship of the arts, to the commissioning of European-influenced architecture, to the completion and opening of the Suez Canal. Ismail famously tasked European-educated technocrat Ali Mubarak with the development of Cairo's western quarter and the design of a masterplan to integrate it with the rest of the city. Ismail had been impressed by Georges-Eugene Haussmann's redesign of Paris, and wished to make of Cairo a 'Paris on the Nile'.[20] As Mestyan puts it, these efforts saw the elaboration of an early khedivial culture which sought to incorporate Egypt into the global regime of art, and to achieve political hegemony in so doing.[21] The cotton boom of the 1860s brought Egypt far more deeply into the world economy and allowed for this expense, but in time, this performance outpaced the capacity of the state to raise revenues. Having taken Muhammad Ali's vision to an extreme, his grandson brought Egypt to bankruptcy in 1876, and presided over Egypt's transformation into a dependent market within the world system.

The period in which Tahtawi could appreciate Europe's advancements and work together harmoniously with French consultants to bring these to Egypt was now to come to an abrupt end: he had 'lived and worked in the happy interlude of history, when the religious tension between Islam and Christianity was being relaxed and had not yet been replaced by the new political tension of east and west'.[22] The political and intellectual elite of his time, however, had already laid the foundations for later articulations of a territorial nationalism around Egypt, with its ancient and Islamic past, couched in his time in a larger Ottoman sphere. The khedives' rule had established the particularity of Egypt politically and culturally through their development of its own modes of governance and security, its advanced systems of agriculture and communications, its nascent printing press and thriving arts scene.

[20] Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 62–8; Nezar AlSayyad, *Cairo: Histories of a City*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 209.

[21] Adam Mestyan, 'Arabic Theater in Early Khedivial Culture, 1868–72: James Sanua Revisited', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 46, 2014, p. 131.

[22] Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 81.

Sovereignty and Contested Nationalisms

Nationalising Islam: From the Young Ottomans to Abdülhamit

A similar evolution in perspectives on Europe now occurred among the Ottoman state's Turkish elites. During the Tanzimat period (1839–76), they had chosen to identify with a European modernity in the image of the French Empire, and to deflect its civilising challenge on to its own peripheries. As the empire's territorial losses intensified, they felt that the Ottomanist formula had failed to preserve the empire's integrity. They began trying to imagine a different unifying narrative of belonging, in order to preserve Ottoman state sovereignty. In this context, after the relegation of the premodern to the peripheries of the empire, another manoeuvre would be added: the assertion of official Islam, and subsequently Turkishness, as culturally ascendant in the empire and upon *that* basis the empire as coeval with Europe.

The relevant dynamics here were the further loss of territory to seceding nationalist movements among Christian subjects, and the influx of Muslim migrants from these formerly Ottoman territories. After its defeat by Russia in 1877–8, the Ottoman Empire lost nearly all its European territories in the Balkan Wars of 1912, and had to fight to recapture its former capital, Edirne. Ottoman Muslim immigrants from the Russian Empire experienced violent uprooting, and subsequently visited the same upon Christian inhabitants of the territories in which they arrived. Both dynamics strengthened the overlap between ethnic Turkishness and Islam as the dominant identity narrative for state elites and increasingly for the majority of subjects. There was an important European dimension too, as the fall of the French Empire at the hands of Germany had confirmed the superiority of 'this interpretation' of nationality through race, as Akçura put it, over the French civic alternative.[23] In some quarters, the French-inspired egalitarianism of the Tanzimat gave way to an increasingly essentialist ethnoreligious nationalism. Last but not least, the Ottoman Empire had succumbed to bankruptcy in 1875, and by 1881 hosted an Anglo-French Debt Commission: 'from the

[23] Yusuf Akçura, 'Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset', trans. David Thomas, in Hasan Paksoy ed., *Central Asian Monuments*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 135.

1890s on, Ottoman integration with Europe had started to take a substantially different course, much akin to imperialism'.[24]

It is important not to oversimplify trends in political thought and state policy during this period, first the rule of Sultan Abdülhamit, and then the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). It may be said, however, that while Western-oriented defensive reforms and alliances were pursued, both practices now proceeded in a far more hostile context. Fortna describes this as a kind of 'besiegement' amidst foreign missionaries and capitalists, as well as European empires and neighbouring secessionists.[25] Meanwhile with the rise of print capitalism in the 1840s and the state's drive to create its own empire-wide 'Muslim' school system, the opportunity for broadly disseminated opposition grew, drawn from a modern, self-conscious, reading public. As Findley writes, 'From the widening circle of literacy came both the foot soldiers and the charismatic leaders for a long-term cultural revolution that got under way between 1840 and 1860 and has continued ever since.'[26]

Although they only stayed organised for five years, the Young Ottomans' ideas about the empire's ills and remedies were disproportionately influential, informing the CUP's and later the republicans' positions vis-à-vis Europe. They represented views from sectors as diverse as small Muslim guilds to alienated ulema to educated middle-class intellectuals and functionaries.[27] They railed against the Tanzimat for having theoretically equalised but in practice privileged the non-Muslim communities further, and for their superficial mimicry of European fads and fashions. Instead, they sought to provide an authentic narrative to propel modernisation in the empire, above all by restoring faith and affirming the sufficiency of Ottoman traditions.[28] Nevertheless, their chosen route was to reconcile liberal European ideas with Islamic thought, by arguing for constitutionalism that would embody the Islamic principles of *shura* and *bay'a* through

[24] Eldem, *Financial*, p. 443.
[25] Benjamin Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 33.
[26] Carter V. Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History, 1789–2007*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010, p. 118.
[27] Zubaida, *Beyond Islam*, p. 168.
[28] Haldun Gülalp, 'Using Political Islam as Political Ideology: Turkey in Historical Perspective', *Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2002, p. 25.

the European-modern practices of parliamentary representation and elections.[29]

The poet and political thinker Namık Kemal was among the most prominent expounders of these ideas in such critical publications as *Tasvir-i Efkar*, and provided this bridge through an exercise of translation.[30] However, this introduced a tension akin to that present in Tahtawi's work, and also in the contemporaneous writings of Egypt's Islamic modernists, between religious traditions and the secular modern. Thinkers such as Kemal endowed the language of religion with new connotations of secular time and space: *vatan* acquired the meaning of *la patrie, hurriyet* that of *liberté*, and crucially, *millet* that of *la nation*.[31] Such innovations reflected the delicate adaptation of a rising paradigm to the needs and distinctions of the empire. Meanwhile, the high circulation of the Young Ottomans' publications 'contributed greatly to the remoulding of Ottoman public opinion', especially 'since some newspapers were read out loud in coffeehouses to the illiterate'.[32] Thus the Young Ottomans used the very modern media and literary modes of print journalism and novel writing, moving beyond the complex traditions of Ottoman poetry, in order to appeal to fellow Ottomans directly as modern, self-consciously patriotic subjects.

The enduring influence of the Young Ottomans, as Mardin says, was 'not so much the proclamation of the Ottoman constitution as the establishment of the belief that Sultan Abdulhamit had perpetrated a crime in suspending it'.[33] Of course Abdülhamit himself – conventionally described as a 'pan-Islamist' – played a crucial part in this, since his rule in fact propelled the modernising formula of the Tanzimat, spreading literacy and education in particular.[34] He accepted the need to catch up with Europe, but he reflected some of the concerns of the Young Ottomans, in commissioning school textbooks, public works, arts and architecture, all to underline the

[29] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, Princeton University Press, 2008, pp. 103–4; Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: a Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Syracuse University Press, 2000.
[30] Sami Zubaida discusses them as 'cosmopolitans': *Beyond Islam*, pp. 134–5.
[31] Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p. 72.
[32] Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, p. 94.
[33] Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 403.
[34] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*.

superiority of Islam over Christianity.[35] He had inherited an empire which lost most of its Christian territories, and for which the fraught questions of the status of non-Muslims in the army and in taxation were less relevant. In this way, just as he equated Christianity with the contemporary European states, Hamit deliberately 'nationalised Islam', instrumentalising its legitimising language to propel Ottoman state modernisation.[36]

Moreover, and in another connection with both Europe and Egypt, the realities of European colonialism had spread to overtake the Ottoman Empire in its Muslim areas: 'Exact in the usages of a pious Muslim sovereign, Abdülhamid was uniquely positioned to appropriate this vision politically. He was well aware that he as caliph had the power to call a jihad and rouse Muslims outside the empire against their colonial masters.'[37] In his alliances, Abdülhamit chose Germany, to balance the imperial encroachment of Britain and France on Ottoman territories such as Tunisia and Egypt, and particularly after the 1869 opening of the Suez Canal. His rule was therefore a particularly nimble jump between the rationalisation drives of the Tanzimat in administration, education and military reform, and the invocation and practice of religious morality and law. Fortna's insights on Abdülhamit's schools capture this balance: 'these institutions, far from acting as agents of cultural bifurcation, actually assimilated Western and Ottoman influences', thus asserting indigeneity as well as the empire's 'place alongside its partners in "world time"'.[38]

Islamic Modernism and 'Egypt for the Egyptians'

In Egypt a movement of thought and practice arose in parallel to that of the Young Ottomans, but its evolution towards nationalism would be shaped by a more violent and destructive European intervention – the

[35] Ebru Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks, and the Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2007, p. 89; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, pp. 202–45; Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic,* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.

[36] Selim Deringil, *The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1998; Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman Empire*, Oxford University Press, 2001.

[37] Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, p. 149.

[38] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, p. 244.

British occupation of 1882. This event was preceded by a period in which the modernising changes of the khedives brought many indigenous Egyptians closer to positions of power, highlighting the situation of informal empire that they experienced under the Turco-Circassian European dual class. The two developments would profoundly alter the direction in which political and intellectual elites in Egypt conceived of sovereignty and their own community in relation to Europe.

The community of Muslims, the *umma*, was plagued by submissiveness and apathy; addressing this internal decline was key to throwing off the external aggressor; and this resolution was contingent on Muslims relearning their faith and its principles, and restoring the unity of the *umma*. So went the core thinking of the Islamic modernists, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his Egyptian student, Muhammad Abdu. Like Tahtawi, they wrote of Islam as a civilisation, adopting this concept from French thought, and emphasised that it was not inferior to Christian civilisation. Also like Tahtawi, they diagnosed the decay of the *umma* partly in its Turkish rulers, criticising the resort to intermediaries with God that these rulers had allowed. Abdu argued that 'Contrary to what its enemies say, Islam has never taught that human reason should be checked, it is the friend of all rational enquiry and all science.'[39] It fell to Muslims to exercise their own independent reasoning, namely the Islamic practice of *ijtihad*, when grappling with the challenges of modern life.[40]

Al-Afghani and Abdu were keen to illustrate the compatibility of Islam and modernity not only in their own teachings but also in public debate with European counterparts.[41] In both realms, the parallels with the Young Ottomans are striking. Both Al-Afghani and Namık Kemal published rejoinders to the same lecture delivered in 1883 by the French Orientalist Ernest Renan. In it, he had argued that religion was the extinguisher of science and progress, but singled out Islam in particular. As Aydın clarifies, 'What made Renan's ideas different from the frequent anti-Muslim writings in the European media was their precise attack on the historical consciousness of optimistic Muslim modernists, who saw their own

[39] Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 148. [40] Ibid., p. 144.
[41] James Piscatori, 'The West in Arab Foreign Policy', in Robert O'Neill and R. J. Vincent eds., *The West and the Third World*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, pp. 129–30.

history as part of the history of European civilization and progress.'[42] The modernists sought to challenge and expose this cultural onslaught, but by agreeing to refute Renan's attack within its own framework, they conceded significant ground in their defensive polemics. Al-Afghani accepted that Islam was behind Christianity in its attitude to rationalism, and put this down to poor leadership and 'despotism'.[43] Namık Kemal resorted to exegesis to argue that Islam was a religion that loved knowledge. Abdu affirmed that the Egyptian people were in a state that did not allow for self-rule, but that this would change in just fifteen years of government by 'a just despot'.[44]

The year before Renan delivered his lecture – and the reason why it stung particularly badly – the British had bombarded Alexandria and occupied Egypt. Having coerced the sultan to depose Khedive Ismail, and installed his son Tewfik in 1879, the British and French had been hoping to manage Egyptian affairs through dual control of Egypt's treasury, and through the Public Debt Commission. The crystallisation of opposition against them, however, forced their hand. This originated in a constitutional movement centred around the newly formed Al-Jam'iyya al-Wataniyya ('National Society'), which had formed during Ismail's short-lived 1866 Chamber of Deputies. Its members – some of them students of Al-Afghani and Abdu – described themselves as 'the representatives of the Egyptian nation and defenders of its rights and interests'.[45] When Ismail dismissed the chamber in 1879, army officers like Ahmad 'Urabi – whose peasant origins had kept him from higher rank – drew close to the constitutionalists. Mobilisation followed amongst peasants and new urban migrants, who were chafing under extreme taxation and conscription, and guild merchants and artisans, who were suffering European competition. Together they now adapted their tradition of petitioning the sultan to affirm their support for 'Urabi and his demands.[46]

[42] Cemil Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 48.

[43] Cited in Nikkie Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, p. 187.

[44] Muhammad Abdu cited in Abdel Malek, *Arab Thought*, p. 40.

[45] Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origins*, p. 23.

[46] Juan Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's* 'Urabi *Movement*, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 20.

In its composition, the 'Urabi Revolution was the first genuinely protonational political movement in Egypt, and though loosely bound together, it propelled radical new solutions to Egypt's malaise that would become formative of the national anticolonial tradition. The rise of print media and opinion journalism in the 1870s provided a crucial venue for the articulation of national sentiments with these ideas, particularly using colloquial Egyptian Arabic, and for mobilisation around them. Key figures were the Syrian immigrant Adib Ishaq, the Egyptian orator of the 'Urabi group, Abdallah Al-Nadim, and the Egyptian poet and dramatist Yaqub Sanua.[47] The 'Urabi movement's solution was encapsulated in its deceptively simple slogan, coined by Sanua: 'Egypt for the Egyptians'. Since ethnic difference corresponded to political power among the Turco-Circassian and European classes, there was an egalitarian dimension in the call to unseat them. As Abdullah Nadim saw it, 'The Orientals have been reduced to mere employees, planting, harvesting and manufacturing in order that Europe's trade should grow.'[48] There was an early notion of popular sovereignty in the mass support for 'Urabi's demand for a constitution, and in his 1881 rejoinder to Khedive Tewfik: 'how do you deign to enslave us when we were born to our mothers free?'

With this solution came the elaboration of the contours and membership of this imagined community. Although a degree of communalism persisted in some of the slogans of the time,[49] there was also an emphasis on the belonging of Muslim and non-Muslim Egyptians to the nation equally. This was clear in the writings of Al-Afghani and Abdu against Khedive Tewfik and in their journal in exile, *Al-'Urwa Al-Wuthqa*, as well as later in the discourse of 'Urabi and Nadim. As the latter wrote, 'Let the Muslim among you, O Egyptians, turn to his brother Muslim and strengthen the religious bond between them. Let them both then turn to the Copt and the Israelite and strengthen the patriotic union that binds them all together as one many with a single goal: to keep Egypt for the Egyptians … ' Nadim was careful to overturn the conventional comparisons in favour of the West on their head: 'There were never any aggressive clashes between [Egyptians] over religion, nothing to

[47] See Radwan Al-Kashif, *Al-Hurriyya wa-l-'Adala fi Fikr Abdallah al-Nadim*, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aamma li-l-Kitab, 2005.
[48] Abdallah Al-Nadim cited in Abdel Malek, *Arab Thought*, p. 90.
[49] See Zubaida, *Beyond Islam*, p. 94.

parallel what has happened to the Jews in the West ... [nor] as the French did towards the Jesuits ... '[50]

As Chalcraft observes, 'Whereas the British had urged a constitution, in the absence of mass mobilization, in Istanbul in 1876, they looked on and acted with increasing hostility as a more popular constitutional movement developed in Egypt.'[51] The abortive 'Urabi Revolution dealt a profound blow to the momentum of the modernist constituencies in Egypt, which now had to reckon with their defeat, and find ways to outmanoeuvre a juggernaut on its own terms. As the occupation wore on, it progressively radicalised each generation. Their discourses and practices indexed a steadily rising rejection of compromise.

Sovereignty and Nation Fused

Ethnic Nationalism and the Rise of the Young Turks

A similar change of generation and attitude was forthcoming in the Ottoman centre, with the rise of the protonationalist Committee of Union and Progress, which overthrew the sultan in 1908. Rather than colonialism, however, its founders' constructions of community focused on the exclusion of internal Others. Abdulhamit's rule had propagated the imperial identity of an Islamic caliphate fused with ethnic Turkishness, elevating it above non-Muslims and non-Turkish Muslims in turn. After the defeat against Russia in 1878, however, and as anti-Christian violence peaked in the 1895–6 Armenian massacres, a pan-Turkist alternative arose: a reaction to the palace's inability to stem the same tide of external encroachment and centrifugal pressures. This animated the activities of CUP branches that had formed clandestinely between Istanbul, Macedonia and Paris.[52] Although the CUP included members of different ethnicities, all committed to preserving the empire, its Turkish leadership exercised a tighter grip with time. Two of its intellectual leaders were Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp.

In 1904 Tatar Turk Akçura had put forth a trenchant critique of the empire's policy of Ottomanism, which he considered to be out of touch

[50] Al-Nadim cited in Abdel Malek, *Arab Thought*, p. 90.
[51] John Chalcraft, *Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 163.
[52] Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: the Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926*, Leiden: Brill, 1984.

with the reality of community formation, which could never be by choice. He followed this with a critique of Abdülhamit's alternative of pan-Islamism, for again failing outright in what its predecessor could implicitly not address, namely the place of non-Muslims in the empire. He then presented the logical conclusion as a racial basis for community, which took the form of pan-Turkism and stretched to include the Turks of the Russian Empire and Iran.[53] His and several contemporaries' ideas were profoundly shaped by their forced displacement after the gains of the Russian Empire against the Ottoman state, and their settling in Istanbul.[54] Akçura's view remained a marginal one in this period, during which the counterargument of his friend Ahmet Ferit (Tek) on the primacy of Ottomanism remained predominant. However, it would later be appropriated to the republic's nation making canon as Akçura became personally close to Atatürk.

Akçura never joined the CUP, however, in contrast with his contemporary Ziya Gökalp, whose writings came to inform the CUP's official expression of its nationalism after the loss of the Balkans in 1912–3. Gökalp did so through Akçura's Turkish Hearths association and as frequent contributor to its journal *Türk Yurdu*. Gökalp was from Kurdish Diyarbakir, and was writing under the shadow of Europe's steady erosion of the empire. On the first count, he charged the Ottoman statesmen with subordinating Turkish national culture to Arab and Persian equivalents, and later with the mimicry of the national cultural values of European nations. On the second, Gökalp addressed the predicament raised by Chatterjee almost to the letter, by contrasting Turkish culture or *hars* with universal (read European) civilisation or *medeniyet*, and arguing that the former needed to take from the latter only what suited it. For Gökalp, national culture encompassed 'aesthetic, moral, philosophical, and other norms … emotions, enthusiasms, tastes', while civilisation was international, characterised by 'concepts, methods and techniques'.[55]

There was a popular dimension to Gökalp's celebration of the folkish *hars*: he was clear that it was the people and not the elites who should determine what could be borrowed from European civilisation

[53] Akçura, 'Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset', p. 138 on Caucasian, Azerbaijani and northern Iran based Turks.
[54] Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 306.
[55] Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp: 1876–1924*, Leiden: Brill, 1985, p. 30 and fn. 26.

and what constituted slavish imitation. At the same time, his writing followed the same line as Abdülhamit's textbooks had done, arguing that Ottoman Islam was as civilised as its European Christian counterparts, if not superior. Thus in *Islam and Civilisation*, Gökalp wrote expressly: 'the progress of the Anglo-Saxon nations was a result of the fact that they had freed themselves from the Catholic tradition and approached the principles of Islam'.[56] Gökalp's blend of ethnic Turkism, populist celebration of folklore and custom, and anti-European defensiveness in pursuit of modernity became the ideological mainstay of the CUP. As Meltem Ahiska writes, 'the elite, while differentiating themselves from the people by identifying with the West, reciprocally differentiated themselves from the West, by identifying with the people – hence, they engaged in continuous boundary management'.[57]

Aside from their experiences of the violence and secessionism afflicting the empire, the Young Ottomans' and certainly the Young Turks' ideas were profoundly shaped by certain European Orientalists whose larger intellectual project the Turks were battling against – abundantly evidenced by Renan. Turcologists, who studied ancient Turkish culture and language, presented treatises that elevated Turkish dialects above their Arabic-Persian linguistic counterparts in Ottoman, and that emphasised the contributions to world civilisation of Turks as a race, equal to or even fused with the Aryan.[58] These apparent pathways through ancient history into a modern present were irresistible for many Young Turks, providing a rebuttal of the charges of inferiority long associated with the word 'Turk' by other Europeans. Not surprisingly, these interactions only reinforced the chasm that Turkish elites perceived between themselves and their Arab and Kurdish co-religionists. Indeed Ziya Gökalp had been at pains to distinguish Turkish culture from the backward Oriental contaminations of the Arabic-Persian world, writing about their 'sickly Oriental music', for example.[59] Publications by Turkist factions within

[56] Cited in Charles Kurzman, *Modernist Islam: a Sourcebook, 1840–1940*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 197.
[57] Meltem Ahiska, *Occidentalism in Turkey: Questions of Modernity and National Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2010, p. 56.
[58] Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Reform, Revolution and Republic*, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 260–1.
[59] Gökalp, cited in Ahiska, *Occidentalism in Turkey*, p. 58.

the Young Turk movement engaged increasingly in condemnations of the Arabs as an inferior race aiming 'to annihilate the power of the Turk in the Islamic lands'.[60]

What would take these ideas and bring them wider appeal was the climate of external aggression, defensive war and state-sponsored internecine violence that characterised the late Hamidian and early CUP periods.[61] The Balkan Wars of 1912, in which the Ottoman Empire lost nearly all its European territories, were the vehicle through which many Ottoman subjects experienced the effects of nationalist division. They began to see themselves within that pattern as they responded to CUP calls for action in defence of the Muslim-Turkish Empire. It was this framework that made it possible for the state to turn on its Armenian subjects so violently in 1915.[62] It was then the death of so many in the First World War fighting – more than 200,000 ethnic Turks – that 'laid the basis for a nationalist perspective on the dismantlement of the empire'.[63]

In their positions as rising elites seeking to capture the state and reshape it to better suit its existing functions, the Young Turks can be compared with 'Urabi and his allies. In the substance of their nationalisms, however, the anticolonial discourse of Abdu had fortified a place for Egypt's Christians, fixing the Other firmly as the foreign ruler, while the CUP's ethnocentric worldviews and Turkification practices identified an array of internal Others as linked to the external threat of imperial Europe.

Egypt's Occupation and the 1919 Uprising

As the British colonial administration entrenched itself in Egypt, Lord Cromer and his successors, Eldon Gorst and Lord Kitchener, each

[60] 'Ebulhuda ve Avanesi', 1904, cited in M. Ş. Hanioğlu, 'Turkish Nationalism and the Young Turks, 1889–1908', in F. M. Göcek ed., *Social Construction of Nationalism in the Middle East*, New York: SUNY Press, 2002, p. 93.

[61] In this atmosphere, ethnic Turks, resettled from the Balkans, engaged in attacks on Armenians in Adana and Cicilia in 1895, and on Greek villages in 1910, in both cases responding to provocations from nationalists with an eye on the European powers.

[62] On Jewish communities, see Leyla Neyzi, 'Remembering to Forget: Sabbateanism, National Identity, and Subjectivity in Turkey', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 44, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 137–58.

[63] Keyder, 'A History and Geography of Turkish Nationalism', in Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas eds., *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 6.

asserted Arabs' innate incapacity for self-rule, and repeatedly subdued their efforts to do so. A notorious example was the hanging of six innocent Egyptian peasants at Dinshwai in 1906, after provocations by British troops led to violence. The injustice was narrated, printed and protested across the country and intensified the sense of a shared experience of colonial domination across classes. This confrontation ultimately generated a firmer consensus on the sovereignty of the territorial unit of Egypt, and on the national unity of the people living on its land since ancient times. In this reading, Egyptians were custodians of a long civilisation enhanced by the arrival of Islam, and long capable of self-rule. The unity of the Nile Valley was also emphasised, with the Sudanese people depicted as part of the same 'national family', though often as dependants.[64] Despite the complexity of such negotiations between modernity and nationalism, political discourses and practices converged on the cause of Egyptian independence, most dramatically in the uprisings of 1919.

Two parties had formed in 1907, which were polarised as regards the place of religion and the broader Ottoman project in national self-definition, as well as the encounter with European modernity and approaches to colonial powers. The first party was formed by several of Muhammad Abdu's students, who wielded considerable influence as judges, educators and lawmakers. They were led by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, a liberal who had adapted his readings of Rousseau and Comte to valorise freedom above all, and to affirm that regardless of levels of civilisation, every people had the right to self-rule. Theirs was a gradualist approach to reformism in cooperation with the British Agency in Cairo where useful, and opposition to the khedive and Ottoman sultan as false and exploitative rulers. Sovereignty was for them fused with an Egyptian nationhood in which religion was one cultural determinant among many, and far from its sole moral-legal foundation. Similar to the Young Turks, these Egyptians conceived of 'the decay of Islam seen in the perspective of Darwinism'.[65] Like Tahtawi and directly inspired by Abdu, they focused their energies on education and longer-term cultural

[64] Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005, p. 26.
[65] Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 164.

renewal, leading such popular projects as Cairo's 'National University', al-Gam'iyya al-Ahliyya.[66]

A younger generation came of age in the 1890s under the reality of British occupation and in the new professions that formed the effendiyya class. Mustafa Kamil was a prime example, educated in Egyptian and French law in Cairo and Toulouse, and founding editor of *Al-Liwaa'* in 1900. In 1906 he organised the Law School mass student strike in protest at British rule, and in 1907 he founded the National Party. He appealed to the rising sectors, including students and small merchants, who continued to identify with the pan-Islamic imaginary of Afghani, Abdu and Abdülhamit. As with Amin and Afghani before him, Mustafa Kamil directly refuted Cromer's charges of Egyptian inferiority with his own narrative of Egyptian fortitude, this time appropriating to the narrative Muhammad Ali, who was presented as having transformed Egyptians from fellahin into soldiers and conquerors.[67] Mustafa Kamil's embodiment of such sentiments of national pride and defiance earned him the epithet of Egypt's 'first popular politician' and prompted an outpouring of grief at his untimely death in 1908.[68]

Thus the triad of the national malaise, the reasons for it and the proposed solution continued to haunt these politicians, but the factors that they identified differed from those of their predecessors. Where Tahtawi and Abdu saw flawed religious practice, Lutfi al-Sayyid called out societal disunity and weakness; where 'Urabi railed against the foreign rule of the Turco-Circassian elite, Kamil increasingly emphasised the British;[69] and where the solution had been a return to reason in religious practice and morality, this now became

[66] Ahmed, *Intellectual Origins*, pp. 56–7; Donald Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

[67] Wilson C. Jacob, *Working out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870–1940*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011, pp. 57–9.

[68] Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 208.

[69] Kamil even briefly sought to lean on the khedive, the Ottoman sultan, and beyond them the French, to outmanoeuvre the British: see Ziad Fahmy, 'Francophone Egyptian Nationalists, Anti-British Discourse, and European Public Opinion, 1885–1910: the Case of Mustafa Kamil and Ya'qub Sannu'', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East,* Vol. 28, No. 1, 2008, pp. 170–83.

societal, national unity and resistance instead. However, a striking common thread was the repeated definition of Egyptian patriotism as love for the homeland regardless of origin, language, religion or status. For al-Sayyid it was the 'willingness to take Egypt as his first and only mother country';[70] for Kamil, it was all those residing in Egypt, bar the *dukhala'*, namely Syrians who had taken positions in the British-run bureaucracy. The nation's Others were determined by their stance on colonialism. Kamil's successor, Muhammad Farid, 'defined a great man as a nationalist who inspires others to become nationalists ... not a conqueror ... '[71]

This common thread was strengthened in the trajectory of the Wafd Party and its founder, Saad Zaghlul, who was another of Abdu's students, and initially in the Umma Party. He concurred that Egypt's malaise was caused by Turkish rule, and compounded by British control. On the solution, however, his career charts a transformation from reformist to nationalist champion. What would effect this change, and bridge the two parties' constituencies, was Britain's intransigence vis-à-vis Zaghlul's gradualism, and the swell of popular support for him. Thus while the Kemalists prised victory from the wreckage of the First World War by force, the Egyptian liberal elite sought to do so through diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference. The British refused, however, exiling Zaghlul's delegation and persistently thwarting their demands for independence.[72] This undermined the Umma's approach that a democratic political culture would require slow fostering, and that this justified working with the British. The Wafd asserted that it was no mere competitive political party: it was the nation embodied, and mandated to act on the world stage.[73]

Substantiating this was the unprecedented coalescence of urban and rural sectors in support of the Wafd, a qualitative shift from the days of 'Urabi. British conduct throughout the First World War had alienated even Egypt's comprador class: the khedive had been deposed, Egypt had been declared a British protectorate, and Egyptian troops were forced to wage war on an Ottoman Empire to which most of them felt

[70] Cited in Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, p. 177.
[71] Jacob, *Working out Egypt*, p. 51.
[72] See Chalcraft, *Popular Politics*, pp. 206–14.
[73] See Anthony Gorman, *Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egypt: Contesting the Nation*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 120.

loyal. Fiercely endorsing the Wafd, Egyptian traditions of petitioning and strikes now evolved into national affairs, spanning greater geographies, and extending to boycotts of British envoys such as the Milner Mission of 1919.

Throughout the Wafd's wrangles with Britain – it succeeded in extracting formal independence in 1922 – the contours of its ideology of Egyptian nationalism were being hammered out. These flowed partly from the leaders' own liberal conceptions of nation, but were equally rooted in the political practices of participants in 1919. Thus in the Wafd's 1918 statute, but also in the language of its disparate supporters and organisers, the establishment of national sovereignty had become an end in itself, with the nationalist subject defined by his or her ability to secure it. As the 1919 slogan went, Egyptians desired 'complete independence or instant death'. After the concerns of the educators of the nineteenth-century Nahda with internal reform, the external imperative had now taken over. However the Wafd presented the resolution for Egypt's problem of colonial domination as a democratic polity: an innovation compared with the 1880s.

Moreover, the equal place of Muslims and Copts and indeed of men and women in the national community was underlined in practice, through protest slogans and symbols, and the vocal participation of women such as Safiyya Zaghlul and Huda Sha'rawi, who led the Wafdist Women's Committee from 1920.[74] Protest sociability meant that membership of the national community was increasingly defined by the sharing of colonial experience. Meanwhile, the Wafdist narrative emphasised historical continuity with pharaonic Egypt – a strand of Egyptian nationalism which reached its apogee in the Mahmud Mukhtar statue *Nahdat Misr* ('Egypt's Awakening') and the popular campaign to bring it from Paris to Cairo. Zaghlul summed up these elements as follows: 'the nation is that part of humanity which shares the same history, the same traditions, the same customs, speaks the same language', but also shares the same aspirations for independence.[75]

[74] See Baron, *Egypt as a Woman;* Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Princeton University Press, 1995.

[75] Marius Deeb, *Party Politics in Egypt: the Wafd and its Rivals, 1919–1939*, London: Ithaca Press for St Antony's College, Oxford, 1979, p. 71, fn 265.

Futures: Western Turkey, Arab Egypt

Kemalism after Independence

The Ottoman Empire's ultimate defeat culminated in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, a blueprint for the carving up of its remaining territories. The CUP had often called out European double standards regarding Muslim and Christian victims of violence in the empire.[76] Sèvres now confirmed this, embodying feelings of betrayal and dejection among the Turkish elite. The loss of Anatolia was ultimately averted by Mustafa Kemal's rallying of resistance forces to defeat the Greek army in 1922. Significantly, Ataturk had styled himself a Gazi (conqueror), leading a *jihad* for national borders that encompassed Muslims of all ethnicities.[77] The people of Anatolia now entered a liminal state, after empire but hardly anticipating a republic. A bitter contestation for political hegemony followed, and the same questions of malaise, its causes and salvation now appeared even more urgently. Mustafa Kemal, using the political capital he had earned as Gazi, was able to marginalise his opponents and determine the answers. His manoeuvre was to gradually turn on their head the premises upon which many had fought in the war.

In one strand of his narrative, he attributed the defeat of Anatolia to the Ottoman Empire itself, to the very traditions of Ottoman Sunni Islam that had underpinned it, and the eastern loci of its references. While the Ottoman Orientalists and Ziya Gökalp had elevated Ottoman above 'Oriental' Islam, Kemal relegated Ottoman practices of Islam together with Oriental civilisation to a stagnant, enchanted time. Here it was not their religious nature as such that was given as the problem, but their versions of unscientific, superstitious Islam.[78] He affirmed the solution in the adoption of the structures and discourses of 'contemporary civilisation', understood as western Europe. This entrenched a series of discursive binaries – old/new, Ottoman/Turkish, religious/modern,

[76] See Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks, and the Balkans*, p. 91 on post-1908 children's history textbooks.

[77] Indeed Muslims around the world, particularly from India, had donated to the war effort, aiming to preserve the caliphate.

[78] Ismet Parlak and Özlem Kiliçarslan, 'The West or the EU as "the Other" from the Perspective of National Pride', *South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs*, No. 3, 2006, p. 135.

East/West – that were now presented as codes for citizens to follow. During the 1920s and 1930s, Atatürk's iconoclastic modernisation project aimed for 'a general state of amnesia which would lead to a process of estrangement of the people from some of their own cultural practices'.[79] This was used 'to disqualify all individuals who did not conform to the model of the ideal citizen'.[80]

At the same time, an unspoken narrative attributed the weakening of the empire to its pluralist constituency. It had hosted treacherous Christians, who collaborated with Christian imperial powers to undermine the empire – as well as a range of non-Turkish Muslim Orientals. The 'short-sighted Ottoman administrators, who had forgotten the civilised character and the superiority of their ethnic origins', were blamed for leaving the Turkish nation 'under the political dominance of the west'.[81] Accordingly, the solution was to unite the ethnically pure Turkish nation, thereby reclaiming Turkey's place within civilisation, amongst other Europeans. Muslim identity now acquired its fullest secularisation in the sense of serving as a silent *national* marker in contrast to Christians.[82] The term 'Turk' was to be reclaimed from its derogatory connotations – whether used by Europeans referring to Ottomans, or by Ottoman elites referring to Anatolian peasants. The Kemalists' Turkey would be an answer to audiences both at home and abroad, a practice of Kemalist Orientalism and Occidentalism at once, in its assumptions regarding the decadence and social alienation of Europe.[83]

To conjure this imagined community into being at home, the Kemalists had to fashion its spatial and territorial myths and use these to fill an emptied national canvas. Thus, even though Kemal himself had affirmed in 1922 that the Turkish nation's boundaries

[79] Ayşe Kadıoğlu, 'The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 1996, p. 186.

[80] Emmanuel Szurek, 'Go West: Variations on Kemalist Orientalism' , in François Pouillion and Jean-Claude Vatin eds., *After Orientalism: Critical Perspectives on Western Agency and Eastern Re-appropriations*, Leiden: Brill, 2015, p. 116.

[81] Parlak and Kiliçarslan, 'The West or the EU', pp. 131–2.

[82] Gülalp, H., 'Whatever Happened to Secularization?: The Multiple Islams in Turkey', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 102, Nos. 2/3, Spring/Summer 2003, pp. 381–95; Ahiska, *Occidentalism in Turkey*, p. 17.

[83] Findley, 'An Ottoman Orientalist in Europe: Ahmet Midhat Meets Madame Gulnar, 1889', *American Historical Review*, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 15–49.

were 'those that could be defended by bayonets', this was now replaced with imagery of an ancient homeland, rediscovered after centuries of burial under Ottoman rule. The ethnic conquest of Kurdish villages was presented as a reclamation, Ankara was promoted over Istanbul, and Anatolian villages revered. The paradox that Keyder points out is that the privileged site of the founding myth of Turkey was not geographical but historical, an ancient mythical past in an alien geography – a 'geography of nowhere'.[84] A new genealogy for the Turkish nation, and indeed all others, had to be manufactured in this phase. Through vehicles of mass education, the People's Houses, the National History Thesis and Sun Language Theory, Turkish nationalist discourses reversed the Orientalism of the West, claiming that 'the first geographic location where civilisation was born is the east, namely central Asia . . . the holy motherland of Turks'.[85] In the fields of art and architecture, Bozdoğan observes that 'Republican discourse . . . was devoted almost exclusively to identifying the "Turkish character" of Ottoman heritage and reclaiming it for the nationalist narrative.'[86]

This process of nationalist construction had a foundational element of destruction, displacement and forgetting. The state's nationalist project 'introjected' a homogenous Turkish nation that excluded religious and ethnic minorities.[87] This manoeuvre completed the merger of Turkish and Sunni identity that had begun in Ottoman times, and that Gökalp had propelled through his concept of a Turkish *hars*. It reached its zenith in the 'aggrandising' of the war with the Greeks, a limited war relative to the Turkish participation in the First World War, but which it was presented to eclipse, thereby also silencing both the Ottoman defeat and anti-Christian violence.[88] This also facilitated policies of state violence and transfer, which were practised upon the Christian subjects of the empire, in a continuum linking the Aegean Greeks to the Armenians, and then the Kurds of the republic.[89] Measures such as the Greek–

[84] Keyder, 'History and Geography', p. 9.
[85] Parlak and Kiliçarslan, 'The West or the EU', p. 129.
[86] Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, p. 248.
[87] Edhem Eldem, 'Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism', *Architectural Design*, No. 80, 2010, p. 28.
[88] Keyder, 'History and Geography', p. 11.
[89] See Matthias Bjornlund, 'The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification', *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, pp. 41–58.

Turkish population exchange then 'cleansed' Turkey of those Christian citizens who did not conform to the new nationalist framework.[90] The collective erasure of this diversity from the Turks' glorious past was then a simple matter of censure and selective, or creative, history writing.

In the first narrative, the community to be formed was to resemble and imitate Europe; in the second, it was to stand proud of its Turkishness in order to defy Europe from within, as historically superior, and certainly a peer. In the first narrative the popular conceptions of community and sovereignty were to be discarded and the European model valorised; in the second, a novel one was to be fabricated, and any dissent among the old one repressed. In practice, these manoeuvres unfolded in different moments and coexisted uneasily; in both cases there was an important element of performance throughout. Thus a journal like *La Turquie Kemaliste* produced reports in French and English on the strides made in various fields by the Kemalist revolution, but presented Turkey as uniquely placed 'to defend European civilisation at the gates of Asia'.[91]

Egypt: Popular Politics and the Decline of the Wafd

In its heyday, the Wafd could lay claim to genuine representation of the Egyptian people's demands for independence. By 1936, after a wave of strikes and demonstrations, it was able to negotiate further autonomy from Britain in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. However, with the king's repeated dismissal of Wafdist governments, often on British orders, its leaders were severely undermined.[92] The political initiative moved away from the centre, and non-parliamentary groups began to mount challenges to the orthodoxies of liberal Egyptian nationalism. This activism brought with it several radical reinterpretations of the triad of Egypt's woes, the reasons and solutions. Its popular strength introduced new vocabularies in which Egyptians now expressed their search

[90] Renée Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*, Oxford: Berghahn, 2003.
[91] Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building*, pp. 63–9.
[92] Gamal Mu'awad Shaqra, 'Masadir al-Takwin al-Fikri li-l-Ra'is 'Abd al-Nasir wa Thawrat Yulyu', in Muhammad al-Said Idris ed., *Dirasat fi-l-Heqba al-Nasiriyya*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 2003, pp. 83–7.

for sovereignty in their national community. This activism took multiple directions: on the right came the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 and the nationalist Young Egypt Party in 1933, and on the left the Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL) in 1938 among other communist groups. They had in common a resounding critique of the liberal nationalist parliamentary experience, as well as the mounting of resistance to British political interference and its military presence in the Suez Canal zone.

Beyond this, each group proposed differing formulae, and their constituencies varied. The Muslim Brothers diagnosed a moral crisis which had enabled foreign control, and put this down to religiously and morally lax leadership, and to the presence of corrupting foreign influence in Egypt. They proposed the expunging of the European economic and political presence, and the pious re-education of all Muslim Egyptians within a larger Arab-Islamic community. Joining their ranks were the lower rungs of the effendiyya middle class, who were alienated by the discourse and lifestyle of the pashas and beys of the landowning and business classes. Seeking openly to combat nationalism, the Brothers partook in anti-British activities for religious reasons, which nevertheless appealed to disenfranchised Egyptian nationalists.

Less enduring, but influential in its blend of conservatism and nationalism, was the Misr al-Fatah ('Young Egypt') organisation of Ahmad Hussein. He was initially inspired by the rising fascist movements of Europe: the 1933 programme described Egypt's need to be resurrected as the 'centre of the East and leader of Islam' through its youth's 'faith and action'.[93] Keeping with the times, however, Hussein ultimately reshaped his party towards a stronger social content and pan-Arab orientation, renaming it the Egyptian Socialist Party. As Chalcraft observes, 'Fascism did not make much headway in Egypt, and was only the most minor of the radical alternatives to liberal nationalism that emerged in the 1930s ... Its more lasting impact in Egypt was to serve notice on the monopoly of the Wafd, and to mobilize criticism of the established order.'[94]

[93] P. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and his Generation*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1978, p. 73.
[94] Chalcraft, *Popular Politics*, p. 281.

Of particular note among these contestations of Egyptian nationalism was the rise of pan-Arabism, since it effected a change at the highest levels within less than a decade. Britain's presence in Egypt had inspired and provoked critical engagements among Arabs in similar predicaments.[95] Nevertheless, the Wafd had remained aloof from the Arab world, reflecting a pharaonist outlook that emphasised ancient civilisation and Greco-Roman connections. This extended to a disdainful echo of the Ottomans' Orientalism vis-à-vis the more distant and less urbanised provinces. When asked about the prospect of Arab unity in 1925, Zaghlul's retort was: 'if you add one zero to another, and then another, what sum do you get?' However, since the turn of the century, Egypt had been a haven for pan-Arab societies and intellectual activity. By the 1930s, mass education, print media development and the growth of the middle class had all spurred the dissemination of a narrative of pan-Arabist community beyond elite circles.

There was an economic rationale among Egypt's rising bourgeoisie, who had pioneered the Egyptianisation of capital and now sought new markets. There was a political rationale presented by men like Sati' al-Husri and Abdullah Azzam, who insisted on Egypt's geostrategic and cultural position as a gift of leadership it had to take up. There was a cultural reality in the presence of Syrians and other Arabs in Egypt's literary, drama and music scenes already, and their contributions to debates on Egypt's liberation. These trends were strengthened with the popular Egyptian reaction to the 1936–9 Palestine Revolt, which saw the formation of several solidarity groups in Cairo.[96] Even before 1936, these developments had spurred debate within the establishment. Taha Hussein was the Wafdist Minister of Education famed for his belief in Egypt's Mediterranean identity and its original place in Europe.[97] However, when another distinguished man of letters, Tawfiq al-Hakim, wrote of Egypt's pharaonic superiority to the Arabs, Hussein responded firmly: 'This [Arab] element, which has been Egyptianized for centuries, is not foreign . . . The Arabic language

[95] Zachary Foster, 'Arabness, Turkey and the Palestinian National Imagination in the Eyes of Mir'at al-Sharq (1919–1926)', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 42, 2010, p. 42.

[96] Shaqra, 'Masadir al-Takwin', pp. 98–9; Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 240.

[97] Taha Hussein, *Mustaqbal al-Thaqafa fi-Misr*, Cairo: Dar al-Kutub, 1937. See Zubaida, *Beyond Islam*, pp. 186–7.

is . . . our language, and a thousand and one times closer to us than the language of the ancient Egyptians.'[98]

From a wholly different perspective a series of underground communist organisations wove into this pan-Arabist sentiment a Marxist theorisation of the routes to Egypt's liberation. The DMNL's analysis linked Egypt's fortunes with those of the Arabs by underlining the role of what it called 'Anglo-American imperialism' across the region. In this critique of economic imperialism and the role of the comprador class, leftist intellectuals disturbed the binaries of Egyptian/'foreigner' in the discourse of the Brotherhood and Young Egypt on the one hand, and the Wafd on the other. Through the 1940s, the leftist critique was mounted by a widening collective of unionised and independent workers, university students and educated urban effendiyya. These fronts were an indictment of the Wafd's neglect of economic redistribution,[99] and also strengthened the popular currency of the notion of Egypt's place in an Arab future of liberation from colonialism.

These trends compelled a transformation in the foreign policy discourse of nationalist party leaders, which saw them embrace the notion of Arab solidarity.[100] It gradually became a component of party political competition.[101] By 1937, Zaghlul's successor, Mustafa al-Nahhas, was speaking in the League of Nations of Egypt's concern for Palestine, citing reasons of neighbourhood, history, language and civilisation. By 1945, the Arab League had been founded with its

[98] Taha Husayn,' Ila al-Ustadh Tawfiq al-Hakim', *al-Risala*, 15 June 1933, p. 9, cited in Ralph Coury, 'The Politics of the Funereal: the Tomb of Saad Zaghlul', *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt*, Vol. 29, 1992, p. 199.

[99] See Anouar Abdel Malek, 'Nasserism and Socialism', *The Socialist Register*, 1964, p. 39; Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882–1954*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1988.

[100] Muhammad Hafez Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi fi 'Asr al-Tahadiyat*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1987, p. 86; M. Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad: 1948–1978*, Vol. II, Beirut: Al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Nashr, 1987, pp. 28, 40.

[101] Tariq al-Bishri, 'Misr fi Itar al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya', in Saad Eddin Ibrahim ed., *Misr wa-l-'Uruba wa Thawrat Yulyu*, Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1982, pp. 35–6.

headquarters in Cairo.[102] With the mass outpouring of anger over Palestine's partition in 1947 and the Egyptian role in its loss in 1948, the notion that Egyptian and Arab futures were intertwined took deeper root.

Still in 1951, King Faruq continued to use language that distinguished Egypt as a state and a people, *umma*, as did parliamentarians referring to Egypt's sympathies with the Arab peoples, *al-umam al-'arabiyya*.[103] The widespread demand for national sovereignty for Egypt was by now entrenched. So Egypt was still to be 'for the Egyptians', even as the Muslim Brothers had different conceptions of the place of women in public life, the left had a critique of the efficacy of party politics, and the pan-Arabists saw Egypt within a wider spatio-temporal continuum than did the Egyptian nationalists of an earlier generation. It was into this contested national political field that the Free Officers would stride just one year later. Indeed their membership reflected all these different strands, united primarily by the issue of Egyptian territorial sovereignty and independence from Britain.

Comparative Conclusions

Despite their complexity, the influence of the international on conceptions of sovereignty and nation in Ottoman Turkey and Egypt prompted certain common trends. A highly unequal encounter with Europe had led to political reactions of defensive reform and accommodation, alongside rejection and resistance. Intense searches for authenticity accompanied these accommodations, particularly where they had been made through coercion, whether financial or military. Thus Ottoman Turks and Egyptians simultaneously grappled with the charges of European Orientalists, and asserted the civilisational contributions of Islam, before both turning increasingly to the national imaginary in which ethnicity or territory determined community bonds, and in so doing tacitly

[102] Ahmed Hamrush, 'Thawrat Yulyu wa Thawrat al-Taharrur al-Watani al-'Arabiyya', in Abd al-Aziz Ramadan ed., *Thawrat Yulyu wa-l-'Alam al-'Arabi*, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aamma li-l-Kitab, 1993, p. 144.

[103] Eberhard Kienle, 'Arab Unity Schemes Revisited: Interest, Identity and Policy in Syria and Egypt', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1995, p. 62.

admitting their need to adapt to European modes of time and government.

It is important to underline the contrasts between these accommodations and manoeuvres, however, and how differently the two experiences of Europe would influence Turkish and Egyptian national narratives. In Turkey, they propelled two particular manoeuvres in the nationalist discourse of successive elites that related directly to engagements with the international. The first was that of Ottoman Orientalism, which identified the Arab periphery as a source of backwardness in the empire and sought to expel the Arab from Ottoman narratives of self, thereby signalling a position of equality with Europe. The second was the manoeuvre of Turkish nationalism, to elevate the Turk above even the European in the context of ancient pasts and origins, in another effort to assert equality in the present. Whereas Ziya Gökalp had talked of the folk culture of Anatolia as *hars*, Atatürk emphasised the pre-Islamic might of the Turks,[104] while presiding over the conscious importation of western European cultural as well as legal norms. Despite spirited contestation from various communities, the state's adopted formulae were an elite choice, to be imparted to the people by force if necessary.

In Egypt, comparable discursive manoeuvres were made by nationalist elites and contenders for power alike. The first manoeuvre relevant to the constituencies of the Free Officers was the singling out of Egypt as a territory and community, whose problems and resolutions were not understood in terms of ethnic choices but rather of enfranchisement within the Ottoman Turkish and later the British run order. This was identified as a problem by Tahtawi, but was most vividly expressed in the popular mobilisations of the 'Urabi and 1919 revolutions alike. The second was to present Egypt's problems as the same as those of its Arab neighbours – namely the impact of European colonialism – and to seek resolution in Arab unity. This shift was illustrated in the trajectory of the Wafd Party, under the popular pressure mounting ever since the 1936–9 Palestine Revolt. Through these two manoeuvres, sovereignty was pursued with reference to notions of community that tended increasingly towards nationalism in Egypt.

[104] Bozdoğan, Modernism and Nation Building, pp. 242–4; Şerif Mardin, 'The Ottoman Empire', in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997, p. 126.

By the mid-twentieth century then, differences between the Turkish and Egyptian cases could be observed in three broad areas. First, the origins of the two official nationalisms differed, one in imperial disintegration at the hands of peers turned rival empires, the other in anti-colonial resistance to a distinctly foreign and distant occupation. Second, the two nationalisms had different social bases, the one elite-driven, the other increasingly popular and anti-establishment. Third, radically different futures were imagined in the dominant national narratives, the one as merged with the European West, the other as independent from it and part of an Arab national imaginary. Therefore by 1930, when Yahya Haqqi was posted to Turkey as Egyptian ambassador, he would already describe Atatürk as effecting a 'grave experiment … very different' from the project that he believed to be underway in Egypt.[105] These fissures would be prised open by the dramatic choices imposed by the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s. To understand how, the next chapter turns to the political formation of the decade's two leaderships, and the influences upon their own nationalist commitments of the trends of the 1930s and 1940s.

[105] Haqqi, 'Ashjan', p. 41.

2 *The Democrats in Opposition: Imagining a 'Little America'*

The founders of the Democrat Party (DP) were the last generation in Turkish politics to have been subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and the first generation to sit in the parliament of the Turkish republic. Their political formation occurred in a context of European encroachment as well as republican rebirth. After forming the party in 1946, they promised to offer a new, liberal vision for the state's existing goal and strategy. As Kemal Atatürk had articulated it, the republic's objective was to 'reach the level of contemporary civilisation' (*muasır medeniyet seviyesine erişmek*), and the political strategy expressly adopted was a turning westwards (*batılılaşmak*).

In fact, as Chapter 1 has shown, this official narrative concealed considerable tensions and ambiguities in Turkish elites' perceptions of the West, and of their national identity in turn. These generated an elite consensus on the need to catch up with Europe, on the one hand, and on the privilege of the 'Turkish difference', on the other, namely exceptionalism and superiority both to Arab contemporaries and to European ancients. The Democrats, who had started their political careers as members of the Republican People's Party, inherited these views. This chapter therefore begins by underlining the Kemalist fold from which the DP emerged, interpreting political traditions from the late Ottoman era that confronted European modernity. Their responses to the challenges of unequal engagement with western Europe would go on to mark out Turkey's experience significantly from that of Egypt.

Yet the Democrats would also soon demonstrate some of the iconoclasm of the revered founder of the republic. For new President Celâl Bayar, and his chosen Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, the republic's modern vision carried an American stamp. On 23 May 1950, nine days after the Democrat Party's sweeping victory at the polls, Bayar went to meet former president and 'National Chief' Ismet Inönü, to personalise the handover. As Bayar prepared to step into Inönü's shoes, he asked

him for any advice on the foreign policy of the state he was now bequeathing to the Democrats. Inönü shrugged, reminding Bayar that they had discussed such details in a meeting four years earlier, in which the roles had been reversed, and Inönü had authorised the formation of the Democrat Party. Nevertheless, he offered a brief summary. Undeterred, Bayar then posed a pointed and painful question: 'Why did you not join NATO? Did you not want to?' A disturbed Inönü replied, 'Why, did we get accepted and refuse?'[1] Six days later, Menderes unveiled the Democrats' first programme in government, and accorded unusual importance to foreign affairs, and to the United States, in his historic speech: 'our greatest hope is to strengthen, every day, in a spirit of familiarity and understanding, our political, economic, and cultural relations with our great friend the United States, for whom we feel profound gratitude as a nation, for its support of our peaceful policy with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid . . . '[2]

Upon coming to power, Democrat leaders set to work immediately on realising this vision. They announced a national project that expressly sought to make of Turkey a 'little America'. Indeed, both the Democrats and Republicans made this precise pledge while campaigning in the 1940s, reflecting enthusiasm and gratitude for Marshall Aid in particular.[3] However, it was the Democrats whose conservative-liberal conception of the nation and its traditions approximated most closely to the American model. They also underlined that national sovereignty was defensible exclusively within the framework of the Western bloc. As soon as they came into office, they began working to bring Turkey politically, economically and culturally into the 'Free World' and its 'democratic community'. These and other buzzwords – the 'red menace', the 'traitors to the nation' – sank deep into the Turkish political lexicon, colouring it with the stark palette of the Cold War.

[1] Baha Akşit, DP deputy, recounts this story in Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar and Bülent Çaplı, *Demirkırat: Bir Demokrasinin Doğuşu*, Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991, p. 55.

[2] First Menderes Government Programme: Ismail Arar, *Hükümet Programları: 1920–1965*, Istanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968, p. 225.

[3] Reşat Kasaba, 'Populism and Democracy in Turkey, 1946–1961', in Ellis Goldberg, Reşat Kasaba and Joel Migdal eds., *Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993, p. 51.

This chapter pieces together the political formation and profile of the Democrats that led them to be so revisionist of the Kemalist status quo. It substantiates the Democrats' views on three commitments of nationalism in light of this experience: national belonging, sovereignty and progress. This entails a discursive analysis of the particular genealogy of ideas and policies to which the Democrats were exposed over the early twentieth century. At the same time, it acknowledges that their conceptions of sovereignty and nation were shaped by material factors, such as their state's capacities and the political practices of previous rulers. An appreciation of both will be crucial to understanding how their nationalist commitments were enacted through foreign policy during the early Cold War, and why their choices diverged so much from those of their Egyptian counterparts.

The Emergence of the Democrat Party

If the Ottoman and early Kemalist periods bequeathed a legacy that Turkish parliamentarians took to heart, the subsequent era saw some of its aspects become controversial. Indeed, the future Democrat politicians emerged out of a decade-long contestation of the different approaches to Kemalism within the Republican People's Party (RPP). Meanwhile the Second World War, and the upheavals it brought in domestic and international circumstances, paved the way for the onset of multipartism in Turkey and the rise of the Democrat Party itself. To understand the Democrat policymakers' conceptions of national sovereignty then, it is instructive to explore the domestic and international contexts in which their careers developed, and their own socioeconomic and political profiles. Three transformations in particular conditioned the emergence of the DP: firstly, a socioeconomic transformation which saw the enrichment of the landowning and bourgeois classes; secondly, an ideological transformation within the RPP elite which saw the rise of an alternative, anti-statist approach to Atatürk's early republican policies; and thirdly, an international transformation in balances of power after the victory of the Allies and the onset of the Cold War. Turkey's emergence from the Ottoman defeat, and the Kemalists' existential quest to reach Western civilisation, was the backdrop against which the Democrats evaluated all three transformations.

Within Turkey, the war years elicited a breakdown of the alliance of socioeconomic forces held together by the early republican state, and

saw the rise of a new composition of elites with a different profile. These were the large landowners and new commercial bourgeoisie who were among the few to accumulate wealth during the war. They were the all-Muslim beneficiaries of the violent nationalist campaigns against the Christian middle classes, most viciously targeting the Armenians. By the mid-1940s, it was firmly in such groups' interests to limit the role of the state both politically and economically. Meanwhile, their enrichment had taken place in line with the impoverishment of lower-rank civil servants, the urban proletariat and the peasantry during the war. These groups laid the blame for their plight at the state's door, however, for its oppressive wartime measures and the corruption of its senior bureaucrats. This resulted in the singular phenomenon of a popular base which had suffered a great deal while the commercial and landed classes grew, and yet was ready to support them politically against the state.

Grievances had been brewing amongst increasingly broad sectors of Turkish society ever since the 1930s. The étatist experience had been fundamentally conservative, and attempted no socioeconomic restructuring.[4] For the workers, the state's drive for industrialisation in Turkey had spelled lower real wages, while the adoption in 1936 of a strict Labour Law, borrowed (with the Criminal Code) from fascist Italy, prohibited unionisation and strikes. In agriculture, prices fell in line with world prices and the peasants' terms of trade suffered, while industrial prices were kept high through taxation. This ensured that much of the surplus accrued to the coalition of state bureaucrats and the industrial bourgeoisie, while living standards for the majority – the middle peasants – deteriorated significantly. Compounding this was the repressive state-imposed regulation of religious practice, which further alienated particularly the peasants and urban petty bourgeoisie from the ruling classes.

The war years exacerbated these processes, as the state extracted more and more through taxes to shore up revenue. At the time, Turkey's defence budgets were sapping more than 50 per cent of national income.[5] Widespread corruption characterised many of the

[4] Çağlar Keyder, 'Economic Development and Crisis', in Irvin Cemal Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak eds., *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 292.

[5] TRA: E4/30.1.0.0/60.373.8: Minutes, Ankara Meeting on NATO Accession, 14.10.51, p. 5.

typical collaborations between the state bureaucracy and bourgeoisie. The war economy saw shortages, inflation and falling salaries, impoverishing the urban petty bourgeoisie and the salaried classes, as well as the peasantry. Existing regional development disparities between the Anatolian west and centre, and the Kurdish southeast, were magnified: the latter population comprised mostly landless peasants, who were locked in feudal dependency on their landlords and subject to a clientelistic relationship with the RPP. Meanwhile, measures such as the National Defence Law of 1940 gave the government emergency powers to control pricing and market supply, as well as use forced labour.[6] Discontent was heightened by the increasing authoritarianism of Ismet Inönü's government.[7]

As these tensions were rising, the bourgeois and landed components of the coalition in ascendance since the 1920s soon broke away from their étatist partners. The commercial bourgeoisie had been nurtured by the republican state, but, with its newfound wealth,[8] was less and less circumscribed by such connections. Meanwhile both the bourgeoisie and landowners wished to guard against the state's extraction schemes, such as the notoriously arbitrary Wealth Tax of 1942, though this had not been directed against them, but discriminated clearly against their few non-Muslim competitors.[9] It was only a short step from this to their estrangement from the state's ideological prescriptions too, and their move to embrace the promise of political and economic liberalism.[10] The Democrat Party founders were members of this new alliance of forces, themselves a mixture of landowners and businessmen.

The interwar years had also seen substantial ideological transformation among political and intellectual elites in Turkey, as the exceptional circumstances of the young republic faded and different shades of opinion came into view. Gradually, a fissure developed in the ranks

[6] Mustafa Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2004, p. 28.

[7] Ibid., pp. 30, 25; Kasaba, 'Populism and Democracy in Turkey', p. 50; Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956, p. 224.

[8] Keyder, 'Economic Development', p. 297.

[9] Ibid.; Keyder, 'The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy', in Schick and Tonak, Turkey in Transition, p. 38; see also Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*, Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 2000.

[10] Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, London: Verso, 1987, p. 118.

of the ruling People's Party, with new voices critiquing the fundamentals of the republic's official ideology, as institutionalised by Atatürk and preserved by Inönü. Among the principles at issue was that of étatisme (*devletçilik*) in strategies for development. There were two main groups who advocated it as a permanent feature of the economy: the first, and the more influential, was a group of left-leaning intellectuals who published the journal *Kadro* (1932–4). These included editor Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir.[11] A second group of statists favoured the corporatist models of 1930s Italy: these included pro-fascist writers and politicians such as Tekin Alp and Recep Peker. The 'official' view, associated with the premiership of Inönü, was that statism was no alternative to capitalism, but was instead a temporary defence mechanism, a tool to sponsor private enterprise for development.[12]

Meanwhile, a third intellectual trend had formed to compete with both the *Kadro* group and the far right for the attention of the political centre. This was the liberal trend, and was arguably the most successful, influencing RPP policy increasingly over the 1930s. The most prominent intellectual of this persuasion was Ahmet Ağaoğlu (Ahmet Agayev), an Azerbaijani writer and politician who was a key member of the pan-Turkist movement of the 1910s in Istanbul, and who moved to Ankara after the Sovietisation of Azerbaijan in 1920. Ağaoğlu became one of the founding members of the Free Republican Party (FRP) of 1930; his son would later become Democrat minister Samet Ağaoğlu.[13] The FRP was an opposition party set up at Atatürk's behest, the popularity of which led to its closure within a matter of months. What the FRP shared with the DP after it, and indeed with the Progressive Republican Party[14] before it, was its self-identification as

[11] See William Hale, 'Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey, 1930–1945', *Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1980, p. 105.

[12] John VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938–1950*, Albany: SUNY Press, 2005, p. 20.

[13] Nazım Irem places Ahmet Ağaoğlu within a current of Bergsonian 'republican conservatism', which rivalled the 'dominant version of Kemalism': Irem, 'Undercurrents of European Modernity and the Foundations of Modern Turkish Conservatism: Bergsonism in Retrospect', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4, July 1994, p. 81.

[14] See Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve Ideolojisi*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970, p. 57. See also Erik Jan Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: the Progressive Republican Party*, 1924–1925, Leiden: Brill, 1991.

'antiauthoritarian and economically liberal'.[15] Both the FRP and DP sharply criticised Turkey's étatisme as stifling, and counselled the rolling back of the state. Ahmet Ağaoğlu's recoil from bolshevism was clear in his book *Devlet ve Ferd* ('The State and the Individual'), published in 1933, in which he wrote: 'the involvement of the state in economic affairs in the form of the suppression of the individual and by means of state entrepreneurship is very dangerous'.[16] This centre-right economically liberal ideology gradually moved to permeate the discourse of the ruling centre, its vehicles being the political elites of the rising landowning and bourgeois class, and future founders of the DP. Members of the *Kadro* group were soon silenced and their editor exiled, while such extreme right-wingers as Peker were tolerated by the RPP.

Thus a discursive dimension had emerged to the socioeconomic changes in the composition of the Turkish elite, together constituting a forceful political assault on the dominant narratives of the republic. Proponents of the liberal approach to Kemalism demonstrated their increasing opposition to RPP policy from the 1930s onwards in parliamentary debates.[17] Prominent among them was future Democrat leader Celâl Bayar, whose criticisms of Inönü's economic policies locked the two into a competition that would last more than a decade. Inönü and Bayar can therefore be juxtaposed as representatives of two different camps,[18] broadly understood as the statist and the liberal (see Figure 2.1). Bayar had been charged with forming the Iş Bankası in 1924, which was the only nominally private bank among those founded by the state at the time. He had then worked as Atatürk's Minister of Economy from 1932 to 1937, during which his preference for economic liberalisation had become clear.

Another founding member of the DP and future Turkish premier, Adnan Menderes, had also begun his political career as a liberal critic, in his case as chairman of the FRP in Aydın. When the Free Party was shut down, Menderes moved to the RPP, but carried his convictions on

[15] Keyder, 'Political Economy', p. 35.
[16] Cited in Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik*, Istanbul: GerçekYayınevi, 1974, pp. 220–1.
[17] See Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, pp. 42–4 on their opposition to such moves as the nationalisation of the Şirket-i Hayriye ferry company, and the proposed Budget and Land Reform of 1945.
[18] VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, pp. 20, 24.

Figure 2.1 Turkey's first three presidents: Kemal Atatürk, Ismet Inönü and Celâl Bayar, 1935.
Source: *Fotoğraflarla Atatürk*, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı CD, 2000.

liberal politics with him. Bayar replaced Inönü as Prime Minister in 1937, '[illustrating] the growing division of ideas among politicians and intellectuals regarding expectations and aspirations for the future of Turkey'.[19] When Bayar and Menderes turned together to competitive politics in 1946, it was with an inevitably liberal, anti-statist approach. By that time, the debate on the need for political freedoms had already intensified in the pages of Turkey's main newspapers. The most vivid illustration of this was the feuding of *Vatan*'s Ahmet Emin Yalman with Falih Rıfkı Atay of the government mouthpiece, *Ulus*.[20]

Meanwhile, the implications of the Allies' victory in the world war had to be absorbed by policymakers in Turkey as elsewhere. This transformation in international forces became the third contributing factor to the erosion of RPP ascendancy, as it became clear that access to much-needed foreign assistance would depend on convergence with the victorious powers' political and economic models. In 1945, Inönü

[19] VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, p. 25.
[20] See Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye, 1944–1950*, Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1970, pp. 31–2.

told his ambassador to Washington, Feridun Cemal Erkin, to inform American officials at the San Francisco Conference that Turkey would move towards democracy as soon as the war ended.[21] Inönü announced this publicly in May 1945, just after Germany's surrender.

The impact of international pressures on Inönü's decision was more visible still by mid-1947, shortly after the unveiling of the Truman Doctrine. Inönü soon made his famous '12 July Declaration' conferring legitimacy on the opposition, despite its growth to threatening proportions, and signed Turkey's first military agreement with America on the same day. In Cem Eroğul's words, 'The link between the two is evident: for Inönü to decide to eliminate the DP, he would have to change his fundamental position on security; yet, in his eyes, alliance with the United States had become the direct condition for the continuation of the state's sovereignty.'[22]

Concurrently, economic policy changes would also be necessary if these new international ties were to flourish and expand into non-military fields of assistance. The influential reports of US experts arriving in Turkey during the late 1940s recommended economic liberalisation and legal measures to encourage industry.[23] The Democrat Party was very much a beneficiary of these propitious international circumstances for the ushering in of its political opportunity.

The Democrat Party's Nationalism

Given that the Democrats were early Kemalists themselves, most accounts have rightly asserted continuities between their understanding of Turkish nationalism and that of Mustafa Kemal. Indeed the founding members of the DP were comrades of Atatürk in his earliest political organising, and believers in the same ethnonationalism. Celâl Bayar rose in the ranks of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in Bursa before being appointed head of its branch in Izmir in 1909. He was a proud member of its armed wing, the Special Organisation,

[21] Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, p. 30; Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multiparty System*, Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 141.

[22] Eroğul, 'The Establishment of Multiparty Rule, 1945–71' in Schick and Tonak, *Turkey in Transition*, p. 106. Cf. Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975*, London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977, p. 24.

[23] Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, p. 317.

which oversaw violent ultra-nationalist campaigns against Ottoman Christians, to purge what he recalls were described as 'internal tumours'.[24] During that period, his future DP co-founder and Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, attended a CUP-founded school in Izmir, and met Bayar at the city's CUP cell.[25] During the war with the Greeks, Bayar successfully mobilised resistance in the Aegean area, while Menderes participated in the fighting. After the war, Bayar moved swiftly to become deputy for Manisa in Atatürk's new People's Party in 1923, and the following year was appointed minister in charge of overseeing the Greek–Turkish population exchange,[26] in which Orthodox Greeks from Anatolia were exchanged for Greek-speaking Muslims from Thrace, with the aim of achieving ethnic-religious homogeneity in Turkey. Another of the founding members of the DP, Refik Koraltan, helped establish the Society for the Defence of National Rights in the Trabzon area, which targeted the Pontic Greek Christians in this period.[27]

Nevertheless, as this section will show, the Democrats stood out for the extent to which they identified a Western *liberal* orientation, modelled after the United States rather than western Europe, as part of their self-definition, even if its implementation was conservative. Unlike the étatist RPP old guard, the Democrats enjoyed a harmony between their socioeconomic and ideological positions, their political aspirations, and American preferences for liberalisation in the political and economic fields. These can be traced in discourses, symbolic acts and material practices by DP politicians themselves, as well as journalists and public figures who supported the party's campaigns, from its founding in 1946 to its victory in 1950.

[24] Fatma Müge Göcek, 'The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab Nationalisms', in Göcek ed., *Social Construction of Nationalism in the Middle East*, New York: SUNY Press, 2002, p. 93 citing Celâl Bayar, *Ben De Yazdim*, Vol. 5, Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967, pp. 1578–9. See also Matthias Bjørnlund, 'The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification', *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008, pp. 41–58.

[25] Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı (1899–1960)*, Istanbul: Yükselen Matbaası, 1969, pp. 32–4; Celâl Bayar, *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes*, ed. İsmet Bozdağ, Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1986, pp. 21–2.

[26] George Harris, 'Celal Bayar: Conspiratorial Democrat', in Heper and Sayari, *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 47.

[27] Zürcher, *Turkey: a Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 395.

The new value which would be placed at the centre of the Democrats' conceptions of the nation was freedom – the freedom of each citizen in the nation vis-à-vis the state – and consequently in all fields in the thus far state-dominated Turkish society. The Democrats' opposition platform emphasised political, economic and religious freedoms, which affected policies corresponding to three of Kemalism's Six Principles: populism (*halkçılık*), étatisme (*devletçilik*) and secularism (*laiklik*). Each one implied reshaping the relationship between citizen and state, and specifying who legitimately did or did not belong to the Turkish nation. Achieving this freedom was presented as ensuring Turkey's national progress towards its goal of 'contemporary civilisation'. Beyond Turkey, this national vision was articulated with a particular set of audiences abroad, namely the 'liberal democracies' of 'the West', among which the United States' model would be the most influential. Meanwhile, difference inhered instead in the realms of the Eastern bloc, as well as in the backwaters of uncivilised states in Asia and Africa.

Thus the late Ottoman articulation of Turk and Westerner by juxtaposition with the East was now enhanced with yet more patterns: the articulation of individual freedom and national sovereignty through Western alignment; economic enterprise and national progress through US expertise; and religious faith with national authenticity through opposition to communism and the Soviet Union. Moreover, each one of the binary opposites could be rearticulated in opposition to one another, in new iterations of the national narrative, and have their effect multiplied as a result, as forthcoming chapters will show.

Sovereignty as 'Freedom', at Home and Abroad: Recasting Halkçilik

The Democrats' official discourse emphasised a liberal view of freedom as opportunity and non-interference. By contrast, the RPP ruling elite had invoked the 'general will' to justify a corporatist system in which they were uniquely placed to define what was in the 'national interest'. Their discourse turned on the concept of *hakimiyet-i milliye*, the 'sovereignty of the nation'. The DP's rupture would be to invoke the very similar concept of *milli irade*, the 'national will' – through the 'people's voice' (*milletin sözü*) – but within a conservative-liberal framework which defined this very differently. The DP presented the national will

as an aggregate of the wills of each individual citizen, where the priority for each was his/her personal freedom, for the pursuit of his/her individual interests.

In the political sphere, the DP's understanding of liberalism focused on the multiparty system, and on the free participation of each individual in selecting their representatives, rather than on pluralism as a principle. The DP did succeed in increasing the participation of non-elites, encouraging them both to vote and to stand for office, particularly in local politics. However, this enfranchisement was conceived within the DP's conservative limits. These were visible when it came to members of the Left, and to a lesser extent to those on the religious Right, whose respective ideas were deemed a threat, much as they had been ever since the founding of the republic. According to Avcıoğlu, 'one of the first innovations of the 1946 "freedom advocates" was the slogan "no freedom for the enemies of freedom"'.[28] Indeed, the Democrats themselves declared that 'they did not believe "in granting freedom to those who did not recognize it"'.[29]

The articulation of political freedom and nation in the Democrats' discourse had begun with the *Dörtlü Takrir* ('Memorandum of the Four') of 1945, a demand for internal reform, the rejection of which prompted the formation of the Democrat Party in January 1946.[30] Although Bayar, its new chairman, had consulted Inönü in the interim,[31] the party immediately projected an image of itself as the party of the masses, lambasting the RPP as insensitive and aloof in contrast. This discourse was furthered by a second DP text, the *Hürriyet Misakı* ('Freedom Charter'), in January 1947. The Charter was adopted at the first DP convention, whose delegates had participated in four days of debate on the subject of freedom, punctuated by renditions of *türküler*, folk songs from rural Anatolia, on the same

[28] Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, Yenişehir, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1969, p. 250.

[29] *Son Saat*, 8.3.47 (Köprülü's views), cited in Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 180 fn 44.

[30] Most accounts agree that the Memorandum was not an ultimatum, but that the harsh RPP reaction to it, and to its signatories' articles in the press, triggered the process of expulsions and resignations.

[31] Inönü is said to have checked there would be no change on three issues: secularism, the Village Institutes and foreign policy. Toker cited in Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çaplı, *Demirkırat: Bir Demokrasinin Doğuşu*, Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991, p. 24.

theme.[32] These discussions had affirmed that 'the Turkish people believe that, for renewed national development, national competition (the establishment of a multiparty regime) is necessary'.[33] The Charter was another demand for political liberalisation, in a language that invoked the people's voice, portraying the DP as its genuine representative. Tunaya recalls the DP's self-presentation as 'the body that millions of citizens had brought to being', hence 'possessing a structure broad enough to accommodate the entire nation'.[34]

The Charter's name was understood to be intentionally reminiscent of the *Misak-i Milli* ('National Charter') of 1920, according to which Atatürk had defined the young Turkish state's boundaries in the Independence War. The Democrats also drew on Atatürk's legacy for legitimacy in threatening to withdraw from parliament.[35] Their challenge would become known as the threat to 'return to the bosom of the nation' (*sine-i millet*): this was an old phrase Atatürk had used when he left the army and launched the Independence War.[36] The DP reiterated this message at its second party convention in June 1949, in a third text that it called the *Milli Teminat Andı*, or 'Oath of National Assurance', while the RPP press termed it the *Milli Husumet Andı*, or 'Oath of National Enmity'.[37] This statement again warned that 'governments that failed to heed the citizens' votes would inescapably face the "nation's enmity"'.[38] These challenges came after the 1946 electoral defeat indicated RPP tampering, prompting the DP to initiate the

[32] See Eroğul, *Demokrat*, pp. 25–6, citing Orhan Mete, *Bütün Tafsılatıyla ve Akisleriyle Demokrat Partinin 1inci Büyük Kongresi*, Istanbul: Ticaret Dunyası Matbaası, 1947. See also accounts in Birand et al., *Demirkırat*, pp. 37–8.

[33] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984, p. 650.

[34] Ibid., p. 650.

[35] *DP'nin Birinci Büyük Kongresinde kabul edilen Ana Davalar Komisyonu Raporu*, text in Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, p. 675. Over the following two years, a pattern was established in which crises between government and opposition erupted and were diffused, each time over the DP's demands for electoral reform and political liberalisation. These demands crystallised around the implementation of Inönü's 12 July Declaration of 1947. See Eroğul, *Demokrat*, pp. 30, 43–4.

[36] Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 65.

[37] Bayar points out that the name which the DP gave to the statement was the 'Freedom Oath' (*Hürriyet Andı*) or 'National Solidarity Oath' (*Millî Tesanüt Andı*), but that the pro-government press at the time changed its name amidst their attacks. Bayar, *Başvekilim*, pp. 98–9.

[38] Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 107.

practice of 'going to the people', convening mass demonstrations in the major cities of Izmir, Bursa, Ankara, Konya and Adana, and speaking often and directly to crowds of 40,000 at a time.[39] DP speakers used an earnest vernacular that established a familiarity and rapport with their audiences, and during their first election campaign, the party even published two books of 'epic poetry', written by local poets, extolling the new horizons awaiting Turkey.[40] This was the time when the slogan *Yeter . . . Söz milletindir!* ('Enough . . . the nation has the word!') first emerged (see Figure 2.2), 'launching the period known in Turkish political literature for its "46 spirit"'.[41]

This approach to the nation's individual freedoms was firmly tied to the Western framing of Turkish national identity, which was still best expressed by reference to the Atatürk era. The Democrats placed their 'liberal democratic' nation building firmly within this Western context. Where Atatürk had emphasised the cultural dimension of westernisation, however, the Democrats downplayed this somewhat, and seized upon the political freedoms aspect in their model. As Bayar put it:

> Since Selim III, all new movements had been conducted from the top-down. For various reasons, the state's elites had felt the need for westernisation and had tried to make the non-elites accept this. In 1945, we had reached a point where the non-elites grasped these salvatory ideas. It was now necessary to launch the idea not 'from the state to the nation' but rather 'from the nation to the state' . . .[42]

The Ottoman practice of borrowing and translation had continued in the republican era: it now took liberal institutional forms. The translators here were the public figures in the oppositional press and intelligentsia who supported the DP's conservative liberal outlook. A case in point is Ahmet Emin Yalman, editor of the pro-Democrat *Vatan* newspaper.[43] Yalman made his admiration for European and

[39] See Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 18.

[40] See *DP Seçim Destanı*, published for 1950 electoral campaign, cited in Sinan Yıldırmaz, 'The Mass Mobilization in the Elections of the Democrat Party Period', unpublished PhD thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2002, Appendix B, pp. 221–4.

[41] Birand et al., *Demirkırat*, p. 36. See Cem Çakmak, '1950'li Seçimler ve Demokrat Parti', *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol. 9, No. 53, May 1988, p. 24.

[42] Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 41.

[43] Yalman had been editor of *Vatan* since 1923, and after its closure in 1925, had 'formed a company early in 1927 to act as dealers for various American products (Goodyear, Dodge, Caterpillar . . . and so on)'. See Vatan, *An Experiment in Clean Journalism: the Life Story of the Turkish Daily 'VATAN'*, Vatan Press,

Figure 2.2 *Yeter … Söz milletindir!* ('Enough … the nation has the word!'), Democrat Party election poster designed by Selçuk Milar, 1950.
Source: www.dp.org.

American culture and political systems known, and exemplified the trend of borrowing Western prototypes, practised by the Turkish elites of the time. In his memoirs, Yalman recalls:

> the brightest hope I saw was the Liberal International, organized by liberals from nineteen countries in Oxford, England, in April, 1947, to counter the Communist International. Its 'Liberal Manifesto' stood squarely for private initiative, free competition, and . . . public and private acceptance of responsibility for social justice.[44]

Yalman goes on to recount his subsequent founding of the influential Society for the Diffusion of Ideas of Liberty, which he describes as 'a Turkish chapter of the Liberal International'.[45]

The DP's narrative on individual freedoms was also articulated with its discourse on national sovereignty through the adoption of the Western bloc's Manichean Cold War framework. The novelty of the Democrats' views on sovereignty has often been downplayed, as in Gönlübol's assessment that 'the ideology and the social bases of the political parties was so limited as to leave little room for assessing or criticising the Turkish foreign policy with a new outlook'.[46] Certainly, it was the RPP that had moved from shunning direct military alliances, as Atatürk had done, towards an increasingly comprehensive set of relations with the Council of Europe, the United States, and NATO allies in general.[47] However, the Democrats' critique of the Soviet Union was enhanced by their emphatic discursive championing of civil liberties and political pluralism. This in turn bolstered their representations of Turkey's Western credentials, which they wished to promote at home and abroad.[48] Initially Bayar may have displayed a reluctance to believe that the years of Turkish–Soviet cooperation – which had characterised his time as Minister of Economy and Prime

1950, p. 6. Yalman had been criticised for his endorsement of the idea of an American mandate for Turkey after the First World War, but was later rehabilitated as a respected member of the liberal intelligentsia and media elite.

44 Yalman, *Turkey*, p. 235. 45 Ibid., p. 236.

46 Mehmet Gönlübol, 'NATO, USA and Turkey', in K. Karpat ed., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1974*, Leiden: Brill, 1975, p. 16.

47 Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1960–1992: the Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage*, New York: Vantage Press, 1994, p. 32.

48 Eylem Yılmaz and Pınar Bilgin, 'Constructing Turkey's "Western" Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the "Intellectuals of Statecraft"', *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2006, p. 51.

Minister under Atatürk – had passed.[49] However, 'as soon as the Soviet territorial claims took a definite form in 1946', Bayar ensured that the DP issued statements supporting the government on foreign policy:

> Today there is no need to say much more about our foreign policy, which is the expression, not of a particular party, but of the entire nation's united will. Our greatest wish is to further strengthen our political and economic relations with the US with each day, in an atmosphere of sincerity and mutual understanding.[50]

National Futures, American Models: Recasting Devletçilik

The next branch of the opposition platform, the economic dimension, was also indicative of the Democrats' Western-oriented, conservative-liberal conceptions of nation. The party emphasised the sanctity of private property, and preached a liberal route to economic development and material enrichment for all. This required a reinterpretation of Atatürk's principle of étatisme, or *devletçilik*, and an adjustment to the nation's economic culture, which was aptly summarised in the DP catchphrase: 'We will create a millionaire in every neighbourhood.' The nation was still to be oriented towards progress and civilisation, but this was now substantiated with an emphasis on entrepreneurship and consumption. Bayar had expressed such views while still in the RPP, for example in his speech on the second Industrial Programme, scheduled for 1939–43: 'We wholeheartedly desire the development of private initiative in the industrial sphere, and we are continually investigating the best ways of achieving it.'[51] Writing a sort of advocacy article for the DP in the *Middle East Journal* in 1947, Yalman clarified:

> The essential point of opposition to the People's Party lay in the Democrats' understanding of *etatism* . . . The Democrat Party accepted state ownership only for certain key industries which were to feed private enterprises. These state institutions were to be kept beyond the influence of particular government interests, and were not to come into competition with the endeavors of private individuals.[52]

[49] See Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 415, fn 62.
[50] Demokrat Parti, *Demokrat Parti Tüzük ve Programı*, Ankara: Güneş Yayınları, 1946, p. 21. This continued at the party's second convention in June 1949: see Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 97.
[51] Bayar, cited in Hale, 'Ideology', p. 107.
[52] Yalman, 'The Struggle for Multi-party Government in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 1, 1947, p. 55.

These preferences emerged from a discursive framework that rejected the notion of class struggle, as Koprülü once declared: 'In our country, there is no such thing as a class issue . . . In Turkey, there is no such thing as capital or capitalist. Is the poverty of our farmer down to landlessness? No, we are simply at the lowest level of living standards. That is the whole issue.'[53] While this rejection of class struggle ideology was shared by the RPP, the difference lay in the corporatist style that the economy had adopted under the early Kemalist policy of *devletçilik*, and the DP's preference for its undoing. Menderes made this clear as early as 1943, speaking as part of the parliamentary Economic Committee, and attacking government proposals for the Trade and Industrial Unions, Crafts Unions and Trade Markets Law:[54]

> They want to make the traders, industrialists and craftsmen all part of the same obligatory corporation. They want to bring us the economic structures of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. They claim, simply: 'we wish to energise our national and historical institutions into guilds' . . . but all I see is corporatism. A fascist corporatism, a national socialist corporatism![55]

The Democrats focused on the plight of the middling peasant in Turkey, and pledged to raise peasants' living conditions by paying attention to the agrarian sector. In short, they were fundamentally opposed to the implications of any class analysis in terms of redistribution or structural reform.[56]

Indeed, it was partly in protest at the RPP's Land Reform Bill that the *Dörtlü Takrir* had been submitted, an early instance of the manifestation of DP discourse in political practice. The landowners among the RPP knew that 'the party machinery at the local level depended on small town merchants and landlords. This powerful interest group was in a position to block any attempt to radically improve the lot of the poor peasantry.'[57] Aydemir's account describes the commission set up to investigate the new bill as 'composed of large land-owners', who were all 'against the government and against this bill'.[58] More significantly, Menderes was appointed its rapporteur: according to Aydemir,

[53] *Cumhuriyet*, 9.10.48, cited in Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 60. For Bayar's view, see *Başvekilim*, p. 12.
[54] Menderes speaking in 1943, cited in Samet Ağaoğlu, *Arkadaşım Menderes*, Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967, pp. 13–4.
[55] Ibid., p. 15. [56] See Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, pp. 249–50.
[57] Keyder, 'Political Economy', pp. 38–9.
[58] Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, pp. 125, 127.

he protested against the bill until the end, resigning from the commission a day before its ratification.[59] It is also worth noting that the first version of the bill had been presented by Inönü to parliament as early as 1937, but had been swiftly shelved upon Bayar's accession as Prime Minister.[60]

Significantly, the DP leaders – like their RPP counterparts – were not at all representative of the vast majority of the population's socio-economic situation. Rather, the party was able to exploit disaffection among vast strata of non-elites to generate popular support. In Aydemir's words, 'However close to the people the DP was, it was destined to develop as a middle class party. The DP was to be a party that drew on the support of the urban and rural middle classes, and that proceeded with national development . . . through its efforts to speedily create a middle class.'[61] Indeed, those who had flocked to the DP's ranks, and whose interests it primarily served, included members of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, feudal lords and landowners, and the rural middle classes.[62] The individual elements of the enterprising nation envisioned by the DP were summed up well in a speech from 1950 by Minister of Agriculture Nihat Iyriboz. Speaking just months after the DP's election win, Iyriboz promised:

> Since former times the system of tenant farming [or sharecropping, *ortakçılık*] has been in practice. Under this system the wealthy landowner provided the small farmer with credit in kind and in cash. The Land Law ended that and created conflict over land between the landlord and the tenant. Now, we shall encourage tenant farming and also try to give land to the landless as soon as possible . . . The big landlord will be protected . . .[63]

The recasting of *devletçilik* had to be realised through regional and international links of exchange but also, crucially, assistance.

Subsumed within these new relations was the second important foreign policy shift of the late 1940s – the open pursuit of foreign economic assistance, which had been minimised since the 1920s in view of the adverse impact of borrowing on the Ottoman Empire.

[59] Ibid., p. 127. Despite RPP party discipline ensuring the bill ultimately passed, the law was never effective.
[60] Ibid., pp. 122–3. [61] Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, p. 222.
[62] See Çakmak, '1950'li Seçimler ve Demokrat Parti'; Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, pp. 249–50.
[63] Statement to the press, *Cumhuriyet*, 12.9.50, cited in Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, pp. 133–4.

In 1945, with Turkey suffering economically after the Second World War, Inönü approached the Export-Import Bank for a loan of $300 million. In July 1947, Turkey requested inclusion in the Marshall Plan, and was admitted to the Economic Recovery Programme a year later. This was part of broader US strategy after the war, 'aimed at the establishment of pro-American regimes based on open, liberal economies in the periphery'.[64] In view of the emphasis placed on agricultural policy, it has been assumed that the role unofficially assigned to Turkey was as agricultural exporter to western Europe. With this new 'economic dimension to her foreign policy', as Karpat terms it, 'international economic aid came to play a vital part in determining the structural transformation of Turkey, and in cementing her foreign policy affiliation with the West'.[65]

It is in this respect that the DP can be said to have gone beyond the RPP's interest in the US relationship, aiming at greater revisionism in foreign affairs. For while the RPP might have launched the turn westwards for protection and aid, it was the DP whose political and economic programme most enthusiastically mirrored the prescriptions of Turkey's US advisors. The Democrats fully embraced the Thornburg Report of 1949, for example, which had been commissioned by the Twentieth Century Fund, and recommended privatisation and a liberal trade regime based on agricultural exports.[66] The Democrats' enthusiasm reflected the party's social base of commercial bourgeoisie and landowners: 'there is no doubt that its ardent adoption and advocacy of [this] socioeconomic perspective . . . was the major factor that brought it to power'.[67] Thornburg was the chairman of the Board of Engineers of the California Standard Oil Company, and Petroleum Advisor to the US government: in 1956, he would become Menderes' personal advisor on economic affairs.[68]

The DP, like the RPP, certainly sought American protection from the perceived Soviet threat, but more enduringly, it fostered this relationship in order to legitimise narratives of Turkey's Western belonging,

[64] Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yıldızoğlu, 'Agrarian Change, 1923–70', in Schick and Tonak eds., *Turkey in Transition,* p. 277.
[65] Karpat, 'Introduction', in Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy*, p. 5.
[66] Max Weston Thornburg, Graham Spry and George Soule, *Turkey: an Economic Appraisal*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1949. For a critical perspective, see Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni,* pp. 270–1.
[67] Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 'Agrarian Change', p. 278.
[68] Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p. 124, fn 6.

and to finance a liberal national development project, regardless of changes in the Soviet position. As Yalman put it, recalling a European tour in 1947: 'Another visit to Sweden and Denmark, in search of campaign ammunition against Turkey's wasteful state industrialization, reconvinced me that planned economy is a poor alternative to free competition.'[69] The Democrats voiced their views on foreign policy on rare occasions whilst in opposition, but when they did, it was to present the American bloc as the only choice for Turkey. In 1948, Menderes made a speech in Izmir, criticising the Turkish Left and the Soviet Union together: 'Those policies seeking to be described as national or independent . . . amount to policies that distance [us] from cooperation with the democratic world. In such circumstances, our country would be destined to remain . . . [behind] the iron curtain.'[70] The same year, Bayar spoke in Balıkesir:

> As the Atlantic Pact has no aggressive goals, it would have been appropriate for us to take our place there. The Mediterranean Pact, which will be established for defensive purposes, might cater to the same need. We wish our land to remain safe in the event of a new world war. But our geographical situation gives us pause for thought. In a war by Britain and America against Russia, our country's neutrality would be unthinkable.[71]

Moreover, after the Allied victory, 'the United States was generally depicted by the Turkish press as the defender of right, justice, and humanity'.[72] As Yalman described:

> The stand I took in *Vatan* was that the United States of America, undertaking a heavy postwar task without adequate support elsewhere for her basic ideals, needed Turkey's sympathetic partnership; and that, since our survival and development next door to Russia must depend on collective security, our duty was to support the United States . . . Credit should go to the Twentieth Century Fund for underwriting, prior to the United States' government's plan to aid Turkey, an investigation which was published under the title, *Turkey, An Economic Appraisal* . . . I found Dr Thornburg always most sympathetic to our liberal campaign.[73]

[69] Yalman, *Turkey*, pp. 236–7.
[70] Menderes, Speech, Izmir, 27.8.48, cited in Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 61.
[71] Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 129.
[72] George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971*, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972, p. 14.
[73] Yalman, *Turkey*, p. 236.

As heirs of the early Kemalist tradition then, the Democrats shared what was arguably an obsession among the RPP elite with the westernisation of Turkey.[74] However, in light of the postwar balance of power, and the eclipse of the fascist alternative of the 1930s, attention moved increasingly to the United States as a model, and the Democrats in particular focused on the establishment of direct alliances with the US and its allies. Thus in the 1949 DP convention, the RPP was criticised for its 'hesitant' foreign policy and the 'fiasco' of Turkey's exclusion from NATO.[75] This approach to the US-led bloc connected well with the DP's anticommunist stance domestically, and its discourse on the Turkish nation at last realising its liberal democratic destiny, within a community of Western nations.

National Belonging: Faith against Communism, Recasting Laiklik

The third plank of the opposition platform – religious freedom – was among the DP's most controversial tamperings with the Kemalist legacy. Secularism (*laiklik*) was the name given to those early republican reforms which had sought to control and delimit religious practice, as part of Atatürk's drive to modernise the country in the image of Europe. As Gülalp points out, this was not in the context of 'the centrality of *religion* in Muslim societies, but the role that Islam has historically played in signifying a social and communal identity'.[76] Seeking to replace this with more 'modern', nationalist commitments, the RPP regime had institutionalised a series of iconoclastic reforms. These had generated frustration and dissent, which were communicated, unsurprisingly, in the religious idiom under attack. As the secularisation project was one of the more prominent aspects of the state's generally overbearing nature, the Democrats capitalised on it for electoral success. Their party programme contained pledges to set up religious education foundations and university Divinity Schools, and to reform primary school education to emphasise 'spiritual values'.[77]

[74] Harris, 'Turkey and the United States', in Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy*, p. 53.
[75] Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, p. 653.
[76] Haldün Gülalp, 'Whatever Happened to Secularization? The Multiple Islams in Turkey', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 102, Nos. 2/3, Spring/Summer 2003, p. 382.
[77] See Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, p. 367.

Yet these pledges also reflected the Democrats' resolution of the longstanding conundrum of westernisation and authenticity present since late Ottoman thought, the 'search for a paradoxical harmony between subjectivity and modernity'.[78] If Atatürk's answer to Gökalp's *hars* was to create an ethnically Turkish cultural identity, stripped of its Ottoman past, then the Democrats' step was to restore the religious part of that identity. The DP even subverted this dichotomy by declaring religious freedom to be part of the route to a 'Western' model of progress and civilisation. In promoting religious freedom, the Democrats invoked the example of the West's liberal democracies, where freedom of conscience was presented as inviolable: 'Education and travel abroad disclosed to many intellectuals that religion occupied a great part in the individual's life in the Western countries which they took as models in science, art, education, and politics.'[79] In their discourse, the DP presented freedom of religious practice as a crucial component of each citizen's individual liberties; of course, as with RPP precedents, this was a purely Muslim privilege. Thus in Bayar's opening speech at the DP's second convention in 1949, he emphasised religious freedom alongside the fight against reactionaries in Turkey, making no mention of Turkey's religious minorities.[80]

Another dimension of this liberal approach to religious expression was its utility in relation to the DP's economically liberal plans for national development. Here, religious freedom was an important aspect of a general relaxation of state control. Thus, while the Democrats' promises on religious freedom might appear to have held the clearest implications for nation building of all their platforms, they were arguably just as concerned with shaping a nation oriented towards enterprise. The Democrats' discourse on freedom of religion was further combined with a degree of conservatism, visible in their reverence for the 'traditional' – and not simply religious – values of rural Anatolia. This aligned with their focus on the middle peasantry and its embourgeoisement, as opposed to the landless and the need for structural reform.

Indeed the Democrats were conservative Kemalists, whose ethnic nationalism further marked the parameters of inclusion in their

[78] Nilüfer Göle, 'Batı-Dışı Modernlik Üzerine Bir Ilk Desen' ('A Preliminary Sketch on Non-Western Modernity'), *Dogu Batı*, fourth edition, February–April 1998, p. 71.

[79] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 275. [80] Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 47.

political project. Thus one of the Democrats' main target groups was the Anatolian peasantry, which comprised 80 per cent of the population, while the Kurdish peasants were omitted entirely from their discourse. The Democrats were faithful to Kemalism in emphasising the peasantry's special place as the repository of the nation's cultural values, and used this electorally. Speaking in 1949, Bayar underlined the peasantry's disenfranchisement at the hands of the RPP and asserted: 'Those in the East, West, and Central Anatolia have equal political rights … This is one of the Democrat Party's greatest causes … '[81] Thus when the neologism *Demokrat* was adopted by Turkish peasants as *Demirkırat* – the white steed of Köroğlu, the folkloric champion of Anatolia's peasants – the horse's image was quickly incorporated into the party's emblem.[82] In 1947, Fuat Köprülü wrote that 'the Turkish villager, who is no less patriotic and politically mature than the city man, presents an intelligent, nationally unified point of view in matters pertaining to the interests of the country'.[83] Another DP member, Ihsan Yurdoğlu, publicly declared: 'The very first ideal of the Democrat Party is to develop the village and the villagers. We will reach the villagers with political and human rights and freedoms, land, abundant production, school, healthcare, and wealth, and we will make them the masters of the nation.'[84] This reference to Atatürk's slogan – on the peasant as the master of the nation – was yet another example of the DP's self-presentation as faithful to his legacy, mitigating its otherwise dramatic ruptures with Kemalism. Meanwhile, the DP never disturbed or questioned the discourses and practices of erasure of Kurdishness from the national narrative.

Traditionalism was also a useful antidote to the stirrings of leftist movements. Indeed, just after speaking of freedom of religion at the 1949 DP convention, Bayar went on to the topic of the communist threat in Turkey.[85] Another DP politician, the conservative Hamdi Tanrıöver, called for religious education expressly as a measure to

[81] Bayar, Speech at Second Party Convention, January 1949, cited in Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, p. 676.
[82] Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, p. 138.
[83] Fuat Köprülü, 'Partiler ve Milli Birlik', *Kuvvet*, 4.4.47, in Köprülü, *Demokrasi Yolunda*, Tibor Halasi-Kun ed., The Hague: Mouton, 1964, p. 306.
[84] Ihsan Yurdoğlu, *CHP'nin Oyunları ve Demokrat Parti*, Istanbul: Rıza Köşkün Matbaası, 1948, p. 9.
[85] Ibid.

combat 'leftist currents' and to 'protect the youth against the "evils of materialism"'.[86] Indeed, invocations of religious freedom would also contribute to bolstering Turkey's Western identity in the international system, through its use in juxtaposition with Soviet-aligned communism, every trace of which the Democrats sought to eliminate during the 1950s.

The Democrat leaders had enjoyed an opportunist relationship with the Turkish Left at the outset, as illustrated in the debates surrounding the shaping of the party just after its founding. The pattern here was that the DP leaders, having attracted a broad spectrum of oppositional elements, including the Left, would discard the support of those leftists who wished to influence the party line. According to Toker's account, for example, former Foreign Minister – and before his turn to the RPP, co-founder of the Turkish Communist Party – Tevfik Rüştü Aras was providing assistance with the writing of the DP programme in 1945. Aras expressed his desire for a programme 'more progressive' than that of the RPP on 'ideas of social justice'.[87] Upon his attempt to include clauses reminiscent of 'socialist slogans', he was sidelined and ultimately dismissed by the founders.[88]

Similarly, before founding the DP, Bayar and Menderes had benefited from cooperation with leftist publisher Zekeriya Sertel, owner of the influential *Tan* newspaper. In 1945, they had agreed to contribute to a new magazine, to be published by Sertel's wife Sabiha, entitled *Görüşler* ('Views'). However, that December, the headquarters of *Tan* were attacked and the Sertels accused of communist sympathies: Bayar and Menderes immediately issued a public statement distancing themselves from the two publications.[89] Both Aras and Sertel had publicised their views that Turkish national interests lay in reconciliation with the Soviet Union:[90] the Democrats swiftly repudiated these views.[91] The DP did not oppose the RPP's subsequent closure of the Turkish Socialist Party and Turkish Socialist Workers Party, six newspapers and magazines, and nearly all Turkey's trade unions

[86] See Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 276.
[87] Toker, in Birand et al., *Demirkırat*, p. 107. [88] Ibid.
[89] See M. Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım*, Istanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977, pp. 265–70. Cf. Toker, in Birand et al., *Demirkırat*, pp. 108–11.
[90] See Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım*, pp. 256–9, 261.
[91] See also the Democrats' reaction to a scandal over links between Zekeriya Sertel and DP supporter Marshal Fevzi Çakmak: Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 177–80.

in December 1946. Once again, the Democrats' preferences for the economic dimension of national development not only reinforced those on Turkey's Western identity, but also those on Turkey's international role.

Conclusion

Far from being a mere extension of the RPP legacy on foreign policy, the Democrats operated within a complex framework of sensibilities and practices, which reflected legacies of Ottoman Orientalism, Atatürkist nationalism, and their own conservative liberalism with its increasingly American reference points. They preserved from the late Ottoman and early republican eras the goal of civilisation for Turkey, to be attained through westernisation. The crucial experience here was a continuously Eurocentric worldview which equated Europe and modernity, and which generated a focus on the 'modern' dimension of Turkish identity, rather than total rejection of Europe and its identity signifiers, values or symbols. This was reaffirmed by victory in the War of Independence, after which official narratives of Turkey's Western identity were moulded to correspond with a foreign policy that aimed to bring Turkey into Europe's new institutions. Accepting these legacies, the Democrats did not seek to reinterpret the nationalism, republicanism or reformism of Kemalism's Six Principles.

At the same time, the Democrat Party offered a new vision for the meaning of *muasır medeniyet* ('contemporary civilisation') as Turkey's goal. Before the 1940s, this notion had been understood with reference to European republican models and good relations with the ascendant Western states in Europe. In the context of postwar international politics, the DP saw Turkey's national belonging in its acceptance within the Western community of liberal democratic nations as led by the United States, the 'Free World'. On the nation, the Democrats were revisionist of much of the superstructural westernising reforms of the Kemalist nation building project. They allowed for a relaxation of religious expression in public life, they elevated communism after religious or Kurdish loyalties as the primary Other of the nation, and they presented the rural values of Anatolia as the authentic voice that naturally opposed this threat.

In terms of international forces, the Democrats' desire to entrench Turkey in the Western bloc dominant at the time represented a stepping

up of the existing postwar orientation of their RPP predecessors. The latter had already begun the shift away from Atatürk's traditional preference for loose multilateral associations over more binding commitments overseas. The Democrats formalised the alternative as the pursuit of alliances, however, and added its counterpart in national development as the pursuit of economic liberalism. Their revisionism was thus to promote alternative conceptions of both national sovereignty and national progress, entrenching their American orientation further. Any latent resentment or feelings of inferiority vis-à-vis the Western states were sublimated ostentatiously into declarations of affinity and praise, and simultaneously into scorn for the (non-Western) Other. The corollary of this was the assertion of Turkey's sovereignty vis-à-vis the external Other of Soviet communism, and the denunciation of its counterparts at home. In 1950, the stage was set for the realisation of these ambitious plans.

3 *The Free Officers in Opposition: Imagining Revolution*

Before the whole world, [the British] declare that they are working to raise the living standards of the nations whose land they occupy … the Free World also declares through its mouthpieces that it is assisting the small nations with their self-determination, and with choosing the nature of rule they see fit, and that it is helping the backward nations to rise.

I consider this talk an opium, which the Western world produces to drug the subjugated peoples into sleep, while this Free World continues to control them, so that they never grow strong, never confront it, and never seek to be rid of it. They consider us markets to promote their goods, they plunder and steal our resources, and present them there to their families and children, and in return, they give us promises and words, all delusion and deception.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, speech at Minya al-Qamh,
Sharqiya Governorate, 20 November 1953

While the Democrat Party leaders were working hard to forge Turkey's place in the 'Free World', a very different assessment was offered of the same project by Gamal Abdel Nasser in this speech in late 1953. At this time, the Free Officers were newly at the helm in Egypt, and were endeavouring to secure the departure of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone. It has become something of a cliché to maintain that the Free Officers had no blueprint of action before seizing power, and that they were pragmatists with little in the way of ideological formation or political experience. This view is debunked, however, by an examination of their discourse and political practices – and their supporters in public life – from 1946 to 1953. This covers their 'conspiratorial phase' before the 1952 coup, as well as their first year in government, which was characterised by a flux of activity in all fields of policy. Analysing this period reveals the Free Officers' steady development of a connected critique of colonial rule, and the social injustice and political corruption of Egypt's political condition.

The Free Officers were among the first generation of *effendi* or middle-class Egyptians to graduate from the Military Academy, after the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty led to a perception of liberalised admissions procedures to the army and improved curricular provision.[1] With so many of these new recruits politicised by the 1935–6 anti-British student and workers' movement, the military was soon to become the vehicle of an aspiring anticolonial vanguard. For one, like the Democrats, these future leaders inherited and rehearsed the dominant discourses of recent generations of nationalist movements and organisations, specifically regarding the goal of securing sovereignty for the nation from European colonialism, where that national community was defined as Egyptian. Since most of them came from the rising effendi class, an educated but alienated social group, their professional and political opportunities were often blocked by the comprador system of the colonial elite.

Furthermore, however, the individuals who came to form the Free Officers had participated in the nationalist uprisings of 1935–6 and 1945–6, the Palestine War of 1948, and finally, as instructors, in the guerrilla resistance of 1951. Their social grievances were compounded by the disappointments of each of these experiences. As a result, their visions for national progress emphasised development and wealth redistribution, as a reversal of the unjust hierarchies of the colonial system. Moreover they aspired to see national sovereignty achieved not only for Egypt, but also for other colonised nations, and most urgently in the Arab world, with which they felt most immediately connected. These aspirations entailed a necessary rupture with the Western colonial powers.

This chapter discusses the social profile of the Free Officers, and examines the genealogy of thought and practice within which their political formation took shape. It looks in turn at the visions for national sovereignty, belonging and progress that they, and particularly their leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, developed in the years before their decision to move against the king in 1952. These visions were the basis for the first efforts at nation making that the new Egyptian leadership launched upon its swift seizure of power.

[1] See the detailed rebuttal of conventional wisdoms in Tewfik Aclimandos, 'Revisiting the History of the Egyptian Army', in Arthur Goldschmidt, Amy Johnson and Barak Salmoni eds., *Re-envisioning Egypt, 1919–1952*, Cairo: American University Press in Cairo, 2005, pp. 68–77.

Profile: The Free Officers

The profound impact of British colonialism on the political formation of the Free Officers is difficult to exaggerate. Their memoirs describe their feelings of humiliation at the indignity of 'the occupation' and the complicity of Egypt's political elite,[2] while their first conspiratorial Free Officer pamphlet begins clearly: 'The Free Officers Council demands that the army's mission be the independence of the country.'[3] For these young patriots, with Britain still in control of Egyptian borders, its troops still at the canal and most Egyptians experiencing either economic exploitation in a one-crop economy or blocked opportunities at work or in politics, Egypt's recognition as an independent sovereign state was meaningless.[4] As a result, even before their formation as the Free Officers in 1946, Egypt's future leaders kept their distance from the nationalist Wafd Party.[5] Instead, they sought new strategies – outside the parliamentary system – to reach the goal of liberation.

The Free Officers began to organise in the mid-1940s:[6] their first pamphlet dates from 1946, and their first cell meeting to 1949.[7] The environment in which they had come to form their political ideas was one characterised by transformations in the same three fields considered in postwar Turkey. These comprised socioeconomic transformation, with accelerating rural–urban migration in the 1930s; an ideological transformation in the intellectual and political sphere, manifest in extra-parliamentary activism; and transformations in the international arena, marked for the Free Officers by the Palestine War of

[2] Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Falsafat al-Thawra*, Cairo: Madbuli, 2003, first published 1953, pp. 9–15; published in English as *Egypt's Liberation: the Philosophy of the Revolution*, trans. Dorothy Parker, Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1955, pp. 19–24; Khalid Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1992, p. 118; Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi*, Vol. I, Cairo: Al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1977, pp. 12–13, 18–20; Hussein Al-Shafe'i and Ahmad Mansur, *Shahid 'ala 'Asr Thawrat Yulyu*, Beirut: Al-Dar al-'Arabiyya lil-'Ulum, 2004, pp. 54–5; Tharwat Ukasha, *Mudhakkirati fi al-Siyasa wal-Thaqafa* ['My Memoirs in Politics and Culture'], Vol. I, Cairo: Al-Shuruq, 1987, p. 25.

[3] Free Officer Pamphlet, 'Al-Jaysh Juz'an min al-Sha'b', circa February 1946.

[4] Gamal Mu'awad Shaqra, 'Masadir al-Takwin al-Fikri li-l-Ra'is 'Abd al-Nasir wa Thawrat Yulyu', in Muhammad al-Said Idris ed., *Dirasat fi-l-Heqba al-Nasiriyya*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 2003, pp. 83–7.

[5] Ibid., p. 86, fn 61.

[6] Aclimandos, 'Revisiting the History of the Egyptian Army', pp. 80–4.

[7] Free Officer Pamphlet, 'Al-Jaysh Juz'an'; Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, p. 63.

1948. In addition, the organisation that they took as their vehicle into politics was the army. The Free Officers' early pamphlets reveal their frustration with the use of the army to secure the Egyptian regime and suppress popular uprisings against the British colonial presence.[8]

The impact of these four transformations on the Free Officers' thinking in the domestic context has been discussed in several important studies and memoirs. Firstly, the social origins of the Free Officers executive committee, for example, were mixed: some came from families of notables and others, like Nasser, from lower middle-class families in rural Upper Egypt.[9] All of them, however, were sensitised to the social and political frustrations of their generation. Nasser himself grew up between Alexandria and Cairo, but his family were from the rural *Sa'id* (Upper Egypt).

Secondly, and consequently, most of them had dabbled in extra-parliamentary activism, in the shadow of the ruling class' broken legacy of liberal Egyptian nationalism. Many Free Officers passed through the secret cells of the Muslim Brotherhood, though the majority not as members, while some were Marxists, attracted by the communist Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL).[10] Some had briefly been members of Misr al-Fatah ('Young Egypt'), and its later incarnation as the Egyptian Socialist Party.

Thirdly, the Palestine War is generally presented as a catalyst for action in Egypt. The young officers were furious at palace complicity in the sale of defective arms to Egypt, and the poor military instructions issued from Cairo.[11] In his *Memoirs of the First Palestine War*, Nasser writes: 'the crime of the Palestine War was not committed by the Egyptian army but by others'.[12] He complains bitterly about the 'instructions issued from Cairo that bore no relation to the requirements of the situation'.[13] Palace complicity in the sale of defective arms

[8] Free Officer Pamphlets, 'Al-Jaysh Juz'an'; 'Al-Jaysh ma' al-Sha'b', circa February 1950.

[9] Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1996, p. 42.

[10] Al-Shafe'i and Mansur, *Shahid 'ala 'Asr Thawrat Yulyu*, pp. 50–1.

[11] Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat,* I, p. 29.

[12] Gamal Abdel Nasser, 'Nasser's Memoirs of the First Palestine War', trans. Walid Khalidi, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1973, p. 4; originally published in *Akhir Sa'a*, April–May 1955.

[13] Ibid., p. 17. See also Mahmud Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad: 1948–1978*, Vol. II, Beirut: Al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Nashr, 1987, p. 16.

to Egypt's forces 'ruptured the bond between the army and the king and provided Nasser fertile ground for the development of a clandestine movement'.[14] In this context, Nasser began recruiting new Free Officers while still in Palestine.[15]

Finally, the Free Officers were heavily influenced by their experience in the army, as a striking example of a national institution under foreign control. Meanwhile, thoroughly disillusioned with party politics, they acquired a faith in military discipline and the meritocratic structures of the army that seemed to offer the perfect vehicle for revolutionary political change.[16] Accordingly, Nasser ensured that new Free Officers were welcomed strictly as individuals.

What has received less attention, however, is the way in which Egyptian and pan-Arab poles of identification appeared to coexist in these Free Officer experiences. Indeed, tracking the various Free Officers' interest in extra-parliamentary politics, anticolonialism and concern for social justice emerge as the principal values shaping their attraction to, or dismissal of, particular groups. The main attraction of the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, was as a route to participation in armed activities against the British and an organisational network, rather than any ideological affinity.[17] Khalid Muhyi al-Din and Nasser himself spent a brief time in its Secret Apparatus, for example.[18] Muhyi al-Din recalls its founder, Hassan al-Banna, telling them: 'We ... are like an immense hall that can be entered by any Muslim from any door ... You have come to us with the issue of "the nation". So, I welcome you.'[19]

However, Muhyi al-Din emphasises his and Nasser's rejection of the Brothers' politico-religious message from the first moments of their brief enrolment. Nasser wrote that he felt repulsed by their assassination methods and terror attacks on the Egyptian Jewish community.[20] His conceptions of nation appear to have been religiously inclusive

[14] Joseph Lorenz, *Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity*, Boulder, CO; Oxford: Westview Press, 1990, p. 25.
[15] Nasser, 'Memoirs', pp. 16, 19; Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat,* I, pp. 27–8, Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 16.
[16] Nasser, *Falsafat*, pp. 18–19; Nasser, *Philosophy*, pp. 29–31.
[17] Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, pp. 47, 104; Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, *Nasser: the Cairo Documents*, London: Mentor, 1973, p. 28; Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Moment*, p. 49; Aclimandos, 'The Egyptian Army', p. 82.
[18] Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, p. 47.
[19] Hassan al-Banna quoted in Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, p. 45.
[20] See Heikal, *Nasser: the Cairo Documents*, p. 28.

from an early stage, and after the formation of the Free Officers, the only link he permitted with the Brothers was anticolonial activity. Thus they smuggled arms equally to the Brothers' resistance operations in the Canal Zone and to the military wing of the communist Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL), al-Ansar.[21]

Meanwhile, an important dimension of the attraction of underground leftist groups for Free Officers such as Muhyi al-Din, Yusuf Siddiq and Nasser was their attention to pan-Arab unity against imperialism and domestic regimes. Such underground leftist groups were the second significant strand of the extra-parliamentary ideological and political scene in Egypt, and the Free Officers – particularly Muhyi al-Din, and through him, Nasser – had strong ties with them.[22] Indeed, an alliance had grown between communists, Wafdists and nationalists since 1945, when these groups first united to form the National Committee of Workers and Students.[23] Many Free Officers had taken part in its actions, and their cooperation with groups like the DMNL persisted after their formal organisation.

DMNL figures such as Ahmad Fuad exerted particular influence on their ideas and slogans, most notably helping to write the Six Principles and raising their awareness of the problem of inequality in Egypt.[24] Another important dimension of this influence was the Left's attention to pan-Arabist solidarity, stressing 'the unity of the Arab peoples' fight against imperialism and domestic reaction'.[25] More practically, the DMNL lent regular assistance to the Free Officers by printing their pamphlets, in which some DMNL slogans, such as that of 'Anglo-American imperialism', appeared often.[26]

Throughout this period, given the rising currency of pan-Arabism among many Egyptians,[27] the Arab dimension of Egyptian policy had

[21] Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, p. 104.
[22] Ibid., p. 87; Shaqra, 'Masadir al-Takwin', pp. 96–7.
[23] See Anouar Abdel Malek, 'Nasserism and Socialism', *The Socialist Register*, 1964, p. 39.
[24] Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, pp. 90–1; Ahmad Hamrush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu: I, Misr wa-l-'Askariyyun*, Cairo: Madbuli, 1983, p. 178; Shaqra, 'Masadir al-Takwin', p. 95.
[25] Anouar Abdel Malek, *Egypt: Military Society: the Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser*, New York: Random House, 1968, p. 252.
[26] Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, pp. 90–2.
[27] Shaqra, 'Masadir al-Takwin', pp. 98–9; Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 240.

become a component of party political competition.[28] Free Officers Hafiz Ismail and Mahmud Riyad both recall noting favourably this remarkable transformation in the foreign policy discourse of erstwhile Egyptian nationalist party leaders.[29] Finally, while Free Officers like Nasser were put off by the fascist influences of Misr al-Fatah's leader,[30] its nationalist and strongly pan-Arabist message resonated with them, as did its programme on social reform.[31]

Similarly, the experience of the Palestine War of 1948 superseded the domestic theatre and any ideological differences among the Free Officers. It widened their national consciousness to Arab horizons, as they strongly identified common cause with the Palestinian Arabs, while narrowing their first objectives to the determined pursuit of independence for the Egyptian nation, starting with its present rulers. As Al-Baghdadi put it, 'We returned from this battle ... completely convinced that a fundamental change had to take place in Egypt and in the Arab world itself if we wanted to live with honour and dignity.'[32]

The army was also an important locus for the development of the Free Officers' pan-Arab concerns. In Nasser's 1953 book *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (hereafter *The Philosophy*), he wrote of how 'the first glimmers of Arab awareness began to steal into [his] consciousness' when he demonstrated against the Balfour Declaration at secondary school, and remembers wondering why he was angry about a country he had never seen.[33] He continues that 'a kind of understanding began to develop when I became a student in the Military Academy, where I studied in particular the history of all past military campaigns in Palestine and in general the history of the area' (see Figure 3.1).[34] Lorenz comments that Egypt's eastern defence was a concern that Lord Allenby 'was fond of pointing out to officers of Nasser's generation'.[35] It should be additionally noted that Nasser wrote his own thesis at the Military College on Allenby's

[28] Tariq Al-Bishri, 'Misr fi Itar al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya', in Saad Eddin Ibrahim ed., *Misr wa-l-'Uruba wa Thawrat Yulyu*, Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1982, pp. 35–6.
[29] Muhammad Hafiz Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi fi 'Asr al-Tahadiyat*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1987, p. 86; Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, pp. 28, 40.
[30] Shaqra, 'Masadir al-Takwin', p. 92; Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Moment*, p. 49.
[31] Ahmad Faris, 'Ru'yat 'Abd al-Nasir li-l-Nizam al-Iqlimi al-'Arabi, 1952–1955', in Ibrahim, *Misr wa-l-'Uruba wa Thawrat Yulyu*, pp. 200–1.
[32] Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat,* I, p. 29.
[33] Nasser, *Falsafat*, pp. 61–2; Nasser, *Philosophy*, p. 89.
[34] Ibid., pp. 62, 90.
[35] Lorenz, *Egypt and the Arabs,* p. 24.

Figure 3.1 Nasser carrying the Egyptian flag at Military College, 25 June 1936. Source: Huda Abdel Nasser, *Gamal Abdel Nasser: Al-Awraq Al-Khassa*, Part Two, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aamma li-l-Kitab, 2015.

military tactics, before becoming an instructor during guerrilla resistance at the Suez Canal after October 1951.

The Free Officers' Nationalism: Glory and Dignity

In later years, a recurrent motif in Nasser's discourse became the quest for glory and dignity – *al-'izza wa-l-karama* – through liberation from foreign control.[36] In the years and months spent building the Free

[36] See Nasser, Speech to Liberation Rally, Munufiyya, 23.2.53; Speech at First Arab-Islamic Conference, Liberation Rally Headquarters, Cairo, 26.8.53; Statement to Egyptian Press Agency in answer to Lord Salisbury, 9.10.53;

Officers organisation, however, Nasser had expressed this through a discourse around the twin 'political and social revolutions' that were needed to secure the removal of the British-sponsored political elite and the economic system that they upheld, respectively. He considered the same system to obtain in the Arab and wider colonised Asian and African worlds. This informed the outward-looking orientation of his nationalism, and his subsequent efforts at cooperation in solidarity with pan-Arab and Third World counterparts. For the purposes of analytical clarity, each may be considered in turn: pursuing sovereignty through the 'political revolution', social justice through the 'social revolution', and both within their pan-Arab and wider constituencies.

It is important to clarify at the outset that the Free Officers leadership was no monolith, and to acknowledge the difficulty of tracing the ideological leanings of each member of its executive committee and parallel operational command before July 1952, or of its centralised decision-making body, the Command Council of the Revolution (CCR), thereafter.[37] Three features of the Free Officers' decision-making were certain, however, and support the connections proposed here between political formation and policymaking. The first is the consensual nature of decision-making among the senior Free Officers in the early period, which followed the principle of 'collective leadership' and sought unanimity, as they recount in their memoirs.[38] In Joel Gordon's words, 'The overemphasis on personal differences and the unfortunate tendency to divide the movement's leaders into political factions betray a misunderstanding of the group's dynamics and fail to capture the movement's true spirit, the camaraderie that bonded the officers to one another and to their leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser.'[39] The second is the Free Officers' fiercely guarded independence from their contemporaries in extra-parliamentary politics – including the Muslim Brotherhood[40]

Speech to Giza Liberation Rally, at People's National Conference, 23.5.54; Speech to Syrian and Lebanese Youth Delegation, 26.2.55; Speech on Fourth Anniversary of the Revolution and the Nationalisation of Suez Canal Company, 26.7.56.

37 Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Moment*, pp. 47–8; Richard Dekmejian, *Patterns of Political Leadership: Lebanon, Egypt, Israel*, New York: SUNY Press, 1975, pp. 213–4.

38 Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat*, I, p. 36; Al-Shafe'i and Mansur, *Shahid 'ala 'Asr Thawrat Yulyu*, p. 72.

39 Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Moment*, p. 47.

40 Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat,* I, p. 35; Aclimandos, 'The Egyptian Army', p. 82.

and the Marxist Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL)[41] – and the behaviour of the CCR vis-à-vis such former associates once it came to power.[42] Last but not least, the overriding influence of Gamal Abdel Nasser on the movement he founded merits a particularly close look at his own statements for insight into the leadership's positions.

Sovereignty: Political Revolution for Dignity

The earliest expressions of the quest for national sovereignty are read in the Free Officers' conspiratorial pamphlets, distributed among the Egyptian army between 1946 and 1952. The first begins: 'The Free Officers Council demands that the army's mission be the independence of the country . . . the army is part of the people and its hopes and dreams are part of the people.'[43] A second pamphlet reiterates: 'The Army is the army of the nation and not that of an individual . . . '[44] One major theme of the pamphlets was the complicity of the government with the British in withholding weapons from the army.[45] The Free Officers were also stung by particular incidents, such as the forced dissolution of the cabinet by the terrorised king in February 1942, after British tanks surrounded his palace. In the words of Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, prominent Egyptian journalist and Nasser's closest confidant, 'The start of the Free Officers' Movement as a cohesive movement can be dated from the moment when the first British tank trained its gun on King Farouk's palace. The Free Officers talked of little else but freedom and the restoration of their country's dignity . . . '[46]

Another theme of the pamphlets was the Free Officers' resentment at being reduced to a tool of British control. Their first pamphlet states: '[The Free Officers] cannot accept that the army be used to suppress patriotic movements, because the army is a part of the people . . . '[47]

41 Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Moment*, p. 54.
42 Al-Shafe'i and Mansur, *Shahid 'ala 'Asr Thawrat Yulyu,* pp. 92–4, 107–9, 123–9; Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi*, Vols. I and II, Cairo: Al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1977, pp. 12–4.
43 Free Officer Pamphlet, 'Al-Jaysh Juz'an'.
44 Pamphlet, 'Al-Jaysh Jaysh al-Umma', *c.* mid-1950. 45 Ibid.
46 Heikal, *Cairo Documents*, p. 28.
47 Free Officer Pamphlet, 'Al-Jaysh Juz'an'.

This is likely a reference to the events of February 1946, when the army was used to crush the National Committee of Workers and Students. Similarly, after the Cairo Fire of January 1952, another pamphlet stated: 'we refuse to strike at the people, nor to fire even a single bullet at a popular demonstration, nor will we arrest loyal patriots'.[48] This fire had been started by extreme right-wing groups, and the palace, with the aid of senior army and police officers, had used it as a pretext to suspend the constitution, dismiss the government and arrest members of the armed resistance in the Canal Zone.[49] A subsequent pamphlet in March 1952 described these events, and warned: 'Anglo-American imperialist conspiracies have increased in the country, in an attempt to crush the national movement and to distract the people from armed struggle against imperialism in the canal, so that they think about domestic problems in Cairo.'[50] The Free Officers' memoirs describe their feelings of humiliation at the indignity of the British occupation in the same terms, and narrate the Cairo Fire and other events bitterly.[51]

The way in which the Free Officers' conceptions of the nation related to the international was encapsulated by Nasser's principle of the two concurrent revolutions – political and social – his strategy for liberation. This concept was first laid down in writing in 1953 in *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, which presents itself as an overt guide to his own political ideas: 'an effort . . . to know who we are and what our role is to be in the connected stages of Egypt's history . . . They are an effort to discover our objectives, and the resources which we must mobilise to achieve these objectives.'[52]

Although *The Philosophy* is often said to have been ghost-written by Nasser's confidant Heikal, the idea was in fact propounded by Nasser much earlier, amongst the Free Officers' cells, in the late 1940s. Amin Huwaydi recalls joining the organisation in 1951 and specifically endorsing 'Nasser's idea' of social and political revolution – that there could be no democratic freedom without the

[48] Free Officer Pamphlet, 'Al-Jaysh ma'a al-Sha'b'.
[49] See Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. vii.
[50] Free Officer Pamphlet, 'Al-Inqilab al-Jadid', *c.* March 1952; see also Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'an Atakallam,* p. 120.
[51] Nasser, *Falsafat*, pp. 9–15; Nasser, *Philosophy*, pp. 19–24, Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'an Atakallam,* p. 118.
[52] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 5; Nasser, *Philosophy*, p. 12.

'freedom of bread'.[53] It was later a recurrent theme in Nasser's speeches, and in state publications such as *Egypt between Two Revolutions*.[54] Nasser explains:

> we are going through two revolutions, not one . . . Every people on earth goes through two revolutions: a political revolution by which it wrests the right to govern itself from the hand of tyranny, or from the army stationed upon its soil against its will; and a social revolution, involving the conflict of classes, which settles down when justice is secured for the citizens of the united nation.[55]

The political revolution denoted the struggle for liberation, and corresponded with Nasser's aspirations for national sovereignty. The social revolution was presented as generating national unity through social justice. The former was the call of the broad national movement from which the Free Officers emerged; the latter showed the influence on them of its Marxist elements in particular. Both revolutions entailed confronting the British and their local clients – the landowners, the monarchy and the corrupt political elites – who propagated dependence and economic inequality, and of course, commanded political authority.

The first practical steps towards reclaiming national sovereignty thus consisted in establishing control over political institutions deemed to have been used against the national interest by previous regimes. In addition, of course, as Free Officer and former Intelligence Chief Salah Nasr adds, 'the revolution realised it needed to overturn old institutions to be able to continue'.[56] In the radio communiqué announcing the coup, Free Officer Anwar al-Sadat declared that the army had seized power in order to 'purify' the corrupt political establishment, which had prolonged Egypt's subjugation by foreign powers.[57] King Faruq received an abdication order, and the Executive Committee announced itself the Command Council of the Revolution.[58] In the text declaring the abrogation of the constitution in December 1952,

[53] Amin Huwaydi, *Khamsun 'Aman min al-'Awasif: Ma Ra'aytuhu Qultuhu*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 2002, p. 44.
[54] Muhammad Ata, *Misr Bayna Thawratayn*, Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1955.
[55] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 26; Nasser, *Philosophy*, pp. 39–40.
[56] Salah Nasr, *Mudhakirat Salah Nasr: Al-Su'ud*, Vol. I, Cairo: Dar al-Khayyal, 1999, p. 172.
[57] Tariq Habib, *Milaffat Thawrat Yulyu: Shahadat 122 min Suna'iha wa Mu'asireeha*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1997, p. 60.
[58] This comprised nine men, the original leadership of the Free Officers organisation: Gamal Abdel Nasser, Abd al-Hakim Amer, Gamal Salim, Salah Salim, Kamal al-Din Husayn, Hassan Ibrahim, Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, Anwar

and indeed in the warning sent to Faruq in July, the same references appear to the king's 'abuse of the constitution and [his] disregard for the will of the people'.[59] For the Free Officers, the political party system seemed irrevocably tainted by its record under British control.

National Progress: Social Revolution

As both *The Philosophy* and their earliest policies demonstrated, the Free Officers had a specifically socioeconomic critique of imperialism to add to that of their predecessors. They argued that imperialism bred exploitation – the British, and the Ottoman era rulers before them, had used 'two iron arms: *social oppression* and political subjugation, so that each time we tried to raise our voice, *feudalism* and subjugation pressured us'.[60] This argument arose out of the specific condition of Egypt at the time: 'Western imperialism shaped Egypt to suit its own needs, turning the country into a plantation for Western industry and its landed upper class into *compradors* with a stake in the extroverted economy.'[61]

Before the Free Officers could face the coloniser itself, they believed that these comprador classes had to lose not only their political, but also their economic privileges, thus weakening the infrastructure of British influence in Egypt. Nasser would later refer to Egypt on the eve of the revolution as the 'society of the half per cent'.[62] One way in which Nasser and the Officers claimed to be fostering national unity in Egypt was by economically enfranchising the forgotten majority, in the 'social revolution'. Moreover, this concern with social equality, and the overturning of colonial patron–client relations, applied to two overlapping national fields – the Egyptian and the Arab nation. This sense of

al-Sadat and Khalid Muhyi al-Din. See Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Moment*, pp. 47, 53, 59.

59 Declaration Abrogating Constitution, 10.12.52; Warning to the Former King, from Chief of Staff General Muhammad Nagib, 26.7.52: www.nasser.org.

60 Nasser, Speech to Liberation Rally in Shibin al-Kum, Munufiyya, 23.2.53, emphasis added.

61 Raymond Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat: the Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 11.

62 Galal Amin, *Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? Changes in Egyptian Society from 1950 to the Present*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2000, p. 31.

unity within a larger Arab nation derived from the common history of imperial rule, and its manifestations were evident very early on, in both the Free Officers' discourse and practice during their formative phase. Accordingly, the following sections will consider the developmental aspect of their conceptions of nation in Egypt, its implications for conceptions of the Arab nation, and the connection between conceptions of Arab nation and Arab sovereignty.

The Free Officers' position on development for the Egyptian nation was expressed in three of the Six Principles declared in July 1952: the end of feudalism and monopoly, the realisation of social justice, and the establishment of democracy. According to Nasser, the reason for the failure of previous attempts at liberation in Egypt's history lay in the conflicting demands of the social and political revolutions:

> the terrible experience through which our people are going is that we are having both revolutions at the same time . . . [with] attendant factors which clash and contradict violently. To be successful, the political revolution must unite all elements of the nation . . . and instil in them the spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of the whole country. But one of the primary features of social revolution is that it . . . sets the citizenry, as individuals and classes, to fighting each other.[63]

Here he was referring to the deceptive coherence of the 1919 uprising, in which different social classes had converged wholeheartedly on a negative nationalist demand – a desire to be rid of foreign domination – but not on a positive platform. The Wafd had presented itself as a popular party, yet showed considerable neglect of social reform.[64] In order to avoid repeating the failures of the past, Nasser declared his intention to coordinate policies in the national and the international in future. The national unity demanded by the political revolution would be secured through a state-guided social revolution.

Just as this social revolution was imagined as erasing class difference, a further dimension was that no distinction be made between Egyptians according to faith. The Free Officers' secret pamphlets, first announcements and the Six Principles were all free of religious reference. In *The Philosophy*, discussion of the Islamic Circle is brief, and focuses on the common political aims that should be prioritised by members of

[63] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 27; Nasser, *Philosophy*, pp. 40–1.
[64] Shaqra, 'Masadir al-Takwin al-Fikri', pp. 83–4.

different Muslim nations.[65] Nasser did at times use religious language in his speeches, particularly when addressing religious audiences, and the influence of Marxist groups upon his thinking did not extend to a repudiation of religion. However, such addresses were marked by his continual references to pan-Arabism alongside those to Islam, and did not elevate religion to a state-endorsed moral code.[66] Scholars agree that Nasser's 'infrequent substantive references to the relationship between religion and politics clearly indicate a personal preference for the separation of the two as distinct spheres of human activity'.[67]

National Belonging: Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism

In tandem with those on Egyptian sovereignty and progress, the Free Officers' views on their equivalents in the Arab world emerged from the same anti-imperialist prism. This contradicts the conventional view that the Free Officers lacked consistent ideological commitments, and employed pan-Arabist rhetoric either sentimentally or pragmatically, after rather accidentally stumbling upon its utility.[68]

The experience of the Palestine War helps explain how Nasser's conceptions of the interlinking of Arab and Egyptian sovereignty would develop, in tandem with those on national progress, by highlighting the Egyptians' and Arabs' common imperial pasts and common cause of liberation, rather than an ethnic or linguistic bond:

> When the struggle was over in Palestine and the siege lifted, and I had returned to Egypt, the Arab circle in my eyes had become a single entity. The events that have taken place since have confirmed my belief. I have followed developments in the Arab countries, and I find they match, point

[65] This is the gist of Nasser's proposition on turning the Hajj into an opportunity for the meeting of Muslim heads of state from across the globe. He used the metaphor of Hajj as an 'Islamic parliament'.

[66] Nasser, Arab-Islamic Conference Speech, 26.8.53.

[67] Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, p. 35. See also Marlène Nasr, 'Vocabulaire National et Islam dans le Discours de Hassan el-Banna et de Gamal Abdel Nasser', in Sylvianne Rémi-Giraud, Pierre Rétat and Paul Bacot eds., *Les Mots de la Nation*, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1996.

[68] Panayotis Vatikiotis, *Nasser and his Generation*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1978, p. 233; Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, pp. 30, 69; Adeed Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, London: Macmillan, 1976, pp. 107–9; Malcolm Kerr, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy and the Revolution', in Vatikiotis ed., *Egypt since the Revolution*, New York: Praeger, 1968, p. 128.

for point. What happened in Cairo had its counterpart in Damascus the next day, and in Beirut, in Amman, in Baghdad and elsewhere. This all fitted in with the picture drawn by long experience. It is a single region. The same circumstances, the same factors, even the same forces, united against all of it. And it was clear that the foremost of these forces was imperialism.[69]

In Egypt, the palace's corruption was blamed for what al-Bishri cites as the Free Officers' main grievance against both the monarchy and the Wafd: their 'failure to confront the Israeli threat to Egypt's national security'.[70] The Free Officers saw the Arabs as common victims not only of the imperial powers, their external occupiers, but also of the same *internal* clients which had manipulated Egyptian politics. In 1953, Nasser blamed the self-interest and vacuous rhetoric of Arab leaders for the failure in Palestine: 'what did we do to prepare against colonialism? Nothing – every country thought only of itself.'[71] The leaders 'used to refer to a "*so-called* Israel" in their speeches, but never did anything about this "so-called Israel" except speech-making'.[72] Free Officer Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi agreed: 'those leaders only resisted this threat with speeches and further fragmentation and division'.[73] One particular passage of *The Philosophy* most vividly illustrates the connection between national sovereignty and community in the Free Officers' formulation of pan-Arab connection. It also tells of corrupt leaderships during the Palestine War:

> The Arab peoples entered Palestine with the same degree of enthusiasm. They did so on the basis of ... a common estimate shared by all as to the outer borders of their security. These peoples left Palestine with a common bitterness and disappointment; then, each in its own internal affairs encountered the same factors, the same ruling forces that had brought about their defeat, and forced them to bow their heads in humiliation and shame.[74]

Even Israel, a formidable Other for the pan-Arab community, was first presented as such through this anti-imperialist framework. Nasser and his colleagues were further influenced by the writings and campaigning of the Egyptian Left, which had been consistently

[69] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 69; Nasser, *Philosophy*, p. 98.
[70] Al-Bishri, *Al-Muslimun wa-l-Aqbat fi Itar al-Gama'a al-Wataniyya*, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1988, p. 624.
[71] Nasser, Alexandria Speech, 13.12.53. [72] Ibid.
[73] Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat*, I, p. 29.
[74] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 66; Nasser, *Philosophy*, pp. 94–5.

'formulating Arab problems in its program and theoretical analyses'.[75] In a speech in 1953, Nasser asked directly: 'Who is responsible? … Britain. We used to forget this, and say it was the Jews' fault, but during the war, Britain withheld weapons from us while the Jews received them from everywhere.'[76] Viewing Israel as planted by Western imperialism, and with such impact on contiguous Arab land, Nasser 'was utterly convinced that the fighting there was not taking place on foreign soil … It was a duty necessitated by self-defense.'[77] Free Officer and later Secretary to the Presidency Sami Sharaf agreed: the Palestine experience had fuelled the Free Officers' 'recognition and conviction that Egypt's security was inseparable from the security of the Arab nation'.[78]

Alongside this focus on Egypt, a survey of Nasser's early statements and speeches reveals that pan-Arabist references to national belonging overlapped with Egyptian references in his public discourse. These sources defy the simple categorisations traditionally implied by juxtaposing *wataniyya* (one-state patriotism) and *qawmiyya* (pan-Arabism). Nasser frequently referred to the Egyptian and Arab world using both terms, depending on the context.[79] Thus over the same years, Nasser spoke of *al-watan al-'arabi* ('the Arab homeland'),[80] and of *al-umma al-'arabiyya*;[81] he would refer to Egypt as *al-watan* ('the homeland'),[82] and also to Egypt's citizens as *al-umma* ('the nation').[83] In her careful study of Nasser's Arabist discourse, Marlène Nasr identifies 1954 as the year in which he began to use the term *al-umma al-'arabiyya* ('the

[75] Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. 252. [76] Nasser, Alexandria Speech, 13.12.53.
[77] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 62; Nasser, *Philosophy*, p. 90.
[78] Sami Sharaf, *Sanawat wa Ayam ma'a Jamal Abd al-Nasir: Al-Juz' al-Awwal*, Cairo: Al-Fursan, 2005, p. 171. See al-Bishri, *Al-Muslimun*, p. 623.
[79] On the word *qawmi* ('national'), compare its uses to signify 'Egyptian national' and 'Arab national' respectively in Nasser, Interview with Italian Press Agency, 17.9.54 and Speech to Military College Graduates, 11.7.55.
[80] Nasser, Alexandria Speech, 13.12.53; Speech on *Sawt al-'Arab* on Second Anniversary of the Revolution, 24.7.54.
[81] Nasser, Alexandria Speech, 13.12.53; Statement to Syrian Press, 7.1.54; Speech on Surprise Visit to Gaza, 29.3.55.
[82] Nasser, Speech after Ministers' Questions at Liberation Debate, Cairo, 25.8.53; Statement to Journalists on Occasion of End of British Occupation, 27.7.54; Speech to Military College Graduates, 11.7.55.
[83] Nasser, Speech at Fuad I University on Martyrs Day, 15.11.52; Interview with Arab Department Chief, *Voice of America* Radio, Cairo, 25.2.53; *Sawt al-'Arab* Speech, 24.7.54; Speech on Fourth Anniversary of the Revolution; Speech on Eid al-Fitr, Armed Forces Headquarters, 22.5.55.

Arab nation'), but in fact it also appears in a speech at the Palestine Club in 1953.[84] These examples reflect the relational nature of his discursive choices, and complicate the notion that Nasser's diction betrayed a 'contingent' or 'secondary' commitment to Arab causes.[85]

More indicative of politically formative views than speeches might be, recently published documents from Nasser's private papers offer rare insight into the contours of the political project he was literally sketching out at the early stage of 1953–4. On the occasion of the 1953 visit to Saudi Arabia of the Free Officers' figurehead and Egypt's first president Muhammad Nagib, Nasser's handwritten notes include: 'names of Egyptians in Arab countries, support of political apparatus in Arab countries, trade with the Arab states'.[86] Another document from 1954 contains repeated reference to 'the Arab *umma*' and indeed the 'Arab socialist society', as well as the 'organisation' and 'method' by which it will be mobilised 'working towards Arab unity'. His notes also single out the United States as wishing to 'freeze the status quo in the Middle East': Nasser responds that the Egyptian objective will be 'the fortification of popular organisations to convince others of our strength', pondering 'how to gather the powers of the Arab *umma*' (see Figure 3.2).[87]

The crucial feature of the discursive framework Nasser was elaborating was its application of similar standards and expectations to both Egyptian and Arab spheres of national belonging, while context determined which was foregrounded at any particular time. Egyptian and Arab identity were both interpreted through the common agenda of liberation for each in his early thought:

> There can be no doubt that the Arab circle is the most important, and the one with which we are most closely linked. For its peoples are intertwined with us by history … we have gone through the same crises, and when we fell

[84] Nasr, 'Vocabulaire National'; Nasser, Speech at Palestine Club, Alexandria, 13.12.53.

[85] See Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, 29.

[86] Nasser, 'Diary on Domestic, Arab and International Affairs and on Withdrawal Negotiations', 1953, in Huda Abdel Nasser, *Gamal Abdel Nasser: Al-Awraq Al-Khassa*, Part Two, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aamma li-l-Kitab, 2015, pp. 194–5.

[87] Nasser, 'The Political Situation', in Huda Abdel Nasser, *Abdel Nasser Fi Muwagahat al-Sahafa*, Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Akadimiyya, 2012, pp. 237–40.



Figure 3.2 Nasser's handwritten notes entitled *Al-Wad Al-Siyasi* ('The Political Situation'), 1954.
Source: Huda Abdel Nasser, *Abdel Nasser Fi Muwagahat al-Sahafa*, Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Akadimiyya, 2012, pp. 237–40.

beneath the hooves of the invaders' steeds, they were with us under the same hooves.[88]

The notion that the Free Officers were politically predisposed towards a conception of Arab national sovereignty, as traced to their early discourse and first policies, is almost uniformly disregarded in the secondary literature. The Palestine War generates a different picture, however, as it was not only significant for shaping the Free Officers' commitment to pan-Arabism, but was also a war fought against a force that they deemed a direct threat to Egypt. The 1948 war arguably reaffirmed, rather than '*taught* Nasser the critical importance of Egyptian security in the area of the Fertile Crescent'.[89]

The Free Officers' anti-imperialism was also the springboard for Nasser's emphasis on the African sphere, and on solidarity with its

[88] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 61; Nasser, *Philosophy*, pp. 88–99. While Nasser adds religion and geographical continuity as further factors, his emphasis remains on the historical element.

[89] Lorenz, *Egypt and the Arabs*, p. 24, emphasis added. See Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 17.

peoples in their liberation struggles. In *The Philosophy*, Nasser wrote of the African circle of Egypt in the same terms he used for its Arab counterpart, emphasising in each the commonality of history rather than any ethnic or symbolic identity marker in itself:

> Can we possibly ignore the fact that there is an African continent which Fate decreed us to be a part of, and that it is also decreed that a terrible struggle exists for its future – a struggle whose results will be either for us or against us, with or without our will?[90]

The book closes with an emphatic reiteration of the role that Egypt's geographical and historical realities call upon it to fulfil: 'We alone, by virtue of our place, can perform the role.'[91] Years later, this conception would be repeated by Free Officer Muhammad Fayiq, Nasser's advisor on African and Asian affairs, in his description of Egypt as 'the role state'.[92] Both Fayiq and his then junior colleague in the presidency's African Bureau, Helmi Sharawy, affirmed that anti-imperialism informed early African policy as a natural outcome of Egypt's location:

> We were first concerned with Sudan, for if Sudan unified with us, we would find ourselves bordering seven colonised African countries, and even if independent, Sudan would remain a 'strategic depth' for Egypt surrounded by colonisers. So early on, Egypt found itself confronted with all this imperialism.[93]

In *The Philosophy* too, Nasser had detailed the liberation struggles of the African peoples and Egypt's vital connection with them, both as responsible guards of their northern gate, and as bound to them by the Nile and neighbouring Sudan.[94] More indicative than *The Philosophy* were Nasser's early decisions to mobilise support for the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya against the British in 1954, and his meetings with the leaders of Uganda and Nigeria the same year.[95]

[90] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 59; Nasser, *Philosophy*, p. 85.
[91] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 82; Nasser, *Philosophy*, p. 114.
[92] Interview, Muhammad Fayiq, Founder of African Affairs Bureau, Cairo, 26.2.07.
[93] Muhammad Fayiq Interview; Interview, Helmi Sharawy, African Affairs Bureau, Cairo, 30.8.17.
[94] Nasser, *Falsafat*, pp. 79–80; Nasser, *Philosophy*, p. 110.
[95] Tareq Ismael, *The UAR in Africa: Egypt's Policy under Nasser*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 24.

Nasser clarified that Egypt's role was to be one not of leadership, but rather of interaction, 'a role such as to spark this tremendous power latent in the area surrounding us ... with the aim of creating a great strength which will then undertake a positive part in the building of the future of mankind'.[96] The first moves in the direction of what would become the Afro-Asian Movement were prefigured here, as early as 1953. In this passage, by extrapolation from anti-imperialism and common history, Nasser formulated the notion of a bloc, whose power lay in its unity, and whose unity had thus far remained untapped.

Conclusion

In Egypt, at the turn of the twentieth century, the most formative experience for the Free Officers was the continuing popular struggle against the British occupation. As this struggle continued into the early 1950s, the Free Officers preserved the goal of national liberation from the successive Egyptian responses to foreign control. Unlike in the Turkish case, there was little possibility of, or inclination towards, a merging of national identification with that of the European coloniser. The Free Officers were therefore far more revisionist as regards their country's place in the international system than the Democrats, orienting themselves very differently towards the 'West'.

For the Free Officers, the first step towards national sovereignty entailed curbing the political and economic power of those who represented imperialism's footholds in the nation. This placed them at odds with Egypt's political and economic elites, some of whom were landowning members of the nationalist Wafd Party, whom the Free Officers nevertheless held responsible for acting as compradors to the British. Thus, like the Democrats, the Free Officers stressed the need for a developmental national project, but theirs recommended the pursuit of social justice through greater statism, and denounced the liberal system of the colonial order.

Meanwhile, seeking an end to imperialism in Egypt and beyond, Nasser in particular looked to an Arab sphere of action in which to preserve Egyptian and Arab sovereignty, if hoping at first to combine this with good relations with former imperialist powers. This was

[96] Ibid., pp. 61, 88.

articulated with an Arab locus for discourses of Egyptian national belonging. In this sense, the Free Officers were revisionist of the brand of Egyptian nationalism that had guided elite politics in the country for decades. Certainly, the Wafd had first grafted an Arab policy on to Egyptian calls for independence in the 1940s, and before that, the Egyptian Left had placed great emphasis on Arab solidarity in its programmes. Yet the Free Officers' contribution was to emphasise Egypt's place in the Arab nation through political practice, to a far greater degree. Snubbing alternative trends of Islamist or Egypt-centric identity, they insisted on secular politics, and championed the overlapping heritage of the Egyptian and Arab nation. This was framed primarily in terms of the Arabs' common struggles for liberation, and the common imperatives of development in their newly independent states. These were the orientations and aspirations with which the Free Officers now faced the challenges of the Cold War.

4 *Turkey's Accession to NATO, 1950–2: Members of the 'Free World'*

You wander the streets in your great freedom,
You are free - free to be out of work!
You give your country away as if to your dearest friend,
Then one day, for instance, they sign it over to America
Together with you, and your great freedom,
You are free - free to become an airbase!
Wall Street grabs you by the scruff of the neck,
One day, let's say, they could send you to Korea,
You could fill a pit with your great freedom,
You are free - free to become the unknown soldier!

These lines form part of 'A Sad Freedom', written by the great Turkish poet Nazım Hikmet in 1951, the same year he was forced to leave Turkey for good. It is a perceptive indictment of a series of political values and practices that were becoming hegemonic in Turkey, under the government of the newly elected Democrat Party (DP). The emphasis on freedom, articulated within a nationalist frame of self-sacrifice and patriotism on the battlefield, was an innovation that the DP had brought in to reconfigure Kemalist meanings of nationalism. Hikmet himself had escaped the country after being drafted – at fifty years old – into the Turkish war effort in Korea, a decision by the DP that announced their view of Turkey's intentions and self-image in the national and international fields. The reference to America's airbase and Turkey's beholdenness to Wall Street prefigured a set of foreign and economic policies which the Democrats would oversee in order to bring Turkey in line with the free market. This was unfolding – and Hikmet was writing – against the backdrop of an anticommunist McCarthyism that underpinned these westward orientations, and helped reconfigure the meanings of secularism in turn, as socialism was increasingly juxtaposed with freedom of conscience and faith. This chapter considers the period in which all these

changes were occurring, crowned by Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952.

Given the Cold War context enveloping the eastern Mediterranean at the time, Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has conventionally been understood as a matter of security, and a direct consequence of the Soviet threats of 1945. Yet an analysis accounting for the political formation and nationalist commitments of the DP reveals different dimensions. It makes clear that foreign relations concerns for independence and security were expressions of a state agenda for nation making that was initiating profound changes to the political landscape bequeathed by the Republicans. This project aimed to articulate narratives of Turkey's national belonging with those of the Western community of states as defined within the new frameworks of the Cold War. This was to occur first through the pursuit of national sovereignty by upgrading ties with the United States – the subject of this chapter. It would also involve fostering national progress as economic development, through the adoption of Western liberal models – the subject of Chapter 6. NATO membership was to provide a significant boost to the first of these goals, while the Baghdad Pact was intended to bolster the second: analysis of the 1957 Syrian Crisis, subject of Chapter 8, reveals the ways in which the DP pursued both simultaneously. This DP programme would unfold through an energised hostility to communism which mirrored that of the Western bloc at the time, but also by a recharging of conventional Orientalist tropes against Arab former Ottoman subjects.

The RPP Precedent

By various accounts, the United States remained distant from Turkey during the Second World War, perceiving it to lie within the British sphere of influence.[1] In 1945, the Soviet Union made its unwelcome overtures to Turkey, demanding the revision of the Soviet–Turkish

[1] Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 65. See also George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–1971*, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972, p. 14; Haluk Ülman, *Ikinci Cihan Savaşının başından Truman Doktrinine kadar Türk–Amerikan*

Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1925, in light of 'present circumstances'.[2] During the late 1940s, after their initial willingness to leave the issue to Britain, the Americans became subject to a concerted campaign by Turkish diplomats seeking their support against Russia.[3] The heated exchange of notes between the Soviets and the USA, Britain and Turkey during 1946 culminated in a defusing of tension, but still in no substantial US aid for Turkey.[4] Then in February 1947, Britain asked the USA to take over its economic role towards Turkey.[5] The State Department then decided to provide assistance to Greece and Turkey, culminating in the Truman Doctrine of March of that year.[6]

While Washington had committed to military aid, it was thought that the Turkish economy would be buoyed by international agencies, and that its political system could not inspire levels of confidence that would merit economic assistance.[7] When the Marshall Plan was unveiled in June 1947, however, the Inönü government successfully lobbied for inclusion. Turkey duly received $300 million between 1948 and 1952, the majority invested in agriculture.[8] The turnaround was linked to security considerations, as American journalist Walter Lippmann remarked at the time: 'We did not choose Turkey and

Diplomatik Münasebetleri: 1939–1947, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1961, pp. 126–8.

2 See Kuniholm, *Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 255–8. Malcolm Yapp explains Soviet policy mainly in terms of border security and ideology: 'Soviet Relations with the Countries of the Northern Tier', in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha eds., *The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives*, London: Heinemann for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1981.

3 See Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 17–8; Ülman, *Ikinci Cihan Savaşının*, pp. 127–9.

4 See Kuniholm, *Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 355–76; FRUS: 1946, The Near East and Africa, Vol. VII, Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson), 8.11.46, pp. 916–7.

5 FRUS: 1947, The Near East and Africa, Vol. V, USE, Britain to DOS, 21.2.47, pp. 35–7.

6 FRUS: 1947, Vol. V, Memorandum Regarding Proposals Contained in British Aide-Memoires of February 21 relating to Greece and Turkey, 24.2.47, pp. 41–2.

7 Ülman, *Ikinci Cihan Savaşının*, p. 131.

8 The terms of the 1948 Economic Cooperation Agreement sparked much controversy in Turkey. See John VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938–1950*, Albany: SUNY Press, 2005, pp. 179–81.

Greece because they really needed us, or because they represented models of democracy. We chose these countries because they are strategic doors onto the heart of the Soviet Union and Mediterranean . . . '[9]

By 1948, and with the signing of the Brussels Pact among Britain, France, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, US policy also moved towards the building of a collective security arrangement for western Europe. Ankara's pressure to be included was disregarded, so Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak proposed the temporary alternative of a Mediterranean Pact.[10] President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson both rejected this idea, but stressed that US interest in Turkey had not diminished.[11] Turkey and Greece were initially snubbed but then invited to join the Council of Europe in 1949. By early 1950, the USA was far too preoccupied with events in the Far East to make any direct assurances to Turkey. Similarly, the UK was more interested in Suez as a strategic base than in the position of Turkey.[12] Its overtures to the USA were unsuccessful in turn, this time for collaboration on Middle East defence. The British concern for Middle East influence would soon find its way into Turkey's NATO accession talks. This was the situation on the eve of the DP's election.

The DP's Political Ascendancy

Although they were the first opposition party to come to power, and in the first free and fair elections to be held in Turkey, the DP decade ended in a coup that led to the closure of the party in 1960, followed by the execution of Adnan Menderes, his Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan in 1961. Yet the DP's devastating demise was unforeseeable in 1950, as its government had won a sweeping majority, and moved quickly to purge, co-opt or muzzle its potential and genuine opposition. Menderes was both Prime

[9] *New York Herald Tribune*, 1.4.47, cited in Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, Yenişehir, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1969, p. 249.

[10] Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman, 'Bölüm III, Ikinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası (1945–1965): Genel Durum', in Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, Vol. I (1919–1973)*, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1987, p. 224.

[11] Gönlübol and Ülman, 'Bölüm III', p. 225.

[12] See Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945–1952: The First Enlargement of NATO*, London: Frank Cass, 1999, pp. 149–59.

Minister and elected DP leader, and Bayar became Turkey's first civilian president. Meanwhile, of the other two members of the founding four, Fuat Köprülü immediately became Foreign Minister, remaining in that post until 1955, and becoming Deputy Prime Minister into 1956 before quitting the DP, while Refik Koraltan became Speaker of the House and remained so until 1960. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was a diplomat who served first as Turkey's ambassador to NATO (1952–4), then as Deputy Prime Minister (1954–5), and Foreign Minister replacing Köprülü (1957–60). This relatively enduring positioning of senior DP figures in top political posts enabled the party elite to take the reins of foreign policymaking in particular, and to be assured of support in the rest of the executive, parliament and the judiciary. Before analysing their policy behaviour, it is important to establish the institutional setting in which the DP operated then, and how it managed to assure it position vis-à-vis contenders for political and social influence.

A crucial source of potential subversion was the military, yet this was mostly tamed by the DP from the outset. The Democrats made a clandestine pact in early 1950 with junior officers who were disgruntled with the RPP's control over the army, and wished for its modernisation with American help.[13] In June 1950, within months of their accession to power, the Democrat leadership removed all senior commanders and several generals: the effect was, in William Hale's words, 'to continue the Ataturk tradition that the army should be loyal to the civilian regime'.[14] Laws from 1946 to 1950 meant military men could not stand for office, and in 1949 further legislation made the Chief of Staff accountable to the Defence Minister and appointed by the Prime Minister. Menderes would subsequently base promotions on DP loyalty, and this ensured for some years the appearance of a cooperative military, which did not pose an obstacle to DP foreign policy. Dekmejian has characterised this as 'civilian control and military partnership'. Indeed it was middle ranking officers, disgruntled with the patronage system that the DP had built up in the army, who then plotted the coup of 1960. In 1957, they were nearly exposed, and some of them arrested, in what became known as the Nine Officers

[13] Hakan Yılmaz, 'Democratization from above in Response to the International Context: Turkey, 1945–1950', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 17, 1997, p. 11.

[14] William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 93.

Incident: thereafter, however, they conspired more cautiously.[15] They are often said to have taken inspiration from the Free Officers movement, though they may also have made comparisons with their counterparts in the NATO armies, which were less hierarchical and enjoyed more advanced resources.[16] Nevertheless, for the most part, increased government expenditure on weapons and training, particularly after NATO accession, secured support in the army.

The government's main political rivals, in the RPP, were kept in check by the Democrats' own popularity, on the one hand, and by their increasingly repressive and paranoid legislative measures, on the other. The Democrats' large majorities were sustained throughout the decade: 53 per cent in 1950, 58 per cent in 1954 and 48 per cent in 1957. They were virtually unassailable amidst this swell of support among the middle peasantry, the rural urban migrants of the new urban quarters, the religiously conservative, and rising business elites. This was initially underpinned by the economic growth and political liberalisations that followed the DP's election, and seemed to meet their electoral pledges. Thereafter, Menderes oversaw the imposition of severe restrictions on the RPP, confiscating its assets in 1954 and investigating it continually, banning the Nation Party in 1953, legislating to restrict parliamentary opposition and press freedoms in 1957, and using police to rein in any dissidence.[17] He had already seen through restrictive electoral reforms that enfeebled the opposition and made moves towards coalition building extremely difficult.[18]

Meanwhile, Menderes intensified the centralisation and personalisation of his political power, over both his own party and the Turkish population. A system of patronage, through appointments by loyalty, brought the party's policy development forum, the General Administrative Council, and the DP's Parliamentary Group under his control. The DP Group members had expressed strong criticism of his conduct in September 1955, after he had clandestinely organised protests in Istanbul in order to bolster his negotiating position over

[15] Ibid., pp. 100–2. [16] Ibid., pp. 98–9.

[17] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975*, London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977, pp. 76–98; Clement H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 26–8.

[18] Kemal Karpat, 'The Turkish Elections of 1957', *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2, June 1961, p. 438.

Cyprus. These had escalated, out of control, into intense anti-Greek violence, and an international scandal for Turkey.[19] Menderes survived this, as he did the Nine Officers' threat, however, through waves of coercion and consent. This hold that senior DP figures exercised over power makes the Turkish case comparable, despite formal structural differences, with the single-party system presided over by Nasser in Egypt, and means that a focus on the nationalist commitments of those figures can provide valuable insights as to their foreign policy decisions.

Joining the Korean War: Freedom as Sovereignty

As soon as the Democrats came to office in July 1950, they placed an immediate emphasis on political, economic and religious freedoms. As new President Celâl Bayar declared: 'today our nation … has begun working hand in hand with the government for a system that protects rights, that offers freedom of conscience, and economic and social development'.[20] This was phrased as a process of rebuilding: 'Now, in every field, the time has come for the reconfiguration of the general legal system, in line with freedom, specifically individual freedom, at the heart of democracy.'[21] The reinterpretation of the Kemalist principle of populism and its relationship to nationalism – which had been performed throughout the DP's electoral campaigns – saw the articulation of freedom, rather than state service, with populism and that in turn with nationalism. This was now to be concretised in government.

The DP soon made clear that the international corollary of this principle of freedom at home was the campaign to attain such freedom in the international field. Its leaders immediately embarked on an assertive foreign policy aimed at attaining NATO membership. Turkish sovereignty was to be embedded within the indivisible Western community of sovereign states. In the first government

[19] Sabri Sayari, 'Adnan Menderes: Between Democratic and Authoritarian Populism', in Metin Heper and Sayari eds., *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002, pp. 75–7.

[20] 'The Text of President Celâl Bayar's Speech on the Occasion of the Grand National Assembly's Entry into the New Working Year', 1.8.50, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 201, August 1950, p. 22.

[21] Ibid.

programme of 1950, Bayar continued: 'We believe that our open and sincere policy . . . is an important factor for the democratic front and for world peace.'[22] He then emphasised Turkey's gratitude to its 'great friend' the United States for supporting Turkey's peaceful policy through the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid.[23]

The DP pursued US assurances by switching from the RPP government's calmer diplomatic style, to more high-risk initiatives that made louder statements.[24] These included voluntary acts of commitment to NATO-approved ventures, such as the DP's historic decision to send troops to Korea in July 1950. The outbreak of war provided the Democrats with an opportunity to prove their use and commitment to the NATO allies. Turkey's ambassador to Washington, Feridun Cemal Erkin, was first consulted by President Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes just two days after war broke out in June,[25] and one month before the secret meeting in which the decision was made to send troops to Korea. Announced on 25 July, the move caused a storm amongst the opposition, which had not been consulted.[26] In a statement to the press, Menderes rationalised the move as 'not a decision [to go to] war, but rather an effort to protect peace', and attacked the RPP for turning national interests into party politics, which he said the Democrats had never done in opposition.[27] Speaking months later in Erzurum, Menderes warned his audience of the Soviet threat, which had placed 'the country's security and international prestige ... at stake'.[28] Democrat Party members reminded the opposition that 'today's leadership is bringing into place an international agreement which yesterday's leadership signed. For in foreign policy, full unity is a consistently confirmed

[22] Ibid. [23] Ibid.

[24] BNA: FO371/101848, *Annual Report on Turkey, 1951*, BE, Ankara to FO, 2.1.52.

[25] Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl: Vaşington Büyükelçiliği*, Vol. II, Part 1, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1986, pp. 152–4.

[26] See Nihat Erim, 'The Government's Most Recent Decision', *Ulus*, 27.7.50, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 200, July 1950, pp. 106–8; 'Implications of a Mistaken Decision', *Yeni Sabah*, 28.7.50, in ibid., pp. 109–10; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 39, fn 23.

[27] Menderes' statement to the press on the Korea issue, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 200, pp. 69–74.

[28] TRA: Report: 'The President and Prime Minister in Erzurum, 3.10.50', p. 4. By the end of July, and formally in December, the opposition had withdrawn their complaints and supported the war effort.

Figure 4.1 'Turkish soldiers brave the cold weather in Korea', 1950. Source: Defense Photo Magazine, Republic of Korea, 2010.

reality.'[29] Yet the commitment of 4,500 troops to Korea constituted the first military operation in the history of the republic to occur beyond the borders fixed in the 1920 National Pact. It illustrated the lengths to which the new government was prepared to go to prove its commitment to the Western bloc, and to assert Turkey's place within it (see Figure 4.1).

Another tactic was to take the initiative to strengthen ties with NATO allies, for example in the DP's conclusion of Turkey's first trade agreement with Israel in July 1950. Indeed, one of the earliest signs of Turkey's attempts to satisfy the NATO allies was its recognition of Israel in March 1949.[30] This was a deviation from its earlier position against partition in Palestine, which had been received with gratitude by the Arab states.[31] The latter decision was mostly taken in response to rumours of the new state's Soviet leanings, however, and

[29] Faik Fenik, 'All the Best to our Soldiers on the Way to Korea', *Zafer*, 27.7.50, *Aym Tarihi*, No. 200, July 1950, p. 108.

[30] TRA: 76–1038/30.18.1.2/118.108.3: Presidential Decree 8942, Office of the Prime Minister, 24.3.49.

[31] TRA: 438A48/30.10.0.0/266.793.49: Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak to the Office of the Prime Minister, 'On Telegraphs Received on Occasion of Our Vote against the Partition of Palestine', 8.12.47.

when Israel's favour among NATO powers became clear, Turkey lost little time in changing sides.[32] Within a year, President Inönü had authorised senior economic affairs diplomat Fatin Rüştü Zorlu to begin trade talks with Israel,[33] and the agreement was duly finalised under Bayar's presidency within a matter of months.[34]

The Democrats also kept up a strong publicity effort on the advantages of Turkish accession, while employing a private form of pressure which stressed the disadvantages of Turkey's exclusion. Turkey's press monitoring agencies had been aware of the American administration's preoccupations with the Korean crisis.[35] During August, Turkish leaders had also been concerned at the unfavourable position of NATO's western European members.[36] Therefore, when the Democrats reapplied to NATO in early August, Foreign Minister Köprülü issued an accompanying statement, published in the *New York Times*, containing a clear message to the USA. Köprülü cautioned that the Turkish public regarded NATO membership as an 'acid test' of US interest in Turkey and that Turkey's inclusion was 'essential to close a breach' in the Allies' defence system.[37] Köprülü encouraged the world's democracies 'to wake up from their slumber' and band together against the 'communist flood', of which Turkey was painfully aware.[38] In a meeting with Dean Acheson on 25 August, Ambassador Erkin underlined the incongruity of Turkey's position inside only two of the three interdependent systems constructed to contain communism in Europe: the Marshall Plan, the Council of Europe and NATO.[39] Meanwhile, Turkey's newspapers across the party divide echoed the

[32] Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, p. 37.
[33] TRA: 70–61/30.18.1.2/122.23.14: Presidential Decree 10855, Office of the Prime Minister, 10.3.50.
[34] TRA: 172A25/30.10.0.0/163.142.4: Minister of Economy and Trade, Circular 378, 'On Trade Agreement and Modus Vivendi between the States of Turkey and Israel', 12.7.50.
[35] TRA: F11/30.1.0.0/102.630.6: Report, Turkey's Press and Publishing General Office to Presidency, on American press, 28.7.50.
[36] TRA: 422329/30.10.0.0/235.590.40: Report, London Press Attaché to Presidency's Press and Publishing General Office, 22.8.50.
[37] Farnsworth Fowle, 'Turks Call Entry in Pact Acid Test: US Interest to be Gauged by Atlantic Decision, says Foreign Minister', *New York Times*, 1.8.50, p. 11.
[38] Abidin Daver, 'Democracies, Wake up from your Slumber', *Cumhuriyet*, 21.8.50, p. 1.
[39] Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, p. 158.

government's line: Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, editor of the Republican party mouthpiece *Ulus*, spoke of Turkey and the NATO nations' 'shared destinies',[40] while in government newspaper *Zafer*, DP deputy Mümtaz Faik Fenik affirmed every Turk's readiness to resist Soviet aggression to the last: 'hence, Turkey's acceptance into the Atlantic Pact will not be an act of charity, but will enhance our nation's security on the one hand, and strengthen the Pact, thanks to the Turks, on the other'.[41] When the NATO Council's second refusal of Turkey's application came in September 1950, writers across the Turkish press uniformly expressed their profound disappointment.[42]

Confronting the Dilemma: the Middle East Command and the Turkish Difference

The Democrats were now confronting the first instance of the dilemma between sovereignty and development: they could not secure national sovereignty in their preferred way, through NATO, because of external players' claims about Turkish underdevelopment. These were made through euphemistic references to Turkey's geography 'outside Europe' and 'beyond the Atlantic', most vocally by smaller NATO member states such as Norway, Holland, Belgium and Denmark.[43]

More troubling still for Turkey's leaders was America's reluctance: in his August meeting with Acheson, Ambassador Erkin detected a 'softening' of the atmosphere, but also an attempt to dissuade Turkey, by implying that existing ties with the USA, Britain and France were more consequential than entry into an overstretched NATO.[44] Turkish leaders were forced to accept the State Department's concession in September 1950 that Turkey and Greece

[40] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, 'Turkey in the Atlantic Pact', *Ulus*, 9.8.50, p. 1.
[41] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, 'Turkish Power and the Ideal of Peace', *Zafer*, 7.8.50, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 201, August 1950, pp. 131–2; see also Fenik, 'The Atlantic Pact will be Stronger with the Turkish Army', *Zafer*, 12.9.50, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 202, September 1950, pp. 28–9.
[42] Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, p. 192; see Selim Ragıp Emeç, 'The Atlantic Pact Story Again', *Son Posta*, 22.9.50, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 202, September 1950, pp. 31–2; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, 'The Atlantic Pact and Türkiye', *Ulus*, 17.9.50, p. 1; Nihat Erim, 'Turkey's Security', *Ulus*, 7.10.50, p. 1.
[43] Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, p. 157; see Fenik, 'Turkish Power', and Ömer Sami Coşar, 'Turkey and the Atlantic Pact', *Cumhuriyet*, 3.8.50, p. 3.
[44] Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, p. 159.

be included in the military planning of NATO's Mediterranean section.[45] They had further cause for alarm when Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, published an article discouraging US involvement in 'local wars' in places understood to include Turkey.[46] Even as some reported the misinterpretation of Bradley's text, they still expressed their insecurity, and their desire to be brought into US and European discussions of Mediterranean defence.[47]

Turkey faced the added complication of Britain's divergent and unwelcome plans for a Middle East Command (MEC) in 1951. Turkey's dilemma resurfaced as it found itself further demoted from the branch of Western alliance it preferred, and having to submit to consideration as a less developed, *Middle Eastern* state. A survey of both government and opposition press reflects a deep dissatisfaction with Britain's proposals, as well as an emphasis on Turkey as separate from the Middle East.[48] Ahmet Emin Yalman wrote in *Vatan*, for example: 'In return for being accepted among those charged with the defence of the Free World, we do not need to pay a toll too. We just cannot view the toll of supporting Britain's incorrect and self-destructive Middle East policy as valid.'[49]

In responding to this dilemma, the Democrats persisted with their goal of NATO membership, in pursuit of Turkish freedom-as-sovereignty. They demonstrated the greatest flexibility when it came to the proposals of the strongest power, the United States. As a final tactic then, the Democrats played off the Americans against the British, as fortuitous developments for Turkey brought the US and Turkish positions closer. Firstly, after the Soviet–Yugoslav split, the US military began to favour the idea of an anti-Soviet alliance between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.[50] Secondly, with Soviet advances in nuclear

[45] Ibid., p. 173. The British reluctantly acceded to this, a further blow to their hopes to draw the USA into plans for Middle East defence via Turkey.

[46] See 'America Leaves Turkey outside its own Security Borders', *Ulus*, 7.11.50, p. 1; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, 'After Seeing General Bradley's Study', *Ulus*, 9.11.50, p. 1; Abidin Daver, 'General Omar Bradley is Mistaken!', *Cumhuriyet*, 8.11.50, p. 1; Ali Naci Karacan, 'Bradley's Ideas', *Milliyet*, 9.11.50, p. 1.

[47] Fenik, 'General Bradley's Latest Statement', *Zafer*, 16.11.50, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 204, November 1950, pp. 106–7.

[48] See Aptülahat Akşin, *Türkiye'nin 1945'den Sonraki Dış Politika Gelişmeleri – Orta-Doğu Meseleri*, Istanbul: Akgün, 1959, pp. 38–40.

[49] *Vatan*, 3.8.51, cited in ibid., p. 39.

[50] Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, pp. 211–2; Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests*, p. 196.

technology during 1951, US air force officials in particular favoured Turkey's inclusion in NATO as a provider of US airbases.[51] Turkey's decision-makers reacted shrewdly to these trends in American circles.

At this juncture, Ambassador Erkin describes his conscious change of lobbying strategy, from the State Department to Congress, as well as mobilising journalists in high-profile publications.[52] He liaised particularly closely with Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter, who was a personal friend of President Truman's and a staunch advocate of Turkish accession to NATO. Together with such confidants, Erkin made a plan: 'When any foreign affairs issue is discussed in Congress, and particularly the Senate . . . one of our Senator friends will bring up Turkey's situation.'[53] This generated results in time, including writings in major newspapers which Erkin had discussed in advance with the authors, as well as a positive speech on Turkish accession by Senator and friend Harry Cain, delivered to warm reception by both US parties on 21 March.[54] An American diplomat soon reported to Erkin that as a result of the questions posed in the Senate, as well as articles published in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* by such well-known writers as James Reston and Joseph Alsop, 'thousands of telegraphs and telephone requests for Turkey's acceptance in the Pact were being sent to Congress and the White House'.[55]

Meanwhile, in Turkey, in February 1951, the Commander of British Forces in the Middle East, General Brian Robertson, had paid an official visit, and proposed an Anglo-Turkish alliance in the Middle East, instead of the NATO Mediterranean command. This was rebuffed, however, as attention shifted to the Istanbul conference of American Middle East ambassadors that same month.[56] Pending progress on Turkey's role in NATO military planning, Turkish officials were emboldened by US Ambassador McGhee's emphatic messages to Washington on Turkey's centrality to Middle East defence, which warned that Turkey might resume its earlier neutrality, or even 'defect' otherwise.[57] The Turkish press was filled with anticipation and appeals

[51] Gönlübol and Ülman, 'Bölüm III', p. 230; Çağrı Erhan, '1945–1960: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc – Relations with the USA and NATO', in Baskın Oran ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010, p. 327.
[52] Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, p. 193. [53] Ibid., p. 194. [54] Ibid., pp. 212–3.
[55] Ibid., pp. 216–7. [56] Ibid., p. 215.
[57] See George McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy*, New York: Harper and Row, 1983, pp. 266, 268–70.

to the American guests, underlining both Turkey's need for a concrete commitment and its pivotal role in Middle East defence.[58] These were answered at the Istanbul meeting, which recommended that the USA should urgently make mutual defence arrangements with Greece and Turkey, with NATO accession as the preferred method.[59]

Turkey would have to confront further British diversions, however. Firstly, Britain proposed that Turkey (and Greece) not be given full-member status in the alliance.[60] Turkish negotiators successfully resisted this with US support. By July, Britain was proposing that Turkey enter NATO but come under a separate Mediterranean or Middle East Command, to be led by a British general, aimed at finally securing the Egyptian base.[61] Turkey had to accept, in order to neutralise Britain's objections. At its Ottawa meeting of September 1951, the NATO Ministerial Council decided to invite Greece and Turkey to join the alliance. This news was hailed as a great victory across the Turkish press. *Zafer* declared: 'the Turkish bloodshed in Korea has not been wasted. There was an honourable share of the blood of our Korean heroes in the signatories' ink used at Ottawa for the acceptance of Turkey into the Atlantic Pact.'[62] Across the political divide, *Ulus* echoed: 'This Pact is not only a military agreement … We are once again connecting to the principles of democracy, as understood and applied by Europe.'[63]

The Democrats' final hurdle would come at the high-level talks held in Ankara to discuss the MEC, to which they had agreed on condition that their outcome not precede Turkey's formal admission to NATO. At the October talks, Menderes came under joint pressure to adhere to the MEC, rather than (Eisenhower's) Western European Command.[64] This was condemned across the political spectrum: Republican and

[58] Ahmet Emin Yalman, 'Our Cooperation with America', *Vatan*, 16.2.51, in *Aym Tarihi*, No. 207, February 1951, pp. 298–9; Asım Us, 'Our Expectations from the Istanbul Conference', *Vakit*, 16.2.51, in ibid., pp. 299–300; Necmettin Sadak, 'Suddenly the Issue of the Security of Turkey and the Middle East Comes to the Fore', *Akşam*, 24.2.51, in ibid., pp. 300–1.

[59] FRUS: 1951, Near East and Africa, Vol. V: Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference of the Middle East Chiefs of Mission, Istanbul, 14–21.2.51, pp. 54–5.

[60] Erkin, *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, pp. 230–2. [61] Ibid., pp. 231–2, 245–6, 247.

[62] *Zafer*, 21.9.51, p. 1.

[63] Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, 'We are Entering the Atlantic Pact', *Ulus*, 23.9.51, in *Aym Tarihi*, No. 214, September 1951, pp. 130.

[64] BNA: FO371/96552, WU11923/314, *Correspondence*, BE, Ankara to FO, 2.10.51.

former Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak wrote: 'All states that joined the Atlantic Pact entered a treaty in Europe. Turkey is to enter a treaty in Europe *and* the Middle East! Why this exception of excess, I wonder! . . . Turkey, considered another region alone (how strange!), cannot accept remaining outside the borders of the Eisenhower Command.'[65] This 'relegation' to the Middle Eastern theatre was framed by the US, UK and French spokesmen in terms of Turkey's ability to work through NATO's Defence and Economic Committees. Moreover, the US commitment went much further than that of its allies, and was reassuring. General Bradley pledged: 'no matter what agreement is reached in NATO and which regional command Turkey falls under . . . the US will continue to donate equipment to Turkey directly and will keep a mission in Turkey'.[66] The Turks held their ground once again, and Britain was largely overruled. In the end, the delegates decided that the Turkish and Greek land forces would come under the responsibility of NATO's Allied Land Forces' Southern Europe Command, while their navies would come under a new Middle East Command.[67] Turkey and Greece were formally admitted to NATO on 18 February 1952.

DP politicians' speeches and the pro-government press in this period betrayed the persistence of Ottoman legacies of inferiority vis-à-vis the West, and seemed to protest too much in affirming their status as peers. It was with the following words, for example, amidst rapturous applause, that Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü celebrated Turkey's accession to NATO at the DP's third Grand Congress in October 1951:

> The Atlantic Pact . . . is not just a military and political community, it is a community of civilisation, a community of culture, a community of democratic nations.
>
> Today you see that Turkey is viewed by European and American politicians and major newspapers as a great power, as a state that defends the foundations of civilization, that protects the rights and honour of humanity in this civilised world. We are proud of this.[68]

[65] Necemettin Sadak, 'Turkey Can Now Enter the Atlantic Pact Equally and Unconditionally', *Akşam*, 10.10.51, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 215, October 1951, pp. 109–10.
[66] TRA: E4/30.1.0.0/60.373.8: 14.10.51, p. 2.
[67] Erhan, 'Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', p. 327.
[68] Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü's statement on NATO accession at Democrat Party's Third Party Congress, 19.10.51, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 216, October 1951, p. 60.

This was the DP's first congress while in government, but its leaders then repeatedly underlined the 'Free World' democracies' recognition of Turkey at last as an *equal*.[69] In February 1952, DP deputy and writer Nadir Nadi echoed: 'with our accession to the Pact comes a great truth: the official approval of our Turkey as part of the community of Western civilisation'.[70]

The Turks maintained their positions at the October conference by forging linkages between their international policy and their prospective regional role. First, Menderes stressed Turkey's unique geostrategic importance as a state equally capable of protecting the Middle East as well as the 'right side of the Atlantic pact' and the Balkans. This was to rationalise Turkey's request for an increase of up to thirty-five regiments, and its complaints about the meagre 1.1 per cent share it was receiving in Marshall Aid. Turkey had sent a memorandum in advance which Menderes discussed as follows: 'we do not wish to make this a matter of bargaining ... Having said this, there are things that show us that we are not exaggerating our demands. We know that equipping the Turkish army means arming the whole Atlantic community.'[71]

This argument was also used to impose the Turks' preferred order for their priorities in NATO, expressed in this simple phrase: 'As a member of NATO, we will work towards the establishment of a Middle East Command with great determination ... '[72] Menderes stressed that it was a strong Turkey that was a prerequisite for Middle Eastern defence, and not the MEC itself: 'Imagine for a moment if Turkey were not there, what would happen? We must assume that all these [Arab] countries would have gone to the other side of the Iron Curtain ... But if the forces [I have mentioned] were present in Turkey today ... the whole area around our country would be secure.'[73] Speaking before parliament in December 1951, Foreign Minister Köprülü made a clear distinction between Turkish accession to NATO and the MEC:

[69] Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 44, citing *Zafer*, 22.9.51. See also George McGhee, 'Turkey Joins the West', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 4, July 1954, p. 617.

[70] Nadir Nadi, 'The Meaning of the Decision', *Cumhuriyet*, 19.2.52, p. 1; see also Fenik, 'The Great Achievement of the Menderes Government', *Zafer*, 19.2.52 in ibid., pp. 188–9.

[71] TRA: E4/30.1.0.0/60.373.8: 14.10.51, p. 6.

[72] TRA: E4/30.1.0.0/60.373.8: 14.10.51, p. 6.

[73] Ibid., p. 7.

These two issues are completely separate from each other. On the one hand, there is the Atlantic Pact, a defence organisation, which has been established in line with treaty principles. On the other, there is the Middle East Command, an idea, a concept, whose treaty basis has not been laid out. We will first accede to the Atlantic Pact and then deal with the business of the MEC, together with America, Britain and France . . . [74]

Koprülü repeated this message in early 1952, emphasising the different place Turkey would occupy in each organisation, and its equal rights with the other members of each.[75]

The discursive affirmations of Turkish national belonging within the West, and its firm differentiation from the Arab Middle East, were evident throughout this foreign policy process. Menderes' presentation of Turkey's role at the Ankara conference highlighted the role of national identity and its Others in his own perceptions. The MEC seemed to be stealing away not only Turkey's American-assured security, but also the prize of integration into the club of 'civilised nations'. Thus Menderes began his speech by responding to the British and Scandinavian countries' disparagement of Turkey's economic and democratic credentials, and their description of Turkey as 'outside European civilisation'.[76] He pointed out that the conditions of poverty in parts of Turkey were due to the necessarily high defence budgets of a country in Turkey's geostrategic position.

Secondly to distinguish Turkey more clearly from the Middle East context, persistent Ottoman Orientalist tropes were operationalised within an ostensibly novel context, that of Cold War security calculations. Menderes indulged in such Orientalism when contrasting Turkey with its Arab neighbours.[77] After extolling the honour and self-sacrificial ethic of Turkey's 'fighter nation', Menderes added, 'When it comes to the Arab countries, they are divided into many states without . . . unity between them. Even if all these states were able to come together, the force they would generate would not be more than

[74] Koprülü, Speech in Grand National Assembly, 19.12.51, cited in Akşin, *Türkiye'nin 1945'den Sonraki,* p. 41. See also BNA: FO371/101853: BE, Ankara, to FO, No. 299, 27.12.51.

[75] Koprülü, Speech in Grand National Assembly, 7.1.52, in Akşin, Türkiye'nin 1945'den Sonraki, pp. 43–4.

[76] Gönlübol and Ülman, 'Bölüm III', p. 230.

[77] See extended citations of Foreign Minister Köprülü's views on Arabs in Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, Ankara: METU Press, 2001, p. 44.

two or three regiments.'[78] Once again, Menderes emphasised Turkey's place in the Western camp: 'Turkey will perform whatever duties it must for the realisation of democratic ideals and the protection of [our] common civilisation.'[79] In an interview one month later, Menderes' language distanced Turkey even further from the Middle East, describing it as 'an area in which Turkey is obviously interested'.[80] Menderes went on to reiterate his commitment to Middle East defence but framed this firmly within the context of Turkey's front role in NATO:

> To mix the defense of the Middle East with the Atlantic Pact organization and to shift Turkey toward the East would mean that Turkey would be considered differently from the other members of the Pact. If Turkey is admitted to the Pact she must have the same rights, the same obligations, as any other member.[81]

After Korea: Faith in Turkey, Against the Left

While populism was refashioned as individual freedom, which in turn was articulated through NATO affiliation with national sovereignty, another important dimension of the DP's national vision was a liberal reinterpretation of the Kemalist principle of secularism (*laiklik*). This was certainly linked with its electorally motivated populism; however, it also functioned as a powerfully legitimising Islamic component to the international crusade against communism that the Democrats wished to join. Their revisionism involved the rehabilitation of the religious and related cultural aspects of Turkish identity, and the immediate implementation of policies to relax the strictly regulated system instated by the RPP. An analysis of these ostensibly domestic changes is enhanced by an appreciation of their utility in stigmatising those on the Left who criticised the Korean War, and the DP's abundant enthusiasm for the American model. They were smeared gravely as both unpatriotic and unbelievers.

Menderes' first public policy change in government was to lift the ban on making the call to prayer, the *ezan*, in Arabic. He emphasised that the ban 'amounted to a fanaticism against freedom of

[78] TRA: E4/30.1.0.0/60.373.8: 14.10.51, p. 7.
[79] TRA: E4/30.1.0.0/60.373.8: 14.10.51, p. 3.
[80] TRA: S3/30.1.0.0/132.855.5: Draft Text of Interview with Menderes by Howard Flieger of *US News and World Report*, 5.11.51, p. 5.
[81] Ibid.

conscience'.[82] The bill passed on 16 June 1950: Menderes had pushed it through even against Bayar's wishes, threatening to resign in the process.[83] In parliamentary debates on the bill, several DP members made a distinction between those of Atatürk's reforms which were 'eternal' and those which were 'temporary'.[84] This echoed the DP's first government programme of May 1950, in which Menderes spoke of those particular Kemalist reforms that had been 'internalised by the people'.[85] Within the DP's framework of popularly bestowed legitimacy, this implied that those reforms which had not been internalised could be reversed. Arabic was now described by the Undersecretary of Religious Affairs as 'the original language of the *ezan*'.[86] In July 1950, the DP began allowing Quran broadcasts, as well as religious programmes, on state radio and increased the budget share of the Directorate of Religious Affairs.[87]

A related policy change came in March 1952, when Fuat Köprülü and 204 DP deputies brought a bill to parliament proposing that the Constitution be rewritten in Turkey's 'living language', namely one free of the neologisms of the early republican language reforms. The final law of December 1952 reinstated the 1923 Ottoman-Turkish text, as well as ministry names, restoring further prestige to Arabic – long associated with the Islamic religion in Turkey – in public life.[88]

Menderes also paid attention to religious life through education. The DP's first government programme had stressed the 'national and

[82] Menderes cited in *Zafer*, 5.6.50; Şerif Demir, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Adnan Menderes*, Istanbul: Paraf, 2010, p. 420.

[83] 'The Ban on Arabic Ezan Recital is Lifted', *Ulus*, 17.6.50, p. 1; Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çaplı, *Demirkırat*, Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991, pp. 58–60; on Bayar's reactions, see Demir, *Adnan Menderes*, p. 420, fn 1249.

[84] See Esma Torun, 'II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türkiye'de Kültürel Değişimlere Yol Açan İç ve Dış Etkenler (1945–1960)', unpublished PhD thesis, Ankara University, 2002, p. 253.

[85] First Menderes Government Programme: I. Arar, *Hükümet Programları: 1920–1965*, Istanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968, p. 225.

[86] TRA: 51.0.0.0/4.31.12: Statement, Undersecretary of Religious Affairs, for distribution to Turkey's Muftis, No. 6715, 23.6.50.

[87] 'The Quran will be Recited on the Radio', *Milliyet*, 16.8.50, p. 5; Binnaz Toprak, 'The Religious Right', in Irvin Cemal Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak eds., *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 226; Demir, *Adnan Menderes*, pp. 424–5.

[88] See Torun, 'II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası', pp. 280–3; Ercan Yılmaz, 'Demokrat Parti Döneminde Milliyetçilik', unpublished Masters thesis, Marmara University, 2008, p. 49.

ethical' dimensions of education, and the second reiterated that Turkey's youth should be 'educated with the spiritual and human values of the national character and of their forefathers'.[89] The main figure propelling reforms was National Education Minister Tevfik Ileri, who in July commissioned the Director of Religious Affairs, Ahmet Hamdi Aksek, to prepare a report on 'Religious Education'. That October, Aksek noted the need for religious education in schools, and better training for preachers, to combat the spread of 'invalid doctrines and tarikats' in Turkey.[90] The rationale here conformed to the framework of state-sponsored religion institutionalised by Atatürk in the Directorate itself. The content of the suggestions, however, represented a significant shift from the policies of the early republican period. By October, religious education had entered the curricula of all primary schools.[91] According to Menderes, 'everyone will have the religious education that they want ... this is how we understand freedom of conscience and laicism'.[92] In May 1951, the DP group began discussing the upgrading of Imam-Hatip ('Imam-Preacher') courses into schools, and the first seven of these opened in 1952.[93] A subsequent British report on internal affairs in Turkey observed: 'The most striking evidence of the liberal policy of the government has been the revival of religious observance ... New mosques were built, old shrines repaired, and places of pilgrimage openly frequented.'[94]

The speed with which the government began relaxing the secular regime in Turkey was matched by the speed with which it clamped down on 'local communists' – two closely related developments. In August 1950, Aksek declared: 'Islam rejects communism absolutely ... Faith and the spirit are the most powerful weapons against communism.'[95] The DP's McCarthy-like wave of 'anticommunism' was the fourth pillar of its nation making project, and accorded in the first instance with the Democrats' pursuit of the USA in foreign

[89] Arar, *Hükümet Programları,* pp. 221, 241.
[90] Yılmaz, 'Demokrat Parti Döneminde Milliyetçilik', p. 70.
[91] Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, p. 371; Demir, *Adnan Menderes*, p. 426.
[92] Menderes cited in *Zafer*, 23.5.52, p. 1.
[93] Demir, *Adnan Menderes*, p. 427; Howard Reed, 'Turkey's New Imam-Hatip Schools', *Die Welt des Islams*, new series, Vol. 4, Nos. 2/3, 1955.
[94] BNA: FO371/107547, WK1011/1, BE, Ankara to Foreign Office, 9.1.53.
[95] Ahmed Hamdi Aksek, press conference, *Cumhuriyet*, 28.8.50; cited in Ahmad, 'Turkish Experiment', p. 366.

policy. Certainly, it would serve as a veil for censorship, but the Democrats' statements were also connecting the Others of the Turkish nation at home and abroad.[96] Menderes repeatedly described Turkish communists as 'spies or instruments of our enemies, who eye our freedom with bad intent'.[97] Minister Ileri, whose links with right-wing nationalist groups would later bring him into disrepute, placed the 'struggle against communism' at the top of his agenda for the Education Ministry.[98] In October, DP deputy Faik Fenik wrote on the 'technique of the war on communism', as well as on the crooked methods of communist agents provocateurs, whose ideology had become 'simply a means to ensure red Russia's colonialism and world domination'.[99] By November, the penal code was changed to include the death penalty as punishment for communism.[100]

Turkey's leftists, who had criticised the Korean War decision, became subject to a zero-sum game in which the government classified citizens as either at one with the nation or treasonable communists.[101] According to Eroğul, 'Inönü had sought to establish a multiparty democracy of limited scope, keeping it closed to the entire Left as well as illegitimate currents on the Right. The Democrats skewed this model to an extreme beyond Inönü's plans, as their enmity towards the Left reached hysterical proportions.'[102] For example, when the Turkish Peace Association was formed in July 1950 and distributed leaflets against the Korean War decision, it was closed down within days.[103] Menderes declared that the organisation had 'international roots', that the government was determined to fight communism, and that it

[96] Many RPP deputies raised their concerns as early as 1950 in discussions of the government's first programme. See Yılmaz, 'Demokrat Parti Döneminde Milliyetçilik', pp. 45–6.

[97] *Zafer*, 18.1.53. See First and Second Menderes Government Programmes, 1950 and 1951, in Arar, *Hükümet Programları,* pp. 255, 230.

[98] Cited in Yılmaz, 'Demokrat Parti Döneminde Milliyetçilik', p. 45.

[99] Fenik, 'The Technique of Fighting Communism', *Zafer*, 19.11.50, in *Aylın Tarihi*, No. 204, November 1950, pp. 107–9.

[100] 'Death Penalty for Communists', *Ulus*, 7.11.50, p. 1.

[101] TRA: A7/30.1.0.0/18.103.3: Letter to Bayar from Europe Committee, Union of Progressive Young Turks, 25.3.52; forwarded by Presidency's General Office, 1.4.52.

[102] Cem Eroğul, 'The Establishment of Multiparty Rule, 1945–71', in Schick and Tonak eds., *Turkey in Transition*, p. 109.

[103] Erhan, 'Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', p. 326. See also BNA: FO371/101852.

'would not accept freedom for anyone or any organisation out to obliterate freedoms' – a phrase repeated by the DP ever since its time in opposition.[104] Also closed down on anticommunist charges were seventeen magazines located in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, which published criticism of the decision.[105]

Meanwhile, the government closely monitored and directed state radio, which featured broadcasts such as *Korean Hour* and *Korean Report*, extolling the heroism of the Turkish army, as well as programmes allowing families and soldiers to speak on air.[106] The national narratives constructed at these moments invoked both Westernism and Turkish exceptionalism, as Turkey's soldiers stood apart from Europe in their willingness to fight.[107] Meanwhile, both government statements and their media reflections conveyed to the Turkish public the sense that the Korean War threatened Turkey's own borders. As Faik emphasised in Zafer:

> Our brave soldiers, while in combat in the realms of another continent, will know that they are fighting for the protection of our homeland's borders, and will use their weapons with that faith. We feel that [their] calls, 'Allah Allah', which will echo in the Korean mountains, are already protecting all our borders . . . For the Korean War is the world's war of life and death.[108]

In October 1951, news of Turkey's accession to NATO was accompanied by further arrests of communists. These involved 'no less than 184 members of the Socialist Party and the Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party', whose memoirs tell of brutal interrogations.[109] Several prominent leftist activists – from publishers Sabiha and Zekeriye Sertel, to renowned poet Nazım Hikmet – had already been forced to escape from Turkey. After Hikmet's escape in June 1951, the DP government revoked his citizenship, and even erstwhile supporter Ahmet Emin Yalman fell promptly in line:

[104] Menderes' Korea statement, *Aym Tarihi*, No. 200, July 1950, p. 73.
[105] Erhan, 'Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', p. 326.
[106] Nevra Ersan Gözübüyük, 'The Democrat Party and the State Radio (1956–1960)', Boğaziçi University, unpublished PhD thesis, 1999, p. 111.
[107] Fenik, 'Turkish Power', *Zafer*, 7.8.50; 'Europe's Defence', *Zafer*, 18.8.50, in *Aym Tarihi*, No. 201, August 1950.
[108] Fenik, *Zafer*, 27.7.50, p. 109.
[109] Saime Göksu and Edward Timms, *Romantic Communist: the Life and Work of Nazım Hikmet*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1999, p. 256.

Vatan now subjected Nazım to the full blast of Cold War rhetoric, denouncing him as a traitor and … morally dead … Nothing could reveal the polarized nature of Turkish politics more clearly than Yalman's evident need to eliminate all trace of his public-spirited action on behalf of political prisoners in the late 1940s for fear of being thought a fellow traveler himself.[110]

Meanwhile, the right-wing press 'began a campaign for reprisals against Nazım's associates'.[111]

A British report on 'Communism in Turkey' from 1951 noted: 'The fact that so little material is available on the subject is due at least in some measure to the effectiveness of Turkish methods in dealing with this problem.'[112] The Democrats had recently increased the specificity and severity of punishment of the relevant provisions in the Penal Code, including the death penalty for communist party leaders.[113] Of the three left-wing periodicals which existed in 1950, only one, *Noah's Ark*, survived by late 1951.[114] Thus the British ambassador could conclude:

deprived of their leaders, harried by the police and their informers, cut off from direct Soviet help and encouragement, and inhibited by a climate of public opinion increasingly hostile to anything bearing the taint of Moscow, the handful of active Turkish communists who remain at large have very little chance of making any progress with the organisation of an integrated Turkish Communist Party.[115]

Conclusion

With the communists so violently denounced as 'Others' of the Turkish nation and the 'Free World', the articulations and juxtapositions between the Democrats' national and foreign policies in the early fifties were not subtle. The conventional Kemalist anticommunism was amplified, bolstering an anti-Soviet foreign policy that in turn propelled a West-seeking project for national sovereignty. Meanwhile, in confronting the dilemma

110 Ibid., pp. 253–4.
111 Ibid., p. 254, citing *Hür Adam*, 31.7.51, and *Sebilürreşad*, 8.8.53.
112 BNA: FO371/95274, BE, Ankara to FO, 4.12.51.
113 Ibid.; 'Communists will be Punished with the Death Penalty', *Hürriyet*, 29.11.51.
114 BNA: FO371/95274, RK1018/3, BE, Ankara to FO, 26.6.51.
115 BNA: FO371/95274, BE, Ankara to FO, 4.12.51.

that the DP faced between pursuing sovereignty within NATO and lacking the resources for acceptance, they drew on an older tradition of Ottoman Orientalism that was now practised by Turkish nationalists. This was now repackaged for the purposes of distinguishing Turkey from the Arabs in Middle East defence constellations, and diminishing the value of an Arab alliance.

This is clarified by considering the counterfactual that Turkey might well have stayed neutral in the Cold War and remained protected. According to Ülman, 'Turkey would be dragged into war under the NATO commitments should there be a conventional war anywhere in Europe. On the other hand, should Turkey be attacked by the Soviets, she would receive help even without NATO membership because the United States could not allow Russia to conquer the Middle East.'[116] As reasonable as this view seems, it was not an option because the outlook of the Democrats prioritised more than simply the Soviet threat. Democrat leaders also desired identification with the West – and, as the next chapter elaborates, access to foreign assistance – hence their efforts to cement their US alliance as far as possible, and Turkey's subsequent will to 'stand and fall with the West'.[117]

This position reflected their revisionism of the statist and secularist tenets of early Kemalism, as well as their reinterpretation of westernisation through the lens of the Cold War and US ascendancy. This helped Turkey navigate its dilemma in turn. All the while, the Democrats were careful to move within the nationalist framework of Kemalist language and legitimacy, while emphasising their election victory as a popular mandate with which to modify this in practice. As DP deputy Faik wrote enthusiastically in 1950, 'Atatürk, you can now rest in peace … the youth to whom you entrusted the republic have completed your great legacy. The nation has … founded the rule of the people … '[118]

[116] Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: a Constructivist Approach*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 64.

[117] Metin Tamkoç, 'Turkey's Quest for Security through Defensive Alliances', *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı*, Ankara: Institute of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, University of Ankara, 1961, p. 34.

[118] Fenik, 'Eternal Legacy', *Zafer*, 10.10.50, in *Aym Tarihi*, No. 203, October 1950, pp. 104–5.

5 *Neutralism and Pan-Arabism in Egypt, 1952–4: Securing Sovereignty*

This is not an appeal we are making: it is a truth we are proclaiming . . . all countries that speak Arabic are our countries, and we must liberate our countries . . . the Muslims across the world are siblings, and siblings must cooperate in times of tragedy and hardship . . . every African is the brother and neighbour of every African, and every neighbour has the right to support from his neighbour, until he is self-sufficient, secure, and liberated . . .

We the East, confronting the greed of the West, are one nation!

These are the four pillars of our policy in this part of the world. We do not desire a tribalism of religion, nor one of race, nor one of land . . .

Instead we desire – we the Arabs, we Muslims, we the people of this East – to become one bloc, supporting the call for what is right, for good and peace, and resisting the ambitions of oppression, aggression and destruction.

Gamal Abdel Nasser[1]

While the Democrat Party were successfully negotiating Turkey's accession to the Atlantic Pact, Gamal Abdel Nasser had led the Free Officers organisation in the Egyptian army in planning to overthrow a regime very much under British control. In Turkey, the Democrats cast their conceptions of freedom and sovereignty in terms of union with the Western bloc; in Egypt, the Free Officers leadership articulated them with a very different, anticolonial bloc. Nasser pronounced this new direction for Egyptian foreign policy with the confident words above in January 1954, less than two years after leading the bloodless coup of July 1952. This text, with accompanying statements and Cairo

[1] Gamal Abdel Nasser, 'Shamal Afriqiya Biladuna', in Liberation Rally Culture and Publishing Council, *Shamal Afriqiya fi-l-Madi wa-l-Mustaqbal wa-l-Hadir*, Ikhtarna Lak series, Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1954.

Radio coverage of the new policy, has gone relatively unnoticed in the wider scholarship on Nasser's Egypt.

Certainly, formal adoption of positive neutralism as a foreign policy only occurred after Nasser's participation in the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. Neutralism's application in Egypt's relations with the superpowers has hence routinely been considered as a forerunner of the principle of non-alignment. Similarly, pan-Arabism under Nasser has often been portrayed as an instrumentalist foreign policy, which emerged in response to wrangles over Middle East defence in the mid-1950s, and not before.

Yet in Egypt, neutralism did not issue from a stance on the superpower struggle at first, and certainly not from one that was determined at the outset. Rather, it came out of the international enactment of the Free Officers' nationalist commitments to Egypt's sovereignty, and was initially directed at Britain's attempts to keep Egypt within its sphere of influence through 1952–4. This unfolded as the Command Council of the Revolution (CCR) launched policies aimed at transforming the social basis of the extant political order. It planned redistribution and industrialisation projects which required international assistance, or at the very least quiescence. The Free Officers also wished to encourage their Arab counterparts to pursue sociopolitical change towards similar ends, and it was therefore during these early years that Egypt proposed pan-Arabism as the preferred sphere of independent action for Egypt and the decolonising Arab states.

The Free Officers' Ruling Apparatus

Before analysing the Free Officers' policies, it is important to clarify how this organisation of multiple cells in an army made the transition to rule, and how that in turn impacted on the realisation of its collective ambition. The Free Officers 'Executive Committee', as they referred to themselves, were the nine most senior officers in the organisation, all trusted friends and some colleagues from the Staff College. Upon the success of the coup on 23 July, the Committee reconstituted itself as the CCR and began meeting secretly, deciding how to proceed. As Khalid Muhyi al-Din puts it, 'We were no longer officers, nor yet rulers.'[2]

[2] Khalid Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1992, p. 157.

Their first tasks involved a consolidation of their own ranks. Within days, they decided on the need to acknowledge the roles of other officers who had made decisive contributions on 23 July, inviting them to join the CCR.[3] Crucially, they needed a public figurehead, and therefore invited General Muhammad Nagib who had been willing to represent them in the Officers' Elections the year before: he became Commander in Chief. Accordingly, they chose to appoint a civilian Prime Minister, Ahmad Mahir, who was then ordered to deliver the king his abdication letter: Faruq duly signed, and departed on 26 July. They then had to appoint a Regency Council for the former king's son, Ahmad Fu'ad. Indeed the British and American ambassadors had issued a warning that British intervention would be necessary in case of bloodshed, which would in turn be assured if a Regency Council were not appointed. Under this pressure, the CCR moved forward amidst rival opinions within its core body: Nasser, along with Abd al-Hakim Amir, Khalid Muhyi al-Din and Yusuf Siddiq were all of the opinion that parliament should be recalled.[4] They were overruled, however, and in resolving this constitutional crisis, the CCR moved steadily towards the temporary exercise of direct power through Mahir's cabinet, rather than by recalling parliament.

At the same time, the CCR agreed that a crucial early action was to secure the army itself, from any potential counter-manoeuvres. They immediately embarked on purges and appointments that would secure loyalty in command positions. Handwritten notes from April 1953 continue to show Nasser's plans 'to eliminate factors leading to suspicions' in the ranks, which might lead to 'extremely secret organisation', and 'to expand the Free Officers Organisation amongst senior officers, personally by the Chief of Staff, and amongst junior officers through our own officers, with attention to the officer rank: purification and insurance, guidance and fostering affinity'.[5] According to Khalid Muhyi al-Din, Nasser was wary of potential competitors within the Free Officers movement, and ensured that none of these was given

[3] These officers were Yusuf Siddiq, Abd al-Mun'im Amin, Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din and Husayn al-Shafe'i. See ibid., pp. 173–5.

[4] Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1996, p. 121.

[5] Gamal Abdel Nasser, 'The Army', Notes, 8.4.53, in Huda Abdel Nasser, *Gamal Abdel Nasser: Al-Awraq Al-Khassa*, Part Two, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aamma li-l-Kitab, 2015, p. 205.

a leading position. Meanwhile, he was happy to promote non-members who demonstrated 'competence and patriotism' regardless of their distance from the Free Officers. In this way, Nasser 'secured the armed forces from both opponents and friends'.[6]

With the CCR taking charge of decision-making behind the scenes, the next months saw intensifying confrontation with the old parties. Particularly in the Wafd and Liberal parties, the old guard refused to relinquish power. It is this standoff that Nasser gave as the reason for the CCR's decision to take matters increasingly into their own hands.[7] A handwritten document from 27 July is a rare artefact of a first stormy meeting with the Wafd leadership.[8] In it, Nasser writes that they were 'willing to reach an agreement with Ali Mahir' and 'did not have any ambitions, as long as they [members of the Regency Council] were all neutral . . . we will not consider Wafdists'.[9] By early September, however, the CCR had clashed with Mahir over its intended land reform, and appointed Nagib in his place. Taking counsel from trusted legal advisors, Nagib appointed a cabinet of young and technocratic ministers, and the Free Officers' control or direct responsibility for key portfolios expanded.

The years 1953–4 saw the consolidation of political power by the CCR. During that time, it proceeded to establish its own institutions, form coalitions and move against its opponents one by one. In January, it unveiled the Liberation Rally, an attempt to institutionalise an alternative to the political parties, and to mobilise support for their new rule. The same month, the CCR dissolved the political parties, formed a constitutional committee and announced a three-year transition period. In June 1953 the CCR unilaterally declared the Egyptian republic, announcing Nagib as President, as well as Prime Minister. Nasser became his deputy, Salah Salem the Minister of National Guidance, his brother Gamal the Communications Minister, and Baghdadi the War Minister, while Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din became Interior Minister, and soon overhauled the intelligence apparatus.[10]

[6] Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, p. 180.
[7] Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Falsafat al-Thawra*, Cairo: Madbuli, 2003, first published 1953, pp. 20–4.
[8] The date of the meeting is confirmed in Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, p. 61, fn 5.
[9] Nasser, 'Mulahazat 'An Al-Wad' al-Siyasi' ['Notes on the Political Situation'], Notes, 27.7.1952, in Nasser, *Awraq*, pp. 58–60.
[10] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, p. 84.

Nasser moved harshly against his former allies in the DMNL and wider Left in 1952, starting with the repression of a workers' strike in August, and with waves of arrests into 1953. Part of the context for this was the CCR's engagement with American officials as a counterweight to the British in this early period. The CCR simultaneously engaged in the utilitarian inclusion of select figures on the Left in its own public mobilisation efforts – indeed Nasser would regularly turn to Egyptian leftist theorists when in need of cultural and intellectual depth in his policymaking.[11] Meanwhile the Muslim Brothers were the last in the coalition to be purged: their differences were tolerated as they were the most organised anti-establishment force in Egypt, with widespread cells in the army. However, the CCR could not tolerate their efforts to steer its direction, and tensions rose throughout 1954. After an attempt on Nasser's life in September, the organisation was banned and waves of arrests and executions followed.

Politically, the greatest test of Nasser's increasingly solid grip on power had come in March 1954. Rifts within the military on the necessity of the restoration of democracy had come to the fore, and Nagib had become the figure around which an otherwise unconnected band of opposition groups had coalesced, including the cavalry corps. Assisted by loyalist CCR members, however, Nasser outmanoeuvred Nagib, and himself became Prime Minister. Thereafter, a combination of surveillance, rehabilitation and incentivisation ensured the loyalty of the army's different units, and their insulation from would-be coup instigators with links to the old parties.

The CCR gradually expanded its control over the media and concentrated power in its own hands, such that it could guarantee control over the main direction in which policymaking went. As Gordon writes,

> In the aftermath of the March crisis, the officers endeavored to move beyond the defensive, backward-looking rhetoric that had dominated their

[11] Ahmad Al-Mulla, *Al-Yasar al-Misri bayn 'Abd al-Nasir wa-l-Sadat: Majallat al-Tali'a, 1965–1977*, Cairo: Dar al-Kutub wa-l-Watha'iq al-Qawmiyya, 2014, pp. 19–84; Anouar Abdel Malek, *Egypt: Military Society: the Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser*, New York: Random House, 1968, pp. 215–9. Also Ahmad Hamrush was invited to edit *Al-Tahrir* in September 1952 but was replaced by Free Officer and later Culture Minister Tharwat Ukasha by October, and jailed by January 1953: see Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, pp. 94–5.

propaganda, a rhetoric that had placed primary emphasis on the crimes of the old regime. They still decried the forces of 'reaction' but now spoke with greater certainty about grand projects, a high dam at Aswan, land reclamation in a 'Liberation Province,' a modern infrastructure for Cairo, and, at long last, a constitution.[12]

In fulfilling these projects, the Free Officers now relied on an expanding cohort of civilians and military men supporting them in both political positions and public life.[13] Originally the Free Officers distinguished between different ranks in their membership, but the boundary between them was fluid, and some of the younger members rose in the ranks to hold positions of great responsibility within years of 1952, most notably Muhammad Fayiq, Director of African Affairs, and Sami Sharaf, Secretary to the Presidency.[14] To add to this, with the achievement of nationalist milestones such as the British withdrawal in 1954 and the Suez Canal Company nationalisation in 1956, the stature of Nasser himself only rose, such that his own word, inclination or judgement could become a decisive factor. Indeed he was arguably sole decision-maker by 1955, albeit one who placed emphasis on consultation and information gathering. He directed national policy increasingly from then onwards.

Political Revolution for Sovereignty: Neutralism vis-à-vis Britain, 1952–4

As elaborated in Nasser's *The Philosophy*, both political and social changes were deemed necessary to unseat the liberal order of colonial Egypt. The practical reflection of this discourse was a mixture of new political organisations, aimed to restore sovereignty to Egyptians, and redistributive economic reform, aimed to secure their future. These were connected in the Free Officers' early political practice: 'When we moved along the path of the political revolution and dethroned Farouk, we took a similar step on the path of the social revolution by deciding to limit land ownership.'[15] This section focuses on the first of these, and

[12] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, p. 192.
[13] See the cabinet composition in CCR Decree on Cabinet Formation, 17.4.54 in Nasser, *Awraq*, pp. 262–4.
[14] See Richard Dekmejian, *Egypt under Nasir: a Study in Political Dynamics*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971, pp. 177–8.
[15] Nasser, *Philosophy*, p. 44; Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 30.

traces its ramifications within the national field, before turning to its pursuit in the international field, through a fundamental realignment of relations with external actors that attracted staunch opposition from imperial Britain and its allies in the Western bloc. As Gordon observes, 'Ideology and power politics are not easily separated',[16] and none of these moves was made solely out of nationalist motivation. The direction in which the CCR moved as it centralised its power, however, was most certainly one that kept within the parameters of a socially egalitarian, Egyptian-Arab nationalism.

The CCR had begun by dissolving the liberal political parties in September 1952, pending their recertification by the Interior Ministry. This was accompanied by a discourse which proclaimed 'unity, order and work' as a nation making slogan. As early as October 1952, Prime Minister Nagib declared these goals 'the foundations of the national movement and the new motto of the nation'.[17] He emphasised 'the honour and pride' of working the land[18] and that 'every [state] employee is serving the people'.[19] This was contrasted with state corruption during previous decades, and was used to justify centralisation of power under a leadership asserting its control over national resources.

In January 1953, when the parties were abolished altogether and the three-year transition period of military rule declared, Nasser presented this as a necessary step towards freedom, for 'the path we are going to follow … to banish the occupation is hard, and requires us … not to deceive in the name of democracy, for we have been deceived long enough in the name of democracy by the British'.[20] Meanwhile, in the Liberation Rally, as much as national unity was a goal of socioeconomic reform, it was also described as a requirement. The Rally made overt appeals for a national effort to support such reform. Its founding statement called it 'a path to work and action open to all Egyptians'.[21]

[16] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, p. 93.
[17] 'In Zaqaziq: Unity, Order, Work, 1.10.52', in Muhammad al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra: Kitab al-'Aam al-Awwal*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1953, p. 39.
[18] 'Tree Week, 23–28.2.53', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, p. 151.
[19] 'The President at the Immigration and Naturalisation Council, 28.2.53', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, p. 152.
[20] Nasser, Speech at People's Conference in Tanta, 31.12.53.
[21] Founding Statement of the Liberation Rally, 23.1.53: State Information Service Digital Archive.

By June, once the monarchy had been abolished and the republic itself announced, state publications presented these as milestones on the road to Egyptian self-government and independence.[22] The state was now to be bound by a social contract with the nation, and was to conduct affairs in the national interest accordingly. This discourse was continually linked to the anti-imperialist struggle. Thus the CCR statement declaring the republic invoked a 'consensus of the nation' on the inadequacy of simply removing Faruq himself – it was necessary to abolish the institution of the monarchy, 'the curtain from behind which the coloniser works'.[23]

Official commemoration underlined the revolution's twin emphases on sovereignty and national development. The anniversary of the Free Officers' coup was declared Egypt's National Day, and was marked annually with official celebrations and two speeches by Nasser in Cairo and Alexandria. A series of stamps was released during 1952–3, bearing the date of 23 July and consistently displaying broken chains, with Egyptian men and women, workers, peasants and soldiers, standing beneath them (see Figure 5.1). Stamps were also issued on the first anniversary of the declaration of the republic, 18 June 1953, and after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954, the latter emphasising in English and Arabic the British withdrawal, *al-gala'* (see Figure 5.2).[24]

A corollary of the levelling associated with the new republican vision was the maintenance of secular national politics. Official discourse introduced a notion of citizenship in which religious ties would be less salient in interactions between subject and state. This vision was paradoxically implemented through the framework of state control: religious institutions were officially regulated, and political institutions, such as the Liberation Rally, kept free of religious connection. Its programme stated that freedom of religion was 'guaranteed within the limits of the law'.[25] Similarly, Article Four of the 1953 Constitution stressed that 'the state protects the right to proclaim the slogans of religions and creeds'.[26]

[22] See 'The Republic is Coming', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, pp. 291–318.
[23] ENA: FM-273(746)/1: EFM Memorandum to Egyptian representatives abroad, attaching 'CCR Statement' declaring the republic, 19.6.53.
[24] Egyptian stamp collection, 1952–4: www.nasser.org.
[25] Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. 92, quoted in Muhammad Nagib, *Egypt's Destiny*, London, 1955, pp. 184–5.
[26] Declaration of the Temporary Constitution, 10.2.53: www.nasser.org.

Figure 5.1 Commemorative stamps: three from 1953 marking 23 July 1952, and two from 1954 marking the anniversary of the founding of the Egyptian republic in 1953 and the British withdrawal from Egypt agreed in 1954.
Source: www.nasser.org website.

The 1953 government yearbook emphasises President Nagib's friendly overtures to Egypt's three religious communities. It is filled with slogans such as 'No division and no discrimination between all the sects of Egypt',[27] from Nagib's visit to the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate, and 'Islam only hates aggression',[28] from his 1952 Christmas address. Egypt's religious leaders are recorded as responding in kind, and their 'blessings' of the revolution appear in the yearbook, alongside excerpts from the Quran, Bible and Torah. Rabbi Haim Naom, for example, is reported to have likened the revolution to 'an orchestra with different instruments . . . [playing] a harmonious tune'.[29]

Whilst religious schools and dervish orders were thus left untouched,[30] in terms of political inclusion, it remained the government's prerogative to include whomever it wished.[31] Nasser's approach was to intervene to correct imbalances, rather than to move against the foundational reasons for continuing differences between communities of Egyptians, such as the family law and religious courts systems. Since none of the Free Officers was Christian, for example, Nasser appointed a Copt, Kamal Ramzi Stinu, to the posts of advisor and minister.[32] The constitutional committee of fifty hosted three Jews, and when Copts won no seats in the first elections after 1952, Nasser appointed ten members to parliament.[33] In 1954, Nasser clarified his view that 'the Koran is a very general text, capable of interpretation, and that is why I don't think it is suitable as a source of policy'.[34] Meanwhile, the CCR directed religious clerics' attention to imperialism: speaking at al-Azhar in November 1952, Nagib had focused on the

[27] 'Nagib's Visit to the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate, 16.11.52', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, p. 77.
[28] 'The Day of Mercy and Peace, 24.12.52', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, p. 91.
[29] 'Speech of the Grand Hacham, 23.6.53', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, p. 315, see also photo-report, p. 55; Nabil Sayyid Ahmad, *Al-Yahud fi Misr: Bayna Qiyam Isra'il wa-l-'Udwan al-Thulathi, 1948–1956*, Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aama li-l-Kitab, 1991, p. 114.
[30] Daniel Crecelius, 'The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt', in Donald Smith ed., *Religion and Political Modernization*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, p. 92.
[31] Interview, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former Foreign Minister, Cairo, 4.1.07; Tariq al-Bishri, *Al-Muslimun wa-l-Aqbat fi Itar al-Gama'a al-Wataniyya*, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1988, p. 677.
[32] Ahmed Abdalla, 'Egypt before and after September 11, 2001: Problems of Political Transformation in a Complicated International Setting', *DOI Focus*, 2003, p. 15.
[33] Ahmad, *Al-Yahud fi Misr*, p. 116.
[34] Jean and Simone Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition*, London: Methuen, 1958, pp. 458–9.

British presence, stressing that 'Islam considers freedom sacred and hates subjugation'.[35]

While these nation making measures unfolded in Egypt, the pursuit of sovereignty in the Free Officers' 'political revolution' would soon generate conflicts with Britain and its allies in the Western bloc. British politicians were the most hostile: they viewed the Suez Canal as the 'jugular of the Empire' and the Suez military base as crucial to regional strategy, both for Soviet containment and for the protection of British oil interests.[36] On the other hand, they had become reconciled to the necessity of some form of departure from Egypt, mainly because of the costs of maintaining the base and, later, because nuclear weapons technology had lowered its strategic value.[37] Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden therefore made proposals that aimed to secure the base in wartime and incorporate Egypt into regional defence pacts in peacetime.[38]

The ensuing conflict ultimately produced Nasser's foreign policy of neutralism. Nasser had begun speaking of his rejection of Western defence pacts as early as August 1952, recommending instead the Arab League Collective Security Pact (ACSP).[39] More specifically, however, the pursuit of sovereignty began with the Suez Canal base negotiations themselves, during which neutralism became articulated as Egypt's official policy with respect to the British presence. In December 1952, Egypt had convened a conference of twelve African and Asian states: these connections highlighted the anti-imperialist dimensions of neutralist policy, while the Cairo visits of Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru in 1952 and 1953 generated waves of enthusiasm for the concept.[40] In a meeting with Foreign Minister Mahmud Fawzi in September 1952, Nasser had noted Nehru's speech on neutralism, and its emphasis on sovereignty in the United Nations Charter, while identifying Egypt's strengths in its 'people, army . . . and

[35] 'The President at Al-Azhar, 25.11.52', al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, p. 81.
[36] BNA: FO371/102835, 'The Suez Canal and Middle East Defence', 24.2.53.
[37] Ray Takeyh, *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: the US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953–7*, New York: St Martin's Press, 2000, pp. 43–4.
[38] FRUS: 1952–1954, *The Near and Middle East*, Vol. IX: Ambassador in UK (Gifford) to DOS, 3.1.1953, p. 1949.
[39] See 'Commander-in-Chief Discusses Collective Security with Arab League Secretary-General', *Al-Ahram*, 9.8.52, p. 1.
[40] See Keith Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt: a Critical Analysis*, London: Stevens and Sons, 1960, p. 215; Nasser, Press Conference, 7.12.53.

allies'.[41] In June 1953, Minister of National Guidance Salah Salim underlined India's example: 'We have heard [India] say that she will not send troops outside the Indian continent … unless directly attacked . . . we must study this statement and adapt our policy according to its guidance.'[42] An official statement suggested 'that Egypt may ally herself with the neutralist bloc of Asian nations in order to try to put an end to the imperialist occupation of the Suez Canal Zone by Great Britain'.[43] Salim defined 'neutrality' in 1953 as 'non-cooperation with those who do not recognise Egypt's sovereignty': this interpretation referred primarily to Britain, rather than to any Cold War strategy.[44] Both Nasser and Salim even adopted the phrase 'cold war' to describe Anglo-Egyptian negotiations: 'the British have seen fit to wage a cold war battle against us, with psychological pressure on our nerves'.[45]

Cairo's neutralist choice then developed further through the negotiation of an early dilemma between sovereignty and national development during 1952–4. The first dimension came from Anglo-American policy on regional containment, and the constraints it placed throughout the negotiations on Egypt's exercise of fully sovereign decision-making. Britain was reluctant to withdraw fully from Egypt, and wished to incorporate plans for the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) into any final settlement. The CCR's first communications clarified that such a commitment could only be considered after full Egyptian independence was guaranteed in an agreement.[46] Meanwhile, under President Eisenhower, American Middle East policy aimed to settle both the Anglo-Egyptian and Arab–Israeli conflicts, in order to induce Egypt to take the lead in the regional containment measures of

[41] 'Nasser's Observations about Nehru's Speech and Egypt's Position Abroad after Meeting Mahmud Fawzi', 15.9.52, in Nasser, *Awraq*, pp. 87–8.

[42] 'Salah Salim at Alexandria University, 30.6.53', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, p. 338.

[43] Cited in Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. 226.

[44] See Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt*, p. 216; Nasser, Press Conference, Kafr al-Dawaar, 19.4.54.

[45] Nasser, 'These Plays will not Distract us from the Great Truth, 22.5.53', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, p. 66. See also Salah Salim, 'Egypt Defeats Britain in the Cold War, 13.7.53', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, pp. 354–6; Nasser, Statement on Britain's Cold War against Egypt, 23.5.53.

[46] FRUS: 1952–1954, IX: Ambassador in UK (Gifford) to DOS, 3.1.53, pp. 1946–8.

NATO.[47] As a result, the USA was willing to support the Free Officers' ambitions for independence, and economic cooperation, technical training opportunities and diplomatic exchanges were all enhanced.[48] However, this was all conditional on pursuit of anti-communist positions, which Ambassador Jefferson Caffrey personally encouraged,[49] and American and British interests largely overlapped with respect to the desired outcomes of the Anglo-Egyptian settlement.[50]

Proposals on joint defence were duly made by the USA and Britain in a joint démarche in March 1953, by Britain alone in April negotiations, and by the USA alone during Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' visit to Cairo in May. Each time, the Egyptians repeated their objections: in March, they rejected US participation in the talks, and the implied discussion of Middle East defence.[51] In April, Nasser insisted that withdrawal be unconditional: he could not allow the British to 'leave by the front door and return through the window'.[52] In May, Nasser told Dulles that he could never join an alliance with a colonial power still on Egyptian soil, reminding him that the Arabs already had a collective security arrangement. According to Mahmud Riyad, then senior Arab Affairs diplomat and later Foreign Minister, Nasser explained that the real threat to the Arabs was not the Soviet Union, but rather the imperialism of Britain and Israel.[53]

Indeed, that month Dulles had visited Israel, and left with the impression of a 'leadership unified in its rejection of concessions'.[54] A year later, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion presided over two inflammatory incidents. The first was the 'Lavon Affair', an espionage operation

[47] Irene Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 33, 35; Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, pp. 25, 45.

[48] Fawaz Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p. 31.

[49] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, p. 166.

[50] Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, pp. 8, 23.

[51] FRUS: 1952–1954, IX, Secretary of State to USE, Egypt, 16.3.53, p. 1947; see also Muhammad Nagib, *Kunt Ra'isan li-Misr*, Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 2003, p. 306.

[52] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, p. 169.

[53] Mahmud Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad: 1948–1978*, Vol. II, Beirut: Al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Nashr, 1987, p. 39.

[54] Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, p. 21.

designed to sabotage Anglo-Egyptian negotiations; the second was the forcing of Israeli ship *Bat Galim* through the Suez Canal, planned 'with the deliberate aim of provoking a war with Egypt'.[55] Egypt's dilemma in confronting Anglo-Israeli hostility then crystallised with British and American challenges to its plans to acquire funding for national development projects.

Confronting the Dilemma: National Futures and American Constraints

The first nation making measure undertaken by the Free Officers was arguably the September 1952 land reform, which placed a ceiling on land ownership and began a redistribution effort among Egypt's peasants.[56] It aimed at correcting unequal land distribution and contributing to a national industrialisation drive.[57] Scholars agree that it was a political move to diminish the power of the landowners, and Nasser made this clear in his speeches.[58] However, it was also indicative of the new leaders' vision for a national future: 'political motivations, however dominant, do not rob land reforms of their social and economic significance'.[59]

Not unlike those of the Democrats in Turkey, the two main themes of Nasser's early speeches were democracy and national unity. Again not unlike the Democrats, Nasser placed the peasants and workers at the centre of his discourse on the nation. However, Nasser's policy revealed an egalitarian dimension that was not reflected in that of his

[55] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, London: Penguin, 2001, pp. 112, 110–17; Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, *Milaffat al-Suways: Harb al-Thalathin Sana*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1986, pp. 763–7; Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, p. 208.

[56] See Galal A. Amin, 'Evolution and Shifts in Egypt's Economic Policies: In Search of a Pattern', in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Çağlar Keyder and Ayşe Öncü eds., *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1994, pp. 122, 130; John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: the Political Economy of Two Regimes*, Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 61.

[57] Robert Mabro, *The Egyptian Economy, 1952–1972*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, pp. 64–5. See also ENA: ECM-5-H/37: Decree Law No. 178, Land Reform, 1952.

[58] See Salah Nasr, *Mudhakirat Salah Nasr*, Vol. I: *Al-Su'ud*, Cairo: Dar al-Khayyal, 1999, p. 204.

[59] Mabro, *The Egyptian Economy*, p. 56.

Turkish counterparts: indeed it was the Democrats' opposition to land reform that had galvanised their coalescence into a party in 1945. Nasser emphasised the pursuit of 'social and economic democracy' in his land reform policy, reflecting equally his goals for development and the need to counter the opposition's demand for a return to parliamentary democracy. In the Free Officers' view, Egyptian agriculture had developed at the expense of the peasants and workers, under the very parliamentarians of the industrialist-landowning class, who had blocked economic reform.[60] Thus in 1953, Nasser declared the CCR's aim to widen social services and health provision, highlighting their importance in furthering social solidarity.[61] Implementing political before socioeconomic democracy, he argued, would only restore 'the dictatorship of the minority'.[62] The land reform thus channeled popular grievances, in a nation making project with a new, and controversial, definition of democracy.

In this context, Nasser personally handed certificates of land ownership to peasants in different villages, making a public performance of the anticolonial message of national entitlement to the land. His speeches at such ceremonies clearly connected the land reform with the Free Officers' stated goal of achieving social justice and furnishing every citizen with equal opportunities.[63] As Reem Saad has written, this became known as 'the law of freedom' amongst Egyptian peasants.[64] It affected many members of the landed class, whose businesses had flourished with European partners under colonial rule, and was followed by the November 1953 decree on 'the reclamation of the wealth and property of the people from the [royal] family of Muhammad Ali'.[65] Nasser declared that the revolution would now

[60] Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882–1954*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1988, pp. 395–6.

[61] Nasser, Speech at People's Conference, Old Cairo, 26.12.53.

[62] Heikal, *Li-Misr La li-`Abd al-Nasir*, Cairo: Dar Al-Shuruq, 2003, p. 74.

[63] Nasser, Speech on Occasion of Land Distribution to Peasants, Taftish Damira, 23.7.53.

[64] Reem Saad, 'The Two Pasts of Nasser's Peasants: Political Memories and Everyday Life in an Egyptian Village', in Partha Chatterjee and Anjan Ghosh eds., *History and the Present*, New Delhi: Permanent Black Press, 2002, p. 190.

[65] CCR Decree, 8.11.53, in Nasser, *Awraq*, pp. 161–2, SWB: IV, 415 and 416, 17.11.53 and 20.11.53. The confiscation decree was to lead to tensions with the Turkish ambassador, Fuat Tugay, whose wife was a former princess and argued that her Turkish citizenship exempted her. Within a year, Tugay had offended

restore these 'stolen' resources to the nation.[66] These funds were then directed to the Permanent Council for Public Welfare Services, itself established in 1953, to build schools and health units in rural Egypt and to expand the existing system of Social Welfare Centres.[67] In its first budget, the CCR transferred £5 million from military to public expenditure, signalling its focus on national development.[68]

Another significant early measure in this regard was the abolition of Ottoman titles, such as *pasha* and *bey*, which had long distinguished the elites of Egyptian society. Their removal was presented as a political symbol of national equality, and of the purging of the stratifications of foreign, imperial rule. In 1953, Nasser spoke to an audience of workers:

> the revolution came motivated by the rights of the peasants and workers, it came to distribute the wealth of Egypt to the people of Egypt justly . . . the old regime deprived you of your efforts, but we will work to strengthen your ranks . . . each worker among you will get his share in work, in making a living, in life with dignity . . . Colonialism used to employ traitors to limit our strength and yours, but we have got rid of the traitors, so the colonialists had better go . . .[69]

That year saw the implementation of several labour laws reducing the working day, founding a social insurance scheme and guaranteeing worker representation on company boards. Arbitrary firing was made illegal, and a special labour court set up, measures 'empowering Egypt's working class as never before'.[70] The limits of the social change envisaged by the Free Officers were made sharply clear when they cracked down on the Kafr al-Dawwar strike of August 1952, sentencing its leaders to death at a military tribunal. They preferred to keep a firm hold on the reins of power, while improving workers' quality of life through statist developmental policy.

Nasser in person, and was declared *persona non grata* in Egypt: SWB: IV, 431, 15.1.54, pp. 40–1.

66 Nasser, Speech at People's Conference, Tanta, 31.12.53.

67 Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'aan Atakallam*, p. 239; Heikal, *Li Misr La li-'Abd al-Nasir*, p. 112; Amin, 'Evolution and Shifts', p. 122.

68 Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes*, London: Corgi, 1988, p. 53.

69 Nasser, Speech to the Workers in Dumiat, 10.4.53.

70 Ibrahim, 'Egypt's Landed Bourgeoisie' in Ibrahim et al., *Developmentalism and Beyond*, p. 31.

The Free Officers' welfarist visions for the nation's future also found expression in policies seeking to foster national industry and a national bourgeoisie. In 1952, the CCR established the National Production Council, commissioned studies on heavy industrialisation projects[71] and approved plans for the Aswan High Dam.[72] These were more than simply planned economic megaprojects: they aimed to signal the overturning of imperialist footholds in Egypt, demonstrating sovereignty over its resources, as well as contributing to the state's capacity for welfare provision:[73]

> The specific decision regarding the High Dam must thus be set in the general context of a new and unknown regime seeking to establish its credibility and to signal its citizens, and make known to the nations abroad, that it was prepared to do what no previous regime had dared contemplate or advocate to promote the country's well-being.[74]

CCR policy on free education also aimed at redressing the imbalances of the colonial economy and promoting its equal provision among new generations. Taha Hussein, Egypt's celebrated man of letters and Minister of Education from 1950 to 1952, had already phased in free primary schooling, famously describing education as 'like water and air'.[75] The CCR took early steps to widen its provision, particularly at primary level, and to encourage girls' enrolment specifically.[76] During 1953–4, 372 schools were built and middle-school fees abolished: education was deemed crucial to the future political and social development of a country in which illiteracy was 75 per cent.[77] There was also an emphasis on vocational education, as

[71] Mabro, *The Egyptian Economy*, p. 110.
[72] 'The High Dam Plan in Action within Four Months', Al-Ahram, 25.8.53; Jon B. Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 1952–1956: Hopes Dashed*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 102.
[73] Amin, 'Evolution and Shifts', pp. 117, 122.
[74] John Waterbury, *Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley*, Syracuse University Press, 1979, p. 98.
[75] Abdel Fattah Galal, 'Taha Hussein (1889–1973)', online source: www.orientation94.org/uploaded/MakalatPdf/Mufakirun/husseine.pdf, p. 10, originally published in *Prospects: the Quarterly Review of Comparative Education*, Paris, UNESCO: International Bureau of Education, Vol. 23, Nos. 3–4, 1993, pp. 687–710.
[76] Ibrahim, 'Al-Mashru' al-Ijtima'i li-Thawrat Yulyu', in Ibrahim ed., *Misr wa-l-'Uruba wa Thawrat Yulyu*, Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1982, p. 142.
[77] Nasser, Speech on Second Anniversary of the Revolution, 22.7.54.

government newspapers described the land reform as 'creating both the technician and the educated farmer'.[78]

The vast majority of these initiatives for national development and unity had been drawn up by the CCR and implemented with Egyptian funds. At this early stage, the CCR wished to accelerate Egypt's transition from an underdeveloped, 'colonial-type capitalism, predominantly agrarian, to an industrial and technocratic capitalism'.[79] It now faced the limitations of resources invariably associated with such colonially conditioned economic systems. Compounding this, the USA withheld substantial foreign assistance in 1952–4, as Britain requested that it not increase the Egyptians' leverage in negotiations with any substantial aid.[80] Over this period, Egypt was repeatedly promised aid, but found it invariably postponed, whether during the Ali Sabri mission to Washington in 1952 or Dulles' May 1953 visit to Cairo.[81] In November 1953, Nasser protested: 'Take America for example, all the papers say that it will give us loans, that it will help us implement our production projects, and that it works to raise the health, social, economic and cultural levels of the nations in need, and here we are, fourteen months since the revolution, and we haven't seen, nor believed, a thing.'[82] The theme was taken up energetically by the press and by Cairo Radio and its pan-Arab radio station, Sawt al-'Arab ('The Voice of the Arabs').[83]

Meanwhile, after Murad Ghalib was first dispatched as Second Secretary to the embassy in Moscow in 1953, the Egyptians also approached the Soviets for military assistance, but were only able to secure a pledge for oil supplies in case of conflict with Britain.[84] At the beginning of the 1950s, Soviet policy still preserved its traditional distance from Arab affairs.[85] Moscow was sceptical of the Arab

[78] Hussein Arif, *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 2.2.54, p. 8. [79] Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. 111.
[80] Heikal, *Cutting*, p. 47; Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, pp. 37–8.
[81] Heikal, *Cutting*, pp. 47, 51. Cf. aid to Israel: Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance*, pp. 75–6.
[82] Nasser, Speech at Minya al-Qamh, Sharqiya Governorate, 20.11.53.
[83] SWB: IV, 418, 27.11.53 and 419, 1.12.53.
[84] Ghalib, cited in Tareq Ismael, *International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: a Study in World Politics*, Syracuse University Press, 1986, p. 173; Murad Ghalib, *Ma' 'Abd al-Nasir wa-l-Sadat: Sanawat al-Intisar wa Ayam al-Mihan, Mudhakirat Murad Ghalib*, Cairo: Markaz Al-Ahram Li-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 2001.
[85] Alexei Vassiliev, *Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism*, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 16.

liberation movements' capacity to oppose the colonial powers in the region and to maintain neutral positions, particularly with so many post-independence states governed by bourgeois pro-Western leaderships.[86] In this context, the Egyptian revolution was dismissed variously as US-instigated, the work of the Egyptian bourgeoisie or worse, a reactionary military dictatorship repressing the workers' movement.[87]

The constraints on sovereignty imposed by Britain were now exacerbated by Egypt's lack of resources for national welfare and industrialisation. The CCR's tactic in dealing with this refined its neutralist policy further, and prefigured those of positive neutralism. Referring to the Americans and British as 'the coming and the going', *al-gayyin wa-l-rayyhin*, Nasser 'thought the coming could be used to put pressure on the going'.[88] During 1953, it became clear that the Americans were unwilling to support Britain in forcing a regional defence pact into the final settlement. Nasser recognised that this opened up space for manoeuvre, and used this to keep regional defence off the agenda, focusing on British withdrawal in the first instance.[89] Just as the leadership looked to the USA for support in foreign policy, articulating a neutralist line, it also made gestures intended to encourage American assistance, particularly with the Aswan Dam. To this end, the CCR's reformist, non-communist labour policy was emphasised, and a number of laws on foreign and local investment were relaxed.[90] Nasser replaced the old guard of liberal economic policymakers with technocratic 'experts', 'to give the country a more modern administration, familiar with recent developments in science, technology and economics and consequently, better able to interpret the industrialists' desire for expansion'.[91]

Towards Britain, the Egyptian leadership combined negotiations with a second tactic, first begun under the Wafd: the launch of fidayeen guerrilla operations against the British base.[92] Nasser called this

[86] Ismael, *International Relations*, p. 170; Vassiliev, *Russian Policy*, p. 19.
[87] Hashim Behbehani, *The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism*, London: KPI, 1986, p. 107, 114; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar: the Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World*, London: Collins, 1978, p. 53.
[88] Heikal, *Cutting*, p. 54. [89] See Heikal, *Milaffat*, pp. 277–9.
[90] Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance*, p. 58.
[91] Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. 101.
[92] Saad Zaghloul Fuad, *Mudhakirat Fida'i Misri*, Cairo: Al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 2001, p. 105.

'calculated resistance', employing scare tactics rather than violence against individuals, and focusing on strategic targets.[93] Towards the USA, Nasser was careful to maintain prospects for cooperation and thus foreign assistance. He told Dulles: 'we may see our future lying with the West, but this is something that can only be said openly by a truly independent Egypt'.[94] Nasser remained wary of US motives, but was hopeful about potential assistance and keen 'to broaden the areas of agreement, and narrow the areas of disagreement'.[95] His final compromise was to accept the clause that allowed for use of the Suez Canal base in the event of an attack on Turkey. In June 1954, the Voice of the Arabs radio station ran a polemical commentary presenting the Americans' predicament between Anglo-French pressure and its own liberal reputation: 'If America has decided to return to its traditional liberal policy against British and French imperialism, let it extend a hand to the peoples of the East to help them regain their complete independence.'[96] By 1954, several American–Egyptian projects reflected the CCR's hopes for this partnership, particularly once talks with Britain had reached a positive conclusion.

Building the Arab Nation: At Home and Beyond

The greater part of the Egyptian leadership's attention in this period went to the effort to secure British withdrawal from the Suez Canal base and from Sudan. It would be simplistic, however, to portray pan-Arabist foreign policy decisions in this period as secondary in importance to the CCR. While its public discourse focused on relations with Britain until the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of October 1954, and it could devote more energy to Arab affairs thereafter, this did not indicate inaction in the Arab sphere before then. Instead, as the dates of the events discussed below illustrate, the CCR worked on multiple fronts at once, fostering networks of Arab solidarity both for the sake of future collaboration and to bolster the Egyptian position vis-à-vis the British. There were two components to this pan-Arabist nation making effort, one inside Egypt and one directed at Arab audiences outside. Of course, the projection of the pan-Arabist message beyond Egypt also affected,

[93] Heikal, *Milaffat*, p. 274. [94] Heikal, *Cutting*, p. 53.
[95] Heikal, *Milaffat*, p. 279.
[96] SWB: IV, 477, 25.6.54, 'An Appeal to the USA to Turn from Britain and France', p. 37.

indeed challenged, non-national actors such as the Europeans, Americans and Soviets. The following discussion addresses each set of interlocutors in turn.

In the words of Free Officer and DMNL member Ahmad Hamrush, while pan-Arabism was not in the Six Principles or the slogans of the CCR's mobilisation vehicle, the Liberation Rally, 'it was a reality in the Free Officers' stances'.[97] The CCR began its Arab initiatives almost immediately, with the upgrading of diplomatic missions around the Arab world to embassy status in August 1952.[98] In September, the Foreign Ministry convened a conference on Egypt's Arab policy, inviting Egyptian ambassadors in Damascus, Beirut, Amman, San'aa and Riyadh to discuss both the issue of Palestine and the problem of Arab defence. This led the popular weekly *Akhir Sa'a* to comment on the 'maturity of [the CCR's] pan-Arabism'.[99]

Egypt's articulation as part of the wider Arab nation now became increasingly visible in media output, speeches, educational texts, state publications and official commemorations of political history and culture. Such state publications were produced first by the Liberation Rally and later by the State Information Service, founded in 1954.[100] Nasser's *The Philosophy of the Revolution* was a notable example of the overlapping emphases on Egyptian and Arab community. On the one hand, the text presented the revolution as legitimate heir to the Egyptian liberation struggle: 'The struggle of any people, generation after generation, is a structure rising stone upon stone.'[101] Free Officer Salah Nasr agrees that *The Philosophy* chose to mark not 1952 as a beginning, but rather 1881, to connect the revolution with credible anticolonial precedents.[102] On the other hand, the book placed great emphasis on Egypt's Arab locus, channelling to that vision the legitimacy of the previous experiences described.

[97] Hamrush, 'Thawrat Yulyu wa Thawrat al-Taharrur al-Watani al-'Arabiyya' ('The July Revolution and the Revolutions for Arab National Liberation'), in Abd al-Aziz Ramadan ed., *Thawrat Yulyu wa-l-'Alam al-'Arabi* ('The July Revolution and the Arab World'), Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aamma li-l-Kitab, 1993, p. 144.

[98] *Al-Ahram*, 13.8.52, p. 6.

[99] *Akhir Sa'a*, No. 933, 10.9.52, p. 4.

[100] Interview, Ayman al-Qaffas, State Information Service Chairman, Cairo, 1.3.07; see also Ahmad Issa, *Egypt: State Information Service Golden Jubilee, 1954–2004, Memorial Issue*, Cairo: State Information Service, 2004.

[101] Nasser, *Falsafat*, p. 8; Nasser, *Philosophy*, p. 17.

[102] Nasr, *Mudhakirat Salah Nasr*, p. 180.

Another such state publication was the 'We Have Chosen for You' series, *Ikhtarna Lak*. These affordable books fit clearly within a pedagogical nation making mould. The first edition, *This is Zionism* (1954), consists of an autobiographical account by a Zionist activist. A seemingly unusual choice, its presentation exemplifies the interplay of the Egyptian and Arab spheres in the Free Officers' anti-colonial nationalism. In his Foreword, Nasser asks 'every Arab' to learn from the account, and to be 'open-hearted' where it might offend: 'nothing matters for us ... except to learn the story of Zionism as it was told by one of its men, so that we may acquire ... a new awareness, which will help us in the stages of the struggle'.[103] The Epilogue is even more direct, urging 'every Arab to ask himself' why the state of Israel suddenly appeared, dismissing superstitious explanations: 'there was no divine miracle in the matter ... nor did the Jews have power and reasons for victory which other people do not ... rather they were a people who believed in themselves, and what they considered their right ... [and] chose a sound strategy'.[104] These words reflected Nasser's belief at the time that Israel was an 'internal problem': its victory and the Arabs' defeat were connected to their lagging development, which he wished to remedy and to highlight through such messages.[105]

Another sign of the CCR's fostering of an Egyptian-Arab national narrative was its introduction of the revolution's own 'Arab liberation flag'. Until 1958, it was frequently flown alongside Egypt's official flag.[106] It consisted of a black, white and red tricolour, with the eagle of Salah al-Din carrying a shield of the old flag superimposed in the centre. The latter, unveiled under King Fuad in 1923, featured a white crescent and stars on a green background, connoting the Islamic heritage of Egypt. The symbolism of the new flag lay in its emphasis on Arab colours and the example of Salah al-Din, revered for uniting Arab-Muslim opposition to the Crusades and winning back Jerusalem. The CCR also adopted a coat of arms for the revolution,

[103] Nasser, 'Foreword', in Liberation Rally Culture and Publishing Council, *Hadhihi Hiyya al-Sahyuniyya*, Ikhtarna Lak series, Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1954, pp. 10–11.

[104] Nasser, 'Epilogue', in ibid., pp. 145–6.

[105] See SWB: 428, 5.1.54, 'Commemoration of the Palestine War', p. 21; Nasser, Speech on Opening of National Assembly, 22.7.57.

[106] Whitney Smith, *Flags through the Ages and across the World*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1975, p. 153.

again displaying Salah al-Din's eagle.[107] These were early, visual manifestations of the Egyptian leadership's aspiration to play the role of pan-Arabist liberator and unifier.

Beyond Egypt

This nation making endeavour was pursued in the Arab world in earnest from 1953 onwards, through three main channels. The first was diplomacy and public statements, coordinated by the CCR and Foreign Ministry. The second was information gathering, Arab political networking and supporting Arab liberation movements. This was conducted by the Arab Affairs Bureau of the new intelligence apparatus, which Nasser had commissioned in early 1953.[108] The third channel was the media, most notably Sawt al-'Arab, the pan-Arab radio station founded by the Arab Bureau in 1953. During that year, the latter two channels served to prepare the ground for the official launching of the pan-Arabist policy in 1954.

In early 1953, senior Free Officer and Chief of General Intelligence Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din had chosen Fathi al-Deeb to found the new Arab Affairs Bureau, and to draw up a plan that would achieve 'the tying of the Arab homeland … with Cairo, in preparation for the exercise of our positive role in the liberation of its occupied parts'. As Muhyi al-Din saw it, 'the liberation of Egypt is not an achievement of the July Revolution's goals … if the occupied areas of the Arab homeland are not liberated'.[109] According to al-Deeb, in March 1953, Nasser personally offered the following guidelines: 'Egypt is a part of the Arab world, and any Arab effort on our part is a completion of our work inside Egypt.'[110] The plan provided for a first exploratory stage of a year, after which a second plan could be devised for public diplomacy in the Arab arena.[111] Private papers from April 1953

[107] Hamrush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu: III, 'Abd al-Nasir wa-l-'Arab*, Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Tiba'a wa-l-Nashr, 1976, p. 28.

[108] Fathi al-Deeb, '*Abd al-Nasir wa Tahrir al-Mashriq al-'Arabi*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 2000, pp. 27, 455–6; Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 35.

[109] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, p. 27. See Ahmad Said Interview in Said al-Shahhat, 'Maw'id ma'a al-Ra'is fi al-Jazeera', *Al-'Arabi*, 17.8.03.

[110] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, p. 30. See Heikal, *Milaffat*, pp. 284–5 on Nasser's interest in Arab affairs.

[111] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, pp. 28–9.

show Nasser's plans to 'forge strong connections with Arab leaders' and to 'draw benefit from the international'. He goes on to name figures to be contacted including Syrians of all political stripes: communist Akram al-Hawrani, Ba'ath co-founders Salah Bitar and Michel Aflaq, and oppositional People's Party co-founder Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi.[112]

By July 1953, al-Deeb had founded the extraordinarily influential Sawt al-'Arab radio station, a major arm of Egyptian nation making through foreign policy thereafter. Nasser told its manager, Ahmad Said: 'I want this radio to be one of the revolution's weapons for the realisation of Egyptian and Arab independence. The radio will be one of the most important weapons of the future.'[113] Said travelled across the Arab world reporting on its liberation movements, and would soon become 'Nasser's Other Voice'.[114] US dispatches at the time, often cited in the secondary literature, claimed that 'by 1957, Nasser was taking a personal interest' in its broadcasts – this was in fact true from the start.[115] Both Said and al-Deeb cite Nasser's approval of the plan for the station on 31 March 1953, his request to see commentaries before broadcast, as well as their many meetings with him.[116] Indeed Nasser's private papers include jotted down notes for themes of radio programmes, including 'an Arab Palestine radio station', and 'the broadcast of all that has been printed against the Turkish [Pakistani] Pact on Sawt al-'Arab and in "What the Press Said"'. It also refers to 'drama series about Zionism and focusing hatred on Zionism and Israel'.[117] The programmes of Sawt al-'Arab were already reflecting a varied geographical range, with contributions from Palestinian refugees, Tunisian political activists and coverage of the French attacks on Cairo Radio for its support for Algeria.[118] Plays written for the

[112] Nasser, *Awraq*, p. 204.
[113] Al-Shahhat; Interview, Ahmad Said, Manager of *Sawt al-'Arab*, Cairo, 7.3.07.
[114] See ERA: 'Interview with Ahmad Said', *Sawt al-'Arab* Radio, Box 9, Cassette 197; William Ellis, 'Nasser's Other Voice', *Harper's Magazine*, 1961.
[115] Cited in Elie Podeh, *The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: the Struggle over the Baghdad Pact*, Leiden: Brill, 1995, p. 55; James Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, p. 55.
[116] Ahmad Said Interview; Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, pp. 28–30, 75, 455–6; Said al-Suwerki, 'Milaf Ahmad Said: Maa' al-Neel Sirr Tawajuh 'Abd al-Nasir li-Afriqya', *Al-'Arabi*, 18.1.04.
[117] Nasser, *Awraq*, pp. 271–3.
[118] SWB: IV, 432, 19.1.54, 'Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" Programme', pp. 25–6.

radio often provided comment on current news, from the progress of Anglo-Egyptian talks to the Anglo-Saudi dispute over the Buraimi Oasis.[119]

Al-Deeb and assistant Izzat Suleiman also began gathering information on Arab political activity: in Cairo, they met with members of the Arab League's General Secretariat, as well as Arab political exiles.[120] In December, al-Deeb began preliminary field visits to Syria and Lebanon. During 1954, he and three colleagues conducted exploratory visits to Iraq, Jordan and Libya. There they made contact with opposition movements, many of which requested Egyptian support.[121] The Bureau also cultivated ties with Arab students in Cairo, who numbered more than 35,000 in 1954, seeking particularly those involved in political activism.[122] In late May 1954, a particularly high-profile event was organised in which members of the CCR met with a group of Arab students studying in Egypt at an iftar dinner organised by the Ministry of National Guidance. Students invited were from Morocco, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Yemen, and their speeches as well as those of Nasser and Salah Salim were broadcast on Sawt al-'Arab and the Cairo's home service, respectively.[123]

A third strand of the intelligence officials' work was to foster ties with liberation movements. After France's exile of King Muhammad V in August 1953, Sawt al-'Arab had covered the Moroccan uprisings extensively, and the CCR had brought the Maghreb to the top of its agenda.[124] The Bureau began talks with representatives from political parties in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in March 1954.[125] In April, Cairo convened a conference of these representatives under the auspices of the Arab League, expressly aimed at evaluating their capacities, to coordinate them for armed struggle.[126] Out of this conference emerged a special relationship between the Egyptians and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria's National Liberation Front (FLN). The CCR soon committed military support to the FLN and began coordinated

[119] SWB: IV, 451, 21.3.54, 'An Imaginary British Conference on ME Affairs', pp. 28, 453; '"Voice of the Arabs" Radio Play on the Buraimi Situation', 2.4.54, p. 50.
[120] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, pp. 31–3. [121] Ibid., pp. 91–112. [122] Ibid., pp. 115–6.
[123] SWB: IV 471, 4.6.54, 'Speeches at Arab Student Dinner', pp. 33–5.
[124] Al-Deeb, *'Abd al-Nasir wa Thawrat al-Jaza'ir*, Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1984, pp. 21–2.
[125] Ibid., p. 23. [126] Ibid., p. 24.

planning for the start of armed struggle in 1954.[127] This led to the launching of the Algerian revolution on 1 November, declared publicly on Sawt al-'Arab.[128] The Arab Bureau had also asked Ben Bella to make contact on its behalf with fellow groups in Morocco and Tunisia, to whom Egypt would offer similar support later on.[129] In these early policies, the CCR was asserting a pan-Arabist view of its duties: this, together with the activism of Sawt al-'Arab, became a principal cause for French hostility to the revolution.[130]

The further implication of this nationalist policy in the international realm was the fostering of a pan-Arab alliance. In parallel with the covert, exploratory aspects of this phase, there were several indications in public diplomacy of Egypt's proposed pan-Arab alternative to the Western bloc in 1953. In May, the CCR convened a meeting of the Arab League states, which agreed to a coordinated policy against colonial threats, and pledged support to Egypt in its struggle with Britain.[131] In August, Nasser called together the Arab chiefs of staff, whom he entreated to cooperate in order 'to turn the words of the Arab Collective Security Pact into action', reminding them of the bitter lessons learned in Palestine.[132] Addressing a first 'Arab-Islamic Conference' at the Liberation Rally headquarters, Nasser emphasised:

> Colonialism is dealing its blows everywhere, and the Arab and Islamic worlds stand today at a crossroads: it is either the path of humiliation and subjugation, or the path of dignity and freedom, and we alone must decide which of these paths we take. Either supplication, surrender and division, which allows our enemy to dominate us, or dignity, self-worth and unity that rids us of that enemy. The Arabs and Muslims everywhere ... must believe that that they are battling one enemy, colonialism, and they must reunite under the banner of unity and struggle ...[133]

[127] Amin Huwaydi's testimony in Hamrush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu: IV, Shuhud Thawrat Yulyu*, Cairo: Madbuli, 1984, p. 89; al-Deeb, *Jaza'ir*, pp. 33–42; Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 37.

[128] Ahmad Said's testimony in Hamrush, *Shuhud*, pp. 49–50; Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, p. 47.

[129] Al-Deeb, *Jaza'ir*, p. 42.

[130] Tariq Habib, *Milaffat Thawrat Yulyu: Shahadat 122 min Suna'iha wa Mu'asireeha*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1997, pp. 227–8; SWB: IV, 449, 'France's Protest against a Voice of the Arabs Broadcast', 19.3.54, p. 32.

[131] *New York Times*, 10.5.53, in Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, p. 18.

[132] Nasser, Speech to Arab Chiefs of Staff Conference, Cairo, 25.8.53.

[133] Nasser, Speech at First Arab-Islamic Conference, Liberation Rally Headquarters, Cairo, 26.8.53.

In public statements, Nasser elaborated his view of the potential of coordinated Arab foreign policy: 'We have an inner strength that cannot be defeated by military power – we have oil, which fuels the European army . . . '[134] This new direction was made official with the reformulations of foreign policy declared in January 1954: the first called for the establishment of an Arab bloc, free from imperialist influence, to protect the interests of the Islamic, Asian and African peoples. The second called for a treaty among these peoples to this end, and the third similarly endorsed an African bloc, to include those still 'under the imperialist yoke'.[135]

The innovation of Nasser's pan-Arabist national project was its extension beyond the traditional confines of the nation-state, to become regionally directed and actively concerned with orienting Arab citizens towards a shared conception of community. To reach – and mobilise – Arab audiences, Nasser made effective use of state radio and media.[136] Contrary to citations of contemporary British reports in the literature, the impact of Sawt al-'Arab in the Arab countries was far from negligible in 1953–4.[137] The station soon achieved wide acclaim across the Arab Gulf, Maghreb, Levant states and Iraq. Egyptian officials noted this in particular during their exploratory visits in 1954, after the radio's airtime was quadrupled in April.[138] In June, National Guidance Minister Salah Salim held a series of meetings on the 'political direction of the Egyptian Broadcasting Service', and tasked the Foreign Ministry Secretary for Arab Affairs, Mahmud Riyad, with forming a committee to supervise Sawt al-'Arab broadcasts.[139]

The Free Officers' speeches to Arab audiences also substantiated and popularised a narrative of Arab community, consistently juxtaposing it with the threat of colonialism. An early example is Nasser's July 1954 speech on the first anniversary of Sawt al-'Arab:

134 Nasser, Speech at Palestine Club, Alexandria, 13.12.53.
135 SWB: IV, 431, 15.1.54, 'Statements about Egypt's Foreign Policy', Cairo in English and Hebrew, p. 40.
136 'The Press is One of the Army's Weapons, 27.7.52', in al-Wakil, *Hadhihi al-Thawra*, p. 19.
137 Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, pp. 55–6, citing UK Embassy Report, 1954.
138 Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, p. 77.
139 SWB: IV, 476, 22.6.54, 'Political Direction of Egyptian Broadcasting', p. 29; 477, 25.6.54, 'Committee for Supervision', p. 38.

Egypt launched 'The Voice of the Arabs' from your heart, Cairo, in war against the imperialists … to declare your identity and power … We are happy to see that our voice, 'The Voice of the Arabs', has realised Arab unity, as it has gathered all the Arabs around it, their minds pondering together the problems of the one Arab nation, and their struggle taking shape through its struggle for eternal Arab freedom.[140]

After securing British withdrawal in October, Nasser made another speech on Sawt al-'Arab in a similar vein: 'Dear Arab brothers in Jordan and Iraq, in the south of the Arab peninsula, in North Africa, and in Palestine, raise your heads from the imperialists' boots, for the era of tyranny is past.' Nasser then hinted at Egypt's future intentions: 'Egypt achieved all this in just two years. Think what Egypt can do for you now that evacuation has been achieved.'[141]

This pan-Arabist discourse was embedded in early practices in the international field, which compared favourably with the pledges of an earlier generation of Arab leaders, and garnered further regional popularity accordingly. Nasser's policy on Palestine was exemplary in this regard: after 1952, Egyptian universities were opened to Palestinian students with a grant and subsidy programme, and the Palestine Students Union was allowed to function freely.[142] There was a marked increase in Palestinian student enrolment as of 1954, followed by significant relaxations of the 'no-work' restriction for Palestinians in Egypt. These policies provided crucial access to education and employment, and projected the message that the constituency of Egypt's revolution was to be broader than the Egyptian citizenry alone.[143] In December 1954, Cairo convened the 'Arab Conference on Compulsory Education', spreading its desire to expedite the literacy campaign to regional delegations.[144] Cairo's further expansion of

[140] Ibid., pp. 79–80. See also SWB: IV, 9.7.54, 'Special Anniversary Programme', pp. 33–4.

[141] Sawt al-'Arab, 19.10.1954, cited in Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: a Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945–1958,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 210.

[142] Laurie Brand, 'Nasir's Egypt and the Re-emergence of the Palestinian National Movement', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1988, p. 32.

[143] See ibid.; also Oroub El-Abed, *Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948*, Washington, DC: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2009, pp. 42–3; Abu Iyad with Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land: a Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle*, New York: Times Books, 1981, p. 21.

[144] *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 'The Arab Conference for Compulsory Education Began Yesterday', 30.12.54, p. 7.

educational opportunities to Arab students illustrated the intersection of pan-Arabism and development in the CCR's nation making project, and their connection with the pursuit of liberation in turn.[145]

Conclusion

At this early stage, nation making in the Arab domain was proceeding steadily, carefully coordinated with grand developmental projects inside Egypt, which needed foreign aid. On the one hand, during talks on Britain's withdrawal, discourse on the Arab nation focused on British imperialism, but was less critical of the USA. Even when Washington tightened Egypt's sovereignty–development dilemma by withholding funds, the Egyptian leadership trod carefully, as it needed American assistance. On the other hand, mobilisation of Arab audiences through a regional nation making programme provided the CCR with support and legitimacy in its negotiation of early dilemmas.

By mid-1954, the CCR was pursuing complementary pan-Arabist and neutralist policies, seeking an Arab consensus in opposition to British colonialism and Anglo-American defence pacts. In June, Nasser commissioned an official delegation to embark on Egypt's first Arab 'mission', inaugurating the second, public phase of Egypt's Arab policy. Minister Salim and Foreign Ministry Secretary Riyad were to make contact with Arab politicians in government, and prepare for an inter-Arab military cooperation agreement. Fathi al-Deeb was to contact progressive oppositional political figures and ascertain their responsiveness to the revolution's principles. The delegation visited Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, where it found consistent manifestations of popular support and interest in the Egyptian revolution.[146] Both the Saudi and Yemeni leaderships committed to oppose the 'Western pacts policy', while the Jordanian king expressed his inability to do so, the Syrians their hesitance, and the Lebanese president his unwillingness.[147] Nasser himself met with Iraqi Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah and King Saud of Saudi Arabia in 1954, as Chapter 7 will discuss, warning of Anglo-American designs both to

[145] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, p. 189. [146] Ibid., pp. 125–55.
[147] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad,* pp. 42–4; SWB: IV 475, 18.6.54, 'Major Salah Salim's Return from Saudi Arabia', pp. 34–7.

separate the issue of Palestine from that of Arab oil and to divert Arab attention away from Israel towards an anti-Soviet front.[148]

Yet despite these developments, the literature continues to emphasise the battle against the Baghdad Pact, the Western-sponsored Middle East defence alliance of 1955, as the turning point for Egypt's pan-Arabism, crowned by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in 1956. Scholars have maintained that pan-Arabism was either a late addition to the Free Officers' repertoire, instrumentally employed in foreign policy, or 'did not represent a radical departure' from pre-1952 policy.[149] The Free Officers have been described as using ethnic, linguistic or religious markers to fashion national myths. According to Dekmejian, the new leadership clung to 'the old value systems of Egyptian nationalism, and Islamic orthodoxy', in this initial phase, while an 'ideological deficiency' remained that was 'imperfectly compensated by the nascent Pan-Arab charisma of the leader'.[150] For him, 'material and social advances are not sufficient to insure successful nation formation'. In a variation on this view, some scholars concede that the CCR paid attention to the Arab sphere early on, but as a continuation of previous instrumentalist – even imperialist – policies: 'Like his predecessors, 'Abd al-Nasir had a strong sense of *Drang nach Osten*, although he disguised it by his sophisticated theory of Egypt's unique role in the Arab, African and Islamic worlds.'[151]

In an exception to the conventional wisdom, Lorenz writes that, 'Nasser did not neglect Egypt's Arab relations before 1955 … he gave them the priority he believed they deserved, though treating them as matters for private diplomacy rather than public rhetoric.'[152] Lorenz cites Salah Salim's energetic schedule of visits to Arab capitals between 1952 and early 1955: these were indeed significant, but it should be emphasised that much public rhetoric had accompanied them, in speeches, press conferences and radio broadcasts.

[148] Heikal, *Milaffat*, p. 315.
[149] Jankowski, 'Arab Nationalism in "Nasserism" and Egyptian State Policy, 1952–1958', in Jankowski and Israel Gershoni eds., *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 166; Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, p. 69.
[150] Dekmejian, *Egypt under Nasir*, pp. 39, 48, 52.
[151] Podeh, *The Quest for Hegemony*, p. 13.
[152] Joseph Lorenz, *Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p. 27.

It is this regional activism that facilitated Egypt's battle against the Baghdad Pact in 1955, after which pan-Arabism became a more prominent strand of foreign policy. The Arab dimension of early national policy did not occupy a lesser position in 1952–4 then, and was rather performing important functions for a government most immediately concerned with British withdrawal from Egypt, but aware of longer term international processes and regional imperatives. Knowing that the Anglo-Egyptian settlement would be followed by American pressure on Egypt and the Arabs to proceed on joint defence, and wishing to unify Arab positions against all forms of colonialism, Nasser was keen to prepare the ground for an alternative – hence the activation of a regional policy for Egypt early on. As Sawt al-'Arab radio manager Ahmed Said recalls, 'Nasser's regime inherited but did not invent Arab identity. The proof for this is the decision to establish the Arab League … Abdel Nasser took the idea and entrenched it further … rather than a preached message, pan-Arabist thought became a battle-cry.'[153]

[153] Interview, Ahmad Said, Manager of *Sawt al-'Arab*, Cairo, 7.03.07.

6 *Turkey and the Baghdad Pact, 1955: 'Freeing' the Middle East*

The year 1955 was dominated by news of the Baghdad Pact in Turkey, with the pro-government press and radio competing to cover every statement by Washington on its merits, and every step taken by an Arab state closer to it and away from pan-Arab alliances in turn. Indeed the Democrats pursued its expansion with unusual persistence, all the more pronounced as the pact's prospects grew increasingly gloomy. The short-lived Baghdad Pact, lasting from 1955 to 1958, has been described as the greatest foreign policy debacle in Turkey's history.[1] Turkey's promotion of the pact has often been explained as a function of the existing political alignment with the West. Certainly, having chosen the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) internationally, it was consistent for Turkey to choose the Baghdad Pact regionally – it was the latest Anglo-American-sponsored outfit for Middle East defence since the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO). However, the zeal with which the Democrats lobbied other Arab states to join, just two years after the Soviet Union had revoked its earlier demands on Turkey, reveal other motivations at play. As with NATO accession, the pact was presented as a security measure, but was pursued for reasons relating in significant part to the Democrat Party's (DP) revisionist national project, and here specifically its developmental component.

This project envisioned national progress as economic development, and equated this in turn with approximating Turkey to the economies of the industrialised West. In a conversation with a minister's aide in 1951, President Bayar phrased the need for industrialisation as follows: 'the citizen wants . . . a house, a road, a bridge, a dam, a port – in one

[1] Kemal Karpat, 'Turkish and Arab–Israeli Relations', in Karpat ed., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950–1974*, Leiden: Brill, 1975, p. 116; Philip Robins, 'The Foreign Policy of Turkey', in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami eds., *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2014, p. 317.

word, he wants civilisation'.[2] This plan was confronting an economic downturn in 1954, however, limited by Turkey's own resources and more powerful external powers' control over aid flows. The Democrats addressed this by promoting the pact and thereby reaffirming Turkey's strategic importance and NATO role. This was aimed to generate inflows of foreign aid and further affirm Turkey's Western affiliation and role in the 'Free World'. Turkey's regional policy thus developed partly from efforts to propel a state project for national development.

National Futures, American Models: 'Developing Turkey'

Pursuing national progress, according to the Democrats, meant a development drive that championed a new figure: the entrepreneur-citizen. The Democrats were beginning to implement their highly revisionist interpretation of the Kemalist principle of étatisme (*devletçilik*), through a series of liberalisations. Both a change in policy and a change in national economic culture were important goals, to provide the appropriate ground for private enterprise and attract levels of American aid and investment that would foster it. The DP's first programme in government paid particular attention to private investment in the agrarian sector.[3] Marshall Aid grants and tractor imports were celebrated as bringing mechanisation and land reclamation to rural areas, as well as assisting the government's expansion of road networks and other infrastructure.[4] Indeed, road construction was 'an absolute priority of the Directorate of Highways, which was established in 1950 and inspired by US advisers, who anticipated Eisenhower's Federal Highway Act of 1956 in Turkey'.[5] The DP also began liberalising barriers to private enterprise and ensured a stream of credit through the Agricultural Bank, and then the Turkish Industrial Development Bank, established in 1952. As long as growth facilitated the government's ambitious public works programmes, it remained averse to planning: indeed the DP parliamentary group had requested

[2] Celâl Bayar, *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes*, ed. İsmet Bozdağ, Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1986, p. 139.

[3] First Menderes Government Programme, 29.5.50: Ismail Arar, *Hükümet Programları: 1920–1965*, Istanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968, pp. 215–9.

[4] See Dwight Simpson, 'Development as a Process: the Menderes Phase in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1965, pp. 144–5.

[5] Kerem Öktem, *Angry Nation: Turkey since 1989*, London: Zed Books, 2011, p. 43.

a plan in January 1952, but the government had refused.[6] Measures brought in generally favoured the landed classes and bourgeoisie, as well as the middling peasants, who were highlighted in government discourse.[7] Meanwhile, electoral campaign pledges to Turkey's workers on the right to strike did not materialise, and initiatives such as the Workers Committee of 1954 were curtailed.[8]

The main slogan of the 1954 election campaign was *Kalkınan Türkiye*, or 'Developing Turkey'. Electoral pamphlets boasted of the strides Turkey had made in development thanks to the DP, while the government mouthpiece *Zafer* reported the building of new schools, ports and factories across the country.[9] The impact of DP policy on villagers was particularly emphasised.[10] The Korean War had raised agricultural prices and this, together with some years of good weather, had increased Turkey's exports by 50 per cent between 1950 and 1953.[11] These facilitated an even greater DP victory in the May 1954 elections.

A crucial engine of this process was the Democrats' recourse to American experts, evident in the fields of education and culture just as much as in economic policy. Of the forty-four education experts who worked in Turkey between 1950 and 1960, forty-one were American. At first, the American contributions took place within the framework of aid missions, sponsoring numerous student and teacher exchanges.[12] However, soon after DP accession to power, they began commissioning US experts directly. The implementation of such projects powerfully bolstered the DP's projected national narrative of Western identity.

[6] See Trade Minister Muhlis Ete's statement: 'Bill on National Development', *Cumhuriyet*, 6.2.52, p. 5.

[7] See, for example, 'Today's Parliament and the Menderes Government', *Zafer*, 1.11.50, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 204, November 1950, p. 98.

[8] Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve Ideolojisi*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970, p. 107. Cf. First Menderes Government Programme: Arar, *Hükümet Programları*, p. 214.

[9] See *Kalkınan Türkiye* and *Hangisi Bulunmaz Nimet*, Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık, 1954 and *Zafer*, March–April 1954.

[10] See *Demokrat Köylü*, Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık, 1954.

[11] Çağlar Keyder, 'Economic Development and Crisis', in Irvin Cemal Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak eds., *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 294.

[12] Esma Torun, 'II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türkiye'de Kültürel Değişimlere Yol Açan İç ve Dış Etkenler (1945–1960)', unpublished PhD thesis, Ankara University, 2002, p. 275.

Most of the projects that the Agricultural and Industrial Banks funded were established under the supervision of US aid agencies and the World Bank.[13] The 1951 Mutual Security Agreement between Turkey and the USA obliged the former to militarily assist the USA even before formal admission to NATO, but also came with a reaffirmation of Marshall Plan levels of US aid. NATO accession assured continuation of such financial aid, critical to the government's development plans. To encourage foreign funding and investment, the DP government amended existing legislation, opening up Turkey to foreign capital.[14] Reviewing Turkish foreign policy in late 1951, the British ambassador described Foreign Minister Köprülü as having 'launched a panegyric of Turkish–American friendship … [giving] detailed figures of all forms of American aid to Turkey, the sum of which amounted so far to the equivalent of TL 1,176 millions'.[15]

The education system and the military – both vehicles and emblems of Turkey's westernisation since Ottoman times – now underwent similar overhaul. The DP sought to fashion a new generation through American models of training in both fields. Indeed, according to Bayar, when he and Menderes first came to power, they drew up a 'state inventory', and the first two institutions that they considered were the universities and the armed forces, 'two state powers which must stay outside daily politics'.[16] When the Democrat leadership opened Ege University, their discourse was loaded with metaphors of the horizons of Western-style progress. Speaking to its new students, Education Minister Ahmet Özel advised: 'I hope that today's Turkish generation is aware of how hard they must work to reach the levels of civilisation and completeness … of the democratic world.'[17]

US–Turkish joint ventures at the time included the Ford Foundation's sponsorship of a business school at Istanbul University under the auspices of Harvard University, and an English teacher-training programme administered by Georgetown University and

[13] Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: a Study in Capitalist Development*, London: Verso, 1987, p. 139.
[14] Erhan, 'Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', p. 330.
[15] BNA: FO371/101853: BE, Ankara, to FO, No. 299, 27.12.51, p. 2.
[16] Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 114.
[17] 'Ege University Joined', *Zafer*, 10.3.56, p. 4; see also 'Ege University', *Zafer*, 8.3.56.

sponsored by the International Cooperation Agency.[18] Of the four new universities established in the 1950s, the most successful was another American-inspired institution, Ankara's Middle East Technical University. Jointly established with American and British partners, the university followed the US system, with teaching conducted in English, American senior administration until 1960, and ongoing exchange programmes with US universities.[19] The US government itself sponsored two higher education projects during the mid-1950s: the New York University Public Administration programme at Ankara University, and Atatürk University in Erzurum. The latter was developed by an academic mission from Nebraska University concerned with agricultural development.[20] In late 1955, Bayar pledged that Atatürk University would 'facilitate the development of Eastern Anatolia from social, cultural, technical and economic perspectives. Nebraska University and Turkish experts have begun working together to realise this great mission.'[21]

Another case in point is the DP's closure of the Village Institutes – the system of rural teacher-training schools established under Atatürk – and their transformation into teacher colleges in 1952. The DP had long been willing to do away with the Institutes, a remnant of RPP educational policy that had expanded under Inönü, and which they criticised as a tool of RPP propaganda.[22] In 1951, during DP debates on educational reform, American expert Kate Wofford was invited to Turkey to advise on their replacement. Her report recommended that the Institutes be fused with other teacher colleges into a unified system. This was accepted by the Ministry Council and a bill presented and passed in parliament by January 1954.[23] In another case, in 1953,

[18] George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective*, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972, p. 77. See also Torun, 'II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası', p. 276.

[19] For speeches by Bayar and US Ambassador Warren during its foundation ceremony, see 'Middle East Technical University Foundations Laid with Great Ceremony', *Zafer*, 3.10.57, pp. 1, 4.

[20] 'A Study on Atatürk University', *Zafer*, 10.1.56, p. 2.

[21] President Bayar's Address on the Opening of Tenth Session 2nd Meeting of General Assembly, 1.11.55, in Kâzim Öztürk, *Presidential Opening Addresses of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, Istanbul, 1969, p. 586.

[22] Alexandre Vexliard and Kemal Aytaç, 'The "Village Institutes" in Turkey', *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 1964, pp. 42–5.

[23] Law 6234 on 'Merging Village Institutes and Primary School Teacher Colleges', 27.1.54, cited in Torun, 'II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası', p. 273.

a specialist for secondary schools in the US Office of Education, Ellsworth Tompkins, was invited to Turkey to write a report on middle school education. After a Turkish delegation's subsequent visit to the USA, the Ministry decided to open a series of middle schools based on the American high school system.[24]

The Democrats' importing of American education models fit well with their pronouncements on national development through individual opportunity. In her study of Turkish universities, Öncu contrasts the 'missionary vision of the Kemalist decades', which harnessed education in grand modernisation projects, with the Democrat era, when 'education became coupled with the symbolism of achievement through individual effort, offering unlimited possibilities of ascent to those who tried'.[25] Meanwhile, the DP curbed the autonomy of existing higher education institutions:

> Turkey's new linkages to international markets and the beginnings of US aid and credit lent the ideological content of the decade a markedly different tenor. It was no longer the prominent professors who acted as advisors and shaped public policy, but the officials of Chambers of Commerce whose influence prevailed in government circles and flowed through party networks.[26]

The other crucial institution of nation making in Turkey was the army. In his memoirs, Bayar describes it as 'one of the most important components' of Menderes' 'ideal of a "Great and Powerful Turkey"', and emphasises the attention both men paid to it as soon as they came to power.[27] Beyond its function in state building, however, it had a powerful nation making function in a conscripting system, as the first institution to be exposed to westernising reform since the Ottoman Tanzimat. The army now underwent critical structural reform under the guidance of ubiquitous American experts. The NATO connection made for the subsequent approximation of the Turkish army ever more closely to the US model, in terms of equipment, techniques and protocols.[28]

[24] See Torun, 'II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası', p. 277.
[25] Ayşe Öncu, 'Academics: the West in the Discourse of University Reform', in M. Heper, A. Öncu and H. Kramer eds., *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1993, p. 158. See also Walter Adams and John Garraty, *Is the World our Campus?*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1960.
[26] Öncu, 'Academics', p. 157. [27] Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 117.
[28] Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 53.

Beyond these structural changes, the army became crucial to the Democrats' celebration of Turkey's Western calling. Bayar remembers Menderes affirming that in order to improve the army, 'it is necessary to learn from the experiences of World War II, and to form ties with the armies of the friendly countries who had fought this war. It is not enough to obtain new weapons: to use [them] ... we must also gain a new mentality.'[29] American influence did bring about a discursive shift in the army's self-image and expression of its mission. Turkish officers were profoundly shaped by their training in US military colleges or by members of the US mission in Turkey: 'In cases like Turkey, it was not only the state and the military that gained universal access to the young population for increasing their "docility-utility" but various foreign (particularly American) "aid missions" as well.'[30] More specifically, the American mission in Turkey brought the tenets of the modernisation school to the fore of Turkish perceptions of national development. Mainstream American political scientists at the time lauded the 'overpowering materialism' which Turkey's 'rapidly modernizing and democratizing army' was teaching its soldiers, thanks to US assistance.[31] These discursive shifts worked in tandem with nation making at the time, and support the thesis that the latter had an important 'developmental' component under the DP. Altınay explains that the role of military service in instilling discipline served also to increase the 'economic utility of a soldier beyond the barracks'.[32]

To differing degrees then, Turkey's national developmental project now bore the mark of the American relationship. In some fields, it became possible to speak of the importing of the American model. State media continued to be used to reaffirm Turkey's Western alignment and identity. In January 1954, President Bayar embarked on a long visit to the United States, which was highlighted by the Turkish state and mainstream media, as well as by their American counterparts (see

[29] Ibid., p. 118.
[30] Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 64.
[31] Daniel Lerner and Richard Robinson, 'Swords and Ploughshares: the Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force', *World Politics*, Vol. 13, 1960, p. 34.
[32] Altınay, *The Myth of the Military-Nation*, p. 64.

Figure 6.1).[33] The Democrats made sure to capitalise on this visit for nation making purposes, emphasising the extensive preparations made to receive Bayar, and the common values and goals of the American and Turkish peoples, and relaying this to audiences back home repeatedly: 'Three fifteen minute Voice of America broadcasts every day during the President's tour were beamed to Turkey and one, a special commentary, was relayed daily by Radio Ankara.'[34] In May 1955, the DP responded positively to a proposal from the Central Intelligence Agency to establish a Radio Free Europe transmitter in Istanbul. The proposal was ultimately shelved, however, probably because the necessary legislation might have prompted the opposition to set up private radio stations of its own.[35]

Confronting the Dilemma, Reasserting the Turkish Difference

Despite their advances in political and economic liberalisation during their first term in office, by the mid-1950s, the DP leadership had begun to confront the limitations of Turkey's state capacity. In 1954, bad weather and the passing of favourable international price trends had begun to erode economic growth. The principal failing of the DP's early economic policy had been a lack of planning, which Menderes refused to acknowledge well into 1954. Accusing the Republican People's Party (RPP) of clinging to the policies of 'totalitarian countries', Menderes asked: 'Was European industry, and the great American economy, established by five-year plans I wonder?'[36] Speaking in Amasya in 1955 Menderes bemoaned the RPP's neglect of the country, and explained that the task that had fallen to the

[33] *Resmi Ziyaret . . . Türkiye Cumhurreisi Celâl Bayar'ın Birleşik Amerika'yi Ziyaretin Hikayesi, Ocak-Mart, 1954*, Ankara: United States Information Service, 1954; SWB: IV, 434, 26.1.54, 'President Bayar on Turkey's Policy', Radio Ankara, pp. 18–20.

[34] *Resmi Ziyaret*, 'New York'.

[35] See *Forum*, Vol. 3, No. 28, 15.5.55, pp. 5–6; 'Free Europe Radio's Istanbul Station', *Cumhuriyet*, 13.12.54, p. 1; Nevra Ersari Gözübüyük, 'The Democrat Party and the State Radio (1956–1960)', Boğaziçi University, unpublished PhD thesis, 1999, p. 126.

[36] Menderes, Trabzon, 21.4.54, cited in Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 102.

Figure 6.1 Front cover of *Turkey's President Celâl Bayar's Trip to America* published by Recep Bilginer and Mehmet Ali Yalçın in 1954.

Democrats was nothing short of 'completely reconstructing the country'.[37]

The Democrats' first action was to seek further foreign assistance. Upon Menderes' arrival in the USA in March 1954, and after Bayar had exerted two months of effort in wooing his hosts, the Democrats had made an important bid for $300 million of additional aid. Bayar had been careful to emphasise the identity of Turkish and American views on the international situation, condemning 'the hazardous game of neutralism' played by other regional states.[38] Turkey's Council of Ministers had been authorised to proceed with the NATO Status of Forces and Military Installations agreements in mid-1953.[39] The Democrats had also made legislative gestures to their foreign donors, such as the January 1954 Law for the Promotion of Foreign Investment and the amended Petroleum Law of March 1954. Both accorded foreign business significant concessions, and were drawn up in close cooperation with US economics and business experts.[40] Yet despite these gestures and the enthusiastic American reception the Turks had received, their request was flatly rejected. Washington allowed a small increase in military aid,[41] but otherwise insisted that the government reduce its agricultural subsidies and imports, as well as cut investment.[42]

This damaged the credibility of the Democrats' developmental project as a whole, and its related claims on Turkey's Western identity. It is in this context that Turkey's subsequent regional foreign policy should be analysed. In order to sustain the Democrats' liberal national project, they had to engage with international assistance sources within the Western bloc, and to foreground Turkey's role in the front against communism. More specifically, securing further aid required the enhancement of Turkey's projected image as the cornerstone of

[37] TRA: A2/30.1.0.0/2.14.7: Private Bulletin: 'Our Prime Minister's Speech in Amasya', 20.11.55. See Eroğul, *Demokrat*, pp. 121–2 on events of 1955 and DP propaganda after an illegal labourers' strike, describing their impoverishment as 'the tax of development'.

[38] *Resmi Ziyaret*, 'Washington'.

[39] For the hefty commitments entailed in these agreements, see Erhan, 'Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', p. 331.

[40] See Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 73 and footnote 59.

[41] BNA: FO371/112928, WK10345/22, BE, Ankara to FO, 20.3.54.

[42] Mehmet Altan, *Süperler ve Türkiye: Türkiye'deki Amerikan ve Sovyet Yatırımları*, Istanbul: AFA, 1986, pp. 93–4.

Western containment policy in the region from south-east Europe to the Middle East. Turkish leaders chose to forge closer linkages between the national, regional and international levels of Turkish policy, through a more dynamic Middle East policy. This policy went through three phases, each driven by the Democrats' pursuit of foreign assistance, and with that, acceptance in the Western community of states.

The first phase saw a determination to affirm Turkey – and not the Arab states – as the Western powers' main partner in regional defence. As with their pursuit of NATO membership, the Democrats shrewdly balanced the demands of external players, in this case their allies, with their own state's capacity for a development drive. Once again the interplay of Ottoman legacies of essentialism with contemporary exigencies was a feature of their efforts. The first instance of this came in Turkish talks with Britain over the Middle East Command (MEC). In October 1951, Turkish diplomats had acquiesced to British pressure to invite Egypt to the MEC. Egypt refused in November, and the British were reluctant to accept Iraqi proposals to take Egypt's place.[43] Meanwhile, Britain's hopes for a base in Israel were dashed when an Israeli note declared its objection to an attack on Russia.[44] Turkey's position as the only fully committed regional power was becoming stronger. The Turkish ambassador designate in London, Huseyin Ragib Baydur, therefore felt able to counsel the British ambassador in Ankara against current strategies. In March 1952, the ambassador reported Baydur's account – steeped in Orientalist metaphor – to the Foreign Office:

> he suggested that a good deal of our troubles might have come from our too obviously courting the Arabs … In his view theirs was a bazaar game and when they saw that they had something that we wanted, they kept on raising the price. If only we would affect disinterest they, like the bazaar merchant, would, after suitable bluster, come along and seek accommodation.[45]

By June 1952, the MEC scheme had evolved into the Middle East Defence Organisation, but it would soon become overshadowed by the Northern Tier plan. Turkish officials would exert their influence here too.

[43] See BNA: FO371/98278.
[44] BNA: FO371/98278: Correspondence, British Legation, Tel Aviv, to FO, 1.3.52.
[45] BNA: FO371/98278: Correspondence, BE, Ankara, to FO, 4.3.52.

Ankara's diplomats continued to impress upon their American counterparts the message of Turkish centrality to Middle East defence, and the negligible utility of Arab participation. When the Dulles tour schedule of spring 1953 was revealed to exclude Turkey, Menderes took the initiative to request a visit. By the end of his trip, Dulles had become convinced that Arab alliances with colonial powers such as Britain were unlikely. At the talks, Menderes echoed: 'hope of having the Arab countries accept MEDO should be abandoned at this time ... the conclusion can be drawn that in the defense of the Middle East, the backbone must be Turkey'.[46] The Turkish diplomats' stance did not account for the variation in Arab positions towards Western alliances – Iraq was a known advocate, for example; it was rather an expression of their own priorities.

When Dulles developed his plan for a Northern Tier alliance to include Turkey, the Democrats opposed even these plans. They proposed instead a 'four power' pact comprising America, Britain, France and Turkey, arguing that the MEC precedent showed that the Northern Tier would not generate Arab cooperation.[47] The Democrats worked hard to keep Turkey close to, and the Arabs distant from, their main providers of security and aid. This behaviour reflected their own self-identification with the West and their dismissive regard for the capacities of the Arab states. Still, as the Democrats preferred to follow the US lead when pushed, Turkey began preparations in late 1953 for the Turco-Pakistani Pact of April 1954.[48]

The underlying pursuit of economic aid in these foreign policy choices was visible from the start. Menderes made what amounted to a 'pitch' for further aid during the 1953 Dulles meeting: 'In addition to Turkey's strategic position, its relentless determination to resist aggression, the social and political stability of the country, and its willingness to contribute forces to the common defence, it is clear that dollars spent in Turkey will buy more for defense than those expended in any other

[46] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1: Memorandum of Conversation, by Counselor of Embassy in Turkey (Rountree), 26.5.53, p. 139.

[47] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1: Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) to DOS, 10.6.53, p. 387. See also BNA: FO371/112921, Annual Report on Turkey for 1953, p. 4.

[48] See FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1: Secretary of State to USE, Turkey, 24.12.53, pp. 439–41.

country.'[49] Highlighting the compatibility of Turkish and American values and identity, Menderes pledged: 'Between 1950 and 1960 Turkey will illustrate how great progress can be achieved by giving way to free enterprise and economic liberty.' He described economic assistance as 'necessary at this time to help Turkey carry out her duty as "guardian of civilization and an element of security in this part of the world"'.[50]

Significantly, a new potential source of assistance to Turkey had appeared the same year: the Soviet peace offensive of 1953 was combined with several offers of increased trade exchange and aid during 1954 and 1955. With the Soviet demands of 1945 withdrawn, and the non-aligned bloc taking shape, these years arguably constituted the phase in which Turkey's neutrality yet again became possible. An opportunity arose to play off the superpowers and draw security and aid from both. Yet Turkey's responses to the Soviet notes of 1953, echoed by Bulganin in 1954 and Khrushchev in 1955, were cold and distrustful.[51] Ankara refused even cultural and sporting event invitations, and told Moscow repeatedly that only an improvement between the blocs as a whole would lead to any change in bilateral relations.[52] In a speech opening parliament in 1953, Bayar insisted: 'Behind the apparently peaceful gestures, the war preparations and destructive activities to peace-loving countries continue.'[53] More than its distrust of the Soviet Union, the Democrat government here maintained its crucial belief that the only way to resolve its dilemma was to strengthen Turkey's position and anti-Soviet credentials in NATO.[54] Indeed, the

[49] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1, Memorandum of Conversation, Counselor of Embassy in Turkey (Rountree), 26.5.53, p. 141.
[50] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1, 26.5.53, p. 142.
[51] Erel Tellal, '1945–1960: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc – Relations with the USSR', in B. Oran ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010, p. 305. On Turkish Foreign Ministry's proposed circular on the Soviet note, BNA: FO371/107557, WK1072/1, BE, Ankara to Western and Southern Department, FO, 14.4.53.
[52] Ara Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours: Origins and Failure of the Baghdad Pact, 1953–58*, Slough: Archive Editions, 2001, p. 13.
[53] Mustafa Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2004, p. 465.
[54] Ibid., p. 466; Tellal, '1945–1960: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', p. 305.

Democrats were able to put aside their misgivings when the US moved towards détente.

The second phase in Turkey's position on regional defence began in July 1954, with the government's private strategies showing a new openness to Arab cooperation. This shift was signalled by Menderes' calling of a special conference on Middle East policy, to which he invited all Turkey's diplomatic representatives in the Arab countries.[55] The participants made a general evaluation of Arab attitudes to Turkey, before discussing regional defence plans. They decided to begin by forcing an answer from Iraq, based on its geographical proximity to Soviet Russia and dependence on Britain. Meanwhile they would continue with the subtle persuasion of Syria and Jordan. Egypt was dismissed as obstinate.[56]

The change in direction of the Turkish conference of July 1954 was likely occasioned by the economic downturn in Turkey, necessitating acquiescence to US plans. Significantly, these plans had been declared just recently in May, during a conference of the US Chiefs of Mission in the Middle East. Meeting in Istanbul, they had affirmed the need to expand the Turkish–Pakistani Pact for regional defence.[57] Dulles later explained the US view that 'an exclusively Western organization for Middle East defense as proposed by the Turks (and at various times by the French and British as well) . . . would be interpreted as a challenge rather than an invitation'.[58] Also significantly, Menderes had made a high-profile visit in June to the USA, where he met with Eisenhower, Dulles and Director of Mutual Security Administration Harold Stassen. An official account of this visit, published by the Turkish Naval Forces,

[55] According to Ambassador Mahmut Dikerdem, this was the first diplomatic gathering of its kind: see Dikerdem, *Ortadoğuda Devrim Yılları: Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları*, Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1990, pp. 104–10.

[56] See account of Orhan Eralp, Director-General of the Second Department of the Turkish MFA in BNA: FO371/110773/V1024/17, Bowker to FO, 31.7.54; Ismail Soysal, 'The 1955 Baghdad Pact', *Studies on Turkish–Arab Relations*, Annual of the Foundation for Studies on Turkish–Arab Relations, Istanbul: Cihan, 1990, pp. 55–7.

[57] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1: Papers Approved by Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul, May 11–14, 1954, 14.5.54, pp. 506–12.

[58] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1: Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, 'US Position on MEDO and Related Questions', 30.7.53, pp. 406–8. On US differences with Britain, see David Devereux, *The Formulation of British Defence Policy towards the Middle East, 1948–56*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1990, pp. 154–60.

emphasised the unity of purpose of the two allies and began simply: 'American nation, we are with you with all our hearts!'[59] On his return, Menderes assured US Ambassador Warren that he would be meeting with the Iraqi ambassador imminently, and would tell him that the '[Iraqis] face a necessity of decision and that there is no longer a place for a negative attitude'.[60]

The Turks found their Arab interlocutor in Nuri al-Said, who had been reappointed Iraqi Prime Minister in June 1954 and had immediately severed ties with the Soviet Union and launched an intense anti-leftist campaign in Iraq. Like the DP in Turkey, he believed that only a Western alliance could protect Iraq after the lapse of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, anticipating – as did Turkey – a steady stream of economic aid as a result.[61] In October, Menderes invited al-Said to Istanbul. At this meeting, the Turkish side was again adept at shaping final outcomes: Menderes steered al-Said towards acceptance of a pact with Turkey in the first instance, rather than with Pakistan.[62] The two then released an official statement on their intentions to sign a bilateral agreement similar to the Turco-Pakistani template, in advance of a wider pact. This news triggered the beginnings of the critical Egyptian-led Arab response.[63]

In January 1955, Menderes and Köprülü embarked on a tour of the Arab states they wished to woo to their alliance, beginning in Baghdad.[64] Menderes reported to Bayar the warmth of their reception by the Iraqis, and that he had invited King Faisal to visit Turkey in due course.[65] In this mood of optimism, Menderes decided to press for the issuing of a communiqué announcing a forthcoming Turco-Iraqi pact.

[59] Hayri Bars ed., *Türkiye Başvekili Sayın Adnan Menderes'in Birleşik Amerika Devletlerini Ziyaretleri*, Istanbul: T. C. Deniz Basımevi, 1954, p. 1.

[60] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1: Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to DOS, 15.6.54, p. 516.

[61] See Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 139–41.

[62] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1: Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to DOS, 23.10.54, pp. 554–5.

[63] See Statement by Major Salim, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Press Conference, 16.1.55; Statement by Major Salim, Press Conference, Conference of Arab League Representatives, 7.2.55: Noble Frankland ed., *Documents on International Affairs*: 1955, Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 313–5, 323–4.

[64] 'A. Menderes goes to Iraq Tomorrow Morning', *Zafer*, 5.1.55, p. 1.

[65] TRA: A1/30.1.0.0/1.8.13: Correspondence, Menderes to Bayar, Baghdad Embassy, 7.1.55.

He had received word from Dulles the previous November: 'we would be pleased to see Iraq sign [a] bilateral agreement with Turkey during Menderes' forthcoming visit to Iraq'.[66] Menderes exploited al-Said's fears that further delays would bring the pact closer in time to the expiry of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, which might display a connection between the two. The Democrat leader was also anxious to act before Israeli pressure on Turkey not to deal with the Arab states intensified.[67] Although Menderes benefited from British pressure on al-Said,[68] and was acting with a clear American mandate,[69] it is worth noting that American and British motivations remained divergent, and that there was a strong sense in which the Turks were the driving force behind the pact. Indeed, both the Americans and British were surprised at the result of the Baghdad trip.

An important aspect of Turkish diplomacy with the Arab states was the official attitude to Israel. The Democrats' position in power followed from their affirmation of Turkey's Western identity and its Others in the Middle East. Thus while Menderes' strategy was to send reassuring messages to all parties involved, the outcome invariably saw Turkey positioned in the Western camp allied with Israel. In October 1954 and February 1955, during talks with al-Said, Menderes worked to allay his fears about associating with Israeli allies, while reassuring his British counterparts that the alliance would ultimately serve to reconcile the Arabs with Israel's existence.[70] Menderes eventually agreed to include in the Iraqi-Turkish treaty an exchange of letters affirming both states' commitment to the United Nations resolutions on Palestine.[71] This was al-Said's initiative, designed to deflect accusations of collaboration.[72] Upon his return to Turkey, Menderes

[66] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX, Part 1: Secretary of State to USE, Turkey, 11.11.54, p. 558.

[67] For a sympathetic account of Israel's policy towards Ankara, see Amikam Nachmani, *Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the Eastern Mediterranean*, London: Frank Cass, 1987, p. 66.

[68] *Akis*, 28.2.55, p. 9.

[69] Magnus Persson, *Great Britain, the United States, and the Security of the Middle East*, Lund: Lund University Press, 1998, p. 210.

[70] See Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1959*, New York: Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 65–6, 75, 77.

[71] TRA: A41/30.1.0.0/35.215/4: Correspondence, Menderes to al-Said and vice versa, 24.2.55, pp. 1–2.

[72] TRA: O1/30.1.0.0/123.790.3: Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Mukhtar Baban's Statement, Special Session of Chamber of Deputies, 6.2.55.

cabled al-Said a warm message reporting the 'profound joy' in Turkey at news of the agreement, and its unanimous approval in parliament.[73] The following day, the Israeli Foreign Ministry complained that 'hostility towards Israel' was clearly 'an integral aspect of the alliance'.[74] Menderes responded that the references to UN resolutions on Palestine did not imply support for their 'literal implementation' and that they entailed 'no change' in Turkey's policy towards Israel.[75] In parliament, Köprülü reiterated that Turkey's friendly relations with Israel would not be affected.[76]

Scholarly appreciations of these developments have varied. Huseyin Bağcı writes that Menderes had inherited a 'foreign policy burden' in Turkey's recognition of Israel, and that while Menderes tried to follow a 'balanced' policy, he ended up following a 'biased and contrary' path, because he lacked a clear Middle East policy at the outset.[77] Accounts by Sanjian and Yeşilbursa speak of a clear 'shift' in the Turkish attitude to the Arab–Israeli conflict, citing as evidence Turkey's alliance with Iraq and Menderes' private and occasionally public assurances in Lebanon and Jordan on solidarity with the Palestine cause.[78] Evaluating the Democrats' positions above, however, they appear rather consistent in their behaviour, backing up private assurances with alliance choices that overlapped with those of Israel, while following their Western allies in displaying impatience and at times outright hostility to Israel's Arab opposition.

The third phase saw the Turkish sponsors of the Baghdad Pact achieve some success among non-Arab states, gaining optimism in their plans for its expansion. The pact's signature in February 1955

[73] TRA: A41/30.1.0.0/35.215/4: Correspondence, Menderes to al-Said, Private Office of the Cabinet to Baghdad Embassy, 25.2.55, pp. 3–4.

[74] Comment by the Israeli Foreign Ministry on the Signature of the Iraqi–Turkish Pact, 26.2.55: Frankland ed., *Documents on International Affairs: 1955*, pp. 289–90.

[75] BNA: FO371/1154489/V1073/180, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 1.2.55.

[76] Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman, 'Bölüm III, Ikinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası (1945–1965): Genel Durum', in Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, Vol. I (1919–1973)*, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1987, p. 260.

[77] Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, Ankara: METU Press, 2001, p. 39.

[78] Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours*, pp. 108–9; Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact*, p. 75. See also Gönlübol and Ülman, 'Bölüm III', p. 257.

was welcomed in Britain, which joined it in April.[79] This soon attracted Pakistan and Iran, such that the pact's executive apparatus could be upgraded, first to establish a ministerial council, and then a military planning committee.[80] At the first ministerial council meeting in Baghdad in November, Menderes made the following statement: 'The fact that five determined states have gathered around these sturdy and benevolent ideals, such a short time after the birth of the Baghdad Pact, is clear proof that this pact will bring peace and prosperity not just to the countries represented here but to those who will join it . . . '[81]

Britain's accession in April coincided with the Asian and African Nations Conference at Bandung in Indonesia, which gathered together emergent neutralist (and later non-aligned) states such as Egypt, whose leaders were heavily critical of the Baghdad Pact. The Turkish delegates' conduct displayed their confidence in the pact at the time, and in their role within Western containment plans. Indeed, Deputy Prime Minister Zorlu later emphasised that Turkey had gone to Bandung as the West's spokesperson and at the West's insistence.[82] Zeki Küneralp, a senior member of Turkey's Permanent Delegation at NATO in Paris, attended the conference: his account closely reflects official policy at the time. He describes carefully the way in which Turkey's delegation, headed by Zorlu, navigated the conference's debates on colonialism:

> Turkey did not defend the colonialism of our NATO allies at Bandung, but she did make NATO's raison d'être acceptable. She . . . reminded the Conference that she had been among the first to revolt against colonialism. But she drew attention . . . to the nations that had fallen within the Iron Curtain, that today a new type of Soviet colonialism had developed alongside the classic colonialism and she asked for this to be condemned no less strongly. In a roundabout way she had her wish; the final communiqué of the Conference condemned 'every kind of colonialism'.[83]

[79] TRA: O1/30.1.0.0/126.809.4: Correspondence, British Ambassador James Bowker to Menderes, 28.2.55.

[80] See 'Proposed Redraft of Letter of Reservation', 18.8.55; Persson, *The Security of the Middle East*, pp. 250–9.

[81] TRA: A2/30.1.0.0/2.14.7: Private Bulletin, 'Our Prime Minister and Our Delegation's Other Members in Baghdad', 20.11.55.

[82] Gönlübol and Ülman, 'Bölüm III', p. 276.

[83] Zeki Küneralp, *Just a Diplomat*, trans. Geoffrey Lewis, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992, p. 56.

Küneralp's language reflects Turkey's priorities at the time: 'At Bandung, Turkey scored some other points in favour of the West.'[84] He describes proudly the confrontation between Zorlu and Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru: 'Joyfully and enthusiastically he attacked Nehru. He spoke at length of the baneful results that could spring from following a neutral policy in face of the Soviet threat. To give vivid proof of the invalidity of Nehru's chosen stance he adduced arguments both reasonable and far-fetched . . . '[85] In the subsequent NATO Council ministerial meeting in Paris, Zorlu received praise for his role at Bandung and thereafter, 'the political stock of both Turkey and Zorlu stood very high'.[86] Addressing parliament in November, Bayar painted a similarly glittering picture of Turkey's performance, noting his pleasure 'at seeing how alert the majority of Asian-African states were to the threats facing the free world'.[87] The contrast between these accounts, on the one hand, and the Bandung states' well-known scepticism of the Western bloc, on the other, reveals the particular lens through which Turkish delegates viewed regional and international affairs.

After Britain's accession, Turkish politicians were anxious for the Arab countries to follow its lead: the Baghdad Pact, unlike the MEC, was their own venture. There were different strands of Turkish–Arab diplomacy depending on the degree to which each Arab state opposed the pact: Syria was a particular target in 1955. On his visits to Damascus and Beirut following the Baghdad communiqué, Menderes had met unenthusiastic officials and confronted large popular protests.[88] During the negotiations for a tripartite agreement between Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Menderes decided to increase the pressure on Syria. On 5 March, he spoke sternly about Syria's Egyptian ally:

> The pressure which Egypt has been trying for some time to put on some Arab states has reached levels irreconcilable with the principle of state autonomy . . . It is well known that we have long joint borders with Syria . . . Therefore, as natural as it is for Syria to feel closely connected to

[84] Ibid., p. 56. [85] Ibid., pp. 56–7. See *Akis*, 29.3.55, pp. 17–8.
[86] Küneralp, *Just a Diplomat*, p. 58.
[87] President Bayar's Address on the Opening of Tenth Session, Second Meeting of General Assembly, 1.11.55, in Öztürk, *Presidential Opening Addresses*, p. 613.
[88] 'Demonstrations in Syria', *Milliyet*, 17.1.55, p. 1; Gönlübol and Ülman, 'Bölüm III', p. 257.

events in our country, it is natural for us to feel the same about events in Syria. For this reason, we find that the unnecessary, and sometimes manifestly hostile moves … made by the Egyptian leaders … need to be taken seriously.[89]

In an aide-mémoire on 13 March, Turkey's ambassador in Damascus, Ismail Soysal, described the tripartite agreement as intended to obstruct Arab accession to the Baghdad Pact. He warned that its hostility to Turkey would force a revision of Turkish policy towards Syria.[90] There followed a diplomatic crisis which combined what has been called 'bullying' on Menderes' part, with Turkish pressure on the Allies to do the same, all met with further Syrian protests.[91] It passed without a change in Syrian policy, such that Bayar, in a speech in late 1955, whitewashed his reception in Lebanon into an 'intimate and warm' one, and conspicuously failed to mention his trip to Syria.[92]

Turkish policy towards those states that had not publicly condemned the Baghdad Pact was far more persuasive than coercive, promising Western military aid upon membership and even 'making token military gifts' to Jordan and Lebanon.[93] Ankara Radio made Arabic broadcasts dedicated to promoting the pact, reporting on Nuri al-Said's speech to parliament for example and the gift of three Turkish aircraft to Jordan.[94] Bayar invited Lebanese President Camille Chamoun to Ankara in April, where he was received warmly.[95] Bayar made a speech announcing the upgrading of diplomatic relations to embassy status, and the impending conclusion of trade and cultural agreements. He emphasised the importance of Turco-Lebanese cooperation, since 'the

[89] 'Prime Minister Menderes' Statement'; 'Menderes Dissects the Approach of Egypt and Syria', *Zafer*, 6.3.55, p. 1; 'Syria and Egypt United against Us', *Milliyet*, 7.3.55, p. 1; SWB: IV, 550, 11.3.55, 'Menderes on the Syrian–Egyptian Agreement', p. 22.

[90] 'We've Given Syria a New Note', *Milliyet*, 16.3.55, p. 1.

[91] Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours*, pp. 101–4; Ali Naci Karacan, 'Heroic Egypt!', *Milliyet*, 26.3.55, p. 1; 'Demonstrations against Us Held in Aleppo', 26.3.55, p. 1.

[92] President Bayar's Address on the Opening of Tenth Session, Second Meeting of General Assembly, 1.11.55, in Öztürk, *Presidential Opening Addresses*, pp. 613–6.

[93] See SWB: IV, 549; Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours*, p. 107.

[94] SWB: IV 549, 8.3.55, 'Ankara's Arabic Broadcasts', p. 1.

[95] See 'Our Dear Lebanese Guests', *Zafer*, 1.4.55, p. 1; Metin Tamkoç, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976, p. 238.

danger of extermination confronted all peace-loving states equally'.[96] Bayar visited Lebanon again in June, where he made sure to declare that Turkey understood very well the importance of independence to the Arabs: 'the main lesson Atatürk taught us was self-determination ... and non-interference in other nations' affairs'.[97] Despite Bayar's efforts, however, strong popular disapproval of the Baghdad Pact in Lebanon forced Chamoun to decline.

By late 1955, the mood of the Western powers was pessimistic. Egypt had signed a Soviet arms deal in September, and the Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi alliance was formalised in October, raising alarm bells in Turkey.[98] Turkish diplomats would not be deterred, however, and urged their allies on. Bayar scheduled a mission to Jordan for November 1955, coordinating with Britain and the USA beforehand. Turkish negotiators were careful to respond to each of their allies' separate concerns. To the British, who were still preoccupied with the securing of bases in the region, they stressed that Jordanian accession would allow a renewal of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty to this end.[99] Meanwhile, the Americans were wary that pact expansion might damage the prospects for an Arab–Israeli settlement, which they were trying to engineer through a plan codenamed Alpha.[100] This was a secret British–American initiative begun in early 1955, which intended to induce Egypt and Israel into talks and concessions. The Baghdad Pact had elicited condemnation from both sides of the conflict, with each party interpreting it as biased to the other. Foreign Minister Zorlu responded to this by suggesting to Dulles that the USA provide a security guarantee to Israel and accede to the pact.[101] The State Department then gave a somewhat muted green light on approaching Jordan, with the

[96] 'Lebanese Friend President Camille Chamoun Was Yesterday Greeted with a Great Ceremony', *Zafer*, 2.4.55, pp. 1, 4.
[97] 'President's Speech in Saida', *Zafer*, 20.6.55, p. 1.
[98] For example, see daily reports in *Milliyet*: 17–21.10.55; Sami Kohen, 'The Situation in the Middle East is Serious', *Milliyet*, 24.10.55, p. 4.
[99] See Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact*, pp. 137–8.
[100] FRUS: 1955–1957, 'Near East; Iran; Iraq', Vol. XII: Memorandum of a Conversation, DOS, Washington, 11.8.55, pp. 140, 144. On Plan Alpha, see Chapter 8 and Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, pp. 65–72.
[101] FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XII: Telegram from Permanent Representative to NATO, 26.10.55, pp. 176–7.

proviso that any agreement was not to jeopardise an Arab–Israeli settlement.[102]

Bayar and Zorlu journeyed to Amman on 2 November, where they made it clear to King Hussein that the pact would offer him funds to expand his army and enhanced security against Israel, as well as potential economic aid from Britain.[103] At the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council meeting later in November, Bayar pressed for Jordanian accession. Accounts of Turkish–British negotiations reveal another instance of the British coming round to the Turkish view, this time on the urgency of strengthening the pact outweighing the risk of distancing Egypt further.[104] Britain's Templer Mission of December 1955 was duly organised, unbeknownst to the Americans, who had advised against such a move. Dulles did not wish any overtures to Jordan to silence recent positive noises from Cairo regarding Plan Alpha.[105] The Templer visit's end in failure was thus a great blow to the Democrat leaders' morale, as they had pushed for Jordanian inclusion against the more cautious US line. Indeed the year ended in continued popular protests against the Baghdad Pact, with the Jordanian Palace, as well as the Turkish, French and American consuls in Jerusalem, all becoming the target of demonstrations.[106]

Faith against Communism

Alongside the Americanisation of influential social institutions, and efforts to secure recognition in the international field, the DP national project nevertheless maintained its emphases – particularly within school curricula – on the 'national character and that of [the Turks'] forefathers'. The Democrats crafted a delicate synthesis of nationalist and religious education in order to appeal to more conservative voters,

[102] FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XII: Telegram from State Department to Delegation at Foreign Ministers Meeting, Geneva, 29.10.55, p. 180.

[103] 'If Jordan is Attacked Our Army will Run to its Aid', *Milliyet*, 6.11.55, p. 1; *Akis*, 5.11.55, p. 18; King Hussein of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, London: Heinemann, 1985, p. 89.

[104] Persson, *The Security of the Middle East*, pp. 275–6; Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact*, pp. 141–3.

[105] FRUS: 1955–1957, 'Arab–Israeli Dispute 1955', Vol. XIV, Telegram from DOS to USE, UK, 5.12.55, pp. 820–1.

[106] 'The Turkish Consulate in Jerusalem was Attacked', *Milliyet*, 20.12.55, p. 1; 'Unfortunate Events Ongoing in Jordan', *Milliyet*, 21.12.55, p. 1.

by relaxing the westernisation measures of Atatürk, while appealing to their American interlocutors, by emphasising individual freedom of conscience within a larger national campaign against communism. The Education Ministry continued the drive for religious instruction, introducing it to middle schools in 1956. As Sakallıoğlu points out, for the DP, 'Islam did not represent a political ideology (either in support of or in opposition to the ruling coalition) but rather, a cultural tradition'.[107] This was combined with the DP's reassertion of the fundamentals of the secular nationalist republic, moving carefully within the framework of Atatürk's principles.

First discussed by the DP Group in 1951, the reform of middle school education had been approached with more caution than that of primary schools, partly due to the rising trend of what was termed 'reaction' (*irtica*) in Turkey, referring to a genre of religious nationalism advocates of which employed political violence. The first instance occurred in May 1951, when members of the right-wing Ticani sect desecrated several statues of Atatürk. The DP had responded by passing an 'Atatürk Law' which punished individuals for such acts, while Bayar proposed the founding of a university in the east in Atatürk's name.[108] The Democrats also presided over the final preparations for Atatürk's reburial at Anıtkabir, a momentous national event, in 1953.[109] The second event was the attempt in 1952 on the life of prominent liberal journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman. The DP responded by banning the Nationalists' Association of Turkey, as well as passing a law in July 1953 on the 'Protection of Freedom of Conscience and Association'.[110] Denouncing religion's instrumentalisation in politics, this law was used to close down the Democrat Party's conservative splinter-party, the Nation Party, in 1955. These gestures illustrate the DP's attitudes to the early republican reforms: their substance could be substantially, if gradually, changed, but their symbolic legitimacy had to be preserved at all times.

[107] Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 'Parameters and Strategies of Islam–State Interaction in Republican Turkey', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 2, May 1996, p. 273.

[108] Grand National Assembly meeting minutes, 7.5.51, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 210, May 1951, pp. 69–72; Bayar, *Başvekilim*, p. 116.

[109] Bayar, *Başvekilim*, pp. 124–6; SWB: IV, 415, 17.11.53, pp. 10–1; Şerif Demir, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Adnan Menderes*, Istanbul: Paraf, 2010, pp. 434–5.

[110] See Grand National Assembly discussion of Freedom of Conscience and Association Protection Bill, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 236, July 1953, pp. 44–56.

By October 1955, the DP Congress was discussing middle school reform again, and voted to bring it to parliament. It was presented as consistent with the Democrats' westernising approach to education and to the effort to bring Turkey to the ranks of civilisation.[111] On the eve of parliamentary debates in January 1956, Menderes told an audience in Konya that religious education was crucial to freedom of conscience, which was in turn part of laicism, and was standard 'in the most advanced nations', which 'remain tied to their religion'.[112] By March 1956, the bill had passed: in the heated parliamentary debate preceding this, a Minister of State had affirmed on behalf of the Education Ministry: 'there will be no place for superstition in the religious classes, nor will they contradict the revolutionary spirit [of the republic]'.[113] Meanwhile, during the years 1953–5, nine more Imam-Hatip schools were opened in provincial capitals,[114] causing much consternation in the ranks of the opposition.[115] More strikingly, the DP effected a kind of rapprochement with the heterodox Nurcu and Nakşkibendi movements, which had been banned by Atatürk in 1924.[116]

This opening to religiosity in the public sphere, and particularly to popular Islamic practice, continued in tandem with the regime's anti-communist campaign in the mid-1950s. The DP personally harnessed the state radio in this campaign – its news bulletins were often penned by Menderes and Zorlu, and were continuously vetted by officials from the presidency before broadcast.[117] The intense censorship of any references to communism affected broadcasts on art and literature, in instances involving books by Sartre and Chekov, and the music of Yves

[111] Ihsan Arif, 'Secularism in the World and Religious Education', *Zafer*, 26.3.56, p. 2.

[112] 'Why Didn't They Like it? The Meaning of Secularism is not Hostility to Religion?', *Zafer*, 10.1.56, pp. 1, 5.

[113] 'Middle School Religious Classes are Launched', *Milliyet*, 29.3.56, p. 1, 5; Nihat Ülkekul, 'The Issue of Middle School Religious Studies', *Zafer*, 29.3.56, p. 4.

[114] Howard Reed, 'Turkey's New Imam-Hatip Schools', *Die Welt des Islams*, new series, Vol. 4, Issue 2/3, 1955, p. 157.

[115] See Falih Rıfkı Atay, 'Think like Turks, not like Politicians!', *Dünya*, 11.7.53, in *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 236, July 1953, pp. 65–6.

[116] Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 32–3.

[117] Gözübüyük, 'The Democrat Party', pp. 97, 107; see accusations of Muammer Aksoy, *Partizan Radyo ve D.P.*, Ankara: Forum Yayınları, 1960, pp. 95–116.

Montand.[118] As early as 1950, DP members had pointed to the utility of Islam in keeping down communism in Turkey.[119] By the mid-1950s, a rise in right-leaning and pious media production was observable, while political expression on the Left was firmly suppressed. On state radio, for example, there was more religious broadcasting, from the regular recitations of the Quran to live coverage of Muslim ceremonies on programmes such as 'Religious and Moral Accounting'.[120] This was in keeping with Democrat Party discourse on the sanctity of both private property and tradition, with particular reference to the population in the countryside. Meanwhile Menderes could boast on the radio: 'Thanks to the Government's prudence and legal measures, not one Communist paper is being published today … the secretly formed Communist Party … has been eradicated. Today, 180 persons accused of Communist activities are under arrest.' He went on to note that the infiltration of workers' and students' organisations had also been stopped, not least thanks to the resistance of 'our patriotic workers'.[121]

Conclusion

Following the celebrations of Turkey's NATO accession, a series of high-profile collaborations with the USA had been initiated to further substantiate this new affiliation. Urban highway building and rural mechanisation programmes – all financed by US credit – were emblematic of this promise to lift development and living standards nationwide. The economic downturn of 1954 had abruptly halted this momentum, and confronted the Democrats with their need for further assistance, in the recurrent sovereignty–development dilemma.

The Baghdad Pact episode had seen them tackle the dilemma with mixed results. On the one hand, they had managed to manoeuvre Turkey into a dominant position in Western defence plans and had played a leading role in expanding the pact. This served to restore some credibility to the Democrats' narratives on Turkey's Western credentials, and preserved US receptiveness to their requests for further assistance with development, as the next episode will show. In this sense, the Baghdad Pact emerged out of overlapping American and British foreign

[118] Gözübüyük, 'The Democrat Party', pp. 72–6.
[119] Torun, 'II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası', p. 266.
[120] Gözübüyük, 'The Democrat Party', p. 110.
[121] SWB: IV, 334, 13.3.53, pp. 17–8.

policy interests, and the willingness of Turkey and Iraq to accommodate these in pursuit of recognition and foreign aid.

On the other hand, however, their initiatives to shape the pact had resulted in its enlargement only among the Americans' originally envisaged Northern Tier states. Meanwhile, their aggressive attempts to incorporate more Arab states had been counter-productive. Above all, it seemed to have displeased their American patrons, whose economic support was among the main objectives of Turkey's Middle East campaign. It was this renewed predicament that they faced as they prepared to contest their third general election in 1957.

7 *Egypt from the Baghdad Pact to Czech Arms, 1955: Shielding Sovereignty*

In 1966, Egyptian cinema-goers were treated to the latest of star comedian Fuad al-Muhandis' satirical films, *Ganab al-Safir* ('His Excellency the Ambassador'). One of its most entertaining scenes involves the multitasking butler having to impersonate the absent ambassador, at a critical moment for his country's international affairs. Representatives of two great powers, the 'Northern and Southern blocs', arrive to compete for his country's diplomatic support in a border conflict, and although he initially feels out of his depth, he manages to extract vast sums from them both. The film uses humorous symbols – Sputnik and a Coca-Cola bottle – to anchor the scene in the politics of the day, and its mood is optimistic, reflecting a belief that smaller states could leverage their status through playing off the powers positioned around and against them.

This mood had its origins in 1955, the year in which both positive neutralism and Egyptian pan-Arabism crystallised into the forms with which the Nasser era would thereafter be associated. According to one strand of conventional wisdom, pan-Arabist policy was a product of the struggle over Middle East defence in 1955, while positive neutralism originated at the Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations in the same year.[1] Yet in reality, 1955 witnessed the unfolding of a second phase of these policies, both of which had emerged from the Free Officers' preoccupation with national sovereignty. Firstly, that year, the CCR made positive overtures to neighbouring Arab states on coordinating foreign policy, while emphasising an Arab locus for national belonging at home. Secondly, it preserved its existing neutralist line, seeking external assistance without conditions that would constrain Egyptian sovereignty, and upgrading state-sponsored development programmes.

[1] Adeed Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: the Elements of Foreign Policy*, London: Macmillan, 1976, p. 11.

Thirdly, both policies were in progress when the sovereignty–development dilemma resurfaced. In early 1955, the British and American administrations had begun realising their plans for regional defence through the Iraqi–Turkish Baghdad Pact, and tried more forcefully to engineer Egyptian acquiescence to a settlement with Israel. Meanwhile, Israel's status as an aggressive external player became clear, as it escalated operations on the Egyptian border. In terms of development, substantial United States foreign assistance proved slow to materialise, leaving Egypt's state capacity little enhanced. These constraints compelled the Free Officers to intervene increasingly in the regional and international status quo. Egyptian pan-Arabism in foreign policy was duly intensified, and Egypt's positive neutralism made official at Bandung. This culminated in the purchase of arms from the Soviet bloc in September, a coup that set the tone for Egypt's linkages of the national and international in years after, and the successes of which *The Ambassador* celebrated.

Seeking Sovereignty in the Arab Sphere: Containing the Baghdad Pact

The agreement on a British withdrawal from Egypt did not seal the issue of sovereignty for the Free Officers leadership, but seemed instead to spur their affirmations of the overlapping liberation struggles of Egypt and the Arab world. This pan-Arab national commitment found expression in state-sponsored publications, such as 'The Egyptian Revolution in Three Years', which referred to the revolution's goal 'to disseminate joint Arab heritage so that the Arabs may build a united front'.[2] These texts reflected the centrality of liberation, and not ethnic or other identity markers, to the nation making project.

Government-sponsored media in general, and Egyptian radio in particular, also continued to be a crucial vehicle for the dissemination of the Arab national narrative. In the revolution's 1955 yearbook, the radio's aims were listed as 'Speaking the language of the whole Arab nation, in a manner that expresses faithfully the true hopes and pains of the Arab peoples; Working towards the liberation of the Arab

[2] State Information Service, *Al-Thawra al-Masriyya fi Thalath Sanawat*, Cairo: Services Council Press, 1955, p. 179.

nation . . .; Working towards restoring this Arab nation, preserving and strengthening of elements of this unity . . .'[3] Alongside its role in critiquing the policies of Western powers, Sawt al-'Arab was at the forefront of such efforts within the Arab sphere. Nasser called the radio 'an open university' for the provision of 'education in national consciousness'.[4] In an interview on the prominent 'Struggle of the Arabs' programme on Sawt al-'Arab, the Syrian Minister of Justice echoed: 'I want the radio to be a school for political, social and technical education, from which graduates a people which loves its country.'[5] In July 1955, on its second anniversary, a further hour was added to the station's broadcasting time, while plans were underway for stations in Khartoum and Port Said.[6]

Reinforcing its influence at home, the impact on Arab audiences was tangible: 'Egyptian Arabism was brought to its constituents in the simplest, yet most infectious way, with people from Saudi Arabia to Syria flocking to buy the "box of Ahmad Said".'[7] What began as Cairo's proposed pan-Arab remedies for its diagnoses of the nation's shared ills was soon accepted and claimed by a host of listeners as their own. Sawt al-'Arab gave considerable time in its daily broadcasts to Arab voices, often hosting Arab figures such as refugees, politicians and artists to speak, or citing publications from across the Arab world on themes such as Arab unity.[8] There was a Sudan Corner and a Palestine Corner, and special attention was paid to the Arab Maghreb and 'Southern Arabia', particularly Oman and Yemen.[9]

One critical site for the forging of Arab national belonging was the education system, through which Egyptian students were coached in *al-mawad al-qawmiyya*, or '(Arab) National Subjects', such as 'Arab Society' and 'The July Revolution'. The curriculum cultivated 'a strong sense of identification and

[3] Ibid., p. 193. [4] Nasser, with Sukarno, 22.7.55.
[5] ERA: Interview by Ahmad Said with Syrian Justice Minister Ali Bouzou, 'The Struggle of the Arabs', Sawt al-'Arab Radio, Box 5, Cassette 199.
[6] See Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: a Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945–1958*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 193–4; Nasser, with Sukarno, 22.7.55.
[7] The radio: William Ellis, 'Nasser's Other Voice', *Harper's Magazine*, 1961, p. 1.
[8] SWB: IV, 443, 26.2.54, 'Egyptian Broadcasts on Arab Unity', 'Voice of the Arabs Quotations from the Arabic Press', pp. 41–2.
[9] SWB: IV, 449, 'Cairo Radio's Voice of the Arabs', 15.3.54, pp. 44–5.

pride with Arabism, anti-colonialism, and nationalist leaders of Nasser's calibre'.[10] Egyptian students were integrated with their Arab counterparts through state-sponsored exchanges and scholarships, while official pronouncements emphasised the Arabness of Egypt.[11] Addressing an Arab student delegation, Nasser affirmed: 'We are brothers. There is an inaccurate theory that says that Egypt does not have an Arab spirit: this is a mistaken delusion, as you observed during your short trip …'[12] Arab students themselves received special attention in the nation making project. This was in accordance with official orientation towards

> increasing Arab students' enrolment … providing financial support and pastoral care, increasing their ties to the principles of the July revolution, aiming to create a generation which believes in its Arabism and aspires to realise Arab unity via its direct contact with the July revolution …[13]

The gathering momentum of pan-Arabist nation making in the region throughout 1955 held a particular place for the Palestinians. Nasser's speeches on unity in the Arab nation elevated Palestine to prime position often that year: to his Egyptian constituents, Nasser emphasised 'the Arabism of Palestine', Egypt's determination to answer Israel's attacks in kind, and that Egyptians had 'taken it upon themselves to protect Egypt and the Arab countries'.[14] In speeches directed at Arab audiences, Nasser juxtaposed references to the Arabism of Palestine with the connected challenges of Israel and the Baghdad Pact.[15] The Arab nation was consistently presented as joined through its subjection to imperialism.[16]

[10] Mahmud Faksh, 'The Consequences of the Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: Education and National Integration in Egypt', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, May 1980, p. 52.

[11] See 'Nasser's Approval of Scholarships to Students from Nigeria and Yemen', 1.11.53, in Huda Abdel Nasser, *Gamal Abdel Nasser: Al-Awraq Al-Khassa*, Part Two, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aamma li-l-Kitab, 2015, pp. 159–60.

[12] *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 27.2.55, p. 1.

[13] Fathi al-Deeb, '*Abd al-Nasir wa Tahrir al-Mashriq al-'Arabi*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 2000, pp. 189–90.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Nasser, with Sukarno, 22.7.55; Nasser, Interview with Ahmed Shuman of Lebanese Newspaper *Al-Jarida*, 16.8.55.

[16] Ahmad Hamrush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu: V, Khareef 'Abd al-Nasir*, Cairo: Madbuli, 1984, pp. 23–4; Muhammad Sayed-Ahmed, *Nasser and American Foreign Policy, 1952–1956*, London: Laam, 1989, p. 107.

Alongside discourse, the practical component of Egypt's pan-Arabist nation making continued its attention to Palestinians during 1955. By now, the Palestine Students Union (PSU), supported by its Egyptian counterparts, had gathered five hundred members, and could avail itself of the networking opportunities offered by its Cairo location. During this time, PSU president Yasser Arafat secured Egyptian approval for the publication of *Sawt Filastin*, 'Voice of Palestine', which was known to exceed the scope of a student magazine, and rather to be rallying Palestinian students beyond Cairo to organise.[17]

Beyond Egypt

In October 1954, a few months before the unveiling of the Baghdad Pact, Cairo's Foreign Ministry and intelligence officials were finalising strategies for the second phase of Egypt's pan-Arabist policy. Egypt's newly secured independence gave these measures new energy. Firstly, through official diplomacy, Cairo was to work towards a multilateral defence treaty. The 'imperialist powers' were not to be confronted together, and the USA was to be reassured, since its own regional ambitions could be used as a counterbalance.[18] Secondly, intelligence plans advised the 'appeasement' of conservative monarchies, with whose internal affairs Egypt would not interfere, thus 'facilitating the appropriate conditions for any oppositional movements to play their own positive role'.[19] Meanwhile, Egyptian intelligence would cooperate with progressive pan-Arabist political parties, and allocate material or training assistance to the most developed of liberation movements. It was strictly emphasised, however, that such organisations would have to rely on their own cadres and plans, and that Cairo's assistance would only be granted upon request and after careful consideration. There was to be 'no contradiction between "Egypt the Revolution" and "Egypt the State"'.[20] Thirdly, to mobilise wider Arab audiences, the plan emphasised the continuing role of Sawt al-'Arab, and the fostering of a wider Arab network linked with Cairo.[21] These three channels would be employed in tandem during 1955 to further

[17] Laurie Brand, 'Nasir's Egypt and the Re-emergence of the Palestinian National Movement', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1988, pp. 34–5.
[18] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, p. 187. [19] Ibid., p. 188. [20] Ibid., p. 189.
[21] Ibid., pp. 188–90.

Egypt's pan-Arabist nation building, but would also assist Cairo in easing the dilemma posed by the Baghdad Pact.

The first harbingers of the dilemma had come in summer 1954, when it became clear that Iraq and Turkey were planning to conclude a defence pact under Anglo-American auspices.[22] Ever since 1952, US policy had identified the Anglo-Egyptian and Arab–Israeli disputes as obstacles to its hopes for incorporating Egypt into a Middle East defence alliance. With the treaty of 1954, the first matter appeared to have been resolved. US policy now followed two separate tracks, welcoming the defence cooperation of 'Northern Tier' states such as Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq, while attempting to coax Egypt into a peace with Israel that would facilitate its cooperation in turn.[23] Britain's motive as an architect of the Baghdad Pact was to secure its regional influence after withdrawal from Egypt and before the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty expired. The British therefore interpreted Washington's Northern Tier plan as a means to renew their treaty 'rights' and access to military bases in states such as Iraq and Jordan.[24]

Meanwhile, as Egyptian officials began on the second phase of the pan-Arabist policy, they aimed firstly to secure an Arab consensus against Western defence pacts, and secondly to empower the Arab Collective Security Pact (ACSP) for Arab defence. They approached the Iraqi leadership first through diplomatic channels, in bilateral talks in Sarsank, Iraq, in August and September 1954. Here the Egyptians argued that, as long as Arab independence remained threatened by imperialist designs, alliances with the states behind them were out of the question. They affirmed that Israel, not the Soviet Union, was the main threat to the Arabs, and that the Arabs could find strength against imperialism through unity, of both purpose and resources.[25] Already

[22] Ibid., p. 138. US arms to Iraq alarmed King Saud in particular: Correspondence, Saud to Nasser, 17.5.54: Document 102, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, *Milaffat al-Suways: Harb al-Thalathin Sana*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1986, pp. 760–1.

[23] See Irene Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 154; Ray Takeyh, *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: the US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953–7*, New York: St Martin's Press, 2000, pp. 49–50, 57.

[24] For detailed accounts, see Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, pp. 49–55, and Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, p. 191.

[25] See al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, p. 142; Heikal, *Milaffat*, pp. 318–9.

in June 1954, Sawt al-'Arab had insisted: 'O Arabs, is it logical to be hostile to Russia simply because the West is her enemy; to help our enemy – who is occupying our countries and looting our wealth – to destroy his enemy Russia; to help the enemy who after destroying Russia would come and destroy us?'[26] Speaking with Nasser, Iraqi Premier Nuri al-Said responded to this argument by asserting that Russia's proximity to Iraq made self-defence impossible without Western aid. He emphasised that this aid would also fortify the Arabs against Israel.[27] Nasser replied that Britain and America would never arm Arab states to a level that could threaten Israel.[28] He insisted on the ACSP as 'the only basis for organising the defence of the Arab countries'.[29]

Egyptian diplomacy now pursued its twin goals through multilateral talks: Nasser invited the Arab foreign ministers to Cairo in December 1954. The conference's first conclusion was direct: no state was to enter into an alliance outside the ACSP. The second, however, mirrored the non-committal mood of several Arab states and the careful position of Egypt: cooperation with the West was possible, provided that a 'just solution' to Arab problems was found.[30] In Seale's estimation, 'There was a failure to grasp or a refusal to face the implications of Egyptian policy: that by demanding absolute freedom from all foreign ties – not only for herself but for the whole Arab world – Egypt must inevitably clash with British interests.'[31] From another perspective, however, this was a negotiation of the sovereignty–development dilemma. Cairo's multilateralism and caution were shaped by the limits of Egypt's resources and the need for assistance with development. Egyptian policymakers could not launch attacks on the pact without some attention to Egypt's potential aid donors. They therefore maintained their strategy of 'reassuring' the USA, combining pan-Arabist initiatives with the neutralist policy of counterbalancing Britain with America.

[26] SWB: IV, 474, 15.6.54, 'Comment on "The Times" Leader of 8th June', p. 28.
[27] Mahmud Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad: 1948–1978*, Vol. II, Beirut: Al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Nashr, 1987, pp. 45, 47. See also ENA: FM-249/1: 'Official Communiqué of the Royal Iraqi Legation', Bonn, 12.2.55, forwarded by EE, Bonn to National Guidance Ministry and EFM, No. 71, 22.2.55.
[28] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 59.
[29] ENA: FM-1248/2: 'Egypt's Answer to Nuri al-Said's Claims', Information Council, c. 1956; al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, p. 207.
[30] Seale, T*he Struggle for Syria*, p. 211. [31] Ibid.

Besides threatening Egypt's capacity for development, the pact also highlighted the limitations placed on Arab nation making that originated in the international field. This crystallised after Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes and Nuri al-Said issued their joint communiqué on 13 January 1955, inviting other Arab states to join. The Egyptian leadership feared a domino effect if Syria were to accept, inducing Lebanon and Jordan to follow.[32] This would tie Arab defence to external players' interests, and would expose Egypt to isolation before Israel. This aspect of the dilemma had much to do with the CCR stepping up its Arab policy in turn.

Firstly, Sawt al-'Arab swung into action, communicating its denunciation of the Baghdad Pact to the peoples of Iraq and Jordan in particular.[33] Next, Nasser renewed efforts at multilateral diplomacy: he invited the Arab premiers to Cairo in January, intending to pursue both coordinated Arab policy and containment of the Iraqi–Turkish overtures. Relying on the commitment of Saudi Arabia, the Egyptians aimed to secure Syria's opposition to the pact, in order to neutralise the other Arab states.[34] The conference sessions vividly displayed the variety of opinions at the time. At one end of the spectrum, Nasser repeated the call for coordinated foreign policy and development plans, which would protect the Arabs from Israel.[35] Saudi Prince Faisal supported him, while at the other end of the spectrum, Lebanon's Sami al-Sulh and Syria's Faris Khuri were reluctant to denounce Iraq, the pact, or indeed Turkey, which they claimed would stand up to Israel. To this, Nasser responded simply that Israel was an Anglo-American creation and Turkey a Western ally. He emphasised the continuity between the pact and the 1951 Middle East Command, noting that Egypt could have secured British withdrawal rapidly had it committed to the Middle East Defence Organisation. This dynamic continued even after the Iraqi premier was re-invited to, and snubbed, the conference: ultimately no compromise was reached. The meeting decided not to join the pact, and reaffirmed its delegates' commitments to

[32] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 50.
[33] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, pp. 279, 407–8.
[34] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, pp. 52–3.
[35] See Secret Minutes of Arab Premiers Meeting, 22–29.1.55: www.nasser.org; Nasser, Annotated Minutes of Arab Premiers' Meeting, in Nasser, *Awraq*, pp. 491–3.

existing collective security agreements within the framework of the Arab League.[36]

The Egyptian leadership further responded to the January communiqué by disseminating its view through official statements, such as a pamphlet entitled 'The Danger of the Turco-Iraqi Pact to the Arab States', which was circulated to all embassies. Reiterating the principles of the ACSP, the statement dissects and dismisses the incentives of Iraq and Turkey in forming their alliance. It emphasises that the real 'danger to the Arab states is the continuation of the situation of the Arab refugees without a solution, and the complete loss of Palestine, through the indirect linking of Iraq to Israel, via its link to Turkey through various agreements'. Once again, however, the statement qualifies: 'In opposing this pact, Egypt does not intend to oppose the West, and Egypt has proven with all her steps . . . her opposition to communist expansion . . . as well as her social, cultural and economic ties with all the countries of the Western bloc.'[37]

Iraq's official response restated the arguments made in Sarsank and Cairo, and the Baghdad Pact was signed on 24 February 1955.[38] The following day, an Egyptian official source declared that Egypt would withdraw from the ACSP 'so that it is not drawn into an indirect alliance with the West, nor indirect cooperation with Israel',[39] through Iraq, whose pact was associated with engineering an Arab–Israeli settlement.[40] To Western audiences, the Egyptian Embassy in Washington explained: 'Egypt's attitude . . . is motivated by its policy of upholding Arab solidarity and Arab nationalism, with due consideration to the defense of the Arab region . . .'[41] The Israeli raid on Gaza followed within days, intensifying Egyptian reactions. This prompted the acceleration of the second phase of pan-Arabist policy, in which its three channels – media, diplomacy and covert links – were combined more assertively.

[36] Decrees of the Arab Premiers' Meeting, 22.1.55 in Nasser, *Awraq*, pp. 494–8.
[37] ENA: FM-249/1: EE, Bonn to Undersecretary of National Guidance Ministry, No. 180, 'The Danger of the Turco-Iraqi Pact to the Arab States', Information Council, 11.2.55.
[38] See ENA: FM-249/1 in fn 125. [39] *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 25.2.55, p. 1.
[40] Husayn Fahmi, 'In the Battle: the Western–Zionist Conspiracy aimed at Destroying the [Collective Security] Pact and Settlement with Israel', in ibid.
[41] ENA: FM-249/1: Press Department, EE, Washington, 'Turco-Iraqi Pact through Egyptian Eyes', February 1955.

In Iraq, Egyptian officials utilised both media and intelligence channels. Sawt al-'Arab blamed the Baghdad Pact and its divisions of the Arabs for the Israeli attack.[42] Meanwhile, Cairo established a Kurdish bulletin, addressing the opposition in the north of Iraq.[43] The impact of this media campaign was immediately tangible in exchanges with Baghdad, as Iraqi opposition to the pact gained momentum.[44] Iraqi politicians asked their Egyptian counterparts 'to work against an escalation of the conflict between Egypt and Iraq', and to tone down the broadcasts of Sawt al-'Arab and two other radio stations with alleged Egyptian links.[45] One of these was likely Sawt al-'Iraq al-Hur ('The Voice of Free Iraq'),[46] whose location in Cairo was kept secret. A group of young Iraqi officers had sought assistance with establishing their own radio, and were given a station initially intended for the Egyptian intelligence. Its Iraqi presenters received training in Cairo, but wrote their own programmes.[47]

With other Arab states, the Egyptian leadership redoubled its efforts to contain the Baghdad Pact and establish an Arab defence alliance. As Syria was deemed pivotal to both goals, Free Officer Mahmud Riyad was dispatched as ambassador in February 1955, and began by prioritising containment. Assisted by the fall of the Khuri government, Riyad quickly established links with like-minded politicians and military officers.[48] On 24 February, Syria's parliament approved a cabinet statement rejecting Western pacts.[49] CCR member and then Minister of National Guidance Salah Salim travelled to Damascus two days later, to proceed with the second strand of Arab policy, the formation of 'the new Arab pact'.[50] By 2 March, Syria's president had signed a declaration of principles on Egyptian–Syrian 'Mutual Defence and Economic Cooperation'. Salim and Syrian Foreign Minister Khalid

[42] SWB: IV, 539, 1.2.55, 'Voice of the Arabs on Israel and the Turkish–Iraqi Pact', p. 27.
[43] Hamrush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu: III, 'Abd al-Nasir wa-l-'Arab*, Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Tiba'a wa-l-Nashr, 1976, p. 22.
[44] ENA: FM-249/1: EE, Baghdad to EFM, No. 20, 'Iraqi–Turkish Pact', 28.2.55.
[45] ENA: FM-249/1: EE, Baghdad to EFM, No. 22, 'Message of Saleh Jaber', 7.3.55.
[46] See heavily critical 'Commentary on Anglo-Iraqi Treaty', in SWB: IV, 571, 24.5.55, '"Free Iraq" Radio', pp. 21–2.
[47] See al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, pp. 287–90.
[48] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, pp. 77–8.
[49] Ibid., p. 79; *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 25/27.2.55, p. 1.
[50] *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 26.2.55, p. 1.

al-Azm then travelled to Riyadh, where King Saud added his pledge to the declaration.[51]

Egypt's Ministry of National Guidance stated that 'the new charter does not aim to oppose anyone, but to support its member states and to follow a purely Arab policy'.[52] The Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi alliance represented the most concrete incarnation yet of Egypt's pan-Arabist policy, with resounding political, if not military, ramifications.[53] Its victory in 'the struggle for Syria' represented the Egyptian leadership's regional fulfilment of its first goal, containment of the pact.[54] This regional success stalled US accession in turn, achieving containment in the international field: 'the US government has decided with regard to the Turco-Iraqi Pact that it will leave matters to calm down for six months, refraining from action that would create further stirs in the Arab countries'.[55]

Egyptian efforts at containment now proceeded with respect to Lebanon and Jordan. After the March agreement, Egypt's allies began providing valuable assistance. In May, for example, King Saud cautioned Lebanese President Camille Chamoun against Baghdad Pact membership, eliciting a defensive reaction from his pro-Western government.[56] Egyptian officials themselves used media and covert channels to combat pressures on Lebanon that summer, after visits by the Turkish President and Pakistani Defence Minister.[57] In light of reports on the penetration of local media by pro-French, sectarian and Iraqi political interests in Lebanon, Egyptian officials in Beirut kept regular contact with Lebanese editors to spread their own message.[58] When an

[51] *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 1.3.55, p. 1.
[52] ENA: FM-249/1: Telegram from EE, Damascus to EFM, 22.3.55.
[53] Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi fi 'Asr al-Tahadiyat*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1987, p. 51.
[54] Cf. Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, p. 226; Fawaz Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p. 29; James Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, p. 78.
[55] ENA: FM-249/1: EE, Washington to EFM, No. 41, 4.3.55; Telegram from EE, Washington to EFM, Press, 17.3.55.
[56] ENA: FM-140: EE, Beirut to EFM, No. 22, 'Lebanon's Policy on Arab Pacts', 25.5.55.
[57] ENA: FM-249/2: Telegram from EE, Beirut to EFM, 15/17.6.55; EE, Beirut to EFM, No. 32, 2.7.55.
[58] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, pp. 68, 71; ENA: FM-249/1: EE, Tripoli to EFM, 'Libyan Press on Iraqi–Turkish Pact', 18.4.55.

Israeli ship carrying Turkish cargo was detained in Lebanon in July, the Egyptian ambassador urged editors 'to alert the public to the extent of the danger of Israeli–Turkish contacts'.[59] He arranged for a Saudi-paid salary for one particular editor, who wished to switch from a pro-Iraqi to a pro-Egyptian stance.[60] Such manoeuvres, and the popularity of Cairo's line within Lebanon, ultimately forestalled a commitment from Chamoun.[61]

In tandem with containment, the Egyptian leadership worked on its second concern, formalising an Arab alliance, over the summer. Differences between Riyad and al-Azm had stalled the development of a multilateral alliance, so Egyptian policy shifted to pursue bilateral defence arrangements. Meanwhile, Syria's new policy had become the subject of threats by turns from Turkey, Britain, Iraq and the USA. Tensions mounted after Turkish troop manoeuvres on the border in February,[62] British accession to the Baghdad Pact in April,[63] and the subsequent exposure of US–Iraqi cooperation in an espionage network aimed at regime change in Syria.[64] Nevertheless, Riyad's activism, and Egypt's popular arms deal, led to the signature of a bilateral defence agreement on 20 October. After Saudi accession, it became known as the Tripartite Alliance, realising the second objective of Cairo's pan-Arabist policy.

The next focus of Egypt's containment efforts was Jordan: a year after al-Deeb's disappointing 1954 visit, Egypt's leadership was concerned at further evidence that Jordan was leaning westwards.[65] In June 1955, King Hussein held cooperative talks in Iraq;

[59] ENA: FM-249/2: EE, Beirut to EFM, No. 74, 7.7.55.
[60] ENA: FM-249/2: EE, Beirut to EFM, No. 75, 7.7.55.
[61] ENA: FM-249/2: EE, Ankara to EFM, No. 94, 10.8.55.
[62] *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 24.2.55; ENA: FM-148: EE, Ankara to EFM, No. 39, 'Meeting with Syrian Minister', 31.3.55.
[63] ENA: FM-249/1: EE, London to EFM, No. 580, 'Issues of Importance for Egypt', 1.4.55.
[64] *Akhbar al-Youm*, 23.4.55, p. 1; ENA: FM-249/2: Arab Bureau to EE, Damascus, 25.6.55. See also Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 97; EFM Research Department to EE, Damascus, No. 4327, 'On British Pressure on Syria to Safeguard Pact', 17.9.55.
[65] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, pp. 151–2, 410; ENA: FM-249/1: EFM Arab Bureau to EE, Amman, 2.4.55; EFM Arab Bureau to EE, Ankara/Damascus/Amman/Baghdad/Jeddah/Sanaa, 'Opinion of Iraq's UN Representative on Iraqi–Turkish Pact', 5.6.55.

in September, his Defence Minister visited Turkey, and in November, President Bayar visited Amman.[66] Finally, in December, Britain organised the 'Templer Mission' to negotiate Jordanian accession to the Baghdad Pact. Egypt's diplomatic campaign continued throughout, arguably outdone by pan-Arabist appeals on Sawt al-'Arab during the Bayar and Templer visits.[67] That month, two Jordanian cabinets fell, amidst protests and a general strike across Amman and the West Bank, compelling King Hussein to refuse membership of the pact.[68] With the pact's extension to Jordan halted in this dramatic way, and other Arab states discouraged, Egypt had effectively 'won' the battle over the Baghdad Pact.

The potency of Egyptian regional policy lay in its mobilisation of popular support. However, it should be highlighted that Cairo galvanised, rather than contrived, Arab dissent vis-à-vis the Baghdad Pact. For example, in 1954, Nasser had been approached for assistance by a Jordanian Ba'ath delegation, and had advised reliance 'on its own fighting capacity ... and local resources', offering assistance in non-confrontational areas.[69] Egyptian efforts and Saudi financing were purposefully channelled towards a media campaign, but it was the population's disenchantment that sealed the fate of Jordanian accession.[70]

Indeed, intense popular grievances and sentiments of pan-Arabist solidarity were manifest across the region. Since late 1954, Palestinian politicians and groups such as the 'Palestine Arab Club' had been campaigning with leaflets and demonstrations, encouraging Jordanian opposition to 'Anglo-American–French

[66] ENA: FM-249/2: EFM Research Department, Memorandum, No. 2882, 'Rumours about King Hussein's Iraq Visit', 20.6.55; EE, Baghdad to EFM, No. 132, 'Pakistani Accession to Pact', 6.7.55 and No. 137, 'King Hussein's Recent Iraq Visit', 7.7.55; Egyptian Consulate, Istanbul to EFM, No. 54, 'Jordanian Defence Minister's Turkey Visit', 9.9.55.

[67] ENA: FM-249: Amman to Egyptian War Minister and Commander-in-Chief, 'Report: Jordan's Political Position in External Arena', 27.11.55; Interview, Ahmad Said, Manager of Sawt al-'Arab, Cairo, 7.3.07.

[68] ENA: FM-251/1: Ankara to EFM, No. 128, 14.11.55; FDA: Afrique-Levant/ Levant, Generalités 536/Jerusalem: Telegrams 386/389 and 390, from FE, Jerusalem to FFM, 17–18.12.55; Salah Nasr, *Mudhakirat Salah Nasr: I, Al-Su'ud*, Cairo: Dar al-Khayyal, 1999, p. 230.

[69] Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, pp. 408–9.

[70] This is acknowledged to a degree in Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, p. 80, and Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, p. 95.

imperialism' and the 'treason' of Nuri al-Said.[71] In Iraq, al-Said confronted mass riots, and ordered the police and army to put them down.[72] In Syria, leaflets were distributed by the 'Committee of Resistance to Colonial Pacts', encouraging the establishment of similar branches nationwide and invoking Arab support.[73] Among the popular opposition in Beirut, the 'National Conference of the Lebanese Political Parties and Associations' demanded that the government oppose the pact and join the Tripartite Alliance.[74] This pro-Egyptian sentiment was based on the resonance with Arab constituents of the Free Officers' analyses of the regional status quo.[75] Even political groups that were initially suspicious of Cairo, such as the Movement of Arab Nationalists, began mobilising as part of its campaign.[76] The success of the battle against the Baghdad Pact thus resulted from the combined effects of sustained Egyptian initiative and autonomous Arab grassroots mobilisation.

An illustration of the impact of Egypt's example is seen in a private exchange between the Libyan ambassador in Ankara, Ali al-Jarbi, and Turkey's Foreign Affairs Secretary, Nuri Berci. The former explains the draw of Egypt to its Arab neighbours:

> We do not fear Egypt . . . Egypt has the moral leadership of the Arab world; it is our focus and hope. The schools in which we and our children studied were Egyptian, the books and newspapers we read are Egyptian, and the radio we

[71] FDA: Afrique-Levant/Levant, Generalités 536/Jerusalem: French Consul, Jerusalem to FFM, 8.4.54; ENA: FM-249/2: EFM Research Department, Memorandum, No. 4255, 'Attacks on the Turco-Iraqi Pact in Jordan', 1.9.55.

[72] ENA: FM-249/1: EE, Bucharest to EFM, No. 63, 3.3.55; 'Protest Memorandum of Iraqi Students against Baghdad Pact Council', in EE, Baghdad to EFM, 2.12.55.

[73] ENA: FM-249/2: EFM Research Department, Memorandum, No. 2876, 'Leaflets by "Committee of Resistance to Colonial Pacts" in Syria', 20.6.55.

[74] ENA: FM-249/1: Telegram, EE, Beirut to EFM, 11.3.55; 249/2: Telegram, EE, Beirut to EFM, 15.6.55; EFM Research Department, Memorandum, No. 2847, 'Lebanese Opposition to the Turco-Iraqi Pact', 20.6.55.

[75] See accounts of Palestine Liberation Organisation founder and head of its Palestine Research Centre respectively: Shafiq al-Hut, *Bayn al-Watan wa-l-Manfa: Min Yafa Bada' al-Mishwar*, Beirut: Riyad al-Rayyes Books, 2007, pp. 68–9, 143–55; Anis Sayigh, '*An Anis Sayigh*, Beirut: Riyad al-Rayyes Books, 2006, p. 173.

[76] See Muhammad Jamal Barout, *Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-'Arab: al-Nash'a, al-Tatawwur, al-Masa'ir*, Damascus: al-Markaz al-'Arabi li-l-Dirasat al-Istratijiyya, 1997.

listen to is from Egypt. You should be aware of this in order to adjust your policy towards the Arab countries.[77]

National Futures and Renewed Constraints: The Gaza Raid

During the first years of the CCR's rule, Egypt's neutralist foreign policy had complemented, and helped finance, the grand national projects of its developmental approach to nation building.[78] Until 1955, neutralism had largely meant playing off the American and British powers, thus avoiding involvement with Western security alliances while securing pledges of foreign assistance. The Soviet Union was not being approached – yet – and the priority was independence from Britain.

The Baghdad Pact confrontation with Britain only confirmed the fact that this could not be a long-term strategy, and that resources would have to be self-generated. During 1955, the Egyptian leadership steadily moved away from reliance on US foreign assistance. The CCR's earliest development policy had been to co-opt and harness large financial and industrial capital in the industrialisation drive, in response to the refusal of the landed class to participate. However, this goal was thwarted by private investors pouring capital into construction instead of industry, and by the refusal of large banks to invest.[79] Meanwhile, despite openings made to foreign investment and aid, Egypt received rather meagre US offerings over the first few years, whether as Point Four aid or else the disappointing lump sum granted in November 1954.[80]

CCR policy and attitudes soon began to change, in response to this sovereignty–development dilemma, away from reliance on American

[77] ENA: FM-249/1: EE, Ankara to EFM, No. 132, 23.11.55.
[78] Nasser, Speech in Honour of Soldiers Heading to the Canal, 12.2.55.
[79] See Muhammad al-Imam, 'Muqawimat Al-Tanmiya fil-Mashrou' al-Nasiri', in Muhammad Idris ed., *Dirasat fi-l-Heqba al-Nasiriyya*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 2003, p. 290; John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: the Political Economy of Two Regimes*, Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 62; Anouar Abdel Malek, *Egypt: Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser*, New York: Random House, 1968, p. 106.
[80] Jon Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 1952–1956: Hopes Dashed*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 59.

Figure 7.1 Egyptian neutralism between its anticolonial and Cold War connotations. Cartoon: 'Abdel Nasser said: "Egypt will not be ruled from Moscow nor London." The Iron Curtain that Egypt has set up.' *Al-Akhbar*, 13 September 1954.
Source: www.nasser.org website.

aid. Just as CCR discourses and practices on sovereignty stressed Egyptian–Arab independence from the states associated with Western imperialism, its programmes for national progress and development moved towards reliance on Egyptian means and resources (see Figure 7.1). This began firstly through moves to 'Egyptianise' existing development projects. In 1955, a US-sponsored project on land reclamation – which was stalling due to Congressional procedures and British pressure – was supplemented by the CCR's own *Tahrir* ('Liberation') Province project, headed by Free Officer Magdy Hassanein. Alterman has described its emphasis on Egyptian expertise as 'xenophobic': yet, in the context, this emphasis rather connoted the significance of Egypt's newfound sovereignty over its resources, and its capacity for independent development.[81] The contrast with colonial times was clearly pointed to in the project's name and presentation.

[81] See related discussion on nationalisations in Alexander Kazamias, 'The "Purge of the Greeks" from Nasserite Egypt: Myths and Realities', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2009.

The first families moved to Tahrir Province were provided with social services, technical training and health care. There were also cultural activities aimed to foster a sense of community: 'Even the uniforms served a purpose – to efface differences and create a sense of equality. Above all, the new society was to foster the principle of equality … the idea that women were equal partners in labor was among the most marked features of life in Tahrir Province.'[82] According to El Shakry's account, which draws on recollections of former employees and settled families,

> the Nasserist land reclamation projects belong to a social welfare model of regulation, in which spatial projects were conceptualized in terms of the circulation of wealth, health, hygiene, and productivity through the body politic. The emphasis was on reconstructing bodies and minds: building and cleaning villages, homes, and children, and thus constructing a 'new Egyptian' …[83]

By 1955, the only project for which the Egyptian leadership continued to hold out for US aid was the Aswan High Dam.

Another shift began in late 1954, as talk of entrepreneurship switched to an emphasis on state planning.[84] The Council for National Planning was founded in March 1955, and Nasser articulated the need for the 'state to take a positive and active role in development' through planning.[85] A notable example was the Public Services Council's countryside project, which installed hundreds of 'Combined Units' across rural Egypt.[86] These aimed 'to bring health, education and welfare services to the estimated 60 percent of the Egyptian rural population that was beyond the reach of any extant program'.[87] Lawyer and then Liberation Rally member Dia' al-Din Dawud headed one such unit, and conveys the aspirations of the nation making project enthusiastically, describing 'a historical event which

[82] Omnia El Shakry, 'Cairo as Capital of Socialist Revolution?', in Paul Amar and Diane Singerman eds., *Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006, p. 79.
[83] Ibid., p. 81.
[84] See Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance*, pp. 59–62.
[85] Nasser, Lecture at Military College, 28.3.55. See al-Imam, 'Muqawimat', p. 289.
[86] 'Thirty Million to Benefit from 200 Combined Units in October', *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 30.12.54, p. 3.
[87] Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance*, p. 84.

affirmed a new, revolutionary meaning in people's eyes. It was the first time that the villages felt that services were extended to them without the need for connections or persistence, and the first time citizens felt that they were the subject of the state's thought and attention.'[88]

At the opening of the first Combined Unit, Nasser spoke of the success of the political revolution in throwing off colonialism, and the need now for cooperation and hard work in the social revolution, to 'build'.[89] Public works and grand developmental projects were thus a much enhanced element of the nation making programmes of 1955.[90] This was reflected in the attention paid to industrialisation projects, agriculture, transport and labour issues in state publications of the time,[91] as well as in speeches.[92]

This attention to national progress through welfare continued in the further expansion of free education, as well as a rise in the enrolment level of girls and women in particular. This occurred in both schools and universities, and with a marked increase in the sciences compared with the humanities.[93] On the 23 July anniversary, Nasser described the increase of the ministry's budget by eight million Egyptian pounds, plans for four thousand new schools, new teacher-training facilities and new university faculties.[94] These development policies were hailed as further steps in the social revolution, and reflected the impact of the CCR's early emphasis on national wealth redistribution. Religion continued to be separate from politics: this was clearest in the trial of the Egyptian Jewish spies of the Lavon Affair, who were depicted as

[88] Dia' al-Din Dawud, *Sanawat ma'a 'Abd al-Nasir*, Cairo: Dar al-Mawqif al-'Arabi, 1984, p. 35.
[89] Nasser, Speech at Opening of First Combined Unit for Rural Services in Egypt, Bamasht, Giza, 13.7.55.
[90] See Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 241–7.
[91] State Information Service, *Thalath Sanawat*.
[92] Nasser, Speech at Ceremony Laying Foundation Stone for Steelworks Factory, 23.7.55.
[93] 'Female Graduates' Union Conference', *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 27.8.55, p. 3. See S. E. Ibrahim, 'Al-Mashrou' al-Ijtima'i li-Thawrat Yulyu' ('The Social Project of the July Revolution'), in Ibrahim ed., *Misr wa-l-'Uruba wa Thawrat Yulyu*, Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1982, p. 142; Kathleen Howard-Merriam, 'Women, Education, and the Professions in Egypt', *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 2, No. 23, June 1979, p. 261.
[94] Nasser, with Sukarno, 22.7.55.

traitors to their own nation and an unrepresentative minority.[95] Israel's raid on Gaza in February 1955 dealt a sudden blow to this fine balance, reproducing the sovereignty–development dilemma:

> Till that moment, we had not moved sufficiently towards making arms deals, because the revolution needed to channel all possible investment towards production and welfare projects which would benefit the citizens. We were encouraged in this by the relative calm on the Egyptian–Israeli border since the 1949 truce.[96]

Arresting these trends abruptly, the Gaza Raid highlighted the weakness of the Egyptian army in the face of the Israeli threat, and the inability of the state to remedy this alone. It also weakened Cairo's concurrent pan-Arabist campaign to contain the Baghdad Pact, itself threatening to isolate Egypt in the face of Israeli attacks. The context was the January 1955 change in government composition in Israel, and the appointment of David Ben Gurion as Defence Minister. According to General Muhammad Hafez Ismail, then Bureau Director for the Chief of Staff, this confirmed 'the preponderance of the extremist camp in the Israeli government ... warning of a new Israeli policy toward the Arab world, and Egypt in particular'.[97] Ben Gurion launched this policy swiftly, with the heavy Gaza Raid. Meanwhile, Israel consistently opposed the Baghdad Pact, describing it as hostile to Israel.[98] The pact was used as a pretext to request further military aid from the Western bloc, and a security guarantee from France in particular, whose exclusion from the pact was known to have bred French grievances.[99] Concurrently, Israel displayed intransigence in US-sponsored talks with Egypt. Ben Gurion escalated border tensions with Egypt, having openly declared his desire to induce a war that

[95] Joel Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics and the Formation of a Modern Diaspora*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 32.

[96] Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi*, Vol. I, Cairo: Al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1977, p. 127.

[97] Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, p. 43.

[98] FDA: Telegram, FE, Tel Aviv to FFM, No. 256/58, 27.4.54 and No. 54/60, 20.1.55.

[99] FDA: Afrique-Levant/Levant, Generalités 536/Israel: FFM, Section Generale des Affaires Politiques, Afrique-Levant/Levant, 'Note to Msr Margerie', 22.1.55; Secretary-General, 'Visit of Israeli Ambassador', Note d'audience, 25.1.55; Afrique-Levant, 'Visit of Israeli Ambassador', 15.3.55.

would nip the Egyptian revolution in the bud, together with its plans for development in the Arab world.[100]

Minister Salah Salim described the CCR's predicament, as different external players together intensified Egypt's dilemma: 'the West was using Israel as a constant challenge to our leadership. The western Powers knew that if faced with the choice of defeat by Israel or yielding to the West, we should have to choose the latter. This was the blackmail to which we were subjected.'[101] Nasser attempted to avoid both fates, by adding to the goals of containing the Baghdad Pact and creating an Arab alliance, that of attaining arms for defence.

Nasser pursued a Western arms offer with increasing determination over subsequent months, as the arms race between Egypt and Israel intensified.[102] In spring 1955, an Egyptian military delegation travelled to Britain and France to agree arms deals, but the results fell short of their needs.[103] Nasser recognised that much depended on his careful participation in Western-sponsored talks on an Arab–Israeli settlement, since the USA was offering assistance in return. Indeed, he could aim at two of his goals – containment of the pact and the securing of arms – through this channel, since he knew that the USA prioritised an Arab–Israeli settlement over the Baghdad Pact itself. Nasser therefore re-employed the neutralist tactic of counterbalancing the Americans and British in pursuit of both these goals, exploiting precisely the Americans' fears of Egypt's growing neutralism.

Nevertheless, despite his participation in talks with US ambassador Henry Byroade in April, military aid remained conditional upon adherence to the Mutual Security Assistance Programme, whose terms Nasser could not accept. This dynamic, and Egypt's attendant dilemma, persisted throughout the spring. The Gaza Raid had thus exposed the limits of the credibility of US assurances of assistance, whether developmental or military. In Free Officer Salah Nasr's words:

> Israel's raid on Gaza amounted to the rock upon which Nasser's faith in the goodwill of the West was shattered. Until the raid, Nasser had hopes that he

[100] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, London: Penguin, 2001, pp. 123–5. Cairo Radio reported on Ben Gurion's personal supervision of the attack's outcomes on 2 March: SWB: IV, 549, 11.3.55, p. 27.

[101] Cited in Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, p. 235.

[102] Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes*, London: Corgi, 1988, p. 81.

[103] Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, p. 44.

could have good relations with the US, and that Washington would announce its willingness to offer him arms, and appropriate economic aid.[104]

The following month, the 'March Intifada' took place, in which Gazan teachers and students went on strike, demanding arms and general freedoms from the Egyptian administration. Palestinian communist activist and historian Abd al-Qadir Yassin remembers: 'it was the events of 28 February and the March Intifada that ended Nasser's American phase and established his progressive pan-Arabist phase'.[105] Meanwhile, 'it was after the Gaza raid that the new team in the Kremlin first came out with a positive statement about the Middle East', and particularly about Egypt's independent foreign policy.[106] That April, the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement criticising the Western powers' use of Middle Eastern states in military pacts, and declaring that the Soviet Union 'would defend' their independence and freedom from external intervention.[107] The previous year, Soviet policy had undergone a crucial shift from distance to support vis-à-vis the Arab and Afro-Asian national liberation movements and decolonising states. After Stalin's death in 1953, new Premier Nikita Khrushchev had adopted a pragmatic approach to the decolonisation wave. He reasoned that 'the policy of the Afro-Asian states … did not contradict Soviet policy but rather widened the gap between these states and the West'.[108] Soviet policy circles re-evaluated their Arab policy accordingly.[109]

Until then, Egypt had not shied away from asking for Soviet military assistance but had not been successful. In February 1955, Nasser's policies had received Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru's public endorsement in Cairo, and in April, Egypt signed a friendship treaty with India and accepted the five principles of peaceful coexistence, Pancha

[104] Nasr, *Mudhakirat Salah Nasr*, p. 371.
[105] Interview, Abd al-Qadir Yassin, Cairo, 15.11.10; Abd al-Qadir Yassin, '*Umrun fi-l-Manfa: Mudhakirat 'Abd al-Qadir Yassin*, Damascus: Al-Dar al-Wataniyya al-Jadida, 2009, pp. 19–20.
[106] Heikal, *Cutting*, p. 80.
[107] Cited in Alexei Vassiliev, *Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism*, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 32.
[108] Ibid., p. 25; Tareq Ismael, *International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: A Study in World Politics*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986, pp. 171–2.
[109] Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, p. 24; Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: a People's History of the Third World*, New York: New Press, 2007, pp. 46–7.

Sila, including non-aggression.[110] Nasser had affirmed that he did not favour hostility to the USSR as a policy.[111] These were portents of the negotiation of this instance of Egypt's dilemma, through the purchase of Soviet arms, which would be facilitated by the Bandung Conference of April 1955 and an evolution in neutralist policy.

Pan-Arab Belonging: Neutralism Made Positive at Bandung

The now legendary Asian–African Conference hosted in Bandung, Indonesia was co-convened by President Sukarno and four other members of the Colombo Group – Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan – who were united by earlier efforts to foster links for socioeconomic development across the Asian region. The conference now brought together twenty-nine countries mostly united by a common experience of European colonialism, and by the search for solutions to its legacies of division and underdevelopment. The formulae advanced at Bandung went beyond neutrality to a clearer positive neutralist policy – moving from equidistance from the blocs to active cooperation and dynamism amongst the decolonised. Conference delegates depicted the superpower struggle as a threat to world peace, since bipolarity could reproduce the same dynamics of great power leverage over smaller powers that had obtained during the colonial era. Such smaller states now had to offer each other material and moral support and seek it beyond the colonial metropole. This resonated strongly with Nasser's policy of opposition to continued Western designs on the region in the Cold War context. Egypt had experienced this process closely, and Nasser had already demonstrated his solidarity with African and Asian liberation movements, and with newly independent states, in their pursuit of sovereignty.

At Bandung, Nasser spoke of his faith in the possibilities of cooperation among African and Asian states, which had proved 'among the strongest factors contributing to the progress of the developing peoples and the protection of their rights'.[112] Nasser's words explicitly linked the aspirations of the national with implementation in the international field:

[110] Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. 226.
[111] Nasser's Press Conference with US Press Delegation, 14.3.55.
[112] Nasser, Speech at Opening Ceremony of Bandung Conference, 19.4.55; see also text in ENA: FM-273(746)/2.

We meet in this conference as representatives of Asian and African States, and there is a similarity between the circumstances in the two continents worth noting, a similarity that unites them: we have all been freed from a phase that had gone on too long, we were all under foreign influence in both our economic and political affairs, and now we all face problems of economic, social and political development.[113]

Soon, Cairo and Sawt al-'Arab radio stations broadened their critiques of Egypt's or the Arabs' past, to critiques of 'reaction' and dependence on imperialism further afield.[114] Meanwhile, Egypt's African policy gained momentum. Its architect in the African Affairs Bureau, Free Officer Muhammad Fayiq, describes Egyptian diplomatic and media support for the Mau Mau movement in early 1955, and Cairo as the first capital to open its doors to Kenyan leaders, who established permanent headquarters there.[115] Fayiq also emphasises Egypt's founding of the first Swahili-language radio in the continent in 1954, the 'Voice of Cairo' radio – the first of many Egyptian radio stations in Africa – and remembers taking advice from his counterparts in the Arab Bureau and from Sawt al-'Arab.[116] Together with follow-up station 'Voice of Free Africa', these broadcasts engendered new collective political vocabularies confronting British rule, and gave voice to assertive political subjectivities, which disturbed the colonial administrations in East Africa profoundly.[117]

The other significant impact of Bandung on Egyptian foreign policy was its occasioning of Nasser's turn to the Soviet bloc for arms. This was the first policy outcome of the effective adoption of positive neutralism. At Bandung, Nasser approached Chinese Premier Chou En Lai for assistance, citing the Israeli attacks as his concern.[118]

[113] Nasser, Bandung Speech. [114] Interview, Ahmad Said.

[115] See Muhammad Fayiq, '*Abd al-Nasir wa-l-Thawra al-Afriqiyya*, Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1982, pp. 32–7.

[116] Interview, Muhammad Fayiq, founder of African Affairs Bureau, Cairo, 26.2.07; Swahili and Persian broadcasts began 3 July 1954: SWB: IV 480, 'Broadcasting Developments', p. 2; see also James R. Brennan, 'Radio Cairo and the Decolonization of East Africa, 1953–64', in Christopher Lee ed., *Making a World after Empire: the Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives*, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010, pp. 177–8.

[117] See Helmi Sharawy, *Political and Social Thought in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA, 2014, p. 32; Brennan, *Radio Cairo*, pp. 179–81.

[118] Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, p. 45; Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, p. 235; Tariq Habib, *Milaffat Thawrat Yulyu: Shahadat 122 min Suna'iha wa Mu'asireeha*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1997, p. 181.

Nasser had already objected to the invitation of Israel to Bandung, and its disregard of United Nations (UN) resolutions had convinced the Colombo Group of his point.[119] This was reinforced by further Israeli raids in late March, as well as news of the French–Israeli arms deal.[120] In May 1955, Nasser received news of Russia's agreement to supply Egypt with arms: he made one final attempt with the British and American ambassadors in June, explaining that he would soon have to turn to the Soviets.[121] Secretary of State Dulles claimed that he was bluffing, and refused.[122] By July, the delegation headed by General Hafez Ismail had travelled to Prague to accept the offer. At a secret meeting with the Soviet military attaché, Ismail asked whether Egypt would receive what it needed: 'He replied that what Egypt needed did not amount to the Soviet army's losses in one day during the battles of World War Two.'[123]

The Gaza Raid also occasioned a re-evaluation of Egyptian policy in the Strip. Until 1954, although it did pay greater attention to social welfare, the Egyptian administration had largely preserved pre-1952 policies.[124] Most notably, it restrained individual Palestinians' resistance actions, despite the continuation of Israeli raids.[125] This was an attempt to keep the conflict with Israel as cold as possible in the early, uncertain years of the revolution and during negotiations with Britain. At a strategy meeting in autumn 1952, Chief of Military Planning Amin Huwaydi had noted that Egypt could not face Israel on the eastern border while the British remained in the Canal Zone.[126] The Free Officers' policy was also based on their assessment of the military superiority of Israel, and their bitter experience fighting unprepared in the 1948 war.

[119] Heikal, *Cutting*, p. 81. [120] Heikal, *Milaffat*, p. 347.
[121] Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat*, I, p. 202.
[122] On Israeli influence, see Sayed-Ahmed, *Nasser and American Foreign Policy*, p. 109, fn 118.
[123] Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, p. 45. See also Nasser's Observations on Meeting a Soviet Official, *c*. early 1956, in Nasser, *Awraq*, pp. 541–2.
[124] Muhammad Saeed Hamdan, *Siyasat Misr Tijah al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya, 1948–1956*, Amman: Al-Yazori, 2006, pp. 338, 344.
[125] Abu Iyad with Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land: a Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle*, New York: Times Books, 1981, p. 24; Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 129.
[126] Amin Huwaydi, *Khamsun 'Aman min al-'Awasif: Ma Ra'aytuhu Qultuhu*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 2002, p. 53; Amin Hewedy, 'Nasser and the Crisis of 1956', in William Roger Louis and Roger Owen eds., *Suez 1956: the Crisis and its Consequences*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. 163–4.

The change in this cautious attitude that came with the Gaza Raid was not immediate either. Gaza had erupted in protest, with demonstrators calling the Egyptians 'American collaborators' and demanding arms, while political leaders formed a National Council to formalise these demands.[127] The administration's first reaction was to contain this revolt, firstly by mediating with political leaders, and then by arresting some and declaring a curfew.[128] Egypt also appealed to the UN, which issued Security Council Resolution 109 of 29 March 1955, calling both sides to talks on border control.

This heavy-handed public management of the crisis was accompanied by profound policy changes in private. A handwritten evaluation by Nasser from 28 February itself is themed by 'the need for revenge', and discusses the scenarios of Israeli response to a proposed air attack.[129] A consequent change was thus the decision to seek Soviet arms. These changes were hinted at by Nasser's language on a surprise visit to Gaza in March, where he affirmed: 'we will never forget the conspiracies devised to destroy Arabism in Palestine ... and just as you Palestinians consider these plots directed against you, we consider them directed against us too ... and are preparing to confront them ...'[130] After another Israeli raid on Khan Yunis, Nasser told an audience of Military College graduates: 'In defending the homeland, we will rely on ourselves ... We will not rely on the Security Council or its resolutions ... I have given orders to the commanders of the armed forces to answer the attack.'[131]

In a second change of tactics, this time specifically on Palestine, the Egyptian leadership resolved to re-allow and indeed sponsor guerrilla operations originating in Gaza, as retaliations for Israeli raids.[132] Nasser's notes from 28 February state: 'I recommend that (1) the highest number of fidayeen possible spread panic in Israel, (2) Egyptian bombers conduct an air raid on Bi'r Sabe' in revenge as

[127] Hamdan, *Siyasat Misr Tijah*, pp. 344–6; Yassin, '*Umrun fi-l-Manfa*, pp. 19–20.
[128] Hamdan, *Siyasat Misr Tijah*, p. 346.
[129] Nasser, 'Evaluation Handwritten by the President after the Israeli Attack on Gaza, 28.2.55', in Nasser, *Awraq*, pp. 500–7.
[130] Nasser, Speech on Surprise Visit to Gaza, 29.3.55.
[131] Nasser, Speech at Graduation Ceremony, Military College, 30.3.55.
[132] Abu Iyad, *My Home, My Land*, p. 22; Yassin, '*Umrun fi-l-Manfa*, pp. 27–8; Interview, Ibrahim al-Dakhakhni, Egyptian military intelligence officer responsible for 'Group 55' on Palestinian affairs, Cairo, 17.10.2010.

soon as possible.'[133] The same document includes 'the announcement of the formation of a Palestinian Liberation Army'.[134] Egyptian intelligence officer Mustafa Hafez was assigned the task of organising the guerrilla units. He released those *fidayeen* imprisoned in 1954, and gathered around a thousand fighters in what became known as Battalion 141. These individuals drew on their intimate knowledge of the areas to be infiltrated, their experience of such operations since 1948 and the example of the Egyptian *fidayeen* in the Suez Canal Zone.[135] Operations gathered momentum after Israeli attacks on Khan Yunis and the annexation of al-Auja in August, and were most intense between September 1955 and October 1956.

More shifts in policy tactics followed, as evidenced by a comparison of the progress of clandestine talks between Israeli and Egyptian representatives from 1952 to 1954, and between 1954 and 1955 via the Anglo-American framework Plan Alpha. Throughout these mediations, Nasser insisted on the refugees' right of return and on the ceding of the Naqab, Egypt's link to the Arab east. He was adamant that land links between the Arab states not be severed by Israel. It was his apparent interest in participation that fluctuated, and this was determined by the broader goals it was calculated to achieve.

Until summer 1954, Nasser's participation in such talks aimed to minimise disruption of the negotiations with Britain on its withdrawal from Egypt. Next, throughout Alpha, Nasser knew that a settlement with Israel represented London and Washington's sought-after precursor to Egyptian participation in the Baghdad Pact. His participation in these talks aimed at undermining the pact further, by playing off Washington's hopes for a settlement against Britain's preoccupation with regional alliances. In late 1955, Ben Gurion returned as Prime Minister and declared openly his intention to wage war on Egypt, signalled by a series of Israeli attacks and Israel's recent receipt of further French arms shipments.[136] Irene Gendzier points out that at this time, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative Kermit Roosevelt had covertly given Israel a clear green light to strike at Egypt in the wake of the Czech arms deal, affirming that 'no-one will

[133] Nasser, 'Evaluation' in Nasser, *Awraq*, p. 504. [134] Ibid., p. 506.
[135] Interview, Yunus al-Katari, former member of Battalion 141, Cairo, 17.11.2010.
[136] See Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 141–2, 144–6, 149.

protest'.[137] This time, Egypt's participation in talks with US envoy Robert Anderson served to maintain Egyptian–American relations and undermine Israel's pretexts for war. However, Nasser's conditions remained the same, and he refused to sign draft letters prepared for him by Washington, reacting indignantly to the 'crude connection' Anderson made between acquiescence in a settlement and Western funding for the Aswan Dam.[138]

These developments in policy were accompanied by greater emphasis on Palestine in Egyptian political discourse. Nasser unveiled his new policy in July 1955 with the assertive and defiant tone that became characteristic of his stances on Palestine thereafter. He described Israel as an imperialist project, supported by powers wishing to subjugate the Arabs, and affirmed the Arabs' refusal to be forced into a settlement.[139] By late 1955, Nasser was speaking openly and critically of America's arming of Israel: since Ben Gurion had declared his intention to impose a settlement through escalation, Nasser believed this policy amounted to encouragement.[140] He also criticised the international community for their disregard of United Nations resolutions on Palestine and complicity in the Palestinians' plight.[141] The events of 1955 had confirmed the Free Officers' views on the Israeli colonial project. Now, Nasser said, 'talk of our foreign policy [is] incomplete without discussion of Palestine'.[142] 'Abd al-Qadir Yassin describes the outcome simply: 'the Palestinian street was a Nasserist street'.[143]

Conclusion

After the deal, the USA and Britain moved from discussing plans to 'get rid of' Nasser by various means,[144] to issuing threats, and finally

[137] Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, p. 209.
[138] Heikal, *Milaffat*, pp. 386–93; see also Appendices 2–3 in *Cutting*, pp. 249–54; Heikal, *Al-Mufawadat al-Siriyya bayn al-'Arab wa Isra'il, al-Kitab al-Thani: 'Awasif al-Harb wa 'Awasif al-Salam*', Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1996, pp. 92–102.
[139] Nasser, Speech at People's Conference, Fayyum, 6.7.55. See also Nasser, Speech at People's Conference, Cairo, with President Sukarno on Third Anniversary of the Revolution, 22.7.55.
[140] Nasser, Statement on US Policy of Arming Israel, 16.11.55.
[141] Nasser, Interview with Press Agencies on Palestine Issue, 28.11.55.
[142] Nasser, Speech with Sukarno, 22.7.55. [143] Interview, Yassin.
[144] See Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, p. 155; Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, pp. 84–5.

incentives, to induce Egypt to cancel it. Throughout, they were constrained by the prospect of pushing Egypt further east.[145] In September, Kermit Roosevelt threatened Nasser with 'severe action' – economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation – unless he cancelled the deal. Roosevelt had already clarified his preference to the Israelis. Nasser responded that Egypt was not to be controlled by the USA, Britain, Russia or any other country. He went on to play his strongest card, the growing currency of his pan-Arabist policy: 'You may think that we are politicians, but we are revolutionaries. This policy of yours will force us to fight you in the region. We will declare what you have told me to the Arab and Islamic worlds, and we will fight you, even if we have to go underground.'[146]

By the time Assistant Secretary of State George Allen visited in October, this pan-Arabist mobilisation policy seemed to have worked: 'The US had decided that since we had made it public ... threats were useless. [They feared] that any action they took would ... increase the Arab world's hostility towards them.'[147] Another meeting with Roosevelt in November was far more conciliatory and saw the American entreat the Egyptians to beware of the increasing pressure against 'Egypt's friends' in Washington.[148] As Gendzier explains, the USA 'did not dare to repeat its Iranian or Guatemalan experiences in Cairo'.[149]

This was a visible instance of the international leverage – albeit limited in time – that pan-Arab nation making in Egypt, generating solidarity beyond, could give to a decolonising regional state, and of the intersection of Nasser's pan-Arabist and neutralist policy. To mitigate its dilemmas, Egypt was forging productive linkages between its national policy needs for assistance, and its regional and international policy. In internal reports, Egyptian officials now evaluated London and Washington as on the defensive, noting their intention to 'appease Egypt with ... financial aid'.[150] In October, their ambassador to the United States, Ahmad Hussein, reassured Dulles that the arms deal was

[145] Cf. FRUS: 1955, Vol. XIV, 'Memorandum of a Conversation', DOS, 3.10.55, p. 543; 'National Intelligence Estimate', 15.11.55, in ibid., p. 771.
[146] Cited in al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat*, I, p. 205. [147] Ibid., p. 213.
[148] ENA: FM-1248/10, EE, Washington to EFM, No. 227, 'Ambassador's Report on Egyptian–American Relations over the Recent Period', 27.10.55.
[149] Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield*, p. 209.
[150] ENA: FM-1248/10: EFM Arab Bureau to EE, Damascus, 8.11.55.

simply a commercial agreement to plug a defence gap, after the election of an extremist Israeli government, and that now, Egypt needed to be reassured of US assistance with the dam.[151] The further dividends of a positive neutralist foreign policy then emerged when the Americans, British and the World Bank negotiated a joint offer to fund the High Dam within months of the Czech deal: 'Nasser, it appeared, had secured not only the independence to choose between East and West, but also the special grace to choose both.'[152]

The benefits of the positive neutralist policy in this phase were threefold: firstly, with the Czech deal, Egypt had broken the Western monopoly on arms supplies enshrined in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. This prised open Egypt's room for political manoeuvre, beyond the confines of the Western bloc and its interests. Secondly, it restored credibility to the CCR's calls for Arab unity in the face of the threat of Israel, enhancing Egypt's success in the final rounds of the battle over the Baghdad Pact. Thirdly, Nasser's turn to the East was productive of further options, as the superpowers now found themselves competing for the allegiance of regional states like Egypt. Within the limits imposed by Egypt's status as a decolonising developing state, Nasser was ably manipulating the bipolar international situation for the pursuit of national interests, the hallmark of neutralist policy. It was in no small part this relatively successful negotiation of the decolonising state's dilemma that brought on the challenges of sanctions and invasion in 1956.

[151] EE, Washington to EFM, No. 223, 'Meeting with Mr Dulles', 18.10.55: Document 113, Heikal, Milaffat, pp. 774–6.

[152] Raymond Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 40.

8 *Turkey and the Syrian Crisis, 1957: Linking Spheres*

In our country, we are working on following the example of the Americans and their advances. We hope that in thirty years, this blessed nation, with its fifty million strong population, will be a little America.[1]

Celâl Bayar, October 1957

The Syrian Crisis of 1957 was ostensibly a breakdown in bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria, over Turkish accusations that Syria had become a 'Soviet satellite'. Yet its significance lies in the way in which the Democrat leadership's behaviour drew superpower involvement into the regional theatre, to bolster their narratives of Turkey's Western identity and to generate resources for their developmental national project. By the late 1950s, the Democrats were confronting the sovereignty–development dilemma most acutely, as the economic slowdown continued in Turkey and their legitimacy began to slide. Turkey's economic capacity had been pushed to the limit, and the external player to which the Democrat leaders looked for assistance, the United States, continued to withhold emergency aid.

In managing this problem, Democrat Party leaders sought to forge productive linkages between Turkey's national policies at home and their international expression, in order to keep American eyes on Turkey as the fulcrum of its containment efforts in the Middle East. This would gain leverage with the United States that could be converted into more funds for the Democrats' developmental projects, as well as renewed credibility for their narratives of Turkey's place among the 'civilised nations'. This time, however, a purely regional policy for expanding the Baghdad Pact was becoming an increasingly unattractive option. Instead, Democrat

[1] 'Celâl Bayar Said: In 30 Years Turkey will be a Little America', *Cumhuriyet*, 21.10.57: pp. 1, 5.

leaders sought to induce US accession – or formalise direct US–Turkish ties – by stirring fears of a particular regional Soviet threat, in Syria.

National Development and the Limits of Assistance

Throughout 1957, the developmental dimension of the Democrats' nation making project was facing the constraints of state capacity. Inflation and deficits were rising, and the Democrats were squeezed between the need to cut government expenditure and the need to cater to the basic needs as well as the growing consumerism of the DP's voting base. Ever since Menderes' Washington visit of 1954, he had kept up his request for $300 million in aid, while Eisenhower continued to insist on a tighter budgetary regime as a condition.[2] In the 1957 election campaign, the Democrats continued to affirm that 'reliance on credits and imports from abroad was an inherent feature of the Turkish economy', hence 'industrialization and modernization of agriculture could not be carried on without foreign capital'.[3] In September 1957, *Zafer* carried almost daily headline news of successive public works projects being unveiled, while DP Ministers invoked the 1954 election slogan of 'Developing Turkey' (see Figure 8.1).[4] A characteristic *Zafer* editorial entitled 'Development and Democracy' proclaimed, 'Turkey is not experiencing normal living conditions at the moment. It is in the middle of a very deep, wide and comprehensive social and moral revolution.'[5] In October, Bayar repeated his first electoral pledge,

[2] See FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XXIV: Telegram from DOS to USE, Turkey, 17.11.55, pp. 658–9; 'An Increase in American Aid Requested', *Zafer*, 16.3.57, p. 1.

[3] See *Zafer*, 10 and 21.10.57, cited in Kemal Karpat, 'The Turkish Elections of 1957', *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2, June 1961, p. 445. Cf. 'In 1957, From the Agricultural Bank: 2 Billion 700 Million Liras in Credit will be Offered to the Farmer', *Zafer*, 13.1.57, p. 1.

[4] For example, *Zafer*: 'Ankara Hospital and Nursing School Opened Yesterday', 22.9.57, p. 1; 'The Largest Munitions Plant in Eastern Europe and the Middle East: Gazi Cartridge Factory Opens 7 October', 27.9.57, p. 1; the month-long column beginning '1950–1957: New Works in the Provinces', 27.9.57, p. 3; 'Turkey's Grand Developmental Campaign Is Successful', *Zafer*, 6.10.57, p. 1.

[5] 'Development and Democracy', *Zafer*, 3.9.57, p. 4.



Figure 8.1 *DP Milletle Beraber*: 'The DP with the Nation', DP election pamphlet, 1957.
Source: Milli Kütüphane, Ankara.

cited above, on transforming Turkey into 'a little America'.[6] In 1958, Menderes emphasised again the connection between the

[6] 'Celâl Bayar Said: In 30 Years Turkey will be a Little America', *Cumhuriyet*, 21.10.57: pp. 1, 5.

external and internal dimensions of the nation making project, this time lashing out at the opposition, 'those who do not want foreign assistance, those who do not want national development'.[7]

The Democrats had spent their first two terms in office attempting to engender closer ties with the USA, firstly through membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and then by championing the Baghdad Pact, but had reached a stalemate in pact expansion in 1955–6. The run-up to the Syrian Crisis saw Turkey lead regional pact members in a new direction of foreign policy tactics, with the same goal, strengthening Turkish ties with Washington. They decided to slow down efforts to expand the pact among the Arabs, and switch to a focus on US accession as a prerequisite step. Thus far, however, Washington was stubbornly maintaining positions of 'firm support'.[8]

During Anglo-American talks in early 1956, the British Foreign Office had suggested a long-term policy of isolating Egypt,[9] and in March, renewed its request for US accession to the Baghdad Pact. The American reply was that this would be impossible without security guarantees to Israel, and that the Allies should wait until the outcome of Plan Gamma, the Anderson mission, with terms for an Arab–Israeli settlement. In late March, however, Gamma's rejection by both Egypt and Israel was blamed on Nasser, and the USA moved to delineate and authorise Plan Omega. This plan involved imposing economic sanctions on Egypt as well as fostering its rivals, particularly Saudi Arabia.[10] President Dwight Eisenhower found it expedient now to reject even his own Chiefs of Staff and Defence Department's proposals that America join the Baghdad Pact, citing political reasons: the inadvisability of becoming mired in Arab politics, and the inevitable

[7] Bayar, Corlu, 28.11.58, cited in Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve Ideolojisi*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970, p. 164.

[8] 'America will Determinedly Support the Baghdad Pact', *Zafer*, 8.3.56, p. 1.

[9] Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson*, London: Constable, 1967, pp. 17–36; Evelyn Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez: Diaries, 1951–6*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986, pp. 341–6; see Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1959*, New York: Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 150–9, for a full account.

[10] Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East,* 1945–1958, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 39–40) notes that the Iranian Shah suggested the building up of Saudi Arabia to the Americans in 1953. See also Ray Takeyh, *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953–7*, New York: St Martin's Press, 2000, pp. 96–114.

pressure from Israel demanding similar offers of aid, which would in turn weaken the pact. These differences between US and British priorities – the latter concerned with its ties with Iraq – would continue to complicate Turkish efforts at securing further aid and a closer relationship with the USA.

Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in March 1956, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes complained that US reluctance was discouraging the Arab states.[11] Later that month, he and Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu voiced the same concerns to their counterparts in Pakistan, Iran and Iraq at a Baghdad Pact meeting in Karachi. They agreed to make individual overtures to the USA: the Turkish memorandum was issued on 30 March, asking for more aid and a decision on US membership.[12] Turkey received a reassurance that a special US delegation would be sent to the Council members' Tehran meeting, to consider increased aid and participation in certain committees.[13]

Turkey's efforts to incorporate the USA in the Baghdad Pact took place in parallel with those of its British ally. However, during talks on Plan Omega, Eisenhower and Dulles had repeatedly deferred, privately expressing distaste for the pact having become 'an instrument' of British policy and a 'forum for Arab politics and intrigue'.[14] At the Tehran meeting in April, Deputy Undersecretary of State Loy Henderson was presented with the regional members' concerns, and with renewed pressure for American accession. Turkish aspirations received a temporary boost when Henderson announced America's membership of the pact's Economic and 'Counter-Subversion' Committees, as well as its intention to establish a military liaison unit.

Turkish policy's aim to attract US accession and assistance also involved disparaging Turkey's regional rivals, most notably Egypt, and working to widen the rift between Washington and Cairo. In Tehran in April, Menderes used public and private speech opportunities to launch a scathing attack on Nasser, in his drive to persuade the

[11] See BNA: FO371/124020/RK1051/31–33.

[12] See 'Prime Minister Menderes Returned from Pakistan Yesterday', 'Joint Statement Issued in Karachi', *Cumhuriyet*, 26.3.56, p. 1; 'The Dangers to which the Middle East is Exposed', *Cumhuriyet*, 29.3.56, p. 1.

[13] FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XII: Telegram, DOS to USE, Turkey, 6.4.56, pp. 268–9.

[14] FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XII: Memorandum of Conversation, DOS, 9.4.56, pp. 275–6.

USA of the danger of its 'lenient attitude' towards him.[15] Some years earlier, during Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over Britain's withdrawal from the Suez Canal base, Democrat leaders had been aware of the parallels between Egypt's position on the Suez Canal and the status of the Turkish straits, and had avoided an independent stance in support of Nasser. Implying that Egypt was being selfish in its claims to Suez, Menderes had told US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles:

> attempts by Egypt to present the issue as a struggle for independence and freedom should be entirely secondary to the importance of the Canal Zone to the entire free world as a point of strategy ... The Turks ... intend to use [their airfields] jointly with United States forces, and they do not feel that this involves in any way a question of infringing Turkish sovereignty.[16]

The Democrat leaders consistently viewed their Western alliance as the sole guardian of their national sovereignty and claims to a Western identity. Following the same logic, when the Suez Crisis erupted, they deemed Nasser to be the primary obstacle to this very alliance in the region, and exerted efforts to focus US attention in particular on the need for action against him. On the eve of the first London Conference, Menderes reminded Dulles of his longstanding unequivocal stance on Nasser, and urged: 'While relief is being sought for each particular symptom, if we fail to heal the focus of infection which is the source of the ailment, we must continue to expect from Egypt, in accordance with the wishes of Russia, all sorts of new blows ... '[17] The Soviet Union had negotiated arms deals with Egypt and Syria in September and November 1955 respectively, and strongly lent its support to members of the pan-Arab, neutralist bloc during the Suez Crisis, underscoring this with a pledge of military assistance near its end.[18]

After America's condemnation of the Israeli, British and French attacks on Egypt of 1956, the Democrats decided to follow the precarious course of adopting the US line on Suez, while attempting to preserve their personal project, the Baghdad Pact. Their behaviour

[15] 'Menderes' Stern Speech in Tehran', *Cumhuriyet*, 18.4.57, p. 1; BNA: FO371/121256/V1073/213, BE, Tehran to Levant Department, 24.4.56.
[16] FRUS: 1952–1954, Vol. IX: Memorandum of Conversation, Counselor in Turkey (Rountree), 26.5.53, p. 139.
[17] BNA: FO371/119114/JE14211/999: Menderes to Dulles, 15.8.56.
[18] Philip Anderson, '"Summer Madness": the Crisis in Syria, August–October 1957', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, Nos. 1/2, 1995, pp. 21–2.

throughout was illustrative of the consistency of the interaction between their national and foreign policy. On the one hand, they provided the Americans with 'staunch assistance during the Suez crisis', accompanied by a drive for economic assistance.[19] On the other, at an extraordinary meeting of the pact's regional members in November, 'the Turks took the lead … [in asserting] that Britain should not be expelled from the pact'.[20] Commenting in retrospect, Bayar told the Pakistani president that, in spite of Arab states' requests for Britain's expulsion, 'In order not to dissipate the Pact's power, we decided not to attach too much importance to these events and to pay attention to keeping Britain among us.'[21] The regional powers also issued a communiqué toeing the wider (American-led) line at the time, advocating a ceasefire and United Nations (UN) resolution of the matter.[22] In a later meeting, Menderes agreed to endorse the Beirut Declaration of November 1956.[23] This aimed to assist Nuri al-Said 'to meet the difficulties of his present position without jettisoning the substance of his associations with the West'.[24] Despite the Turkish government's official silence otherwise, the British ambassador could confidently state: 'The Turkish government have not for a moment wavered in their approval of the Anglo-French intervention in the Israeli–Egyptian conflict.'[25] Indeed, articles condemning Nasser as a dictator, guilty of mismanagement of the Suez issue, filled the pro-government *Zafer* during and after the attack on Egypt.[26]

The Democrats also maintained their commitment to Israel throughout these events. Even when they withdrew their ambassador from Tel

[19] FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XXIV: Letter from President's Special Assistant (Randall) to Secretary of Treasury (Humphrey), Under Secretary of State (Hoover), and Director of International Cooperation Administration (Hollister), 26.9.56, p. 692.

[20] Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınevi, 1969, p. 134.

[21] TRA: B/30.1.0.0/40.236.16: Minutes, Presidency Office, Meeting between Bayar and Pakistani President Iskender Mirza, 25.10.57.

[22] American approval is indicated in TRA: O1/30.1.0.0/126.811.1: Correspondence, US Ambassador Fletcher Warren to Menderes, on message from Dulles, 1956 (precise date unknown).

[23] TRA: E4/30.1.0.0/62.381.14: 'Eight Arab States' "Beirut Declaration"', 15.11.56.

[24] BNA: FO371/121648/VQ1022/15, Bowker to FO, 15.11.56.

[25] BNA: FO371/121801/VR1091/957, Bowker to FO, 16.11.56.

[26] For example: 'Nasser Exposed For What He Is!', *Zafer*, 30.11.56, p. 1; 'Nile–Suez–Nasser!', *Zafer*, 1.12.56, p. 1.

Aviv on 26 November, Turkey's diplomats reassured the Israelis that 'his leaving Israel was not an act undertaken against Israel per se, but an act aimed at salvaging the reputation of the Baghdad Pact under the intense anti-Israel atmosphere prevailing in the Middle East in the wake of the Suez incident'.[27] Turkey's Minister for Trade and Economy talked Menderes out of further action, as 'this kind of rupture might adversely affect the normal development of Turkish–Israeli commercial and economic relations'.[28] Indeed, these relations were not overly harmed: the chargé d'affaires remained in Tel Aviv.[29]

After Suez, Turkey's leaders were concerned at the continuing Soviet aid flowing to the Arab states, while increased US aid to Turkey was not forthcoming at a time of economic difficulty.[30] With British prestige in decline, the Democrats grew more anxious to preserve the Baghdad Pact and improve the position of its regional members. Once again, they invited the US administration to join – this included an extraordinary public appeal by Bayar on 1 November[31] – and there was significant anticipation in Turkey.[32] The political thinking of Dulles prevailed, however: he preferred that the USA turn to bilateral relationships and create its own vehicle of Middle East policy, rather than resuscitate what he considered Britain's 'failed' ventures, namely the Baghdad Pact.[33]

[27] Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference: 1960–1992: The Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage*, New York: Vantage Press, 1994, p. 42. See also Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman, 'Bölüm III, Ikinci Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türk Dış Politikası (1945–1965): Genel Durum', in Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Cilt I, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1987, pp. 284–5.

[28] Ara Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours: Origins and Failure of the Baghdad Pact, 1953–58*, Slough: Archive Editions, 2001, p. 162.

[29] Gönlübol and Ülman, 'Bölüm III', p. 285.

[30] Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan Ilişkileri, 1947–1969*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1979, p. 164.

[31] 'Bayar's Speech on Parliament's Opening', *Zafer*, 2.11.56, p. 5, continued from p. 1; Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours*, p. 164. Turkey's bid was supported by America's own Defence Department: FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XII: Letter from Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to Acting Secretary of State, 14.11.56, pp. 324–5.

[32] 'America Studies the Possibility of Entering Baghdad Pact', 23.11.56, *Zafer*, p. 1.

[33] See TRA: E4/30.1.0.0/62.381.10: Memorandum, 3.11.56. On the motivations behind the Eisenhower Doctrine, see FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XII: pp. 386–9, 393–1, 410–13, 417–18, 440; Sander, *Türk-Amerikan Ilişkileri,* pp. 148–51.

These developments in US strategy culminated in the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. Direct US support was pledged to regional states threatened by 'aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism'. Menderes reacted immediately, and the imbalance in Eisenhower's January speech, which referred briefly to the Suez War and extensively to the communist threat, was amplified in the speeches of his Turkish allies. Days after its acceptance by Congress, Menderes told the Associated Press (AP) Agency what a firm step it was towards political stability in the Middle East. He continued: 'Since Turkey is the main element assuring security and stability in the region, it seems logical and normal that she have her share [in the Doctrine].'[34] The Democrat leaders had instantly recognised the Eisenhower Doctrine's potential for enhancing Turkey's geostrategic importance and prestige, and hence its aid receipts.

The Syrian Crisis and the Turkish Difference

The Eisenhower Doctrine allowed for a change in Turkish tactics: instead of directly inviting the USA to join the Baghdad Pact, Turkish leaders could fashion an imperative for US accession. This shift prepared the ground for the Syrian Crisis, which saw Turkish leaders play on Anglo-American concerns about a regional communist threat and draw on Orientalist tropes to present Turkey as a regional buffer. In late 1956, Turkish leaders had been complaining that Syria had received Soviet arms, and that Turkey now felt encircled.[35] Despite directly communicating the consequent need to strengthen the pact,[36] and publicly acknowledging their troop manoeuvres on the Syrian border, the Turks had received muted support, but no mention of the

[34] TRA: A41/30.1.0.0/35.215.17: Menderes' Statement to *Associated Press*, 6.2.57; 'Adnan Menderes' Important Statement Given to the American and World Press', *Zafer*, 7.2.57, p. 1, 4; see also 'America Will Stop the Spread of Soviet Influence in the Middle East', *Zafer*, 2.1.57, p. 1.

[35] 'Syrian President Asked Russia to Start a War!', *Zafer*, 9.11.56, pp. 1, 4; 'Syria Has Not Yet Worn Red', 21.11.56, *Zafer*, p. 1; 'Where is Syria Going', *Zafer*, 25.11.56, pp. 1, 4; 'Syria is Playing with Fire in the Middle East: Iraqi–Syrian Tensions', *Zafer*, 27.11.56, p. 1; see also *Zafer*, 27–29.11.56 for reports on US and Turkish fears of Syria; see also 'What Are They Busy With in Syria', *Cumhuriyet*, 19.6.57.

[36] BNA: FO371/121223/V1022.11; FO371/121229/V10344/1, 'Conversation at Luncheon', 30.11.56.

pact, from a cautious USA.[37] The Eisenhower Doctrine created new possibilities for Turkish policymakers.[38]

Portents of the Syrian Crisis were visible from January, when Menderes offered his services in bringing those states under Egyptian influence, particularly Saudi Arabia, from the pan-Arabist camp towards reconciliation with Iraq and the Western bloc.[39] That month, Middle East Baghdad Pact members had released a statement affirming that 'vigorous steps should be taken to meet the challenge of false and subversive propaganda' in the region.[40] In February, President Nasser called together the Syrian, Saudi and Jordanian leaders, who had issued a joint memorandum criticising Eisenhower's reference to a 'vacuum' in the region, and had signed the Treaty of Arab Solidarity.[41] In his AP interview, Menderes singled out Syria and Egypt as having governments whose policies 'endangered peace and their own people'.[42] He followed this with thinly veiled comments on both aid and US accession to the Baghdad Pact:

> those who are working for peace in the region and in the whole world must be dealt with separately from those who are endangering the peace and security of the world. That is to say, in the extension of aid, the former countries must receive high priority . . . There is no reason why the Baghdad Pact should not be enlarged . . . as the Eisenhower Plan . . . can be considered an element reinforcing the Baghdad Pact.[43]

Later that month, making a radio speech on the eleventh anniversary of the Truman Doctrine, Menderes underlined again: 'We may rightfully

[37] 'America Gives Turkey Guarantees against Any Threat or Attack', *Zafer*, 30.11.56, p. 1; 'America Supports its Guarantees with a Statement', *Zafer*, 1.12.56, p. 1; on 2 December, *Zafer* chose the headline 'America is Beside Us!' while rebuking *Ulus* for its headline the previous day, 'America is not Entering Baghdad Pact!', *Zafer*, 2.12.56, p. 1; Sander, *Türk-Amerikan Ilişkileri*, p. 157.

[38] Turkey had been party to joint US–British–Iraqi plans for a coup in Syria in 1956, and may have been emboldened by this precedent. See Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours*, pp. 125–7.

[39] Ibid., p. 169.

[40] Communiqué on talks between the Prime Ministers of Iraq, Pakistan, Persia, and Turkey, Ankara, 21.1.57: Noble Frankland ed., *Documents on International Affairs: 1957*, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 259. See also 'Quartet Meeting Statement Published Yesterday', *Zafer,* 22.1.57, p. 1.

[41] Government-aligned *Zafer* critically compared the two quartets – the Baghdad Pact members for the Doctrine and the Arab states meeting against it; see 'Two Different Quartets', *Zafer*, 24.1.57, p. 1.

[42] TRA: A41/30.1.0.0/35.215.17: 6.2.57.

[43] TRA: A41/30.1.0.0/35.215.17: 6.2.57.

claim that this aid has had its value increased in Turkey more than anywhere else.'[44] There followed great celebration of every US statement affirming Turkey's progress in these eleven years.[45]

In March, US envoy James Richards conducted an extensive tour of the region, visiting states such as Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Israel, recruiting adherents to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Amidst great media fanfare around Richards' visit to Ankara,[46] Menderes reiterated to him that he considered America a 'two-thirds member' of the Baghdad Pact but that he was 'fearful that without full US adherence, enemies of [the] Pact will broadcast propaganda' about Washington's lack of interest. Commenting on the Eisenhower Doctrine, Menderes stressed that he was not trying to get the 'lion's share for Turkey', but was rather 'primarily interested in [Middle East] security', and therefore, urged the USA 'to look to declared friends first'.[47] The two then released a joint communiqué in which Turkey 'affirmed its support of America's proposals aiming to buttress the national independence and safeguard territorial integrity of Middle Eastern states against the threat of international communism'.[48] Soon after, the USA joined the Baghdad Pact's Military Planning Committee, which Acting Foreign Minister Ethem Menderes claimed to signify that the USA had 'effectively become a member of the Pact'.[49]

Yet that summer, the USA remained outside the pact. The Democrat leaders' first manoeuvres in what became known as the Syrian Crisis aimed to remedy this. They stepped up efforts to depict Syria as unstable, dangerous and under communist control. Speaking to the US ambassador in March, Bayar warned: 'if [Syria and Egypt] can secure some benefits from the Eisenhower Doctrine through their current stances, they may well become more spoiled and greedy. I do not

[44] 'Prime Minister Menderes' Radio Speech', *Zafer*, 13.3.57, p. 1.
[45] For example, all from the first page of one day's edition of *Zafer*: 'America's Leaders' Words of Praise for Turkey: "Turkey is a Country with a Great Future"', 'Programme Broadcast on 450 Radio Stations in America: "Turkey's Long-Term Economic Prospects are Excellent"', 'New York Times' Article on Turkey: "Touristic Exchange Rate Give Good Results"', 14.3.57, p. 1.
[46] 'American Mission is in Our City', 'Richards' Biography', 'Richards' Mission amongst Us', *Zafer*, 21.3.57, pp. 1, 4.
[47] FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XXIV: Telegram from USE, Turkey to DOS, Ankara, 22.3.57, pp. 710–2.
[48] 'Turkish–American Joint Statement', *Zafer*, 23.3.57, p. 1.
[49] 'Ethem Menderes' Statement Yesterday', *Zafer*, 26.3.57, p. 4.

see a power in Syria with whom we can work … It will slide either to the far left or far right, and the possibility of its going left is very strong.'[50] The same image had already been built up of Egypt, and Menderes told the US ambassador in the same interview: 'there is no need to talk for long about Nasser … he has been sufficiently well-treated … but none of this has made an impression on him'.[51] Bayar was keen to position Turkey firmly between the USA and the regional threat, stating that the Eisenhower Doctrine had made

> a good impact on the whole Middle East, as the Saudi king in particular has changed his behaviour a good deal since his visit to America … The Iranian Shah, during his official visit to Riyadh, had the opportunity to tell King Saud of Turkey's good intentions towards Saudi Arabia, and of Turkey as a country opposing communism and Bolshevism with all its might.[52]

By summer 1957, tension had risen significantly between the USA and Syria, and the Turkish government capitalised on this intersection in international and regional politics. Damascus had recently concluded an aid agreement with Moscow, which had in turn adopted increasingly pro-Arab stances since the unveiling of the Eisenhower Doctrine.[53] In August, a coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been exposed in Damascus, and the government had expelled three American diplomats who were implicated. Washington had responded by declaring the Syrian ambassador *persona non grata*.[54]

When the Syrian Chief of Staff Nizam al-Din was replaced by left-leaning General Afif al-Bizri, the Turks offered this as confirmation that Syria had become a Soviet satellite.[55] While signalling Turkey's willingness to cooperate in military intervention, Menderes also stressed

[50] TRA: B/30.1.0.0/40.236.11: Minutes, Meeting between Menderes and US Ambassador Warren, 25.3.57.

[51] Ibid.; 'What is Nasser Afraid Of?', *Zafer*, 23.4.57, p. 3.

[52] TRA: B/30.1.0.0/40.236.11: 25.3.57.

[53] On statements by Khrushchev and Shepilov, see Hashim Behbehani, *The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism*, London: KPI, 1986, pp. 152–7.

[54] Douglas Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action: the United States and Syria, 1945–1958', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 1, Winter 1990, pp. 51, 71–2; Matthew Jones, 'The "Preferred Plan": the Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Action in Syria, 1957', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2004, pp. 403–4.

[55] 'Syria's Army in the Reds' Hands', *Cumhuriyet*, 16.8.57, p. 1; 'The Situation in Syria is Serious!', *Cumhuriyet*, 17.8.57, p. 1.

that the Syrian Crisis 'was not a matter between Turkey and Syria but a phase and reflection of a great struggle between the two blocs'.[56] The backdrop to this in turn was that the botched CIA operation of August had given way to redoubled efforts, this time across the Atlantic, to overthrow the Syrian leadership, and the Turks wished to participate: 'Thinking in both London and Washington began to coalesce around the idea of encouraging Syria's pro-Western neighbours to take armed action to intervene and overthrow the regime in Damascus.'[57] In late August, Deputy Undersecretary of State Loy Henderson duly undertook a 'fact-finding' mission in the Middle East, aimed at coordinating with regional allies – particularly Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon – on moves 'to eliminate the Syrian government'.[58] He did not visit Syria but later reported that it had indeed succumbed to communist influence.

With the October elections looming, the Democrats were particularly keen to secure a foreign relations victory and the anticipated reward in foreign aid. They knew that the Anglo-American preference was for an Arab partner in the plans for Syria, and specifically Iraq, since Turkish intervention would have been unpopular with Arab audiences. It was therefore necessary to emphasise the utility of the Turkish role and to seize the initiative regionally, appearing somehow 'to lead the Arabs into taking the lead' in plans on Syria.

Firstly, Turkey's leaders made it clear to Henderson that Turkey would be a most willing participant in any military solution sought to the problem of Syrian subversion.[59] Secondly, they mirrored US action in the regional sphere, lobbying the conservative monarchies in Jordan, Iraq and Iran over several meetings in August and September. Bayar stated that 'Turkey did not have any aggressive designs on Syria but was seriously concerned over the possibility of Syria turning into a Soviet satellite.'[60] Each of these leaders agreed on the presence of

[56] Cited in Aykan, *Turkey's Role*, p. 44.
[57] Jones, 'The "Preferred Plan"', p. 404.
[58] Eisenhower cited in Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004, pp. 159–60. See Jones, 'The "Preferred Plan"', pp. 404–5.
[59] FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XIII: Special National Intelligence Estimate, 'Developments in the Syrian Situation', 3.9.57, pp. 678–9.
[60] Metin Tamkoç, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976,

a communist threat in Syria, but Iraq, the proposed linchpin of American plans, proved reluctant to embark on military action after the replacement in June of Nuri al-Said with new, pan-Arabist Iraqi Premier Ali Jawdat, much to the exasperation of Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah. Jordan's King Hussein held talks with Henderson in August in which they agreed that Syrian 'provocations' would suffice to justify military action,[61] but there was no evidence of any such behaviour from Syria. In the meantime, Turkey had begun new troop manoeuvres on the Syrian border.

The international and regional dimensions of the Syrian Crisis began to merge increasingly during September 1957. On 5 September, the USA increased military aid to Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon.[62] Speaking days later, Nasser disputed both that Syria was leaning to the Soviet bloc and that the Americans even thought so. Instead, he described US policy as intended to distract from the real threat in the region – Israel.[63] On 9 September, Cairo released a statement in support of Syria against any attack.[64] Then on 10 September, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent a letter to Menderes, warning of the consequences of Turkish action, to which Menderes responded that Syria itself had not complained, and that the troop concentrations were defensive acts.[65] He then reiterated the substance of statements he had already made in Turkey: '[Syria] is hastily arming beyond the limit of reasonable defense needs. In fact Syria is becoming an arms depot which will probably be used by others in case of need … Your Excellency's message … proves that, as the matter stands today, Soviet Russia has adopted Syria and the Syrian question.'[66]

p. 240; 'Our Friend the King of Iraq His Majesty Faisal II Left Turkey', *Zafer*, 15.8.57, p. 1; 'Hashemite King of Jordan in Istanbul', *Zafer*, 23.8.57, p. 1.

61 FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XIII: Telegram from Consulate General in Istanbul to DOS, Istanbul, 25.8.57, pp. 653–6.

62 'America Will Assist the Middle East Rapidly', *Zafer*, 7.9.57, p. 1.

63 Nasser's Interview with Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, *Al-Ahram* Editor, 8.9.57. See also Nasser's arguments in FRUS: 1955–1957, Vol. XIII: Telegram from USE, Egypt to DOS, 1.9.57, pp. 664–7.

64 Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi*, Vol. II, Cairo: Al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1977, p. 32.

65 See Bulganin's letter, 10.9.57, and Menderes' reply, 5.10.57: Frankland, ed., *1957*, pp. 333–41.

66 'Our Prime Minister's Reply to Bulganin', *Zafer*, 5.10.57, p. 1; Letter from Mr Bulganin to Mr Menderes regarding the situation on the Turkish–Syrian frontier, 10.9.57; Reply by Mr Menderes to Mr Bulganin's Letter of 10 September, 5.10.57: Frankland ed., *1957*, pp. 333–41; see 'The Situation in Syria has become Threatening', *Zafer*, 25.9.57, p. 1.

Meanwhile, a secret 'Working Group' on Syria had formed in Washington in early September, comprising State Department and CIA officials, together with staff from the British Embassy. Within two weeks, they had finalised the latest clandestine Anglo-American plan for Syrian regime change, 'which involved military action by Iraq, perhaps with help from Jordan, coupled with an insurrection within Syria' to be staged using local contacts and sabotage tactics, and with CIA and SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) assassinations of key figures.[67] The Working Group Report also stated that 'Turkish military support would have to be on hand to provide assurance of success for the operation, but unilateral action by Ankara (in view of the political repercussions in the Arab world) could only be considered as a last resort.'[68] As these plans were finalised, on 19 September, Dulles made a speech at the United Nations defending Turkey.[69] On 24 September, Iranian ambassador Ali Mansur relayed to President Bayar a message he had received from Marshall Kliment Vorochilov:

> Given ... the threat posed to Syria by the Turkish military forces gathered along the Syrian border and the US warships in parallel ... and given Russia and Iran's borders' proximity to this region, it was seen as necessary to communicate to the Shah that Soviet Russia cannot look at these growing dangers near her borders passively.[70]

When asked how the Iranians should respond to the question of Turkish troops, Bayar cited the National Defence Ministry's statement on the 'defensive purpose' of troop deployment.[71] By October, the USA had sent an angry retort to Moscow,[72] and had repeated its pledge to come to its NATO ally's aid if it were attacked, condemning Soviet Russia's 'open threats' to Turkey.[73]

[67] Jones, 'The "Preferred Plan"', p. 405; Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action', pp. 71–2.
[68] Jones, 'The "Preferred Plan"', p. 406.
[69] 'Dulles Says: "Turkey Exposed to Threat"', *Zafer*, 20.9.57, p. 1.
[70] TRA: B/30.1.0.0/40.236.14: Minutes, Meeting between Bayar and Iranian ambassador, 24.9.57, p. 2.
[71] Ibid.
[72] United States Note to the Soviet Union, 24.9.57: Frankland ed., *1957*, p. 81.
[73] Statement to the press by US Department of State regarding statements by Mr Khrushchev on US Policy in the Middle East, 10.10.57: Frankland ed., *1957*, pp. 342–3; see also George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective*, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972, p. 64.

Escalations were not coming from the 'right' quarters for the Turkish diplomats and their US allies, however. In mid-September, when Bayar met the Iranian ambassador, the latter reported an exchange between the Shah and King Saud in which Saud spoke of his contacts with Syrian moderates, and his confidence at overcoming 'extreme elements'.[74] Shortly after, Saud travelled to Damascus with an offer of mediation, and was followed within days by Iraqi Prime Minister Jawdat. To the further consternation of Turkish, British and US policymakers, Nasser then upstaged the diplomacy of both Saud and Jawdat in October by sending troops to Lattakia in response to Turkish escalations, in a show of Arab solidarity with Syria. The Syrian leadership then took its case to the United Nations, where it requested an investigation into Turkish troop concentrations, backed by the Soviet Union and Egypt, as well as the Asian–African bloc.[75] The Turkish government sent a note to the Syrian Foreign Ministry, insisting that these manoeuvres were 'security measures inside Turkish territory' and 'an internal matter', accusing Syria again of amassing arms.[76]

There then followed a series of de-escalations by the superpowers. Moscow had sent messages to the socialist parties of western Europe on Soviet proposals for disarmament and non-intervention in the Middle East, a hint at the Soviets' inclination towards magnanimous compromise.[77] For its part, Washington made efforts behind the scenes to persuade Ankara to demobilise its troops, in order to avoid further escalation with Moscow,[78] while publicly insisting that Turkey had maintained a defensive posture throughout.[79] Turkey's Foreign Minister's sudden visit to Saudi Arabia produced a joint communiqué in which Turkey conveyed its acceptance of the Saudi king's 'well-intentioned efforts at mediation'.[80] The rest of the UN debate saw the further trading of accusations rather than substantial threats, followed by a Soviet gesture which helped defuse the crisis. Zeki Küneralp,

[74] TRA: B/30.1.0.0/40.236.14: 13.9.57, p. 5.
[75] Letter from Salah al-Bitar, Syrian Foreign Minister to Mr Hammarskjold, 15.10.57; Letter from Mr Gromyko to Sir Leslie Munro, President of the General Assembly, 16.10.57: Frankland ed., *1957*, pp. 343–7.
[76] 'We Have Given a Reply Note to Syria', *Zafer*, 19.10.57, p. 1.
[77] Mücahit Topalak, 'Another Intervention', *Zafer*, 18.10.57, p. 3; Anderson, 'Summer Madness', p. 35.
[78] Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action', p. 73.
[79] 'Attack Never Crossed Turkey's Mind', *Zafer*, 27.10.57, p. 1.
[80] 'Joint Turkish–Saudi Arabian Statement', *Zafer*, 26.10.57, p. 1.

Political Secretary to the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, relates:

> Bulganin sent a second and milder letter, to which Menderes replied. The Soviet Bloc ambassadors and counsellors in Ankara came one by one to the Ministry and saw me . . . it was perfectly obvious that it was a concerted action. I adopted a measured attitude on each occasion . . . And then the problem died down as suddenly as it had flared up.[81]

Examining Turkey's regional overtures during the Syrian Crisis, it would not be simplistic to say that they too were guided by the priority given to US relations.[82] In his important work on the Baghdad Pact, Sanjian has made much of the brief Turkish–Egyptian rapprochement of mid-1957, as reported in British Foreign Office documents.[83] However, one of the main reports in question notes: 'The effect of these gestures was dissipated by the Syrian Crisis and Menderes told me in November that Nasser was now so far committed to Russia that there were no grounds for hoping that something could still be made of him.'[84] Indeed the events of the Syrian Crisis demonstrated a disdain for Abdel Nasser and his camp by Menderes – whether in private or public, with Turkish or foreign interlocutors – which was relatively consistent.

Further manifesting the priority given to Turkey's US relations, alongside this hostility to Nasser and his allies, was the substantial, covert upgrading of Turkish relations with Israel in 1958. Sanjian has lamented the lack of primary documentation on the details of the meeting between Menderes and Eliyahu Sasson, the former Israeli minister in Ankara, speculating that it was in late 1957 or early 1958.[85] One such document can be found in the Turkish archives, however, and is very revealing indeed. In a letter to Menderes, Sasson

[81] Zeki Küneralp, *Just a Diplomat*, trans. Geoffrey Lewis, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992, p. 67.

[82] See Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975*, London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977, p. 395; Ferenç Vâli, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: the Foreign Policy of Turkey*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971, p. 356; Gönlübol, 'NATO, USA and Turkey', in Kemal Karpat ed., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950–1974*, Leiden: Brill, 1975, p. 22.

[83] See Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours*, pp. 198–9.

[84] BNA: FO 136450, RK1011/1, BE, Ankara to FO, 'Annual Report for Turkey: 1957', 4.2.58.

[85] Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours*, p. 241.

relays his gratitude for their recent meeting in Paris, and his pleasure at the 'accord in views' of both parties. Sasson emphasises the similarities between Turkey and Israel 'within the free world' and extols the benefits of their cooperation for security against the Soviet Union. Sasson then suggests 'exchanging military and political information in the common interest', and underlines the need for maximum secrecy throughout. Finally, he affirms that it is in Israel's interests that Turkey be militarily and economically strong, and that like Turkey, Israel opposes any Syrian or Egyptian initiative to destabilise Jordan or Lebanon.[86]

It is likely that this document was an early reference to the Periphery Pact or Alliance, which Israel wished to establish with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia that year.[87] The letter ends with a demand that Iraq be told at the next Baghdad Pact meeting to refrain from discussion of the Palestinian question. Sasson also pushes for a subsequent meeting, which was probably followed by the secret invitation of Ben Gurion to Ankara in August.[88]

These exchanges provide yet more evidence of the consistency in Democrat foreign policy through the 1950s. Sanjian himself points out that Turkish overtures to Israel took place soon after the Syrian Crisis, and this while Turkey continued its public affirmations of a continued alliance with Iraq.[89] There was evidently no serious turn-around in attitudes or policies towards the Arab states after the Syrian Crisis, and the Turkish–Israeli relationship had at no point been under genuine threat.

Sovereignty and Development: Securing the US Bilateral Agreement

Evaluating the bilateral crisis itself, it is reasonable to infer that Egypt had in fact met the challenge posed to its Syrian ally by Turkey, and had stolen the limelight with its political and symbolic military support. Moreover, ultimately, the USA and USSR were characteristically unwilling to come to blows over this regional dispute. However,

[86] TRA: O1/30.1.0.0/126.814.2: Correspondence, Israeli Ambassador in Rome, Sasson to Menderes, 'Personal and Confidential', 8.1.58.
[87] See Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, London: Penguin, 2001, pp. 192–6.
[88] Ibid., p. 196. [89] Sanjian, *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours*, pp. 244–5.

what is most relevant in understanding the Syrian Crisis from the Turkish perspective is that the balance sheet was positive for Turkish–American relations afterwards, even if the USA remained outside the Baghdad Pact.

In the scramble of escalation with Syria, Washington had affirmed its support for Turkey in numerous public statements and in correspondence with Moscow. This had helped reinforce the Democrats' narrative of Turkey's Western identity, and of its steadfastness before 'International Communism'. Shortly after the crisis had subsided, the Baghdad Pact Council met in Ankara, this time with Dulles present at the head of the US delegation. According to Küneralp, this 'showed the healthy state of Turco-American relations'.[90] Dulles sent a 'Message to the Turkish Nation' on the eve of his January 1958 trip to Ankara in which he affirmed that the USA 'took a deep interest in the efforts of the Turkish government and nation to achieve economic development' and that 'countries that share in collective security systems, like Turkey and the United States, will never be alone'.[91]

Nevertheless, at the Ankara meeting, Dulles continued to defer the question of pact membership, citing the Eisenhower Doctrine as sufficient guarantee.[92] By 1958, the Turkish government was forced to adopt the austerity measures it had avoided for so long, including the devaluation of the lira in August, the freezing of bank credits and the reduction of imports. Only this severe stabilisation package brought the US aid for which the Democrats had been pleading.[93] It certainly eroded the image of an equal partnership which had been crucial to the regime's discourse on Turkey's Western identity. Yet in terms of the economic dimension of the government's nation making, the injection of aid was crucial to the continued currency of the DP's rhetoric on national development and prosperity for the Turkish nation. It had become impossible to conceal, however, that this model had been

[90] Küneralp, *Just a Diplomat*, p. 67.
[91] TRA: E4/30.1.0.0/62.385.1: Dulles' 'Message to the Turkish Nation' on eve of Baghdad Pact Council of Ministers meeting, *c.* 19.1.58.
[92] Küneralp, *Just a Diplomat*, p. 67.
[93] The USA, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and European Payments Union provided an aid package of $359 million: Çağrı Erhan, '1945–1960: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc – Relations with the USA and NATO', in Baskın Oran ed., *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919–2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010, p. 334.

pursued without planning for so long that it had become unsustainable by the end of the decade.[94]

July 1958 then brought a series of upheavals, from the Iraqi Revolution to the landings of US and British forces in Lebanon and Jordan respectively. The fall of Nuri al-Said's regime dealt a serious blow to the Democrats' morale, representing a major setback to their foreign policy venture in the Baghdad Pact and a warning of the grave implications of domestic grievances. Throughout these events, the Turkish leadership continued to display its preoccupation with Turkish–American relations and its eagerness for intervention in the region. It allowed its Incirlik base to be used for the Beirut operation, despite the opposition's severe criticism of Washington's 'notification, rather than consultation of the Turkish authorities'.[95] The limits to which Turkish national sovereignty seemed to have been stretched to accommodate the Eisenhower Doctrine in this period were, and remain, deeply controversial.[96]

A major development in foreign relations, the Turkish–American Cooperation Agreement of 1959,[97] duly provided a boost to the Democrats' nation making project, and particularly its narratives on Turkey's Western identity. In July 1958, two weeks after the coup in Iraq, a special meeting of Baghdad Pact members had been held in London, and Menderes had once again pressed Dulles for US membership. Turning down the request one final time, Washington instead committed to enter into bilateral agreements with the pact's regional members, in cooperation with them for security and defence.[98] The resulting Cooperation Agreement had significant implications for the westernisation project of DP nation making, with American involvement in various aspects of daily life in Turkey increasing still further. This process had been gathering speed ever since

[94] 'A planning board was covertly formed in 1959, since Menderes had always denounced any such activity that had statist overtones.' Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: a Study in Capitalist Development*, London: Verso, 1987, p. 135. See also Dwight Simpson, 'Development as a Process: the Menderes Phase in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1965, p. 151.

[95] Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 67.

[96] See Eroğul, *Demokrat*, pp. 159–61.

[97] Gillian King ed., 'Agreement of Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey', in *Documents on International Affairs 1959*, Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 343–5.

[98] See Gillian King ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1958*, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 370.

NATO accession, marked by the presence of a host of US business, education and technical experts, army missions and non-governmental organisations in Turkey:

> The number of US personnel and dependants, who came to Turkey under the bilateral agreements, reached 24,000 at its height. Some of them were military advisers belonging to JUSMATT, Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, which was originally established in 1947. The civilian group included members of the US diplomatic and consular missions, the US Information Service, the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps and various private business or educational organizations. TUSLOG, the United States Logistics Group, which was established in 1955, regulated all activities of US personnel . . .[99]

Indeed, it is important to see the 1959 agreement as the culmination of a long process, within the context of the series of similar agreements that had gone before it.[100] In 1957, Democrat leaders signed the Agreement on Expropriation and Confiscation with the USA, whereby 'the US government could be a party to disputes between American firms investing in Turkey and Turkish firms'.[101] Before that, the 1954 NATO Status of Forces agreements had made the US military and technical missions a permanent feature of the widespread American presence in Turkish daily life.[102] Parliamentary debate on these US–Turkish ventures was often heated, with the opposition viewing some of them as a voluntary throwback to the days of the Capitulations, those eighteenth- and nineteenth-century bilateral treaties which had given European powers, their subjects and their protégés in the Ottoman Empire both economic and juridical privileges. Still, the Democrats were happy to continue following their American model, and in the medium and long run, to create cadres of Turkish nationals according to it.

Pious Anticommunism

These developments were particularly useful signifiers of Turkey's solid Western credentials, since they carried the stamp of approval of a credible

[99] Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish–American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, New York: Nova, 2003, pp. 70–1.
[100] See Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, p. 69, fn 54.
[101] Erhan, 'Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', p. 334.
[102] BNA: FO371/113452, Correspondence, BE, Ankara to FO, 18.5.54.

external source. By contrast, in domestic politics at the time, the Democrats' pre-1950 discourse on political liberalisation as a crucial feature of Turkey's Western identity was proving increasingly hollow. More specifically, events had shown the Democrats' conception of political freedom to be focused on the ballot box, and less on the protection of civil liberties and the tolerance of political competition.[103] The two areas in which they had most sincerely attempted to realise this liberalisation had proved to be national development and the secular system.

Turkey's Western self-image was cultivated through the DP's liberal approach to Kemalist understandings of secularism, and the invocation of religion against the godlessness of Marxism.[104] The Democrats' relaxed approach to religious practice was undoubtedly kept up for its electoral popularity, but remained a crucial dimension of their nation making project into the late 1950s. Their approach was related in articles distinguishing between secularism and 'hostility to religion', as well as in columns on religious topics, such as the daily series during the month of Ramadan appearing in *Zafer* in April 1957.[105] The DP's departure from the emphases of the Atatürkist template appeared to have gained considerable currency by the end of their term. An important sign of this was flagged by Kemal Karpat at the time, in observing that religious propaganda had not been the key to electoral success in 1957, as 'the differences of view among the existing parties on religious issues have dwindled to a minimum'.[106] Speaking in Konya in early 1956, Menderes had affirmed:

> As to the freedom of conscience, the Turkish people are Moslems … A Moslem child must not be deprived of a very natural right – learning his religion. For this reason, the introduction of religious classes in schools would be an appropriate step. We do not believe that a nation or society can survive without religion.[107]

[103] For examples, see Nursel Sağıroğlu, 'Forum: an Intellectual Opposition in the DP Period, 1954–1960', unpublished Masters thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1990; Ilknur Sarp, 'Relations between the Government and the Opposition in the Last Three Years of the Democratic Party Period', unpublished PhD thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1998.

[104] BNA: FO371-130266, RK1282/2, BE, Ankara to FO, 28.2.57.

[105] 'Why Didn't They Like It? The Meaning of Secularism is not Hostility to Religion?', *Zafer*, 10.1.56, p. 1, 5; Ragıp Akyavaş, 'Ramazan Chats' columns, *Zafer*, April 1957.

[106] Karpat, '1957', p. 444.

[107] Menderes' Speech on Religious Teaching in Schools, Anatolian Agency, BNA: FO371-12405-K178/1.

In 1959, a Higher Institute of Islam was opened, to meet the need for teachers of the growing number of Imam-Hatip schools and the desire for higher education of a generation of Imam-Hatip graduates.[108] In one of the starkest contrasts between Democrat and prior Republican rule, the DP indulged in the somewhat ostentatious sponsoring of religious initiatives, as Iraq's Foreign Minister observed in 1957: 'I saw new examples of the value attached to religion in Turkey. Mosques are being built everywhere, with Menderes' personal donation of 200,000 Lira for the Ankara mosque, and 75 mosques being renovated . . . '[109]

Religion was one of the most prominent features of the Democrats' 1957 election campaign. Menderes declared that the DP had built 15,000 mosques since coming to power, and that in the future, 'next to the factory chimney there would be a mosque minaret'.[110] In one election slogan, Menderes pledged, 'We will make Istanbul a second Mecca, and Eyüp Sultan Mosque another Ka'ba.'[111] When Menderes survived a plane crash in 1959, many DP members and supporters hailed a kind of divine power in him that bolstered the Democrats' use of religion in their nation making project.[112]

The Democrats' discourse on Turkey's Western identity had long been coupled with warnings on the threat of communism, as well as affirmations of religious freedom. A major contribution of the 1959 bilateral agreement was to give the regime's ostensibly anticommunist crackdowns new teeth, and bolster the narratives on (in)security and nation/Other which it had been employing since 1950. The agreement did so by allowing Baghdad Pact powers to request US military assistance against either 'direct or *indirect*' communist aggression. One critical scholar describes the implications for Turkey's foreign policy:

[108] Esma Torun, 'II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türkiye'de Kültürel Değişimlere Yol Açan İç ve Dış Etkenler (1945–1960)', unpublished PhD thesis, Ankara University, 2002, p. 263.

[109] TRA: O1/30.1.0.0/126.813.5: Statement by Iraqi Prime Minister Fadil al-Jamali at press conference after recent visit to Turkey, 7.9.57.

[110] Cited in Karpat, '1957', p. 443.

[111] Cited in Ahmet Yücekök, *Siyasetin Toplumsal Tabanı: Siyaset Sosyolijisi*, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1987, p. 53.

[112] Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945–1971)*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976, p. 192; *Cumhuriyet*, 9.3.59; 27–9.3.59.

The Eisenhower Doctrine had referred to open aggression whereas the 1959 bilateral agreement introduces the new, flexible concept of 'indirect aggression,' which cannot be found in the agreements that any other NATO country has signed with the United States. No Western European country, even though she may be a part of the Western system of war, has given the additional right to the United States of sending troops to her territory under the guise of meeting what is termed as 'indirect aggression'.[113]

This wording had equally serious implications domestically in Turkey, as the opposition pointed out vigorously during 1959. The late 1950s had been marked by a new surge of confrontational politics, after the opposition launched its campaign in early 1956. Menderes and Bayar had responded with their own repressive campaign in turn, reverting to the familiar accusations of 'communist units' at large, and combining this with increasingly repressive press, public association and electoral laws.[114] In April 1957 the Labourers' Syndicates Confederation was closed down.[115] The bilateral agreement strengthened the government's ability to pursue such policies, legitimising them by weaving together its discourse on national and international security and threat.

The late 1950s saw continuing waves of communist arrests, as well as increasingly repressive measures against political activists and commentators, whose ties to any leftist apparatus were far from evident.[116] This was commented on repeatedly in British Embassy reports on 'Communism in Turkey'.[117] When the 1959 agreement was brought before the Turkish parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee for ratification in 1960, debates raged that cut to the heart of the DP's interpretation of political freedom, and not only of national sovereignty, as informed by the events of summer 1958 in the Arab world.[118] Closing the debate, nonetheless, Foreign Minister Zorlu curtly affirmed that the agreement had come to bolster existing arrangements for Middle East defence, and had no other

[113] Ataöv, *Amerika*, p. 142.
[114] See Eroğul, *Demokrat*, pp. 135–9. On the closure of the Vatan Party, see Karpat, '1957', p. 439.
[115] Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 137.
[116] 'Change in the Penal Code's System of Implementation', *Zafer*, 30.5.57, p. 1.
[117] BNA: FO371-130178, RK1016/1, BE, Ankara to FO, 25.6.57.
[118] The fate of Menderes' Iraqi allies made him particularly anxious to keep hold of his political power and revive his national project: Eroğul, *Demokrat*, p. 161.

motives.[119] When it came to nation making, the doubtful veracity of the DP leaders' claims and accusations seemed to confirm the designation of communism as Turkey's foremost Other in the 1950s.

Conclusion

Near the end of the decade, the Democrat leadership could in many ways enjoy the fruits of its decade of westernisation endeavours on the international scene. When Eisenhower visited Turkey in December 1959, he was greeted with great enthusiasm and slogans such as 'Peace without Security is No Peace' and 'Peace, Yes – Concessions, No' (see Figure 8.2).[120] As Küneralp remembers, 'For Turco-American relations, the year 1959 proved to be a pinnacle never again attained … Communiqués and speeches sang the praises of Turco-American relations and emphasized the importance of the services rendered by both countries to world peace and stability.'[121] In this sense, the bilateral agreement may be viewed as the Democrats' final flourish, securing the Turkish–American relationship beyond even the level of their previous feat of NATO membership.

On the other hand, it had come in the wake of the fall of the Iraqi regime in 1958, as well as the imposition of a stabilisation package on Turkey which had not solved Turkey's economic problems. Menderes had travelled to Washington in October 1959 to seek more loans, without success. Just before Eisenhower's visit two months later, Menderes had resolved to go to Moscow in July 1960 to begin talks, in light of the détente, about the possibility of Soviet credits. In Eroğul's view, 'the policy of besieging the Soviet Union with military power, which the DP tried to implement following in the footsteps of the West, collapsed first in the region where it was spearheaded by Turkey. The DP dream of making Turkey into a "little America" went bankrupt both internally and

[119] Erhan, 'Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', p. 339; see 'Important Discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee Yesterday', *Cumhuriyet*, 6.2.60, p. 1.

[120] See *Zafer*, 7.12.59. Sander notes the underlying anxieties in Turkey at the recent US–Soviet rapprochement, which explain the particularly enthusiastic reception of the US president. Sander, *Türk-Amerikan Ilişkileri*, p. 188.

[121] Küneralp, *Just a Diplomat*, p. 72.

Figure 8.2 Turkish President Celâl Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes host US President Dwight Eisenhower at the Presidential Residence in Çankaya, December 1959.
Source: Eisenhower Presidential Library.

externally.'[122] This view is difficult to refute when the fate of the Baghdad Pact in particular is considered, as well as the events of the May 1960 coup itself.

However, from the point of view of the DP's nation making efforts, it is beyond doubt that the American choice had become firmly entrenched in Turkey by the time of the 1960 coup against the DP. The Democrats' behaviour during 1957 continued to reflect their pledges to turn Turkey into a 'little America', and the Syrian Crisis had no small role to play in sustaining US attention through the last years of this process.

[122] Eroğul, 'The Establishment of Multiparty Rule, 1945–71', in Schick and Tonak eds., *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 116.

9 *Egypt from Suez to Syrian Union, 1956–8: Sovereign Action*

Where the Canal met the sea, and just slightly apart from the statue of de Lesseps, a group of people stood waiting silently. A young man in the uniform of the popular resistance stood on the highest step, plying a hand drill to carve a hole in the body of the statue. At this moment, for this young man as he stuffed the hole with explosives, the figure could no longer be a statue. Nor was it so for the crowd awaiting the explosion in agitation. It was a symbol that pulled them back in the loathsome past, that put a barrier between them and a finer future. That symbol must be shattered. The youth bent down to the base of the statue, lit the wick, and moved back to join the onlookers. The explosion shook the ground and a wave of smoke and dirt rose, veiling the scene.

Latifa Al-Zayyat, *The Open Door*[1]

We only left Port Said after the withdrawal of the last British soldier and after we had watched the citizens pull down the statue of de Lesseps, symbolic of all that their ancestors had suffered while digging the Suez Canal. We left proud to have been involved in the resistance operations carried out in that courageous city.

Nehad Salem[2]

In 1957, the Turkish leadership viewed Syria as a vehicle for regional activism that would garner prestige within NATO and mitigate the effects of the economic downturn. Egypt's involvement in the Syrian Crisis, and its most direct encounter yet with its rivals in Turkey, was similarly occasioned by the resolution of a dilemma. However, this was one marked by the effort to remain independent of such Western alliances, despite military attacks from Israel that rendered foreign assistance necessary. This sovereignty–development dilemma was at

[1] Latifa Al-Zayyat, *The Open Door* (*Al-Bab Al-Maftuh*), trans. Marilyn Booth, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002[1960], pp. 361–2.
[2] Nehad Salem, 'When I Fought the British', *The Guardian*, 20.10.06.

its most acute in 1956, when the British and French colluded with Israel to attack Egypt. Nasser's leadership was buoyed through this by the popular legitimacy it had built in previous efforts to remain neutral and to build pan-Arab alliances instead. The emotive words above of two young women in the popular resistance during the Suez War, one fictional and the other an active member, convey the sources of that legitimacy.

Between 1956 and 1958, the full measure of American hostility to the Egyptian leadership's recent choices emerged, now more clearly coordinated with already hostile external players including Britain, Israel and France. In early 1956, it became clear to Nasser that the American offer to fund the Aswan Dam was likely to be withdrawn, leaving Egypt to meet the requirements of its national welfare projects alone, or to risk dependence on the Eastern bloc. Nasser took the most assertive steps of his political career until then, starting with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. His confidence in resisting these pressures stemmed partially from the regional and international recognition that his project for a neutralist, pan-Arabist alliance had earned. This chapter focuses on these international arenas for the realisation of the Free Officers' nationalist project, before turning to the ways in which each of its dimensions was shaped by their efforts.

Sovereignty and a National Future: Between the Aswan Dam and Suez

Spring 1956 had brought signs of the congealing of Western and Israeli opposition to the Egyptian leadership's regional campaigns on pan-Arab sovereignty and its critiques of imperial capitalism. The United States delayed several economic aid programmes and consented to renewed French arms shipments to Israel, while the Egyptian leadership received reports on American intentions to draw King Saud away from his alliance with Nasser.[3] During late 1955, Britain was reportedly trying to stall the World Bank loan to Egypt,[4] and in early 1956, British hostility was manifest when Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd

[3] EE, Washington to EFM, 17.2.56: Document 121; EE, Washington to EFM, 12.4.56: Document 124; M. H. Heikal, *Milaffat al-Suways: Harb al-Thalathin Sana*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1986, pp. 787–8, 790–1.

[4] ENA: FM-431/3: EE, Washington to EFM, 21.10.55, includes Correspondence, Hassan Dawud, First Secretary, to Ambassador Ahmad Hussein, 20.10.55.

jumped to blame Nasser for King Hussein's dismissal of Arab Legion Commander John Bagot Glubb.[5] As efforts continued to expand Arab membership of the Baghdad Pact,[6] Egypt's diplomats described the Cold War as a superimposed frame for an older, more basic 'divide and rule strategy' familiar since colonial times.[7] By April, Nasser felt that the dam funding offer was already a dead letter.[8]

This confrontation had been brewing since 1954, when British and American officials had begun drawing up joint strategies to manoeuvre Egypt and Israel into a settlement. According to the clandestine plan, dubbed Alpha, Israel would make territorial concessions and repatriate some refugees, while the Arabs would cease their embargo, allow Jerusalem to come under international jurisdiction and recognise the state of Israel.[9] In practice, US sensitivities to domestic politics and the influence of the Zionist lobby meant that symbolic rather than real concessions were expected from Israel.[10] The incentive for Egypt to participate in Alpha was to be foreign aid, especially funding for the Aswan Dam. However, Britain pressured the Eisenhower administration to withhold aid from Egypt, and the USA attached conditions to any aid packages offered.[11]

By early 1956, US special envoy Robert Anderson's mission to engineer a settlement had failed in its objectives, and although Israel's intransigence was noted, punitive measures were reserved for Egypt.[12] In March 1956, a covert Anglo-American operation named Plan Omega was designed to isolate Nasser and to coerce him into compliance with Western objectives. Omega's three phases comprised, firstly,

[5] EE, Washington to EFM, 8.5.56: Document 125, Heikal, *Milaffat*, pp. 791–2.
[6] ENA: FM-FM-250/1: EE, Tehran to EFM, 'Preparations for Baghdad Pact Meeting, Possible Efforts to Include Arab States', 3.4.56. See also FM-1248/2: EFM Political Affairs Department to EE, Damascus, No. 60, 25.4.56.
[7] ENA: FM-1248/10, EFM Arab Bureau to EE, Damascus, No. 63, 'Analysis of British Policy in the Middle East', 9.5.56.
[8] Mahmud Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad: 1948–1978*, Vol. II, Beirut: Al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Nashr, 1987, p. 114.
[9] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, London: Penguin, 2001, pp. 146–7.
[10] Ray Takeyh, *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: the US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953–7*, New York: St Martin's Press, 2000, p. 67.
[11] See Irene Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 155; Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, p. 69.
[12] See Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, pp. 96–102.

the freezing of all existing aid programmes, including funding for the dam, followed by their cancellation, and finally, the building up of domestic and regional rivals.[13] The premise was that visible aid to willing partners – particularly Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq – would embolden them to form a bloc against Egypt. This was the rationale behind the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. Omega also made special references to regime change in Syria.[14] Omega's demands meant that 'Nasser not only had to abandon all tenets of Arab nationalism and its quest for self-determination, but also had to actively cooperate in transforming the Middle East into a bulwark of Western influence.'[15]

In this context, Egypt's public response to tensions with the USA was conciliatory but firm. Contrary to Washington's claims that Soviet arms had disrupted the 'balance' in the region, Nasser argued that it had merely given Egypt the means to remain outside alliances.[16] To Selwyn Lloyd, Nasser explained that pan-Arabist uprisings occurred at most through Egypt's example, and not its intervention: he did not have buttons to press that would trigger them.[17] That spring, Nasser continued efforts to build supportive alliances with which to increase Egypt's leverage regionally and internationally. In March, he invited the Syrian Premier Shukri al-Quwwatli and Saudi King Saud for high-profile talks, and issued instructions to *Al-Ahram* to 'explain the reasons for positive neutralism *daily* ... [as] sparing the Arab nation the disadvantages of the Cold War, distance from its conflicts; following positive neutralist policy, thus preserving the national interest; defence of the Arab world must come from within the Arab nation'.[18] In May, Egypt recognised Communist China, securing an alternative source of arms to both superpowers. In June, despite a recent Soviet offer, Nasser accepted further US conditions attached to the dam funding offer, after

[13] See also ibid., pp. 110–4.

[14] Douglas Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action: the United States and Syria, 1945–1958', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 1, Winter 1990, p. 65.

[15] Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, p. 111.

[16] Muhammad Hafiz Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi fi 'Asr al-Tahadiyat*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1987, pp. 49–50.

[17] Ahmad Hamrush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu: III, 'Abd al-Nasir wa-l-'Arab*, Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Tiba'a wa-l-Nashr, 1976, p. 23; Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes*, London: Corgi, 1988, p. 112.

[18] Nasser, 'Directives from the President to Explain Positive Neutralism', March 1956, in Huda Abdel Nasser, *Gamal Abdel Nasser: Al-Awraq Al-Khassa*, Part Two, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Aamma li-l-Kitab, 2015, p. 534.

doing the same with the World Bank in January.[19] Egypt's persistence with positive neutralism angered Dulles, and in July, he spoke publicly of his doubts about the Egyptian economy's ability to sustain a project like the Aswan Dam.

Nasser considered this slur to indicate an earlier decision to cancel the funding offer, so he instructed Ambassador Hussein to call the Americans' bluff and accept their remaining conditions. Dulles duly informed Hussein that the offer had been withdrawn.[20] The British followed the Americans' lead immediately, also framing theirs as an economic and not a political decision. Egyptian diplomats made much of this Anglo-American emphasis on Egypt's economic weakness, intended to diminish confidence in its economy and undermine national pride.[21]

The Egyptian leadership's interpretation of the Western bloc's move is illustrated well by General Hafiz Ismail:

> in Spring 1956, we were in need of two or three years to achieve stability in the Canal Zone after British evacuation, to build up our new fighting capacity, and to fully activate our Arab agreements. But the Western powers and Israel would not allow us this breathing space. It became vital to destroy the Egyptian forces before their preparation could be complete, and to bring down the whole regime with them. This required the creation of the appropriate circumstances, the provision of an acceptable pretext, and US approval. In early 1956, Britain, France and Israel had created tension … Western diplomacy also found in the High Dam the opening through which they would draw Egypt towards war.[22]

Nasser's first move to manage this phase of the sovereignty–development dilemma was to exceed all expectations: he nationalised the Suez Canal Company on 26 July, and in his speech, declared that Egypt intended to rely upon itself and preserve its sovereignty. This was certainly a reaction to the withdrawal of the aid offer, but also the most defiant step yet on the path of Egypt's decolonisation. Undoubtedly, it was a move to reclaim a national asset that compelled action and reaction in the international field. In the words of Free

[19] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 115.
[20] ENA: FM431/3: EFM Economic Affairs Bureau to Ministry of Finance and Economy, 25.7.56, reporting EE, Washington to EFM of same date.
[21] ENA: FM-431/3: EE, Baghdad to EFM, No. 335, 'The Impact of the Anglo-American Withdrawal of High Dam Funding', 26.7.56.
[22] Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, p. 51.

Officer Sami Sharaf, secretary to President Nasser, it was 'the crowning of a series of positions confirming the strategic choice adopted by the July Revolution'.[23]

In the nationalisation speech, Nasser laid out the principles of Egypt's foreign policy assertively, tying the Egyptian struggle against colonialism with that of both the Arabs and the wider neutralist bloc. He spoke at length of the political and economic independence sought by the revolution, and its denial by the British and Americans. He dwelt on the threat to the Arabs of Israel and its Western sponsors, noting Israel's recent assassination of Egypt's 'Commander of the Palestine Army' Mustafa Hafiz, and Egypt's struggle to acquire arms for defence. His words underlined the demand for international recognition of Egypt's sovereignty as an equal, and he emphasised that as a result of Egypt's moves in the pan-Arabist neutralist direction, 'the world has started to take us seriously'.[24]

Egyptian policy now took two courses, on the international and regional levels, designed to utilise the time it would take to prepare Western military action, in order to strengthen its position.[25] Firstly, Nasser employed the familiar tactic of playing off the USA against its allies, since the USA did not favour the use of force against Egypt.[26] On 27 July, Nasser reassured the Western states that the nationalisation was a legal action and did not endanger their shipping rights.[27] He similarly sought to counterbalance the USA and Soviet Union: to Washington, he pointed out that Egypt's decision pre-dated the withdrawal of dam funding, and also allowed it to forgo dependence on

[23] Sami Sharaf, *Sanawat wa Ayam ma'a Jamal Abd al-Nasir: al-Juz' al-Awwal*, Cairo: Al-Fursan, 2005, p. 169.

[24] Nasser, Speech on Fourth Anniversary of the Revolution, Nationalisation of Suez Canal Company, 26.7.56.

[25] Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, p. 53; see also Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar: the Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World*, London: Collins, 1978, p. 68.

[26] See Muhammad Sayed-Ahmed, *Nasser and American Foreign Policy, 1952–1956*, London: Laam, 1989, pp. 124–6.

[27] Mahmoud Fawzi, *Suez 1956: An Egyptian Perspective*, London: Shorouk International, 1986, p. 52; Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi*, Vol. I, Cairo: Al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1977, p. 327; Amin Hewedy, 'Nasser and the Crisis of 1956', in William Roger Louis and Roger Owen eds., *Suez 1956: the Crisis and its Consequences*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. 166–7; Nasser's Statement to Press, distributed by Ali Sabri, Political Affairs, 31.7.56: www.nasser.org.

Soviet offers.[28] At the same time, Egypt benefited from solidarity in the communist and neutralist blocs: the earliest supportive statements came from the Soviet Union and China, while Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was more reserved, but ultimately cooperative.[29]

In Moscow, 1956 had opened with the Twentieth Communist Party Congress, where Premier Nikita Khrushchev made public his critique of his predecessor, Joseph Stalin. He also praised the new international role of 'the peoples of the East', who, although outside the socialist bloc, could 'draw on its achievements in building an independent national economy'.[30] The Soviets had observed Nasser's resistance to the Baghdad Pact with interest,[31] and their official position was now that a 'Zone of Peace' was emerging that gathered together the socialist bloc and those non-socialist states that had 'proclaimed non-participation in military blocs as a principle of their foreign policy'.[32] Soviet policymakers now began to negotiate various economic and cultural agreements and exchanges with Egypt and Syria.[33] Similarly, Egypt's relations with the neutralist bloc progressed quickly: Nasser, Nehru and Yugoslav President Josip Tito met frequently during 1955–6, together formulating the major tenets of positive neutralism.[34]

Nasser therefore felt able to boycott the London Conferences of the Suez Canal Users Association, and to resist the threats of Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies on his Egypt mission.[35] While mobilising support internationally, Egypt ensured that its administration of the canal was flawless. When all Western states – bar Greece – recalled their navigators, the Egyptians, with the remaining Greeks and some

[28] Heikal, *Cutting*, p. 147.

[29] Ibid., pp. 148–54. Also on Soviet reactions, see Hashim Behbehani, *The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism*, London: KPI, 1986, pp. 141–2; Alexei Vassiliev, *Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism*, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 35; on Nehru, see Sarvepalli Gopal, 'India and the Non-Aligned Nations', in Louis and Owen, *Suez 1956*, pp. 174–87.

[30] Behbehani, *The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism*, pp. 107, 114; Heikal, *Sphinx*, p. 124.

[31] See Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, p. 45; Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: a Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945–1958*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 231; Fawaz Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p. 24.

[32] Vassiliev, *Russian Policy*, p. 25. [33] Heikal, *Sphinx*, p. 65.

[34] Correspondence, Tito to Nasser, Belgrade, 23.5.56; Nasser to Tito, June 1956: Documents 126–7; Heikal, *Milaffat*, pp. 793–6.

[35] See Sayed-Ahmed, *Nasser and American Foreign Policy*, pp. 130–1.

international volunteers, managed to increase traffic flow through the canal.[36] Amidst a powerful Anglo-French campaign of incitement against Nasser, Cairo presented its own view in Western media, announcing that revenues from the canal were to be invested in its modernisation.[37] However, by October, Nasser sensed that the Anglo-French appeal in the United Nations (UN) heralded war, and therefore began negotiations, accepting the UN resolution of 13 October as well as direct talks with British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and his French counterpart, Guy Mollet.[38]

Secondly, through diplomacy, speeches and state media, Nasser called on his greatest power reserve – Arab popular support. The nationalisation speech itself was clearly directed at the Arab audience and not just at Egyptians, as Nasser used it to dissect the history of colonialism and Zionism across the region.[39] Nasser followed it with speeches to the Egyptians and Arabs, hailing their own 'spontaneous mobilisation' and slamming the Western 'joint colonialism' concealed behind calls for international administration of the canal.[40] Indeed, the Suez Crisis revealed the remarkable extent of existing regional support and mobilisation. Syrian politicians rapidly organised a cross-party committee to coordinate a response, calling a meeting on 14 August attended by more than a hundred thousand people. They also made contact with counterparts in North Africa, generating similar demonstrations of solidarity.[41] When Nasser declared that Egypt would not attend the London Conference, trade unions across the Arab world called a general strike.[42] Sawt al- 'Arab's feature 'Today's Arab Mail' featured telegrams reporting demonstrations in Damascus and Hama, workers on strike at the US airbase in Libya, dockers on strike in

[36] Fawzi, *Suez 1956*, pp. 44–6; ENA: FM-288/3: Letter from Yugoslav volunteer, August 1956.
[37] Nasser, Speech to International Press Conference on Suez Nationalisation, 12.8.56; Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, pp. 120–1; ENA: FM-140/1: EE, Washington to EFM, No. 119, 2.8.56.
[38] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 125; Heikal, *Cutting*, pp. 178–92.
[39] Nasser, Speech on Fourth Anniversary of the Revolution and the Nationalisation of Suez Canal Company, 26.7.56, 26.7.56.
[40] Nasser, Speech to Well-wishers, Cairo, 28.7.56; Speech to Arab Audience on Suez Issue, Cairo, 12.8.56.
[41] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 119.
[42] ENA: FM-273(746)/8: Telegrams on Strikes from Tripoli, Lebanon, 16.8.56; Jabla, Syria, 17.8.56; Petition of Support for Canal Nationalisation from Palestinian Refugees Foundation, Hama, Syria, 16.8.56.

Tripoli, marches in Gaza, Beirut, Amman, Bahrain and Aden, and strikes by workers in Baghdad.[43] To many, as Free Officer Ahmad Hamrush recalls, the deserted factories and businesses of Arab cities on 16 August signalled 'the birth of a new phenomenon'.[44] Days earlier, Syrian Ba'athist Akram al-Hourani had called for the destruction of Arab oil pipelines in the event of an attack on Egypt.[45] In Qatar, demonstrators telegraphed the British government with the same message.[46] Acting Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad al-Ayish explained the situation to the British ambassador:

> the Syrian government knows its obligations regarding the pipelines and national security, but should Egypt be attacked, no Arab government in Asia or Africa will be able to stand against its own people, who will rise to help Egypt with all means possible and regardless of the outcome.[47]

The influence of popular mobilisation on Arab leaderships was further demonstrated by the outcome of US envoy Robert Anderson's visit to Saudi Arabia, in which he played on Saud's fears of Egypt's preeminence. When Saud wrote to Nasser offering to mediate with the USA, this change in position worried Nasser into visiting Dammam on 23 September. There, the unprecedented popular gatherings in support of Egypt demonstrated their influence on the Saudi leadership, which the USA failed to dislodge from its pro-Egyptian stance.[48] In Jordan, Israel had recently exploited the crisis to conduct several heavy raids, which inflamed public opinion against Israel as well as Britain, whose commitments to Jordan appeared flimsy. This was reflected in the election of Sulayman al-Nabulsi's cabinet, which quickly joined the Egyptian–Syrian Mutual Defence Pact on 23 October.[49]

Egypt's approaches on the international and regional levels received their greatest challenge after Israel's sudden invasion of 29 October and

[43] SWB: IV, Daily Series No. 20, 'Voice of the Arabs on the General Strike', 16.8.56.
[44] Hamrush, *Al-'Arab*, p. 26.
[45] ENA: FM-140/1: EE, Damascus to EFM, No. 471, 'Akram al-Hourani's Pledge to Destroy Oil Installations if Egypt Attacked', 14.8.56.
[46] 'Qatari Nationalists Raise Egyptian Flag on British Consulate', *Al-Gumhuriyya*, 27.8.56, p. 1.
[47] ENA: FM-140/1: EE, Damascus to EFM, 'Al-Hourani's Pledge', 14.8.56.
[48] See Takeyh, *Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine*, p. 131; Correspondence, Saud to Nasser, 7.9.56: Document 139, Heikal, *Milaffat*, pp. 820–1.
[49] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, pp. 122–3.

the subsequent Anglo-French ultimatum. The Egyptian leadership had been observing Israel's amassing of troops on the Jordanian border, and noted that Ben Gurion's open opposition to peaceful settlement pre-dated the Suez events.[50] Indeed, in Israel, the Czech arms deal had been used by Ben Gurion and his chief of staff Moshe Dayan to intensify hostilities against Egypt.[51] They had swiftly developed a new policy accordingly: 'to topple Nasser's regime, it is necessary to arrive at a decisive confrontation with the Egyptians at the earliest possible date, before the absorption of the Soviet arms in Egypt ... Israel does not need to resort to provocation ... Israel can make do with the method of detonation ...'[52] Upon replacing Sharett as Prime Minister, Ben Gurion announced this policy of confrontation to the Knesset in November 1955. He followed it with an assault on Egyptian positions at al-Sabha, as well as Operation Kinneret in December, which targeted Syrian positions at Tiberias.[53] Israel had then disregarded the Anderson Mission, despite such favourable conditions as US offers of assistance with building a nuclear reactor.[54]

The Egyptians evaluated that Israel would use the international opposition to Egypt's move to secure passage in the canal, and would not intervene militarily unless the Western powers did so.[55] The subsequent collusion between Britain, France and Israel confirmed Nasser's view of Israel as a pawn of the imperialists, its policy designed to stall Egypt's development at crucial points.[56] Meanwhile, France had reacted to the Czech deal by playing the aid card as usual: General Muhammad Hafiz Ismail was told that if Egypt cancelled the deal, France would resume shipments promised that spring.[57] When this failed, and the Suez Canal Company was nationalised, French reactions were openly vitriolic, and Prime Minister Guy Mollet soon proposed

[50] ENA: FM-142/3: 'Israel's Position on the Suez Canal Nationalisation', *c.* July 1956.
[51] EE, Washington to EFM, 2.12.55: Document 116; Heikal, *Milaffat*, p. 780. See also Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 140–2; Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, p. 50.
[52] Cited in Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 142.
[53] Ibid., pp. 146, 149; Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, p. 254.
[54] Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 147, 136, 153–6.
[55] ENA: FM-142/3: 'Israel's Position on the Suez Canal Nationalisation', *c.* July 1956.
[56] Nasser, Speech after Friday Prayers in Al-Azhar Mosque during Tripartite Aggression, 9.11.56. See also Rashid Khalidi, 'Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World', in Louis and Owen, *Suez 1956*, p. 380.
[57] Ismail, *Amn Misr al-Qawmi*, p. 50.

the tripartite conspiracy to Britain.[58] Alongside its economic interests, France's motivations for the attack on Egypt were tied to Nasser's support for the Algerian liberation movement, as sovereignty again constrained development for Egypt.[59]

Nasser responded effectively, mobilising the army as well as popular resistance. He closed the Suez Canal, while sequestering British and French assets in Egypt.[60] On 1 November, he made a motivational address at al-Azhar, declaring, 'We will fight', and commending the hordes of volunteers who had already joined the resistance.[61] A week later, he repeated, 'there is a difference between peace and surrender . . . fighting has been forced upon us, but . . . nobody can force us to surrender'.[62]

As with the Suez nationalisation, Nasser's decision to resist was based on his belief in the sympathy of the wider international community and particularly on Arab popular support. His policy continued to involve counterbalancing the imperialist powers with the superpowers, relying on both Soviet support and his knowledge of America's disapproval of its allies' actions. Moscow issued strong ultimatums to all three aggressors within days of the attack, deterring the Israelis in particular,[63] and offered to cooperate with the USA on a military solution.[64] Eisenhower refused this, but used both the UN forum and the weapon of economic sanctions to impose a ceasefire.

Cairo Radio played a crucial role in disseminating official statements and rallying Arab support. For this reason, one of the earliest British targets was its transmitters at Abu Za'bal in Cairo: to overcome this, Sawt al-'Arab journalists continued broadcasting from the airwaves of a radio originally purchased for the Algerian resistance, which they had been using since 1954.[65] Sawt al-'Arab made much of the Iraqi people's

[58] Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 169–78. [59] Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, p. 247.
[60] Hewedy, 'Crisis', pp. 167–8; Heikal, *Cutting*, pp. 196–7.
[61] Nasser, Speech after Friday Prayers in Al-Azhar Mosque during Tripartite Aggression, 2.11.56. See also Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, pp. 130–1.
[62] Nasser, Al-Azhar Speech, 9.11.56.
[63] Heikal, *Cutting*, p. 210; Behbehani, *The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism*, pp. 146–7.
[64] Vassiliev, *Russian Policy*, p. 36.
[65] Ahmad Said's testimony in Hamrush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu: IV, Shuhud Thawrat Yulyu*, Cairo: Madbuli, 1984, p. 50; Hamrush, *Al-'Arab*, p 20; Fathi al-Deeb, *'Abd al-Nasir wa Tahrir al-Mashriq al-'Arabi*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 2000, pp. 87–8. The strike on Abu Za'bal is reported in SWB: IV, Daily Series 88, 3.1.56, p. 1.

grievances against Nuri al-Said, after a joint Anglo-American–Iraqi coup against the Syrian regime was exposed on the day of the invasion, 'inextricably tying Said to the invasion and Israel'.[66]

Beyond this mobilisation, however, the regional reaction again surpassed Egyptian expectations. When Egypt was attacked, numerous Arab volunteers joined the Egyptian resistance, including a commando unit organised by the Palestine Students Union.[67] When Cairo Radio's transmitters were struck, both Amman and Damascus radios began broadcasts in its name.[68] On a trip to Moscow, Syrian President al-Quwwatli requested Soviet support on Egypt's behalf.[69] King Saud imposed an oil embargo on Britain and France, while the Syrian and Jordanian governments offered to join the fighting, as per the Arab defence pact.[70] When Nasser declined, preferring not to enlarge the scope of the war, several young nationalist officers joined the popular resistance forces that had sprung up across Syria – including Syrian Ba'athists and trade unionists, and Palestinian *fidayeen* – and took direct action.[71] Led by Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, chief of the Deuxième Bureau, organised groups moved to sabotage the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline and three pumping stations in early November. The explosions were a source of great consternation to the USA, but contributed to the economic pressure on Britain that precipitated its ceasefire on 6 November. Sawt al-'Arab hailed them as evidence of unified Arab action against imperialism.[72] In contrast, Nuri al-Said

[66] Michael Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 128. See SWB: IV, Daily Series 90, 6.11.56, p. 2; Khalidi, 'Consequences', pp. 381–3; ENA: FM-148/5: EE, Damascus to EFM, 'Sawt al-'Arab and Akram al-Hourani's Iraq Visit', 7.5.56.

[67] Abu Iyad with Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle*, New York: Times Books, 1981, p. 23.

[68] SWB: IV, Daily Series 93, 9.1.56, pp. 1–2; Hamrush, *Al-'Arab*, p. 26.

[69] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 127.

[70] Leaders from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria signed a call to arms in an 'Arab Popular Conference Manifesto': SWB: IV, Daily Series, 91, 7.11.56, p. 4.

[71] Muhammad Saeed Hamdan, *Siyasat Misr Tijah al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya, 1948–1956*, Amman: Al-Yazori, 2006, p. 453; Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 157. An Arab League Summit was held in solidarity with Egypt, issuing statements in line with the Defence Pact, on 13–14 November in Beirut: Muhammad Ali Hella, *Misr wa-Jame'at al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya*, Cairo: Dar al-Kutub, 2010, p. 66.

[72] Interview, Ahmad Said, Manager of Sawt al-'Arab, Cairo, 7.3.07; SWB: IV, Daily Series 99, 16.11.56, p. 11.

began by cutting ties with France only and extolling his own pan-Arabist credentials. While Egyptian embassies across the Arab world were reporting waves of popular demonstrations in support of Egypt, Baghdad reported only their suppression.[73] However, as protests gathered momentum in Baghdad, Basra, Najaf and Mosul, al-Said was forced to cut ties with Britain and voice public support for Egypt.[74]

The Egyptian leadership had navigated the challenges of the Suez Crisis through a pan-Arabist, neutralist combination: mobilising the Arab constituency and thereby retaining the support of leaders such as King Saud, as well as manipulating the split between the USA and its allies while utilising Soviet support. The same combination helped Egypt secure Anglo-French, and later Israeli, withdrawal by March 1957.[75] In this way, a military defeat was transformed into a political and an economic victory, and this instance of the sovereignty–development dilemma was mitigated, as Western states were now forced to pay dues directly to the Egyptian canal administration.

Pan-national Consciousness: From Syrian Crisis to Syrian Union

The realisation of Egypt's Arab national project would face intensified constraints after Suez. Nasser intended to preserve Egypt's positive neutralist stance and its outreach to pan-Arab counterparts in 1957, building on the solidarity displayed during the war and pre-empting potential challenges. Nasser foresaw the way in which these might arise in 1957 immediately after the Suez ceasefire. On 19 November 1956, he circulated his personal assessment of the status quo to several premiers who had supported Egypt. It approximated remarkably closely to clandestine developments in London and Washington: 'The [Baghdad] pact ... is now frozen. Britain and her allies are thinking of trying to convert it into an Islamic pact which will attract all Islamic

[73] On sentencing of Iraqi demonstrators: ENA: FM-142/1: EE, Baghdad to EFM, 28.9.56.

[74] Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, Princeton University Press, 1978, pp. 749–57; Al-Deeb, *Tahrir*, p. 280; Sayed-Ahmed, *Nasser and American Foreign Policy*, p. 128. Similar public pressure was placed on the Iranian leadership: ENA: FM-250/2: Press Report (1), 1957: 'On Baghdad Pact Headquarters in Iran during and after the Attack on Egypt', 1.1.57.

[75] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, pp. 135–7.

countries not already members . . .'[76] Nasser understood that Western policy intended to drive a wedge between Egypt and its Arab allies.

Soon enough, the Eisenhower Doctrine was unveiled, asserting the presence of a 'vacuum' in the region after Suez, and the need to fill it before the Soviet Union could. Clearly endorsed by Britain, and followed by American concessions to Israel on the terms of its withdrawal from Suez, this connected the various threats to Egypt's nationalist project more clearly than ever, with the USA in ascendance. Egypt now faced the first stage of the dilemma of 1957: the progressive freezing of US economic aid limited its capacity for development and exposed it to dependence on the Soviet Union. Yet to subscribe to the Eisenhower Doctrine would be a similar compromise of sovereignty that Nasser could not accept.

At the outset, Nasser refrained from denouncing the Doctrine. Instead, he invited the Syrian, Saudi and Jordanian leaders to Cairo, where they issued a joint memorandum critiquing Eisenhower's reference to a 'vacuum', and signed the Treaty of Arab Solidarity, in continuation of pre-Suez pan-Arabist policy. However, King Saud had been invited to Washington just after, where he accepted American aid (see Figure 9.1). He also met with Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah, beginning the rapprochement with Iraq so crucial to Omega. In late February, Nasser met again with the three Arab leaders, securing a joint statement reconfirming their commitment to positive neutralism. Signs of American pressure on Saud were visible, however, and the Egyptians felt the conference had failed to generate the solid pan-Arabist position promised by the Suez events.[77]

March brought further signs of the tightening siege on Egypt: America joined the military committee of the Baghdad Pact, while US envoy James Richards secured endorsements of the Eisenhower Doctrine from Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia, Tunisia and the Baghdad Pact states. In April, King Hussein effected a coup against al-Nabulsi's cabinet and pro-Egyptian army officers, expelling Syrian

[76] Heikal, *Cutting*, p. 225.

[77] FRUS: 1955–1957, XIII, Instruction from DOS to USE, Syria, 21.9.56, pp. 591–3; Telegram, DOS to USE, Egypt, 27.2.57, pp. 612–3; Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 149; ENA: Memorandum, Arab Bureau, 21.2.57, cited in Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004, p. 110, fn 69.

Figure 9.1 Cartoon: 'Filling the Vacuum!', *Al-Akhbar*, 21 March 1957. King Saud to Eisenhower: 'If you look at the picture carefully you can see there's no vacuum whatsoever!' The picture is entitled 'The Middle East'.

troops from the joint command and receiving military assistance from Saud. The same month, the USA offered Jordan $10 million in aid. This is also most likely the time around which Hussein was placed on the CIA payroll.[78] Meanwhile, Egypt was suffering severe economic pressure, with its assets still frozen in the West and America refusing to supply grain.[79] After his initially careful criticism of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Nasser rejected it outright in April.[80] By May, Heikal was writing of US plans to isolate Egypt by 'taking' Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria, after Egypt's pan-Arabist 'shield' had proved resilient.[81]

[78] Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, p. 138.
[79] Nasser, Interview with Indian magazine *Blitz*, 10.3.57.
[80] See Nasser, Statement to Greek magazine *Athenos*, 17.1.57, *Blitz* Interview, 10.3.57, Statement to Karl von Vegand, 8.4.57.
[81] Heikal, 'The Policy of Isolating Egypt from the Region and its Directions', *bi-Saraha* series, *Akhir Sa'a*, 21.05.57.

The Syrian Crisis intensified Egypt's sovereignty–development dilemma, as US pressure on Syria risked breaking the last remaining link in the pan-Arabist chain. It began when another botched US coup attempt was uncovered in August 1957, less than a year after the plot was exposed in October 1956.[82] When the American officials implicated were expelled, Washington reacted harshly, adopting a view that 'grossly exaggerated' the influence of both the Soviet Union and Syrian communists on Syrian affairs.[83] The backdrop to this was that Damascus had recently concluded an aid agreement with Moscow, which had in turn adopted increasingly pro-Arab stances since the Eisenhower Doctrine was unveiled.[84] US policymakers believed that Syria's conservative neighbours would be concerned at these developments, so envoy Loy Henderson was sent to coordinate with them in August, on moves 'to eliminate the Syrian government'.[85] Henderson, Menderes and Hussein decided that Syrian 'provocations' would suffice to justify military action, preferably by an Arab neighbour. However, when the USA sent its Sixth Fleet to the region in August, with a request for Saudi support, it was rebuffed.[86] Syrian provocations were not forthcoming, and the USA encountered reluctance from the Arabs and eagerness from Turkey and Israel.[87] Meanwhile, there followed an exchange of condemnations between Washington and Moscow, after Henderson's report declared Syria to have succumbed to international communism.[88] In September, Turkish troops moved to the Syrian border.

In this situation, Egypt's position was to affirm the pan-Arabist bloc's neutrality in the Cold War, and to dispel notions of communist domination in Syria or a split in Arab ranks. After the events of 1956, Nasser was even more wary of undue dependence on foreign powers, and with the tightening siege of 1957, he saw that Henderson's mission was designed

[82] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, pp. 140–5.
[83] Vassiliev, *Russian Policy in the Middle East*, p. 45.
[84] On statements by Khrushchev and Shepilov, see Behbehani, *The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism*, pp. 152–7.
[85] Eisenhower cited in Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, pp. 159–60.
[86] Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action', p. 72; FRUS: 1955–1957, XIII, DOS to USE, Saudi Arabia, 21.8.57, pp. 645–6.
[87] FRUS: 1955–1957, XIII, Telegram, USE, Turkey to DOS, 21.8.57, pp. 642–4; No. 368, Telegram, USE, Israel to DOS, 22.8.57, pp. 648–9.
[88] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 152; Noble Frankland ed., *Documents on International Affairs: 1957*, Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 332–47; Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, p. 166.

to frighten Syria's allies further away.[89] Speaking in early September, Nasser disputed both that Syria was leaning to the Soviet bloc, and that the Americans thought so. Instead, he described US policy as intended to distract from the real threat in the region – Israel.[90] In his *Bi-Saraha* ['Frankly'] column, Heikal noted that Syria's enhanced trust of the Soviets was down to the American and British refusal to supply it with arms – in some cases already purchased.[91] In June, Nasser had explained: 'the authentic trend among the [Arab] peoples is [pan-Arab] nationalism, not communism, but the US failed to understand this reality, and tried to combat nationalism while claiming to be combating communism'.[92] Nasser now spoke more forcefully, asserting that early US attempts to impose peace with Israel had given way to a new method, the construction of new threats, to fracture Arab consensus.[93] On 9 September, Egypt released a statement in support of Syria against any attack.[94]

Soon after, through covert links with informants in Iraq, Cairo received reports on divisions between new Prime Minister Ali Jawdat, who was keen for reconciliation with Egypt and Syria, and Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah, who was working with the Americans.[95] Cairo was also informed by Soviet sources that the USA and Turkey were planning an attack on Syria.[96] Thus, by late September, Nasser was speaking of 'a predetermined [US] plan' and criticising Henderson's intimidation of Syria by speculating about its communist credentials from neighbouring capitals: 'why don't they ask Syria herself?'[97]

Cairo Radio echoed Nasser's line, and rallied the populations of the conservative states especially.[98] The leaders of such states were already

[89] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 154.
[90] Nasser's Interview with Heikal, *Al-Ahram* Editor, 8.9.57. See also Nasser's arguments in FRUS: 1955–1957, Telegram from USE, Egypt to DOS, 1.9.57, pp. 664–7.
[91] Heikal, 'Secrets: Henderson's Four Questions for Syria', *bi-Saraha* series, *Al-Ahram*, 2.9.55; Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 152; Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, pp. 155–8.
[92] Nasser, Interview with US magazine *Look*, 14.6.57.
[93] Nasser, Heikal Interview, 8.9.57. [94] Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat*, II, p. 32.
[95] EE, Baghdad to EFM, No. 147, 13.9.57, cited in Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, p. 161.
[96] Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, p. 167. Heikal, 'Khrushchev Told Me', *bi-Saraha* Series, *Al-Ahram*, 22.11.57.
[97] Nasser's Interview with Associated Press (AP), 27.9.57.
[98] See ENA: FM-148/2: EFM Memorandum, 'The Stance of the Press and Radio of Egypt towards Jordan', 25.6.57. See also Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 154; Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, p. 133.

feeling constrained by the popularity of Egypt's Arabist discourse among their constituents. This was probably what inspired Saud's grand moment in late September 1957, when his 'mediation' trip to Damascus, followed by the Iraqi premier, was hailed as having neutralised the threat to Syria. Saud seemed to have stolen Nasser's mantle for a moment – precisely what the USA had wished, yet through the opposite means.[99]

Days later, however, Nasser upstaged Saud by sending troops to Lattakia, after a meeting between Egyptian and Syrian Chiefs of the Joint Command.[100] Nasser had repeatedly affirmed: 'there is a defence pact between us and Syria; any attack on Syria is also directed at us'.[101] In the words of Free Officer and then National Assembly president Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, the troops sent were 'symbolic rather than military forces of great weight … the intention behind sending them was to communicate the meaning of cooperation against these threats'.[102] Nasser's move represented the first time an independent Arab state had effectively come to the rescue of a sister Arab state, according to the tenets of Arabism and of military agreements signed. While the superpowers worked to defuse mutual tensions during October, Nasser was able to take credit regionally for successfully curtailing the siege on the pan-Arabist camp and forestalling a further imbalance in superpower influence in Syria. By combining pan-Arabist and positive neutralist policy tracks, he had contributed to extricating Syria from the midst of the superpower dispute. When asked how he could be neutral between communism and democracy, Nasser explained that his reading of neutralism was an international one, based on the Arab peoples' colonial experience, and not neutralism between two domestic political systems.[103]

As the foreign affairs crisis passed, Egypt's popularity in Syria surged, fuelling the Syrian movement for union with Egypt. The Ba'ath had proposed union often in the past, usually at times of crisis, but Nasser had argued that conditions were not yet ripe, and that unity was a stage-by-stage process.[104] Nevertheless, in November, an

[99] See David Lesch, 'Gamal Abdel Nasser and an Example of Diplomatic Acumen', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, April 1995, pp. 364–5.
[100] Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 155.
[101] Nasser, AP Interview, 27.9.57. [102] Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat*, II, p. 33.
[103] Nasser, AP Interview, 27.9.57.
[104] On Al-Azm's request in March 1955, see Riyad, *Mudhakirat Mahmud Riyad*, p. 89; Nasser, AP Interview, 27.9.57.

Egyptian delegation from the National Assembly was invited to meet its counterparts in Syria, and both parliaments later approved a joint statement supporting a federation. In January, Syrian army chiefs travelled secretly to Cairo, pleading for union with Egypt as a means of overcoming their divisions. They were joined days later, at Nasser's insistence, by Foreign Minister Bitar.[105]

Nasser finally agreed, on two conditions: political party dissolution and separation of the military and political spheres.[106] According to Seale, Nasser agreed because he was no longer able to control Syrian foreign policy without controlling its government.[107] Heikal recalls Nasser telling the Syrian officers that he feared for Syria's stability amidst warring military and political factions.[108] Publicly, Nasser affirmed: 'the door is open to any Arab country who would like to join in union'.[109] Indeed, the merger received remarkable popular backing in the plebiscites of February, and the new United Arab Republic (UAR) was celebrated with a degree of enthusiasm across the Arab world that was arguably matchless in its recent history. This renewed the stores of public support with the aid of which the Egyptian revolution had survived. Without this pan-Arabist mobilisation, Cairo's positive neutralism could not have generated such effective international leverage and consequent resources for national development.[110]

Forging a National Future, Making the Arab Nation: After Suez

By the end of this third phase, there had been significant evolutions in Egyptian national projects – towards nationalisation and socialism in the state's welfare and industrialisation projects, and towards unification in its pan-Arabist policy. Both were inextricably linked to the effort to realise the national visions of sovereignty and welfare, in negotiation with actors and constraints beyond the national field. The

[105] Heikal, *Sanawat al-Ghalayan: Harb al-Thalathin Sana* (al-Juz' al-Awwal), Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1988, pp. 274–8.
[106] Heikal, *Sanawat*, p. 279; Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat*, II, pp. 35–7.
[107] Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, p. 321.
[108] Heikal, *Sanawat*, pp. 267–8; see also M. H. Heikal, *Ma Aladhi Jara fi-Suriya*, Cairo: Al-Dar al-Qawmiyya li-l-Tiba'a wa-l-Nashr, 1962.
[109] 'The President Announces Union Soon', *Al-Sha'b*, 28.1.58, p. 7.
[110] Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat*, II, pp. 45–7.

'Arab socialism' for which the July Revolution later became known should be seen as a most contingent outcome of this series of dilemmas and negotiations.

In the realm of development, there were changes in both discourse and practice – towards further nationalisation, state regulation and the institutionalisation of planning. Egyptian foreign policy was made to work for the national welfare project firstly by channelling Egyptian funds from nationalisation to allow autonomous development. Nationalisation had gained momentum after the Suez sequestrations of British and French government property and companies in Egypt.[111] In January 1957, Egyptianisation of capital was accelerated with three laws decreeing that banks, insurance companies and export–import agencies be Egyptian-owned or run.[112] Statist trends were also enhanced by this newfound capital after the war. In 1956, the new Ministry of Industry undertook to regulate private industry,[113] and in January 1957, the Economic Agency was created, charged with taking over sequestered assets and designing policy for public investment.[114] The same month, a new National Planning Council was established, subsuming its predecessors. The Ministry of Industry unveiled Egypt's first Five Year Industrial Plan in April.[115] In July, Nasser cited the outcomes of planning in agriculture and industry, improved labour conditions, education, medical research and provision, urban planning and transport, as well as state sponsorship of the arts.[116]

[111] See ENA: FM-142(1512)/4: Suez Canal Administration Council to EFM, 10.9.56, on strict conditions to be met before sequestration was enforced. The law applied to British and French nationals regardless of religion. See also Nasser, AP Interview, 27.9.57.

[112] ENA: FM-288(751)/12: Egyptian Ministry of Finance and Economy, *Budget Report for the Year 1957–1958*, Cairo: Government Press, 1957, pp. 10–3.

[113] Raymond Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat: the Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 23.

[114] Anouar Abdel Malek, *Egypt: Military Society: the Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser*, New York: Random House, 1968, p. 111.

[115] Roger Owen, 'The Economic Consequences of the Suez Crisis for Egypt', in Louis and Owen, *Suez 1956*, p. 367; Muhammad al-Imam, 'Muqawimat Al-Tanmiya fil-Mashrou' al-Nasiri', in Muhammad Idris ed., *Dirasat fi-l-Heqba al-Nasiriyya*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya, 2003, p. 289.

[116] Nasser, National Assembly Speech, 22.7.57; Interview with Karl Von Dagen, 16.11.57.

Another avenue through which national development was pursued in the international field was relations with the communist bloc. These bolstered state capacity beyond Egypt's own resources. These relations were upgraded during the economic siege of Egypt in 1957, and helped soften its impact.[117] In January 1958, Egypt secured its first Soviet loan, crowned in October with the Soviet pledge to finance the Aswan Dam.[118] By 1958, Egypt was sending almost half its exports to, and receiving a third of its imports from, the Soviet bloc.[119]

These policies were presented within an increasingly left-leaning discourse during the phase 1956–8. This change was influenced by Egypt's adoption of positive neutralism, as contestations and engagements in the international field now shaped the national field at home. The left shift intensified upon Nasser's return from the 1955 Bandung Conference and prompted the release of several imprisoned leftist writers and activists.[120] The 1956 Constitution declared that the Egyptian 'national economy is organized according to plans that follow the principles of social justice', and that 'although private economic activity is free, it should nevertheless not be prejudicial to the interests of society'.[121] During the Suez events, left-of-centre elements began to gain ground in government, forming a 'tacit national front' with the leftist resistance committees that had sprung up during the war.[122] Fostering these trends, Nasser charged leftist Free Officer Khalid Muhyi al-Din with establishing the newspaper *Al-Masaa'* in October 1956.[123] Suez had occasioned a great debate on the meaning of socialism, which flourished with the opening of such new journals and

[117] On the high-level Moscow visit, 1957, see Heikal, *Sphinx*, pp. 78–83; on China's invitation to the High Dam Committee, ENA: FM-431/3: Presidency's Information Secretariat to EFM Research Department, 5.11.57; on economic support, Owen, 'Economic', p. 365.

[118] See ENA: FM-339(676): EFM Economic Affairs Bureau to Finance and Industry Ministries, 22.12.57; FM-431/4: Head of High Dam Committee to EFM, 28.2.59; Owen, 'Economic', p. 368; Heikal, *Sphinx*, p. 82.

[119] Owen, 'Economic', p. 373.

[120] Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, pp. 115–6.

[121] Egyptian Constitution, January 1956, articles 7–9: State Information Service Digital Archive; see also Nasser, National Assembly Speech, 22.7.57.

[122] 'United Front for Popular Resistance', *Al-Masaa'*, 29.12.56, p. 11.

[123] Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. 120. Muhyi al-Din had fallen out of favour in 1954 owing to his support of the return to democratic parliamentary politics, and had been exiled to Switzerland. Relations with Nasser later improved, however, and he was rehabilitated as editor of *Al-Masaa'*. See Khalid Muhyi al-Din, *Wa Al'an Atakallam*, Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1992, pp. 340–52.

publishing houses during the so-called 'Bandung Period' of 1955–9.[124] In this phase, the government developed its own 'cooperativist democratic socialism', which it nevertheless distinguished from Marxism.[125] However, ties with the Soviet bloc certainly influenced the Free Officers' thinking on socialism, and its example, in improving both industry and living standards, commanded Egyptian respect and interest.[126]

Within this social project, particularly noteworthy were the introduction of women's suffrage in the 1956 Constitution and the election of five female deputies to the National Assembly in 1957. The 1956 Constitution also 'formally recognized women's status as equal citizens with the right and duty to work alongside men in building the new socialist nation'.[127] This was a state-dominated feminist project, however, which left no room for independent organising, and the pioneering Egyptian Feminist Union and other similar groups were duly disbanded in this period.[128] There followed specific laws on gender equality in employment, proscribing discrimination in wages and hiring, the further widening of educational opportunity, and a consequent increase in the female share of all occupational sectors.[129] As Laura Bier notes:

Female workers, particularly those working in the new sites carved out by socialist development (the office, the factory, or the classroom), were represented in state feminist discourse not only as necessary to the economic

[124] John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: the Political Economy of Two Regimes*, Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 317; Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, pp. 120–1. See 'Our Economy before and after the Battle', *Al-Masaa'*, 29.12.56, p. 7.

[125] ENA: FM-339(676): EE, Vienna to EFM, No. 12, 24.1.58. See Nasser, Speech at Cooperatives Conference, Cairo University, 5.12.57; Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. 288.

[126] ENA: FM-339(676)/1: EE, Moscow to EFM, No. 67, 'The Workers' Renaissance', 8.5.57; Eastern Europe Department, Memorandum, 30.11.57.

[127] Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt*, Stanford University Press, 2011, p. 65.

[128] Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 249.

[129] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Al-Mashru' al-Ijtima'i li-Thawrat Yulyu', in Ibrahim ed., *Misr wa-l-'Uruba wa Thawrat Yulyu*, Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1982, pp. 141–3, Kathleen Howard-Merriam, 'Women, Education, and the Professions in Egypt', *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 2, No. 23, June 1979, pp. 263–4; Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood*, pp. 65–8.

success of state socialist policies but also as a critical symbol of the regime's successes in transforming Egypt into a modern socialist nation.[130]

The conventional wisdom is that pragmatism governed the Free Officers' development policies, particularly before the 1962 theorisation of Arab socialism. Yet their original nationalist commitments appear to have been fundamental ever since 1952. Even then, half of the 'Six Principles' were concerned with social justice for the nation,[131] and as Sayegh puts it, they 'did, no doubt, serve as "guides" and "signposts" at every step; and every act was measured by how close it brought Nasser to those goals'.[132] Meanwhile, the changing sources of foreign assistance for the development project did much to determine its ultimate emphases on socialism. Later, Nasser would elaborate on this dynamic:

> We had the courage, at the beginning, to declare that we had no theory – though we did have clearly defined principles. We declared that we would proceed, by trial and error, to construct a theory . . . we are now heirs to an experiment and an application of some eleven years. This has furnished us with the foundation of a theory . . .[133]

In terms of pan-Arabist nation making, the impact of the Suez events cannot be overstated. However the process had already begun, ever since the clandestine and official visits of 1953, followed by the pan-Arabist rhetoric that accompanied the treaty securing British withdrawal of 1954 and the Gaza attack of 1955. This trend was lent significant official expression in January 1956, when Nasser proposed a new Constitution, to be decided by plebiscite. Ratification of the Constitution and of Nasser's presidency in June was ostensibly a domestic event; however, the first article of the Constitution enshrined Egypt's status as an Arab state, a milestone for pan-Arabist nation making in Egypt, and was hailed enthusiastically by many across the Arab world. Telegrams of support from several Arab countries poured into Cairo throughout

130 Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood*, p. 69.
131 Al-Imam, 'Muqawimat', p. 272.
132 Fayez Sayegh, 'The Theoretical Structure of Nasser's Socialism', in Sami Hanna and George Gardner eds., *Arab Socialism: a Documentary Survey*, Leiden: Brill, 1969, p. 102.
133 From *Proceedings of the Unity Talks*, Cairo: Al-Ahram Press, 1963, p. 142, cited in Sayegh, 'The Theoretical Structure of Nasser's Socialism', p. 102.

1956, congratulating Nasser on the new Constitution and his presidency, months before the popular mobilisations of the Suez Crisis.[134]

After Nasser's political victory over Suez, Egyptian newspapers, including the new left-leaning *Al-Masaa'*, covered pan-Arabist themes prominently, depicting Suez as one chain in a link of Arab liberation struggles.[135] The government oversaw an educational campaign on the Suez War, intended to 'enhance the students' national sensibilities'.[136] Indeed a comparative study of pre-1952 and 1970 primary school textbooks finds a concerted effort in this regard. The 1970 readers use poems, stories and prose to instil devotion to an Arab rather than Egyptian homeland, and 'The Arab people are presented as standing by the Egyptian people in times of crisis and jubilation.'[137] In history courses,

> In trying to impress on the student the idea that Egypt and the Egyptians have always been Arab and to instill in him a pride in being Arab, the 1970 readers refer to the ancestors of the modern Egyptians as Arabs, unlike the pre-1952 readers where Egypt and the Egyptians are linked to the pharaonic past ... References to the Islamic past are made, though it is a thoroughly Arabized past ... The patriotism expressed in the 1970 readers is enlarged so as to include all Arab countries, i.e. the Arab nation ...[138]

To Arab audiences, Nasser affirmed that the target of the Suez invasion had not been Egypt, but all the Arabs, and reiterated the message that pan-Arabism had acted as 'a shield for Egypt ... and the rest of the Arab states' against 'the conspiracies of imperialism'.[139] The resonance of Egypt's pan-Arabist nation making was manifest in the solidarity actions and union fever across the Arab

[134] Examples in ENA: FM-273(746)/7: Letters to EE, Damascus from Aleppo Consul, 24.1.56; from Aleppo School, 26.1.56; from Syrian Head of Trade Unions in Homs, 28.6.56; see also 273(746)/2; 272(747)/5.

[135] 'The Liberation Armies Defending Arab Land', *Akhir Sa'a*, 14.11.56, pp. 7–8; 'The Story of Arabism', *Al-Masaa'*, 30.11.56, p. 3.

[136] *Al-Masaa'*, 29.12.56, p. 6.

[137] Hoda Abdel Samea Hegazy, 'Values and Attitudes Expressed in Egyptian Primary School Readers: a Comparative Study of the pre-1952 and the 1970 Readers', Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Rutgers University, 1983, p. 122.

[138] Ibid., pp. 123–4.

[139] Nasser, Speech at Arab Club in Damascus, at Ceremony held by Egyptian Artists, 14.02.57.

world during the war,[140] as well as the proliferation of pro-Egyptian, or expressly Nasserist, political organisations in Arab countries afterwards.[141]

The pace of this project continued steadily in 1957, with particular attention to cultural and economic integration. In March, Egypt, Syria and Jordan signed a Cultural Unity Agreement, with specific provisions 'to unify methods of teaching and education in the three countries and to enhance cultural cooperation among them and thereby contribute to the achievement of Arab unity'.[142] Nasser reiterated to Arab delegates that their work was a 'fundamental requirement of Arab unity'.[143] In May, the Arab League Economic Council concluded an agreement on plans for a common market, as well as the establishment of an Arab Economic Development Organisation.[144] Indeed, there was a significant economic logic, and outcome, behind Arab integration efforts: the budgets of 1955–8 reflect a consistent rise in Egypt's trade with the Arab countries.[145] In early September, the Egyptian–Syrian Economic Unity Agreement was concluded, and presented as a step towards union. Meanwhile, new domestic political institutions such as the National Union affirmed Egypt's Arab policy and its 'call for comprehensive Arab unity'.[146]

The transition to the UAR era saw Sawt al-'Arab continue its integration efforts, from programmes such as 'A Song from Every [Arab] Country',[147] to comprehensive coverage of Arab affairs in broadcasts such as 'The Struggle of the Arabs', 'Algeria's Message of the Day', 'The Arab Maghreb', 'The Arabian Gulf and South', 'Palestine Corner', 'Free Tunisia', 'Arabist Thought', 'Arab Stories' and 'Diaries of the Union'.[148] Nasser's speeches continued to juxtapose pan-Arabist

[140] See fn 42–46, 74, in this chapter; 'Kuwaiti Police Chief and 14 Officers Resign in Support of Egypt', *Al-Masaa'*, 30.11.56, p. 1.
[141] Khalidi, 'Consequences', p. 385.
[142] Directorate-General of Information, *Syria 1957*, Damascus: Directorate-General of Information, 1957, p. 140.
[143] Nasser, Speech to Delegates at Arab Curriculum Unification Conference, 20.2.57.
[144] ENA: FM-288(751)/12, *Budget, 1957–8*, p. 5.
[145] Cf. ENA: FM-288(751)/12, Egyptian Ministry of Finance and Economy, *Budget Report for the Year 1955–6*, Cairo: Government Press, 1955, with *Budget, 1957–8*.
[146] Hamrush, *Al-'Arab*, p. 27.
[147] 'Sawt al-'Arab', *Al-Masaa'*, 29.12.56, p. 11.
[148] *Al-Idha'a*, No. 1249, 21.2.59, pp. 32–45.

tropes with a sharp critique of imperialism: in July 1957, he voiced Egypt's appreciation of Syria's stand during Suez, Egypt's belonging within the Arab nation, and its consequent welcoming of Syrian moves towards union.[149] With the Egyptian–Syrian union, a host of new pan-Arabist symbols were made official, most notably a new flag replacing the eagle with two green stars, one for each UAR province.

Conclusion

In February 1958, Nasser journeyed to Damascus to declare the founding of the United Arab Republic with Syrian Premier Shukri al-Quwwatli. Nasser's car was lifted off the ground by enthusiastic crowds during his tour of Damascus, and his speech from the balcony of the presidential palace cheered by tens of thousands. Earlier that month in Cairo, Nasser had given a speech in the National Assembly, which elaborated on the union endeavour:

> A new hope has arisen on the horizons of this East, a new state is being born at its heart. A great state has been established in this East, which is neither an intruder nor a usurper in it, neither aggressive nor condoning aggression against it. A state which protects and does not threaten, which safeguards and does not squander, which strengthens and does not enfeeble, which unites and does not divide, which is peaceful but does not forfeit rights, which supports its friends and defeats the intrigues of its enemies, which is neither sectarian nor fanatical, which does not deviate from right nor align with some against others, which affirms justice, fortifies peace, and provides prosperity for its own, and for all people, as much as its capacity allows.[150]

The speech proclaimed the particular blend of grand commitments and sentiments common to many anticolonial nationalisms of the time: vigilance against imperial powers but a willingness to treat the international system as a community of fellow states; a pan-nationalist tendency with a rejection of sectarian national divisions; neutralism between greater powers' disputes; and the desire to achieve development, with an awareness of the limits of state capacity. Indeed, examining the evolution of Egyptian nation making and the influence upon it of regional and international players in the years before the UAR's

[149] Nasser, National Assembly Speech, Cairo, 22.7.57.
[150] Nasser, Speech at National Union on Occasion of Announcement of Union, Cairo, 5.2.1958.

Figure 9.2 Nasser speaking to crowds gathered in Cairo after his election as president of the United Arab Republic, 22 February 1958.
Source: www.nasser.org website.

establishment, it is clear that the mould for which Egypt's revolution would become known – secular Arabism, positive neutralism and developmental projects aimed at social justice – was set by the late 1950s (see Figure 9.2).

As in Turkey, the elements of the nationalist project – pursuing sovereignty, development and national belonging – were all increasingly interdependent by the end of the decade. In the 1956 Suez episode, the effort to secure resources for national development through the nationalisation was buoyed by a popular base identifying as pan-Arabist. Pursuing the Aswan Dam development project then brought

on further hostility, which led to the need to assert Arab national sovereignty in the Syrian Crisis. The intersection of development and pan-Arabism in Egyptian nation making was further visible in the rapid export of Egypt's statist political and economic structures to Syria.[151] Nasser began with land reform in Syria almost as soon as he had done in Egypt, passing the first laws in September 1958. In the preface of a UAR publication on the reform, Nasser employed the same language that had legitimised the law in Egypt: 'political freedom is not everything, without economic liberation'.[152] A state publication on the UAR incarnation of the National Union from 1959 made similar arguments about the connection between political pluralism in the contemporary context and exposure to foreign influence.[153] Such measures reflected the leadership's nationalist drive for sovereignty, Arab belonging and progress, and its realisation in the Arab national field.

Furthermore, this effort to realise pan-Arab nationalist commitments had compelled a series of confrontations or engagements in the international field. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider the fortunes of the UAR, but it is clear from these contingencies that the union was neither a predetermined dimension of Nasser's policy nor entirely a product of circumstances beyond his control. As with the decision to purchase Soviet arms in 1955, the union was rather the product of a decolonising drive that had to confront and manage a set of increasingly powerful constraints in the international field.

[151] Al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakirat*, II, p. 48.
[152] Press Office, Agrarian Reform Ministry, UAR-Syria, *Qissat al-Ard wa-l-Islah al-Zira'i*, Damascus, 1959.
[153] Muhammad Afifi Shahin, *Al-Sijil al-Dhahabi: al-Ittihad al-Qawmi*, Cairo: Al-Mustaqbal, 1959.

Comparative Conclusions

In a period when the Communists' attack on Korea caused fear and agitation in the world, our Government did not succumb to that agitation; it saw the situation clearly and took all its measures with sang-froid. It was an example to many countries – even Western countries. The resolute, appropriate and timely measures which we took . . . were the principal factors in maintaining and increasing the moral forces of the freedom-loving countries of the world.

Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü's speech of 10 February 1953, reported by Şerif Arzik on Radio Journal, Ankara Radio[1]

As long as we are confident of our mission, we will realise our aspirations and will build a sound social structure relying on ourselves and on neither the eastern nor western bloc . . . The British will not consider your rights unless they are sure that you are able to gain them. The only way to achieve our claims is to be worthy of them.

Nasser's speech to university students at Liberation Rally in Cairo on 10 November 1953, reported on Sawt al-'Arab, Cairo Radio[2]

Across Asia and Africa in the mid-twentieth century, political leaders were preoccupied with fundamental questions of national belonging, sovereignty and progress: how to secure them all, and how to do so with recognition and assistance in the international field. The Democrats' and Free Officers' policies gave very different answers to these questions during the 1950s, from Turkey's embrace of the Western bloc to Egypt's repeated attempts to stand outside it, and from their diplomatic clash over the Baghdad Pact, to their near military confrontation over Syria. Far from bit players in a superpower saga,

[1] SWB: IV 337, 'Köprülü's Statement on Foreign Policy', 17.2.53, p. 17.
[2] Nasser, 'Speech at First University Debate in Mustafa Kamil Hall of Liberation Rally Headquarters', 10.11.53.

their determination to shape outcomes reflected urgent nation making projects rooted in local circumstances.

Placing the developments of the 1950s in historical context, and highlighting the political formation and nationalist commitments of regional actors, shows that the Cold War was just one moment in a long and arduous process of coming to terms with imperialism, and decolonising, for actors in what was known as the 'Third World'. Analysing this period provides another of the 'set of grids' that Shohat calls for in contextualising the postcolonial.[3] The persistence of patron–client relations, exploitation and power differentials well into the Cold War period meant local actors had to engage with an imperially constituted international in many ways consistently beyond the moment of purported independence. This point was of course made first in the theorisations of Kwame Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon among others. Scholars of Africa and Asia have been working to ground it empirically across different cases, and this book is a contribution towards the same goal.

Studying the 1950s thus serves to decentre the Cold War as the primary frame through which to understand regional leaderships' choices. Instead it takes its place amongst a series of global conjunctures – constraints and opportunities – which local actors sought to engage while proceeding with their own national state projects, which were informed by the Ottoman–European imperial encounter. As Dirlik says: 'The representation of the Third World concept … merely as a product of a world structured by the conflict between the first and the second worlds overlooks a complex history of the search for potential "third worlds" as developmental and utopian projects.'[4] Reading Turkish and Egyptian primary documents reveals the objectives and resourcefulness of global South actors, who tend to confront the regional ambitions of global powers, in the context of persistent relations of relative dependence upon them. Although this book has highlighted the contrasts born of two different positions between the post- and the anti-imperial, the very different policies adopted in Turkey and Egypt during the 1950s should not obscure this common imperative.

[3] Ella Shohat, 'Notes on the Post-Colonial', *Social Text*, Vols. 31–32, 1992, pp. 111–2.

[4] Arif Dirlik, 'Spectres of the Third World: Global Modernity and the End of the Three Worlds', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2004, p. 136.

For Turkey's DP, the Cold War was understood in continuity with prior, particularly Ottoman, conflicts and alliances, in which Britain, France and Russia were all historical adversaries. Meanwhile, to the Free Officers leadership, it was a new framework within which to engage familiar colonial powers from the West, but also a relatively new encounter with Russia to the East. Foremost for Egyptian leaders was the challenge of decolonisation and the threat of Israel – the West's battle with communism was not their own. The focus of some post-colonial theorists on the moment of independence should not lead us, then, to overstate or impose the Cold War framework in response, while overshadowing political actors' multiple pre-existing concerns.

Of course, the realisation of this in the international field involved negotiating successive constraints and dilemmas. These were generated by the persistence of legacies of imperial encroachment and colonisation in Turkey and Egypt respectively, the interventions of contemporary superpowers in the Cold War, and the limits of state resources needed to embark on developmental projects. It was these dilemmas that politicians faced – between the needs of their nationalist project for resources, and the threat to sovereignty that external assistance might represent – that drove the evolution of their foreign policy in the 1950s. Tracking these difficult negotiations produces comparative empirical conclusions, all of which underline the agency of Turkish and Egyptian leaders throughout.

Foreign Policy in Light of Nationalism: Alliance Choices

What has this approach revealed regarding foreign policy outcomes? The historical record shows a substantial degree of consistency in the alliance choices pursued by each leadership, reflecting their divergent nationalist outlooks. It reveals the firmly Western self-identification of Turkish policymakers, whose alliance choice in the early Cold War was a reflection of their nation making project. Despite their different backgrounds, Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes had built a party unified around a message of social conservatism and economic liberalism, with a national vision inspired by the rising American superpower. They then voluntarily made Turkish sovereignty conditional upon the recognition of Turkey as part of a new Western ontological unit: the 'Free World'. Turkish diplomat Zeki Küneralp described Ankara's policy towards the Soviet Union as not 'one of blind opposition. Our policy

was a function of theirs; it was a tough policy because theirs was aggressive. Later, however, their attitude changed and then our policy changed too. In 1959–60, they altered their tactics and *extended a hand to the West* ... Turkey conformed to this climate ...'[5] In fact, the Soviets had extended a hand to Turkey some years earlier, but this had not coincided with a change in American stances, and Turkey had remained aloof. Küneralp's words reveal the Democrats' firm preference for securing sovereignty through direct ties with the United States and by following its lead, in hostility as in détente.

In one light, the Democrats might be seen as an exception to a long line of Turkish foreign policy makers who have shunned the Arab world and its heritage in Turkey. Such a view would be based on the Democrats' leniency with Islamic sensibilities and their references in public discourse to the 'Arab brethren' who had joined the Baghdad Pact. By contrast, a rigorous examination of the DP leadership's nationalist commitments is revealing of the opposite motivations behind their promotion of the pact. The DP did not prioritise action at the Middle Eastern regional level at first, in keeping with a historical precedent of aversion dating to the founding of the republic. Even the Democrats' break with early Kemalist nation building, effected through a rehabilitation of traditional and religious values, was not intended to imply any identification with Turkey's co-religionist Arab neighbours. Instead, Turkey's regional role emerged from the Democrats' negotiation of the sovereignty–development dilemma. To fund developmental projects served the nation making endeavour just as much as did the quest to secure membership of the Western alliance. The gusto with which the Democrats then took up the cry of the Free World in the Middle East was not aimed to nurture an association for Turkey with the region beyond such goals.

By contrast, in Egypt, foreign policy may be read, as Grovogui argues of formerly colonised states, 'as a means of critiquing the current global order ... to restore dignity and integrity ... to transform the ethos, the internal laws of the international system'.[6] The Free Officers did not

[5] Zeki Küneralp, *Just a Diplomat*, trans. Geoffrey Lewis, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992, p. 73, emphasis added. It is true that one of Menderes' last foreign policy decisions was to plan a visit to Moscow in summer 1960, after Washington had refused further assistance in October 1959.

[6] Siba Grovogui, 'Postcoloniality in Global South Foreign Policy', in Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner ed., *The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Approaches*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 46.

begin with such lofty ambitions, but Nasser's early battle with British colonialism in the context of the wider Cold War catapulted Egypt into the ranks of the pioneers of a Third World bloc. With respect to the superpowers, Egypt developed a positive neutralist foreign policy that avowed the right to independent action in international affairs, and the will to remain non-aligned in a superpower conflict that was deemed far removed from, even detrimental to, Egyptian national interests.[7]

This was not simply a reaction to bipolarity, however: it came from a desire to prioritise the nation making measures that the Egyptian leadership wished to pursue, namely expedited national development and the fostering of national belonging predicated on the common Arab experience of colonialism and resistance. As the pursuit of these goals clashed increasingly with the prescriptions and pressures of great powers in the West, Egypt's leaders moved progressively towards neutralism. Ali Mazrui evaluates Egypt's neutralism as 'linked with the search for non-European or non-Western approaches for solving Egypt's own problems at home'.[8] Both this neutralism and Egypt's pan-Arabist foreign policy were guided by an anticolonial stance which renounced relations of dependency vis-à-vis the dominant Western states. It was predicated on a process of 'wresting back' described by Anouar Abdel Malek as follows: 'the struggle against imperialist occupation ... aims fundamentally at reconquering the power of decision in all fields of national life, as a necessary prelude to the "reconquest of national identity," which lies at the very heart of the national renaissance process'.[9]

The Free Officers played an activist regional role precisely to undermine Western defence plans in the Middle East, whereas the Democrats did the opposite. Egyptian leaders saw in the Western states a historical and contemporary obstacle to their sovereignty and national development, where the Democrats saw allies and patrons. Both sides, however, were motivated by the pursuit of the same sorts of nationalist

[7] See Clovis Maksoud, 'Redefining Non-Alignment: The Global South in the New Global Equation', in Phylis Bennis and Michael Moushabeck eds., *Altered States: A Reader in the New World Order*, New York: Olive Branch, 1993, p. 28.

[8] Ali Mazrui, 'Africa and the Egyptian's Four Circles', *Journal of the Royal Institute of African Affairs*, 1963, p. 132.

[9] Anouar Abdel Malek, *Egypt: Military Society: the Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser*, New York: Random House, 1968, p. xxxvi.

commitments, and by the divergent goals and strategies they had adopted for their realisation.

Nationalism in Light of the International: Between Post and Anti-Imperial

If new light is shed on foreign policy by adopting this approach, what can be learned about nationalism itself in light of its pursuit in the international field? Conventional examinations of nation building have tended to assume a relatively powerful and autonomous state, which has the wherewithal to recast constituents as insiders or Others, and whose actors are preoccupied with such Othering for their own perpetuation. Rethinking nation making as contingent on non-national actors and opportunities paints the more nuanced picture of a partially constrained state, and in seeking to alleviate this, of a set of state actors who may find friends and allies in the international field, as often as antagonists.

Comparing these actors' motivations has confirmed important distinctions between the two trajectories of nationalism, and the need to move beyond the categories of Eastern and Western, colonial and postcolonial, in understanding them. Close attention to each case is the only way to grasp the relatively consistent (and divergent) nationalist behaviours in each case, which continue regardless of constraints in the international field, and which are indeed sometimes employed in addressing particular dilemmas.

The Turkish case complicates the simple dichotomy of colonial and postcolonial states that is generated by even the most critical literature. Certainly, studies of hybridity and mimicry have eroded the boundaries between these two categories of states, but they have not paid as much attention to states that might play both roles. Yet the relationship between the Ottoman and Turkish elites and their European counterparts was constantly ambiguous: they were subject to its discourses of colonial difference, and partially deflected these on to their Arab subjects, but partially accepted them and sought to act upon them too. They were by turns self-aggrandising and self-orientalising, and both of these impulses were features of their engagements with international interlocutors throughout the North Atlantic and Baghdad Pact episodes.

This dynamic is what I have called the 'Turkish difference' and charted as constitutive of Democrat Party stances and negotiations of

successive dilemmas between guaranteeing their sovereignty in Western alliances and lacking the resources to merit inclusion. At these points, the Turkish difference – its superiority in military and moral fields – would be invoked, and the West by turns celebrated and berated for its entertainment of the prospect of Turkish succession, and for its reluctance to do so.

Narratives of Turkish national belonging remained informed by the ethnic hierarchies of the Ottoman order, though these acquired a new utility in the international field. Turkey had always looked west, but it now fixed its gaze further afield on to North America, and in so doing, its narratives of Others to the east were revitalised and redeployed in Cold War debates on Middle East security and alliances. This made for a Turkish national narrative that did not alter the fundamental East–West dichotomy bequeathed to the Ottoman Empire by the Orientalist gaze of its rivals, but one that now overlaid these with the protagonists of the moment. Progress was now imagined as the creation of a 'little America' out of Turkey, and public projects launched energetically to this end. These were not simply economic policies; they were interventions into longstanding Kemalist frames of nationalism, injecting a dose of destabilising individualism which sat uneasily alongside Kemalist maxims of the homogenous Turkish nation.

These ambiguities are not fully captured by the notion of Turkish nationalism as postcolonial, nor indeed by its consideration alongside western European histories of post-imperial nationalism that focus on dynamics of Othering and extermination.[10] In this sense, its ambiguous place can be compared with the case of international political thought originating in Latin America. Louise Fawcett discusses this through the case of Venezuelan political thinker Luis Bello:

> Though Bello himself acknowledged the Americas' common cause with Europe, he also highlighted significant differences in the reception, interpretation, and diffusion of European norms and practices. How could he not do so, given the very different reality that was early nineteenth-century Spanish America, and the ambivalent reception the new states and their representatives received in different European capitals? In this respect, again, he defies

[10] See Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton University Press, 1993, and Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen eds., *After Empire: Multi-ethnic Societies and Nation-Building; the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997, respectively.

classification as Western or non-Western. Indeed, as suggested, such a classification hinders understanding and precludes the need to conduct a close analysis of Bello's contribution, which needs to be examined on its own terms.[11]

A similar case, for very different reasons, is seen in Egypt. In the 1960s, Anouar Abdel Malek had introduced a theory of 'nationalitarianism': it did not catch on as a term, but retains significance for its designation. Abdel Malek used his theory to highlight the inadequacy of traditional understandings of nationalism in explaining the specificity of the Egyptian experience and recognising the struggle for liberation as its source. He explained that 'in the terminology of sociology and politics within the Western framework, "nationalism" immediately points to . . . [a] negative set of notions, such as the negation of the other . . . the refusal of universalism; and a second . . . activist sort of notions, such as territorial expansion and frontier hostilities'.[12] During the 1950s, Egyptian nationalists' efforts to connect with allies in decolonisation reflected rather different normative commitments.

The Free Officers' evaluation of the Wafd's record, and Nasser's emphasis on the notion of 'the freedom of bread', reveals the constitutive role of social justice in their understanding of nationalist progress. The pursuit of national sovereignty involved resistance to the negation of the Other by colonial powers, and the search for commonality of experience and allies in the international field, in the effort to break out of it. On the question of who belonged to the nation, as in the case of Turkey and India, Egyptian leaders affirmed an ancient grandeur that neutralised the Orientalism of Europe; however, they moved towards the valorisation of an Arab heritage. This made for a nationalism looking outwards in multiple directions, crisscrossing the East–West lines of the colonial difference discourse.

That is to say, the Free Officers' projected vision of the decolonising nation was one that expanded to the Arab states and still further to their African and Asian counterparts who had undergone similar experiences. These were 'communities of fate', transcending the nation-state boundary, and the commitments that followed from this were not

[11] Louise Fawcett, 'Between West and Non-West: Latin American Contributions to International Thought', *International History Review*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2012, pp. 679–704.

[12] Abdel Malek, *Egypt*, p. xxxv.

informed by ethnic homogeneity.[13] Unlike the picture of Indian nationalism painted by Chatterjee, with its dichotomies of spiritual and material, inner and outer spheres, the July Revolution's project sought to produce a national subjectivity at home that was part of a universal modernity, but self-consciously located in the nested solidarities of Arab, Afro-Asian and Third World communities.[14] Realising this in the national field meant working to secure a future of dignity and coeval status among international powers, seeking resources for grand public works projects from non-national actors, and attempting to forge new, genuinely *post*colonial relationships. The literature on 'Eastern', 'Western' and 'postcolonial' types of nationalism should embrace the nuances offered by such post-Ottoman cases.

For both the Democrats and the Free Officers, national belonging emerged in a dynamic with imperial encroachment, but this meant national narratives that deflected the discourse of Orientalism on to one constituent group in the Turkish case, while the Egyptian equivalent looked out rather than inwards, seeking allies and kindred spirits in the Afro-Asian worlds. The role of imperialism, and its models of modernity, in shaping these national projects was more complex than allowed by the dichotomies of cultural-material or Eastern–Western, even if drawn for heuristic purposes. For these political actors, the drive for sovereignty was motivated by burdensome legacies of external interference, alive not just in recent memory but also in contemporary experience. Material and human development was not simply an economic policy matter, but an integral component of national progress.

Constitutive Others

Exploring nation making through the twists of foreign policy also sheds light on the constitutive loci of difference in each nationalist framework. It is partly by differentiation from such 'constitutive Others' that the negotiations of the nationalist 'Self' and its orientations in each

[13] See discussion in Christopher Lee, 'Introduction, Between a Moment and an Era: the Origins and Afterlives of Bandung', *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives*, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010, pp. 25–7.

[14] Omnia El Shakry speaks of nested colonialisms: *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt*, Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 3.

framework proceed. Beginning with the formation of these frameworks, and asking about their fortunes in the international field, reveals continuities in the identities and functions of these constitutive Others in the two cases. Two in particular have not been paid as much attention as they might in the scholarship on each country.

Arguably the most forgotten and silenced constitutive Other of official Turkish nationalism has been the Arab. In all the revisionist scholarship of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish republic, the figure of the Armenian, the Greek and the Kurd has been restored and the Kemalist decentred. Furthermore scholars have consciously tied this to political effects and advocacy or awareness-raising initiatives in Turkey and beyond.[15] By comparison, the attention paid to the othering of Arabs, both in scholarship and in Turkish public debate, has been minuscule.[16] Even if the obvious differences in experiences of violence can explain the fixation of Ottomanist scholars with the 'minorities', the position of the Arabs and Egyptians, co-religionists of the Ottoman sultan and scapegoats of the founder of the Turkish republic, surely warrant more attention.

The representation of Arabs was foundational in the narratives that aimed to articulate Turkey into a Western ontological unity. This is clear both through an understanding of Turkey's liminal status as an empire colonised, and by study of the Democrat Party's Middle East engagements. Instead of starting with the Baghdad Pact as a self-contained episode, and indeed a debacle in its most common designation, a study of Turkish nationalist history shows elite conduct vis-à-vis Arab populations in a relatively consistent continuum. During the nineteenth century, Ottoman Orientalism was a feature of statesmen's public and private discourse, and this persisted under Atatürk, particularly as he executed his turning away from the Ottoman Muslim past

[15] See Sossie Kasbarian and Kerem Öktem, 'Subversive Friendships: Turkish and Armenian Encounters in Transnational Space', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2014, pp. 121–46; Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas eds., *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, London: Routledge, 2005.

[16] Notable exceptions include Selim Deringil, '"They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery": The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 45, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 311–42; Ussama Makdisi, 'Ottoman Orientalism', *American Historical Review*, Vol. 107, No. 3, 2002, pp. 768–96; Edhem Eldem, 'Ottoman and Turkish Orientalism', *Architectural Design*, No. 80, 2010, pp. 26–31.

and the elements of Turkish heritage associated with the formerly Ottoman Arab provinces.

The continuities are then seen in the way that this Orientalism was brought out and indeed deployed in the 1950s, in the context of regional competitions with Arab states for diplomatic support and material resources. These competitions were forced by the plans of Others, whether the American or European members of the Western bloc, but had to be won nevertheless. These episodes turn out to be an illuminating case study for the constitutive role of Ottoman-Turkish Orientalism in Turkish nationalism in practice. Atatürk's compatriots in the Independence War, Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes, may have had divergences on the issue of national progress and the economic routes to it, but they shared common ground on the question of national belonging, as their willingness to embrace relations with the nascent Israeli state further evidenced.

In the Egyptian case, the main finding in this regard is the influence of Israel, whose role in shaping the national imaginary is worthy of separate study, and which has to be considered in any comparison with Turkey.[17] Examining the place of Israel in the Free Officers' nationalist political formation reveals, firstly, the early appearance of their pan-Arabist commitments, secondly, the consideration of Israel as equally an Egyptian and Arab issue, and thirdly, the way in which Israel's presence and belligerence distinguished Egypt's conduct and fortunes from its counterparts in the non-aligned and Third Worldist movements.

Firstly, if British rule explains the Egyptian elite's transition from Ottoman-Muslim to Egyptian-secular modes, then it is the settler colonial project of Zionism in Palestine that explains the transition to a pan-Arabist framework in turn. In the literature, where it is acknowledged as an element of nation building, pan-Arabism is often portrayed as a remnant of 1930s and 1940s radicalism, 'taken up' by the Free Officers in the 1950s with a 'change of style'.[18] Some accounts pronounce Egyptians as 'late-comers' or 'resistant' to pan-Arabism, but are premised on the idea that events like Suez made Nasser a popular Arab hero even at

[17] See Ewan Stein, *Representing Israel in Modern Egypt: Ideas, Intellectuals and Foreign Policy from Nasser to Mubarak*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2014.

[18] Raymond Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 35.

home.[19] Identifying more than a style change, and looking back to well before 1956, it is an important conclusion of this study that the pan-Arabist nationalism of Egypt appeared earlier than is conventionally assumed. As Walker Connor observes, 'the point at which a quantitative addition in the number sharing a sense of common nationhood has triggered the qualitative transformation into a nation resists arithmetic definition. In most cases we shall probably have to be satisfied with assigning dates after the fact ... '[20] For both the Free Officers and their supporters across the Arab world, 1956 was certainly one such date. As the study of a range of other sources in this book has shown, however, it was a feature of the Free Officers' thinking and practice from at least the 1948 Palestine War onwards.

Related to this is the assertion here that the Free Officers did not perceive the contradiction between Egyptian nationalism and pan-Arabism that animates so much of the secondary literature. It has often been argued that the degree of Egyptian support for Palestine in resisting Israel was a barometer of the 'incongruence' of pan-Arabist and Egyptian national interests.[21] From this flows the inference that the Free Officers used Arabism cynically to promote Egyptian state interests, which ultimately trumped all other considerations. This is a flawed reading when the stakes for Egypt are considered ever since 1948, and particularly with its administration of Gaza after 1950 and repeated Israeli attacks after 1952. The historical record shows that resistance to Israel was recognised as an equally Egyptian and Arab imperative, and this well before the 1955 Gaza Raid, even if Nasser had attempted to postpone confrontation.

Nasser's demands in pre-1955 talks concerned both Palestinian rights and Egyptian border security, and since 1952, he had consistently stated that conducting talks with Israel was a decision he could

[19] Eberhard Kienle, 'Arab Unity Schemes Revisited: Interest, Identity and Policy in Syria and Egypt', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1995, p. 68.

[20] Walker Connor, 'When is a Nation?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1990, p. 100.

[21] Avraham Sela, 'Nasser's Regional Politics: a Reassessment', in Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler eds., *Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Egypt*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004, p. 183; Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution*, p. 35.

not make except in concert with the other Arab states.[22] By 1955, after the Israeli raid that killed twenty-eight Egyptian troops, Nasser was describing Israel as a 'poised sword' aimed at Egypt's freedom and dignity 'just as it had been against Palestine'.[23] In practice, it was as a result of these intertwined fates that Nasser would seek to exercise control over any militant action taken by Palestinians in Gaza. Yet dissonance between Egypt's leaders and their Palestinian neighbours was one of tactics vis-à-vis Israel, but not of commitment. Nasser's post-1955 Gaza policy was one of his most revisionist policies, taken at risks that were well known, and that would become sharply clear within a single year. Meanwhile, Israel's drive for bilateral diplomatic and military ties with decolonising states in Africa – in direct competition with Egypt's support for the continent's liberation wave – brought this threat home in other realms.[24] Egypt's efforts to isolate Israel in this field – such as its raising of comparisons between Israel and apartheid South Africa in the United Nations in the early 1950s – was an important element of its later Africa policy.[25]

Indeed, Israel's presence, and the staunch support it enjoyed in Europe and North America, is a prime factor that has distinguished Egypt from fellow members of the Third Worldist bloc of anticolonial nationalist states. Among the latter, the diverse reconciliations and engagements with their former colonisers – for example, within the Commonwealth framework – were not complicated by such an enduring colonial experience in their midst. The notion that Egypt had become fully independent by 1956 therefore needs to be qualified, given the ongoing curtailments of Egyptian and wider Arab sovereignty by Israel through diplomatic, military and economic channels. The Suez episode alone is enlightening, given General Hafiz Ismail's explanation that it was timed to nip in the bud the Free Officers' efforts

[22] Nasser, Press Agencies, 28.11.55; Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, *Milaffat al-Suways: Harb al-Thalathin Sana*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1986, pp. 179, 293, 388–9; Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, London: Penguin, 2001, p. 78.

[23] Nasser, Fayyum Speech, 6.7.55.

[24] See Helmi Sharawy and Awatif Abd al-Rahman, *Isra'il wa Afriqiya: 1948–1985*, Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, pp. 147–9.

[25] See Sharawy, 'The Presence of African Liberation Movements in Egypt after the Bandung Conference in 1955', in Busani Ngcaweni ed., *The Future We Chose: Emerging Perspectives on the Centenary of the ANC*, Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa, 2013.

to expedite national development, which chimes with Ben Gurion's own statement of intent. If the notion of an anticolonial Egyptian-Arab nationalism that is distinct from the Indian (and Turkish) cases is accepted, it is clear that the Israel factor renders this further qualification and distinction necessary still.

Managing Dilemmas, Shaping Outcomes: Turkish and Egyptian Agency

If these were the national commitments that evolved during the DP's and Free Officers' political formation, what of the impact of constraints upon them once in power? Previous reflections on these have featured evaluations such as this by Adeed Dawisha: 'It is perhaps this relationship of objective dependency, of the absolute need for the support of one or the other of the superpowers, of the utter inability to go it alone, that ultimately tells us most about the nature of the relationship between the Cold War and regional actors . . .'[26] This tendency to overlook, and to underestimate, the agency of Middle East states persisted in conventional accounts of the Cold War in the region, until more recent volumes appeared on the foreign policies of Arab, Middle Eastern and global South states more broadly.[27] Situating itself within this endeavour, this study has highlighted regional states' agency, locating it with political leaders, supported by state resources.

In the following, I compare the ways in which the two leaderships navigated increasingly sharp dilemmas between sovereignty and development. This included identifying great powers with which they shared particular interests, and playing them off against their rivals, as well as forging linkages between different nation making policies, where the outcomes of one might enhance the possibilities of realisation for another. For each dilemma, the analysis then follows the ways in which their agency shaped outcomes in the process. On the one hand,

[26] Adeed Dawisha, 'Egypt', in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim eds., *The Cold War and the Middle East*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 47.

[27] Bahgat Korany and Ali Dessouki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: the Challenge of Change*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991; Stephanie Neuman ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1998; Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, ed., *The Foreign Policies of the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Approaches*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003; Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014.

the emergent role that the Democrats and Free Officers saw for themselves changed from the visions of their political formation. On the other hand, their initiatives shaped the actions and reactions of superpowers, colonial powers and regional neighbours alike, defying both the assumptions of their more powerful international interlocutors and indeed those of many scholars.

Dilemmas of Sovereignty and Development, Changing Roles

For us, the spirit of NATO carried a special significance. Becoming members of the western community is fully connected with our assimilation into the West's ... collective heritage and civilisation, based on democracy, individual freedoms and the rule of law.[28]

I am not a conqueror, I am what you might call ... a magnet.[29]

The first dilemma for the DP arose during talks on NATO accession, when several western European members pointed to Turkey's level of development as inadequate within the alliance, while Britain floated proposals to incorporate Turkey into a Middle East Command. This threatened the Democrats' conceptions of sovereignty, which they wished to guarantee through Turkey's acceptance as an equal partner in a Western alliance. Since Turkey remained an underdeveloped country, however, its state capacities were not such that the Democrats could neutralise these challenges alone. The Democrats' first tactic was to counterbalance Britain with the United States, with the aim of attaining NATO accession, since the latter was more favourably disposed to Turkey's inclusion. This was linked with official pronouncements that emphasised the Western identity of the Turkish nation, and sought to dissociate it from its Middle Eastern neighbours before the NATO audience. This occurred against the backdrop of a Democrat nation making project that was enthusiastically adopting American models in agricultural and education policy. NATO membership was secured by 1952 with a minimal concession, whereby only the Turkish navy came under the Middle East Command. The Democrats had successfully employed counterbalancing and linkage policy to stave

[28] 'The Atlantic Community and Turkey', *Forum* 3, No. 26, 15.4.55, p. 2.
[29] Nasser, Interview with French Journalist, January 1958, cited in Ahmad Hamrush, *Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu: III, 'Abd al-Nasir wa al-'Arab*, Beirut: Al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Tiba'a wa-l-Nashr, 1976, p. 31.

off a solely regional role for Turkey, and preserve their focus on international Western alliances and Turkey's belonging in the West.

In terms of Turkey's emergent 'role', accession to NATO represented a critical narrowing of its options, albeit on the side preferred by Democrat leaders. By 1952, Turkey was bound to the Western bloc, and the Democrats had taken strident steps in the fields of nation making that complemented their American choice. The change which the Democrats were bringing about was hinted at in a remark from 1950 by the British ambassador in Ankara, Noel Charles, according to whom the Democrats initially saw themselves as 'the senior local partner in a defensive system created by the British and the Americans'.[30] Their subsequent insistence on participation in Western alliance structures shows that the Democrats were attempting to locate themselves firmly as equals in the Western community.[31] From this standpoint they wished to then represent the interests of NATO to potential 'senior local partners' such as Iraq or Egypt. The intervention of external powers – most notably Britain – and the limits of state capacity, necessitating aid, meant that the Turks acquiesced to plans for the Middle East Command (MEC), which set the stage for the next phase in the evolution of their role.

In Egypt, the first dilemma confronted was between the Free Officers' desire to secure national sovereignty, both from the British presence and from Anglo-American plans for regional defence, and national development, through US foreign assistance. The USA agreed to hold off assistance to Egypt as long as its leaders did not agree to certain conditions in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, but was publicly inclined towards a swift settlement. Like that of the Democrats, the Free Officers' response was to counterbalance Britain with America, in an attempt to assure British withdrawal and future US assistance. This was combined with a nation making project that made gestures to foreign capital in the development project, but emphasised Egypt's Arab sense of belonging and fostered Arab solidarity in the confrontation with colonialism. British withdrawal was secured in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954, with the concession to Britain of re-entry upon the invasion of Turkey and other Arab states. Like that of Turkey,

[30] Cited in Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945–1952: The First Enlargement of NATO*, London: Frank Cass, 1999, p. 162.

[31] See Bayar, 1950, cited in ibid., p. 167.

the Egyptian leadership had responded to Western overtures on regional defence in the early 1950s through counterbalancing and a linkage policy that coordinated the pursuit of different nationalist commitments. However, unlike the Turkish case, these linkages were designed not to downplay Egypt's regional role, but to enable the Free Officers to exercise it as they saw fit. This dilemma also occasioned Egypt's first expressions of its neutrality in the Cold War context, a conflict to which the leadership of colonised Egypt had not paid as much attention as the Democrats in their first phase.

In this first phase of the Free Officers' policy, Gamal Abdel Nasser judged that the Arab situation was akin to that of Egypt under the monarchy, with the 'forces of reaction' and imperialism in ascendance.[32] In terms of Cairo's emerging role, securing British withdrawal was a step that allowed it to enhance its early overtures to its Arab neighbours: the international expression of a nation making project which aimed to nurture a sense of Arab national belonging. It also launched the preference of the Command Council of the Revolution (CCR) for neutralism, and generated hope in the possibility of cooperation with Western powers on an equal, independent footing. A measure of US foreign assistance had already been channelled towards expanding the scope of the CCR's developmental nation making projects. To negotiate British hostility, the CCR had relied on manipulation of old and new great powers within the Western bloc. At this stage, it was forging Egypt's role as an independent Arab state that was looking simultaneously to its Arab neighbourhood and the Western bloc, while as yet relatively uninterested in the Soviet Union. However, the CCR's focus on British imperialism could not suppress the hostility of Israel for long, nor bridge the divergence in interests between Cairo and Washington.

In Turkey, the dilemma arose again in 1954, when the Democrats' policies on development, heavily financed through American assistance, were stalled by an economic downturn, and Turkish requests for further US funds were turned down. While the Democrats had been assuring Turkish sovereignty by stepping up Turkish–American cooperation in the field of security, they now confronted the limitations of the Turkish state's capacity for development. To address this dilemma,

[32] Fathi Al-Deeb, '*Abd al-Nasir wa Tahrir al-Mashriq al-'Arabi*, Cairo: Markaz al-Ahram li-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa al-Istratijiyya, 2000, p. 175.

the Democrats chose to raise Turkey's regional profile and forge linkages between its national project, regional stances and international role within NATO. They participated actively in the latest Anglo-American plans for Middle East defence by establishing and sponsoring the Baghdad Pact, which generated productive leverage for Turkey with the dominant Western powers. This regional activism was calculated to generate renewed foreign assistance. The negotiation of this particular dilemma launched Turkey's active Middle Eastern role under the Democrats' leadership.

The Baghdad Pact episode propelled a development in the role carved out for Turkey during the first stage: no longer simply a part of the Western alliance, Turkey was now becoming its main spokesman *to* – and not only in – the East. This objective, however, was itself hindered by external players. Foremost among these were the USA, which remained aloof from the pact, and Britain, whose declining regional influence meant it could not alter this. Other external players that stalled DP plans for the pact were its regional members, whose disparate motives for joining – mostly to pursue Western aid – weakened it overall. Nor did the pact members have sufficient military and economic might for their organisation to represent a credible anti-Soviet front. The most influential external players were arguably the oppositional Arab states, whose importance to the USA was behind its reluctance to rescue the venture.

Here, the Democrats were also hindered by their own nationalist commitments to a Western identity and their view of the Arabs as part of a separate Middle East that lagged behind. They would selectively use the fluid idea of Turkey as a bridge, emphasising it when useful to Turkey's role in US-sponsored defence plans, but downplaying it when it came to its position in the 'Western community'. As Köprülü put it in 1952, 'As long as the Middle East is not stable, Europe will not feel stable either. Turkey's role is to facilitate cooperation between this region and the West, for the development and defence of the Middle East.'[33] This ambivalence caused the insensitivity with which the DP responded to objections raised by newly decolonised Arab states to the Baghdad Pact. Even those Turkish diplomats who acknowledged the Arabs' subjection to Western imperialism could not move beyond the prism of the Soviet threat in official discourse, attributing Egypt's

[33] Köprülü, *Cumhuriyet*, 15.1.52.

rejection of the pact to rivalry with Baghdad for Arab hegemony.[34] There was a contradiction between the DP's early claims of intentions to improve Turkish–Arab relations and its later attacks on the sincerity of Arab states' calls for independence. This position was ultimately counterproductive, as it cemented the limitations on the Arab expansion of the pact. As Aykan puts it, 'The Baghdad Pact, originally intended to be a bridge, became a mirror instead, reflecting that chasm' between Turkey and the Arabs.[35]

In Egypt, the dilemma recurred in various forms throughout 1955. First, the Baghdad Pact was launched as the latest Western security framework for the region, and was visibly sponsored by Egypt's former colonial overlord, Britain. The CCR's dilemma consisted in membership bringing unacceptable infringements on Egyptian sovereignty, and non-membership depriving it of foreign assistance for development. Furthermore, mere non-membership would not neutralise the pact's threat to Arab sovereignty, as it was being promoted regionally. The dilemma intensified when the February 1955 Gaza Raid underlined the Israeli threat to Egyptian-Arab sovereignty, while the USA kept foreign assistance conditional on an Arab–Israeli settlement. The Free Officers realised their inability to confront this with Egypt's limited state capacity and levels of development at the time.

To mitigate the dilemma, the CCR added the negative goal of containing the pact to its positive policy on pan-Arabist alliances. Addressing the dilemma on the ground in Gaza, the Egyptian leadership played off hostile powers once again, counterbalancing Britain, and its proposal for the pact with the USA, through engagement with its proposals for indirect talks with Israel. Nasser also decided to sponsor Palestinian guerrilla operations, a method of armed resistance which Egypt's relatively limited resources could support. This reinforced, and was buoyed by, the success of pan-Arabist nation making efforts, and the degree to which popular mobilisation generated regional leverage

[34] Aptülahat Akşin, *Türkiye'nin 1945'den Sonraki Dış Politika Gelişmeleri – Orta-Doğu Meseleri*, Istanbul: Akgün Matbaacılık ve Kitapçılık Müessesesi, 1959, pp. 67–8, 102, 107; Ismail Soysal, 'Political Relations between Turkey and Egypt in the Last Sixty-Two Years', *Studies on Turkish–Arab Relations*, Annual of the Foundation for Studies on Turkish–Arab Relations, Istanbul: Cihan, 1987, p. 52.

[35] Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Turkey's Role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference: 1960–1992: The Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage*, New York: Vantage Press, 1994, p. 43.

for Nasser. This linkage policy allowed Egypt sufficient regional and international leverage to contain Arab and American membership of the pact by December 1955.

The Gaza attack propelled Egypt's neutralist policy to its 'positive' conclusion, through relations with African and Asian leaders at the Bandung Conference, in whom Nasser found partners in Egypt's anti-imperialist stances and the opportunity to seek arms from the Eastern bloc. The Egyptian leadership's adoption of positive neutralism, asserting the right to exercise sovereign choices in the international arena, was closely related to the need for assistance with the developmental dimensions of the nation making project, as well as with the Israeli threat. The regional popularity of Nasser's arms purchase, and his ongoing mobilisation of Arab audiences against the pact, not only attracted Soviet interest in Egypt, but also American acquiescence in its arms deal, followed by a Western offer to fund the Aswan Dam project. The Egyptian leadership had again employed the tactic of linkages, whereby its mobilisation in the regional theatre generated the international leverage with which it could attract both developmental and military assistance for national goals.

In this second phase, Egypt's role as a vanguard for other Arab states' liberation – 'a magnet' – had been confirmed, but also modified. Firstly, its ability to rally other Arab states had been challenged and now relied increasingly on the mobilisation of a popular Arab constituency, and not only addresses to Arab leaderships. Secondly, its sovereign independence was recognised as needing constant protection from a range of hostile external players. This was facilitated by the transformation of neutralism from the manipulation of internal Western bloc differences to the manipulation of the conflict *between* West and East. Egypt's stance in the Cold War thus evolved, not from a judgement on the superpower conflict itself, but rather from the pursuit of national and pan-Arabist considerations. Thirdly, Egypt's role took on the responsibility of the Palestine issue increasingly after 1955.

The third instance of the Democrats' sovereignty–development dilemma occurred in 1957, as Turkey's economic crisis deepened. The Turkish leadership remained unable to generate sufficient funds to re-energise its developmental project, nor to secure US accession to the Baghdad Pact, with the potential for increased assistance this carried. The legitimacy of Turkey's Western-oriented discourse was eroded by this lack of material and institutional support.

The Democrats' response was to further coordinate the two policies, through a diversion of international attention to Turkey's regional role, via the Syrian Crisis. The linkage between Turkey's international and national policy was thus enhanced by its behaviour on the regional level.

This approach was pursued after the unveiling of the Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957. Turkish leaders focused their efforts on claims about the spread of communism in Syria, playing on American fears and presenting Turkey as uniquely capable of dealing with this threat. Their aim was to re-engage American attention, thus generating its increased assistance with Turkey's development projects, a direct security assurance to Turkey and enhanced credibility for official discourses on Turkey's Western affiliation. The 1958 stabilisation package and 1959 Cooperation Agreement were the culminations of these efforts, and provided much-needed material support to Democrat narratives on westernisation. The dilemma did not vanish, but linkage tactics had alleviated its acuteness by the late 1950s.

The events of 1956–8 saw the final stages of the entrenchment of Turkey's status as spokesman of the West to the East, in that Turkey could now denounce a neighbour as communist and spark superpower tensions, however restrained. It also showed that options for Turkey had narrowed still further since the mid-1950s: the Baghdad Pact, previously an instrument, had become an end in itself, which needed to be preserved. The Syrian Crisis was ultimately engineered to induce American membership of the pact, and therefore support for Turkey. When this was not forthcoming, however, Turkey was happy to comply with the new American plan for bilateralism. With the changes of patterns of consumption, migration and employment, as well as perception this caused, controversial or welcome, the legacy of this transformation would resound for decades to come. Still, in 1957 Menderes repeated the notion that Turkey would be transformed into a 'little America' within thirty years.[36]

The last instances of the dilemma considered in the Egyptian case occurred during 1956–7, in the Suez and Syrian crises. At the start of

[36] *Zafer*, 21.10.7 in Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve Ideolojisi*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970, p. 143. See Reşat Kasaba, 'Populism and Democracy in Turkey, 1946–1961', in Ellis Goldberg, Kasaba and Joel Migdal eds., *Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993, p. 51.

1956, as Plan Omega was put in place, American financial assistance to Egypt's development projects was gradually frozen, and its flow made conditional on cooperation with US security programmes. In late 1956, Israel, Britain and France added to the Egyptian leadership's dilemma with their joint attack, an affront to Egyptian and Arab sovereignty which Nasser had to resist with limited state capacity, since the military had not yet had time to adjust to the recent Soviet arms shipments. In 1957, the dilemma tightened again after the Eisenhower Doctrine highlighted Washington's hostility to the Egyptian revolution and as American efforts to erode Egypt's Arab bloc intensified.

Each of Nasser's responses – nationalising the Suez Canal Company, fighting the Suez War and taking initiative during the Syrian Crisis – demonstrated his efforts to coordinate different nation making elements further. The Egyptian leadership played off the superpowers through positive neutralist tactics at the international level, and mobilised regional support through its pan-Arabist campaign at the regional level. Meanwhile, the national developmental project was propelled by resources from both superpowers, as well as increased self-reliance, while pan-Arabist mobilisation gained in legitimacy and now inspired voluntary support across the Arab world. These linkage tactics and coordinated policies generated the leverage necessary to cushion Egypt through each dilemma, if not resolve them fully, in view of the increasing hostility of external players and Egypt's limited capacity as a decolonising, developing state.

By the third phase, Egypt had stepped up to the 'role in search of a hero' that Nasser had anticipated in *The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Nasser's framing of the nationalisation, as well as resistance in the Suez War, as Arab victories bolstered his discourses of Arab national belonging among ever broader constituencies. In 1958, Egypt was the undisputed champion of the role of pivotal Arab state and liberation vanguard. This role crystallised with the adulation Nasser received after Suez and with the founding of the United Arab Republic (UAR). This role also brought with it profound vulnerability: firstly, Nasser's pan-Arabist nation making subjected him to the classic entrapment paradigm in which popular policies both empower and shackle their source. In both the Syrian Crisis and union episodes, Nasser had to intervene, and live up to

wider Arab expectations, in two crises which were not of his own making.[37]

Changing Roles, Shaping Outcomes

The DP era saw a transformation in which the US model was to take the place previously occupied by Europe, in nationalist narratives and praxis and in their international expression. The description of Turkish foreign policy given by Küneralp is indicative:

> The cardinal principle of our foreign policy at the time was reliance on the West. During those years, the West was, above all, America. In every field the West was on our side and we on hers. She was our chief trading partner, she provided our military equipment … the source of all aid was America. Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine, NATO, CENTO, OECD – the aid that was extended to us under all these doctrines and within all these organizations was either of American origin or came at America's instigation. Certainly America did not do this for the sake of our beautiful eyes. It suited her purpose to keep us on our feet; her support suited our purpose. Were we an American satellite? No … it was a case of conformity of interests. It fitted the nature of things. America was far away, Russia was close at hand. America was our natural ally.[38]

Similarly, the Democrats sustained their self-image as distinct from the Middle East, and their distrust of the Arabs, in their policy practice. Ultimately, the role which the Democrats were fashioning over the decade was one of Western spokesman *to* – and not in – the Middle East. In the cooperative contexts of regional defence, the Democrats preferred to keep a distance from most of the Arabs throughout the 1950s, with the exception of those who, like the Turks, declared an affinity with the West. Rather than this shifting in the latter half of the decade, the Democrats had to suspend their preferences for some years after NATO accession was tied to the MEC, before returning to the *status quo ante* once American circumstances dictated so.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that, although Turkey was participating in regional defence schemes thought up variously by Britain, the USA and France, its active efforts shaped the fate of each of these ventures markedly. Moreover, the Democrat leaders' motives

[37] Nasser, Heikal Interview, 8.9.57; AP Interview, 27.9.57.
[38] Küneralp, *Just a Diplomat*, pp. 71–2.

in doing so related to Turkey itself, and to the conditions of development left by a declining empire, which they sought to overturn through a westernisation drive. After securing NATO accession against some significant odds, Democrat leaders manoeuvred Turkey to the fore of the NATO allies' plans for regional defence, and contributed to their loss of interest in their original plans for MEC and MEDO. Nevertheless, at times, the Democrats derived benefit from Turkey's ambivalent geography, and played up their position as a bridge of understanding, or as local experts, at times of regional conflict. The promotion of the Baghdad Pact was subsequently directed in great part by the Democrats' own initiatives, in this spirit. Meanwhile, the Syrian Crisis may have taken on the appearance of a Cold War battle by proxy, between two satellites, but its origins reveal that it was driven by regional actors, and most notably Turkey, productively linking the regional and international fields of its foreign policy. The Turkish case provides strong evidence for a conclusion affirming the agency of newly independent states, and their ability – contrary to conventional accounts – to shape regional outcomes and international players' policies.

Egypt's neutralism has been disputed as an effective tool for a small power in crisis, ultimately forcing it to seek refuge with one particular superpower and compromise on reconciling sovereignty and development.[39] Yet the careful balancing which Nasser effected in the Suez and Syrian crises challenges such accounts, showing that such dilemmas could be tempered, if not fully resolved, through neutralist policy tactics. Certainly, these could never mean complete disengagement or fortification for decolonising states such as Egypt: they rather implied a constant switching between the superpowers, and a careful balance of promises and reticence with both. Egypt's positive neutralism thus allowed it a productive leverage between the superpowers, while its combination with pan-Arabist practice garnered it the regional weight with which to sustain their attention and, in the American case, to suppress some of their more hostile designs. This linkage policy generated funds for development and increasing currency for pan-Arabism in its projects. It bought valuable time for plans that aimed to move at breakneck speed.

[39] Muhammad Sayed-Ahmed, *Nasser and American Foreign Policy, 1952–1956*, London: Laam, 1989, p. 143.

As with the Turkish case, but through very different means, the Egyptian case affirms the conclusion that newly independent states with an imperial past can exercise substantial agency in policymaking in pursuit of their own goals and purposes. Facing the recurrent dilemma between sovereignty and development, they were often reactive. However, as Free Officer Amin Huwaydi put it, the 'ability to react embraces the will to act': these reactions were consistently guided by a longer term, revisionist project.[40] The pragmatism of Nasser's approach was informed by an emphasis on 'fitness for purpose' in the specific Egyptian and Arab contexts throughout, conducting policy to 'suit our situation'.[41] This intention, and the freedom of manoeuvre which Egypt managed to increase, made for substantial Egyptian influence over outcomes in the Middle East during the early Cold War.

Nation Making and Legacies from the 1950s

With the military coup of May 1960, and the hanging of Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Hasan Polatkan by September 1961, the Democrats' dream seemed to have been extinguished. It was the first of a series of military interventions, and led to a new constitution and the entrenchment of the army's political role. More than fifty years later, on the coup's anniversary in May 2011, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chose to address his supporters in Aydın, Menderes' home town. The general elections were approaching, and Erdoğan made the comparisons starkly:

> Menderes turned the RPP's authoritarian regime upside down. What was his crime? He improved this country's economic, political, social and diplomatic standards, was that his crime? He won the nation's love, he left an indelible mark in the nation's hearts with his service, was that his crime? He stood up for the nation's faith . . . was that his crime?[42]

When his Justice and Development Party (JDP) won a second landslide that June, Erdoğan declared it a triumph for the spirit of Menderes.

[40] Amin Hewedy, 'Nasser and the Crisis of 1956', in William Louis and Roger Owen eds., *Suez 1956: the Crisis and its Consequences*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 165.

[41] Nasser, *Blitz* Interview, 10.3.57.

[42] Erdoğan, cited in 'Yassıada özgürlükler adası olacak', *Yeni Asır*, 27.5.2011, https://www.yeniasir.com.tr/politika/2011/05/28/erdogan-aydin-2014e-buyuksehir-olarak-girecek. Full speech available on JDP website.

A few years later, he had the island where Menderes' trial took place, Yassıada, renamed 'Democracy and Freedom Island'. What was the reason for this choice? Why had he singled out the Democrat Party for such special treatment?

In Egypt, 2011 plunged the country once again into revolutionary upheaval, this time driven by mass protest against the rule of Hosni Mubarak. On the long afternoons of early February, the cheerful refrain of a patriotic song, *Sura* ('Picture'), could be heard through loudspeakers in Cairo's iconic Tahrir Square. The song's verses, in the tones of much-loved singer Abdel Halim Hafez, captured a vivid image of a revolutionary gathering, and urged listeners not to leave the square, to stay in the picture. In fact *Sura* was written forty-five years earlier, by vernacular poet Salah Jaheen, for the 1966 anniversary celebrations of the July Revolution. *Sura* celebrated images of an 'Arab socialist' Egypt, its workers and engineers side by side, its schoolgirls learning their Arabic lessons, its soldiers carrying 'the shield of the nations'. In early 2011, these themes clearly conjured a different time: centrestage instead were the domestic problems of a people under near dynastic rule. So why was this ode to Nasser's Egypt being played in Tahrir Square?

Answering such questions sheds light on the dynamic ways in which the legacies of the 1950s have resonated in contemporary politics, as actors today make creative use of the past. While Erdoğan's references may be analysed as rather cynical electioneering tactics, they also reflect his appropriation of the centre-right tradition in Turkey, of which the DP had been formative, through its popularity and the rapid change it oversaw. Over the years, the DP's demise, in a standoff with the RPP–military coalition, had been invoked as an emblem of the perennial faultline of Turkish politics by successor parties that kept its memory alive. Erdoğan now inserted himself into Menderes' position in that standoff, and his own brand of Islamism into the centre-right space. Meanwhile, the experience of the 1950s and 1960s gave rise to the political tradition of 'Nasserism' in Egypt and across the Arab world, where there remain movements and parties that take Nasser's trajectory as an inspiration in addressing contemporary challenges, and call themselves Nasserists. Beyond these, broader coalitions of contentious political and cultural movements have invoked Nasser's legacy in opposing successor regimes on national and foreign policies. Nasser-

era references have become an evaluative standard with which to criticise the status quo.

In Turkey, the coalition that the Democrats mobilised – the rising bourgeoisie and peasants of Anatolia – continued to vote together for successive parties of the centre-right after 1960, rejecting the Kemalist formula of state nationalism. Indeed their choices were successor parties to the DP, whose leaders did not disguise this, though they had to work hard not to fall foul of the military each time. The first of these was the Justice Party (JP), whose pointedly chosen name was a comment on the Yassıada trials, and whose striking emblem was a galloping white horse, directly evoking the DP. In the 1950s, rural voters had adapted the party's name from Democrat to 'Demirkırat', the name of the iron white steed of legendary defender of the poor, Köroglu, and the image had stuck. The party motto was 'We will finish what was begun'. The JP made freedom of worship a prominent theme in the 1961 elections, alongside harsh criticism of the entitlement of the RPP.[43]

In 1965, the JP's Süleyman Demirel became premier and figurehead of the centre-right tradition well into the 1970s, even after the interruption of the 1971 coup. The JP celebrated individual enterprise, while US aid and foreign borrowing continued, as it had under the Democrats. As Kerem Öktem observes, in this period, 'the Turkish economy took on many key characteristics, which would remain for a long time to come: cyclical financial crises, devaluation of the lira, foreign debt and dependence on international agencies such as the IMF and World Bank'.[44] Meanwhile, yet again in this period, the scare tactics deployed by the JP against Bülent Ecevit's left-leaning RPP – *ortanın solu, Moskova'nın yolu* ('centre-left, Moscow's path') – were reminiscent of the nationalist McCarthyism of the 1950s.

After the more profound rupture and violence of the 1980 coup, and with the forced closure of the JP in turn, the centre-right tradition proved once again to be the electoral majority's choice, trouncing the military's preferred party in 1983. This time, however, the military had moved to a religious-nationalist formula for combating leftist challenges, which eased the rise of the Right. In fact two successor parties

[43] Kasaba, 'Populism and Democracy', pp. 64–6.
[44] Kerem Öktem, *Angry Nation: Turkey Since 1989*, London: Zed Books, 2011, p. 42.

to the JP had emerged that year: its direct heir, the True Path Party, and the related Motherland Party, brainchild of Turgut Özal. They would dominate the 1980s governments and 1990s coalitions between them.

It was Özal, however, who presided over the full integration of the Turkish economy into the global free market, through economic policy and a political discourse that valorised entrepreneurship. Özal took the Ottoman motif of regional power and repackaged it as a nationalist goal, with economic implementation: 'What is astonishing here is the enormous success of this reasoning in elevating the interests of the business groups to the status of the national.'[45] Though this new direction saw the state economic enterprises (*kamu iktisadi teşekkülleri*) that had remained into the 1950s finally pulled apart, the parallels with the DP's orientations – the emphasis on economic individualism, the role of patronage politics, the readiness to adopt Western models and to present these as pathways to national progress – are sharp. Into the 1990s, when the True Path Party made a comeback, these leaders' conservative nationalist orientations were accompanied by foreign policies that made no change in Turkey's Western orientations. They featured flourishes with other echoes of the 1950s, such as Özal's strident move to support the 1991 invasion of Iraq and Tansu Çiller's raising of Turkish–Israeli relations to unprecedented levels of military cooperation.

The new millennium saw yet another victory for the centre-right in Turkey, followed by three majority wins that vividly recalled, and recently even surpassed, the DP's record. Of course, the JDP was a successor not of the Motherland Party but of the Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan, which hailed from the Islamist Milli Görüş tradition and had been closed after the 1997 soft coup. Erdoğan had taken a step outside his Milli Görüş heritage when he formed the JDP, shrewdly moving to occupy the centre-right political space.[46] Indeed it was the Democrats' policy of opening Imam-Hatip religious schools that allowed a young Tayyip Erdoğan to study his preferred curriculum, and he and his cadres had often publicly identified with the struggle of the DP trajectory. During their rise to power in the early

[45] Yüksel Taşkın, 'Hegemonizing Conservative Democracy and the Problems of Democratization in Turkey: Conservatism without Democrats?', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2013, p. 297. See also Öktem, *Angry Nation*, p. 67.

[46] Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*, Stanford University Press, 2009.

2000s, they were frequently asked about their religious roots and positions on Turkish *laiklik*, at which questions Erdoğan and senior JDP figures Abdullah Gül and Ahmet Davutoğlu would insistently call themselves 'conservative democrats'. The JDP preserved the economic mission of the centre-right, and added civilisational and religious overtones to it, inspiring the 'Islamic Calvinist' epithet in accounts of the Anatolian Tigers phenomenon. Surveying economic growth in cities like Denizli, Kayseri, Konya and Gaziantep, now there really did seem to be 'a millionaire in every neighbourhood'. The parallels, real and invoked, became stronger as Erdoğan clashed repeatedly with the army and appeared to win, most recently surviving a coup attempt in 2016 which he compared vociferously with the May 1960 process.

At the time of writing, however, it appears that the JDP's colonisation of the centre-right space is now all but complete, and that new faultlines are being forged in Turkey. When Erdoğan colourfully commemorated Atatürk's death in November 2017, after years of downplaying Atatürk's example in public spaces and in education curricula, he appeared to signal the appropriation of the great Gazi's memory in turn. As one *Sabah* columnist crowed:

> Today, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan walks in the footsteps of Atatürk … Today, Erdoğan is the leader who has pushed Turkey into the 21st century as the 17th leading economy in the world … Atatürk's goal of pushing Turkey above the level of the other civilizations of the world will be fulfilled by the year 2023, the 100th anniversary of the Republic.[47]

In tandem with this, Erdoğan's unilateralism and hostile anti-American discourse has led many to observe that he is in the process of terminating Turkey's longstanding Euro-Atlantic partnerships. Despite the JDP's professed intention for a zero-problems neighbourhood and diversified foreign policy, Turkey's shifting alliances – particularly in the context of the Syrian war and its own war on the Kurds – have shaken its relationship with the United States profoundly. Turkey's foothold in NATO had been the vital premise for all the manoeuvring and plays for soft power that Erdoğan had been able to make in recent years. Without the firm establishment of his Western base, his outreach to the Palestinians, to Iran, and even to

[47] Ilnur Çevik, 'Erdoğan Follows in the Footsteps of Atatürk', *Daily Sabah*, 10.11.17: www.dailysabah.com/columns/ilnur-cevik/2017/11/10/erdogan-follows-in-the-footsteps-of-ataturk.

Russia in the recent past, would all have had much less effect on their audiences. In this, it is not hard to see again the echoes of the DP's utilisation of Middle East policy to enhance its leverage with the NATO bloc. However, as republican Turkey moves towards its centenary, its disengagement from Western multilateral institutions is growing. After six decades of influence, Erdoğan's advance may well herald the final collapse of the Democrat deal.

On the other side of this polarisation, the DP's choices profoundly influenced the military institution, the Republican Party and leftist trends in Turkey. The connection with NATO grew from strength to strength, differences over Cyprus notwithstanding, and the fighting capacities of the army grew. Beyond this, however, the senior command moved to entrench their position politically and economically. The new Constitution was written by left-leaning constitutional jurists, who established the National Security Council (NSC): from its composition in 1961, it moved through the 1973 constitutional amendments and 1982 Constitution to increased military representation and to the priority of their recommendations over those of the cabinet.[48] Alongside the NSC, the Army Mutual Assistance Association, known in Turkish as OYAK, was also set up and attached to the Ministry of Defence. OYAK drew on officers' salaries to invest in economic ventures, sharing the benefits in loans and discounted goods. As Feroz Ahmed put it, 'The military had become the guardians of a system of burgeoning capitalism . . .' As centre-right governments came and went, the seemingly relentless repetition of variations of the DP–state clash resulted in this hardening of positions in the military.

By contrast, the DP's hyperbolic enthusiasm for the United States seemed to nuance the opposition's approaches to both developmental and foreign policy, and had helped spur a left turn within the RPP after 1965. Particularly after the disappointment at the US position on Cyprus, a serious reckoning was made across Turkish foreign policy debates and the decision to diversify taken. This said, however, the RPP's enduring concerns remained with Western institutions, most notably the European Union accession process, and it has shown markedly little interest in understanding the politics of its neighbours to the east, even as they relate to Turkey's Kurdish issue.

[48] Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, 'The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 2, January 1997, p. 157.

Finally, the increasing authoritarianism of the DP towards the end, coupled with their strict pro-Western stance, fuelled progressive and leftist student movements of the late 1950s which grew stronger in the 1960s. These formed the more radical wing of the opposition to the centre-right, and can be compared with the youth movements that protested against Erdoğan in Gezi Park in 2013, with the important difference that the latter sought to critique Kemalist nationalism and pluralise citizenship in Turkey. The very frameworks and strictures within which these new generations have been expected to think and act politically and socially, and from which they struggled so energetically to break free, are as much relics of the Democrats' pact with NATO as they are of Atatürk's original project.

In Egypt, rather than form the basis for successive governments' national and foreign policies, the example of the Nasser era became the inspiration and adopted framework for many in the opposition. With Nasser's death in 1970, and the succession of Free Officer Anwar Sadat to the presidency, Egypt was to see a gradual but firm undoing of much of the social content and statist direction of Nasser's developmental policies, as well as a move towards alignment with the United States and a peace treaty with Israel. Sadat's nationalist commitments differed from those of Nasser: he did not view Egypt's sovereignty, development and progress as entwined with those of its Arab and African neighbours, and he believed a solid alliance with the USA was the optimal response to Egypt's predicament after 1967. Sadat's successor in 1981, Hosni Mubarak, was president for three decades and made few substantial changes to these policy directions.

Such dramatic turnarounds precipitated a series of protests of differing scales, from the university sit-ins of 1972–3 to the 'bread uprising' of industrial workers and public sector employees in 1977. These contentious actors often made reference to the principles and precedents of the Nasser era, in a lexicon of protest which many now dubbed 'Nasserist'. Among the protesters' grievances were the breakdown of the social contract, Egypt's new alliance with Washington, and its turn away from the Arab world.

A related, less diffuse group soon expressed their relationship with the Nasser era in a formalised way, both in intellectual exchange and political activity. This included former Nasser-era elites, and a younger generation that had engaged with the Arab Socialist Union's Youth Organisation. After Sadat opened up the ASU to plural platforms in

1975, these groups were not allowed to attain legal political representation as Nasserists. Many joined the officially leftist National Progressive Unionist Party, and from there worked in coalitions.[49] Only under Mubarak, once the Sadatist formula appeared to have succeeded, were Nasserist parties licensed: the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party (ADNP) in 1992 and the al-Karama ('Dignity') Party in 1997. Meanwhile young 'neo-Nasserists' also championed Nasser's legacy, but sought to surpass the old centralised state context and to demand democratic freedoms and political rights. They participated in anniversary conferences and studies convened by pan-Arabist political association inside and outside Egypt, or else in independent, often clandestine commemorations.[50] In these fora, they attempted to find new applications for Nasserism in debates on the contemporary challenges of development, democracy and Arab disunity.

These groups' ability to imagine Egypt's return to an activist Arab policy was increasingly contained by state policy, however, and the priority seemed to lie in challenging corruption and inequality. There was little talk of an Arab state: the ANDP manifesto spoke of 'Arab economic integration' instead. The meaning of anti-Zionism was also reconfigured from a call to arms into the practice of opposing normalisation with Israel. In 1987 and again in 2000, Nasserist groups helped form the Egyptian National Committee in Support of the Palestinian Uprising, but at neither time was participation beyond relief convoys and diplomatic efforts seriously proposed.

Nasserism continued to manifest as a protest repertoire throughout the years leading up to the 2011 revolutionary outbreak. A prominent example was the role of al-Karama and Nasserist leader Kamal Abu-'Aita in leading the 2007 real-estate tax collectors' strikes to form the first independent union.[51] These protests, which spread across sectors from 2006 to 2009, did not demand the restoration of Nasserist corporatism, however, but insisted on the principles of workers' empowerment and social justice which they associated with the July

[49] Raymond Baker, *Sadat and After: the Struggle for Egypt's Political Soul*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. 108–10.
[50] Ibid., p. 111.
[51] Jean Lachapelle, 'Lessons from Egypt's Tax Collectors', *Middle East Report*, *No*. 264, 2012.

Revolution era.[52] After the 2003 Iraq War protests, popular rejection of Mubarak's foreign policies gave way to a demand for domestic regime change.[53] The neo-Nasserists partnered with socialists and Islamist reformists to form the first group to contest the regime directly, namely the 'Egyptian Movement for Change' or *Kifaya* ('Enough') coalition of 2004.[54] Its founding statement made no mention of Nasserism but voiced pan-Arabist goals reminiscent of the discourse of the 1950s.

It was therefore a mark of some continuity when *Sura* was heard playing in Tahrir Square in 2011, whilst the slogans of that January were current and fresh. Egyptian revolutionary protests featured images, slogans and music from the 1950s, but made thoroughly new demands. Indeed, during the initial eighteen days, many unorganised protesters used Nasser-era symbols as recognised cultural frames to communicate the demand for social justice, while Nasserist Kamal Abu-'Aita led several other unions to form Egypt's first independent labour federation.[55] However, protesters used such symbols to signal new understandings of citizenship and Arab solidarity, rather than any kind of nostalgia.[56]

The popular use of Nasser-era symbols in the 2011 protests inserted them into the contest for revolutionary legitimacy in Egypt. Consequently, actors interested in containing the revolution instrumentalised homage to the July Revolution in their efforts. The clearest example of this was the effort of General-turned-President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to invoke the memory of Nasser

[52] Joel Beinin, 'Workers' Struggles under "Socialism" and "Neoliberalism"', in Rabab El-Mahdi and Philip Marfleet eds., *Egypt: the Moment of Change*, London: Zed Books, 2009, pp. 84–5; El-Mahdi, 'Labour Protests in Egypt: Causes and Meanings', *Journal of African Political Economy*, Vol. 38, No. 129, 2011, p. 392.

[53] See El-Mahdi and Marfleet, Egypt.

[54] Manar Shourbagy, 'The Egyptian Movement for Change – Kefaya: Redefining Politics in Egypt', *Public Culture*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, pp. 175–96; El-Mahdi, 'Enough! Egypt's Quest for Democracy', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 42, 2009, pp. 1011–39.

[55] Hisham Fu'ad, 'Al-'I'lan 'an Ta'sis Al-Itihad Al-Misri li-l-Niqabat al-Mustaqila' ['Declaration of the Founding of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Unions'], *Al-Ishtiraki*, 3 March 2011: http://revsoc.me/-3752.

[56] Reem Abou-El-Fadl, 'The Road to Jerusalem through Tahrir Square: Anti-Zionism and Palestine in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2012, pp. 6–26.

explicitly in his campaign for election in 2014. He was running against well-known neo-Nasserist Hamdin Sabbahi, who had risen as a voice of the January revolutionary demands and come third in the presidential race of 2012. Rivalling interpretations of the Nasserist tradition featured in their competition, as al-Sisi emphasised the dangers of the Muslim Brotherhood, while Sabbahi raised difficult questions about the economy and Israel. Once elected president, al-Sisi would frequently recall the vocabulary of 'foreign threats' and 'Arab unity' in his crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, and his alliance with some Gulf states against them, respectively. Preserving such signifiers while so markedly changing the signified – forging alliances with the most conservative of Arab monarchies, and raising security and economic cooperation with Israel – has rung hollow for many.

Today, international politics are differently configured, and power balances in national fields are undergoing transformation since the Arab uprisings. Yet the pursuit of nationalist commitments continues to animate political debate and practices in Turkey and Egypt, and these have roots both in the post-independence era and in the nineteenth-century confrontations with European empires. When nation making is discussed in the Middle East, there is little doubt about the centrality of Gamal Abdel Nasser, but in Turkey, he is compared with Kemal Atatürk and not Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes. Yet beyond the iconoclasm of the Kemalist period, the changes made to Turkish foreign policy under the Democrats proved enduring, and the broad formula of nation making that drove this returned time and again by the ballot box. Meanwhile, the elite-focused accounts that declared the demise of Nasserism have been challenged almost as often as has the status quo in contemporary Egypt, as so many contentious political activities have lauded or instrumentalised the principles of the July Revolution's nation making project. In both countries, the debate surrounding any purported change in foreign policy 'axis' is invariably accompanied by reflections on incumbents' national projects and citizens' narratives of belonging. A critical chapter in this debate was written in the 1950s: it will have many more readings yet.

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